

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

1914—1925

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BY

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TO
THE PRESIDENT AND FACULTY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
WITH AFFECTION AND RESPECT

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PREFACE

In the twelve years which followed the opening of the Great War Europe has made memorable strides towards a peaceful and just international system. All the German possessions on the left bank of the Rhine and on the right bank for a depth of 31 miles are demilitarised by the Treaty of Versailles. The Locarno Agreements have stabilised the eastern frontier of France, and have removed Alsace and Lorraine from the areas of international rivalry. The suppressed nationalities of Europe have been released, and now form independent States or have joined their parent stems. The Little Entente has contributed to the stability of these new frontiers in Central Europe. The League of Nations watches over the territorial integrity of States, and is a standing organisation of the higher diplomacy for peacefully settling international disputes. The Permanent Court of International Justice is steadily building up a Jurisprudence which is bound to command more and more confidence as the world goes on. Racial feeling, although still a disturbing thing, is undoubtedly less acute than it was in the last half of the nineteenth century. Armies are too large, but Germany has already disarmed ; other countries cannot permanently resist the wishes and conscience of enlightened mankind.

In one respect the European system has taken a step backwards. Tariffs are more numerous and are higher than they were throughout the nineteenth century. One of the next great tasks of European statesmanship will be to negotiate inter-state tariff agreements and customs-unions. Agreements made in accordance with the Treaties of 1919 and subsequently, for free transit of goods across several frontiers, are helping to knit Europe together economically. The International Labour Office, by the collection and dissemination of information, and by the negotiation of agreements, is helping onward a movement towards international economic co-operation.

It cannot be denied that many and urgent causes of international

conflict remain, but at any rate means for equitably and peacefully settling them exist and are ready to hand. In spite of the division of the world into sovereign States, there is an international opinion, recognised as not incompatible with patriotism. Civilised mankind is ready for peace, and is ready to be guided.

Guidance, statesmanship, are more necessary than ever, for the world is still hovering on the verge of an age of peace.

In the nineteenth century there were some upheavals, of which the most disturbing was the Revolution of 1848, and some wars of ambition, of which the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-German War of 1870 were the most disastrous. Yet as a whole the political edifice was maintained in stability by the Concert of Europe, which was based, partly at least, on the mutual understanding of sovereigns. The Letters of Queen Victoria are full of graphic illustrations of the solidarity of the sovereign caste.

What Gulielmo Ferrero has called the International of Courts has disappeared. "That order was a unique prodigy of history."¹ The statesmen who are entrusted by the public with the conduct of affairs must now alone carry the responsibility which formerly they shared with their sovereigns. If they can lead, the world will follow :

Tho' much is taken, much abides, and tho'
They are not now the strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which they are they are.

R. B. MOWAT.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE,

OXFORD.

January, 1927.

Note.—I take this opportunity of acknowledging my debt to the Editor of *Discovery* for his courtesy in allowing me to reproduce the substantial portion of two articles in Chapter XI.

¹ "An International that has disappeared," by G. Ferrero, *The Illustrated London News*, Aug. 16, 1924, pp. 314, 336.

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A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY, 1914—1925

CHAPTER I

THE PACT OF LONDON

L'Europe s'en va—Europe disappears—said Mallet du Pan in 1792 when the French Revolutionary War broke out and put an end to a peace which had endured in Central and Western Europe for thirty years. There were many people who again felt that Europe was disappearing, when the invasion of Belgium on August 4, 1914, made a general European War certain. For over forty years the Powers of Europe, veritable nations in arms, had watched each other apprehensively across the masked fortifications of their carefully guarded frontiers. Sometimes people vaguely wondered what would happen when these powerful armies, aided by all the incalculable, terrible, unexpected resources of modern science, were launched against each other. As a rule, however, the European public, quite sensibly, did not trouble itself with speculations of future terrible times which, after all, might never occur. Their statesmen, too, behaved much as the peoples did: they were content with doing their daily work, with settling, somehow, each crisis as it arose, and hoping that the next crisis would also be settled. Doubtless some cold, analytical soldiers in the General Staffs looked unblinkingly at the possible developments of warfare in a European crisis. But outside military circles, once the war had started, the prevailing feeling was of a future desperately uncertain. Only one thing was assured, namely that the old order in Europe had collapsed. Germany had "challenged practically the whole of Europe to submit to her dictation and had set in motion her mighty military machinery."¹

¹ *New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1914, p. 12.

For the next four years there was nothing for international officialdom to do. By "international officialdom" is meant those public servants who, although employed and paid by their own particular Governments, really spend most of their time in adjusting the affairs of Europe (including their own State) for the common good of all. Such international officials are the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and the high diplomatists of the Great Powers. Their routine work, their common daily task, is what they do for their own State; anything outside routine is, in normal times, of international value, and goes to strengthen the comity of nations. The Great War, however, was one in which all the resources of each belligerent were involved: there was no margin of safety; defeat meant, quite possibly, destruction and disappearance off the map of Europe. The universal principle of political action was *sauve qui peut*: and the sole business of every statesman and diplomatist was simply to do the best that he could for his country, by using its resources with the greatest effect, and by arranging the most expedient combinations with other States.

The combatants entered into the momentous struggle with diplomatic engagements of a simple nature. Germany and Austria—the "Central Powers," as they came to be known—were bound together by the terms of the Dual Alliance of October 7, 1879. They were engaged to come to each other's assistance if one of them was attacked by Russia.¹ By the year 1914 the text of this treaty had been public for twenty-five years. It was an enduring diplomatic instrument. Under its terms, supplemented by certain additional agreements during the course of the War, Austria and Germany fought side by side until November, 1918.

The Germans also hoped, but probably scarcely expected, that the Triple Alliance would bring the Italian Government into the War on the side of the Central Powers. This famous treaty had long intrigued the minds of European statesmen outside the *Triplice*, and of the public. It was secret and its terms had never been divulged; the shrewdest guesses made by competent writers and politicians had elicited neither affirmation nor denial. The people who were cognisant of its terms—the number of such people must have been fairly large since its inception in 1882—behaved with perfect discretion. Everybody therefore outside the Central

¹ Text in Fribram: *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary* (1925), I, 25. Cp. Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914* (1923), p. 239.

Powers was relieved (although their curiosity was not satisfied) when the Marquis di San Giuliano declared (August 1, 1914), on behalf of the Italian Government, that Italy was not engaged to fight by the Triple Alliance because this was not a defensive war.¹

The extent to which Germany had received engagements from the Turkish Government before the War is still not precisely known. Probably there were none before the now celebrated convention of August 2, 1914, but "negotiations had been in progress long before the war."² General Liman von Sanders had been brought with a military mission to Turkey in December, 1913, and had been given command of the First Army Corps which protected and controlled Constantinople.³ Djemal in his *Memoirs* acknowledges that by the end of the Second Balkan War, the Young Turks had made up their minds that the Entente was their enemy and that Germany was their friend.⁴

On the Entente side (soon to be generally known as the Allies) there were a number of engagements which, however, did not provide any satisfactory means of waging war in common. There were three precise agreements: the Franco-Russian, the Anglo-Japanese and the Anglo-Portuguese. The Franco-Russian Treaty of 1894 was, like the Triple Alliance, secret. Its contents were not made public until 1917. It engaged France and Russia to employ all their available resources in aid of each other if either of them were attacked by Germany.⁵

When Germany declared war upon Russia on August 1, 1914, France was automatically brought into the hostilities by the engagements of 1894. Of the other two treaties, one—the Anglo-Japanese—bound these Powers to aid each other with their whole resources, if either were attacked by two or more States. The other treaty—the Anglo-Portuguese—was an engagement of mutual defence, contracted in the year 1661.⁶ It had stood the test of the Napoleonic War, and, except during the Miguelite troubles of 1826-34 had slumbered peacefully since then. Neither the Anglo-

¹ Grey to Bertie, Aug. 3, 1914, in *Collected Diplomatic Documents* (1915), p. 106.

² Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman*, p. 107.

³ *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (1919), p. 41.

⁴ Djemal, *op. cit.*, p. 69; Grey, *Twenty-five Years* (1925), I, 128.

⁵ Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy*, p. 253.

⁶ Portugal readily acknowledged her obligation under the "ancient alliance" when the war broke out (*New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1914, p. 6).

Japanese nor the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty would have mattered if Great Britain had not come into the War. By what other engagements was Great Britain bound?

The answer to this question is absolutely certain. Great Britain was bound by no engagements either to France or Russia. The Entente of 1904 regulated Franco-British relations with regard to Egypt, Morocco and Newfoundland. The Russo-British Entente of 1907 regulated the relations of Great Britain and Russia regarding Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Obvious causes of friction being thus removed between Great Britain and France, and Great Britain and Russia, there was nothing to impede a good understanding between them—which is all that an Entente Cordiale means. This Entente, naturally, implied that Great Britain, France and Russia would consider favourably any suggestion for mutual support in a European crisis: it was based on the idea that the interests of the three Powers were, in international affairs, substantially the same. Thus Sir Edward Grey was able to state with complete accuracy and truth, in his celebrated speech of August 3, 1914, that the Entente constituted a “diplomatic group,” nothing more and nothing less.

As it was likely, according to the Entente, that the three Powers would act together diplomatically, and might even undertake joint military operations, it was the duty of the General Staffs of each country to provide for such a possible eventuality. General Staffs, in the depths of their bureaux, are constantly preparing plans to meet the chances of an unknown future: the plans—many of which are quite incompatible with each other—cannot in any sense be considered to constitute either a contract or a promise. Any conversations undertaken by members of the British and French General Staffs could only have a dynamic result if the British and French Cabinets decided to co-operate in a war. That both Governments reserved their freedom to make such a decision or not was explicitly stated in identic notes written by M. Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey on November 22 and 23, 1912.¹ That conversations between British and French, Russian and Belgian Staff officers took place is now perfectly well known. But that the hypothetical arrangements resulting from those

¹ Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, I, 83, 94-8, and 286-7, where he criticises the use made of the word “conventions” in Siebert and Schreiner’s *Entente Diplomacy and the World*, p. 78.

conversations were "conventions," although sometimes loosely alluded to as such by Russian diplomatists, is quite untrue.

In his memoirs written ten years later, Sir Edward Grey is even more explicit. He says :

The honourable understanding between myself and Cambon was very clear, and it was that nothing that passed between French and British military authorities was to entail or imply any obligation whatever on either Government. It was an understanding that was honourably kept even in the week of anxiety and distress before the outbreak of war in 1914.

Nevertheless the Entente so knit at least Great Britain and France together in sympathy and interest that Great Britain was morally bound and, as a self-respecting country, absolutely certain, to give active aid to France in a European crisis.¹ The only question which the Entente left uncertain was how soon Great Britain would afford help : but that she would give help sooner or later was certain. France, in the British interest as much as her own, had concentrated her fleet in the Mediterranean, thus enabling Great Britain to leave that sea lightly patrolled by the Royal Navy and to concentrate her Grand Fleet, where it was wanted, in the North Sea. But by concentrating her warships in the Mediterranean, France had denuded her defences in the Atlantic and the Channel. How could Great Britain (such was the argument of Sir Edward Grey in his speech of August 3) expect France to go on defending the Mediterranean and to leave her western and northern coasts "absolutely undefended"? France, he said, was "entitled to know" what Great Britain meant to do. The least we could do was to undertake that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power." This was the undertaking which Sir Edward Grey gave to the French Ambassador on Sunday, August 2. Such an undertaking was almost certain to lead to naval and military support of France by Great Britain. It is true that the German Government promised not to attack the coasts of France on condition that Great Britain remained neutral. But unless France had quickly succumbed to the German onslaught, the exigencies of war would almost certainly have led the German fleet to attack the French northern coast. In this case they would

¹ Cp. the famous Minute of Sir Eyre Crowe, July 24, 1914, in No. 101, pp. 81-2, of *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, Vol. XI (1926).

have been resisted by the British navy. This would be war. As therefore the existence of the Entente did make certain a more or less speedy co-operation of Great Britain and France it is a great pity that a formal alliance was not made and published in the years before the War. For then Germany would have known that, if she attacked France, Great Britain would be in the war *from the start*. Such knowledge might have deterred the German Government from embarking on war. As things were, she could hope that Great Britain, although certain to join in the hostilities, would join too late. Admiral Mahan, one of the most penetrating and philosophical of historians, stated on August 3: "In my judgment a right appreciation of the situation should determine Great Britain to declare war at once, otherwise her Entente engagements, whatever the letter, will be in spirit violated, and she will earn the distrust of all probable future allies."¹ (Great Britain had already made up her mind and acted according to the spirit of the Entente.

The famous Five Power Treaty of London, April 19, 1839, cannot be considered as a general diplomatic instrument binding the Allies together. It was of the highest importance as deciding the actual moment when Great Britain should declare war. Without the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality the British Government would have gone on hesitating for days, weeks, even perhaps (although this seems scarcely likely) for months.² But when the German army invaded Belgium, Great Britain was bound to make war there and then. The Treaty also was responsible for the Belgian resistance to the Germans.. Article 7 of the Annex incorporated in the Treaty bound Belgium to "observe" her neutrality. Without this legal obligation nobody would have blamed Belgium if she had chosen to tread the primrose path of peace rather than to offer resistance to the devastating wrath of the monster of German militarism.

What might be called the "Diplomatic Front" of the Allies was, as a whole, a rather makeshift affair for the first month of the War. Their diplomatists, however, were not idle. By September 5 all was ready for the signature of the consolidating act without which it is futile for separate Governments to try

¹ *Times*, August 5, 1914.

² This is Lord Grey's opinion: *Twenty-five Years*, I, 285. Grey was prepared to resign on the issue of helping France.

and wage war in common. The Pact of London signed by Grey, Paul Cambon and Benckendorff on behalf of Great Britain, France and Russia on September 5 engaged those three countries "not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other allies." Japan acceded to the Pact on October 19, 1915. Her position was rather delicate: the British Government felt bound to inform her that, while her help was welcome, "her action must be limited and her prospective acquisition of German territory must not extend beyond certain bounds." It was necessary to make this clear on account of the susceptibilities of Australia and New Zealand, and also of the United States, with regard to Japan's aims in the Pacific¹

"The Agreement signed with France and Russia on September 5, 1914, was represented as evidence of British policy to bind her allies to keep up to the mark."² As a matter of fact, it was France and Russia who had pressed Great Britain to sign the Agreement. German propaganda tried to make out that the Pact was a device whereby the British Government rigorously held the other allies in the War when they would have liked to make peace. The British Government, naturally, did not care to rebut this charge by explaining that it was Russia and France who had insisted upon the Pact; for to do so would have introduced irritation and suspicion among the Allies themselves.

A long and dolorous road had to be travelled before the terms of peace alluded to in the Pact came to be discussed. One country did actually drop out and make a separate peace. Yet the Pact endured, a symbol as well as a bond of the united wills of those Powers which stood for the maintenance of the European system and of international law.

On the whole it is scarcely to be doubted that the Allied diplomacy was superior to the German from the outset of the War. In particular the palm must be given to Sir Edward Grey. The speedy compilation and publication of the famous White Paper, issued in August, 1914,³ placed the policy of Great Britain in a clear light and created a conviction in the rightness of her actions which nothing has transpired to dim.

¹ Grey, *Twenty-five Years* (1925), II, 104.

² Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, II, 119. Cp. p. 164: "The proposal did not come from us."

³ Cmd. 7467 of 1914.

CHAPTER II

THE INTERVENTION OF TURKEY

If Great Britain had wielded the chief influence among the European Powers at Constantinople during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, she had lost it in the last quarter. Her pre-eminent position was gradually taken by Germany. The reason for this, according to Marschall von Bieberstein, (German Ambassador to the Porte from 1897 to 1912, was owing to Turkey's belief that Germany's policy was the integrity of Turkey: "hand in hand with this goes his [the Sultan's] admiration for the German army as the bulwark of authority against Radicalism and disturbance."¹ Baron Marschall did not exaggerate the influence of Germany. The reports which the British military *attaché* sent to the War Office about the same date confirm Marschall's opinion. In 1902 a German Syndicate obtained a concession to construct a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad, a good part of which was actually built by the time the Great War began. The success with which the Habsburg Monarchy was able to carry out its plan to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina alarmed the Entente Powers. It showed that the Austro-German influence at Constantinople could persuade the Turks even to abandon the suzerainty of their ancient provinces. King Edward VII took a most serious view of this. "Never did I see him so moved," wrote Lord Redesdale. Russian diplomatists felt that the "historic mission" of their country was entirely blocked by Germany.²

Cabinet Government had been established in Turkey since the Revolution of 1908. When the Great War broke out, the Cabinet was divided. The Grand Vizier, Prince Said Halim, was an old,

¹ *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, Bd. XII, teil, 2, p. 569 (Marschall to Hohenlohe, Aug. 6, 1898).

² Lord Redesdale's *Memories*, Chap. VIII, p. 178. Siebert, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Entente politik der Vorkriegsjahre* (1921), p. 294 (Nelidow to Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 2/5, 1909).

peacefully minded man. Djavid, the Finance Minister, also was, for financial reasons in favour of peace. Talaat and Enver, who in addition to their influence as officials, wielded the mysterious and unscrupulous power of the Committee of Union and Progress, were for war, on the side of Germany.

Talaat has been described as an ignorant, semi-gipsy, ex-postal official. Djemal Pasha in his *Memoirs* denies that Talaat was ever in the post office. Take Jonescu, of Rumania, in his *Memoirs* describes him as a man of decision, energy, courage, but untravelled, lacking in knowledge of the world, and, like all the Young Turks, a Chauvinist. "The blindness of that man will be fatal to Turkey."¹

When the Great War broke out, Talaat held the position of Minister of the Interior. With Enver and Djemal he dominated the Turkish Empire. Enver Pasha was more influential, if not more chauvinistic, than Talaat. He was still a comparatively young man in 1914. He was born in 1881, and until the Revolution of 1908, was little known. An English traveller in Macedonia in the late 'nineties noticed a striking-looking Captain of Rediffs at Monastir. It was Enver. In the Tripoli War Enver showed great enterprise, getting to the scene of hostilities, it is said, in disguise through Egypt and organising the defence of Tripoli for months. He was a slight, dapper figure, neatly dressed, smart—a little in the Italian hairdresser style, it was unkindly said. He sat a horse well, was a very spruce military person, and liked to be told that he resembled Napoleon. He was really patriotic and quite reckless. Europe, the whole world, might go up in flames: it would not deter him from snatching advantage for Turkey—the greater the conflagration, the more chance of restoring the former power of the Ottomans on the ruins of their neighbours.

Djemal, the Minister of Marine, was a very intelligent man, with knowledge of the world. Smooth, suave, humorous, he was very agreeable company. "Among the distinguished blackguards of my acquaintance," wrote Mr. Steed, "I have always remembered him as the most agreeable." He was quite as militaristic as Enver. He had been appointed Military Governor of Constantinople in 1913, towards the end of the Second Balkan War. The Young Turks had made a mess of things in their country, but they did not despair. Their characteristics were

¹ Take Jonescu, *Souvenirs* (1919), pp. 145, 149.

various. Take Jonescu summed them up thus: Talaat was the strongest, Djavid the most instructed, Djemal the most civilised, and Enver the most bustling.

The Grand Vizier of 1913 was a soldier, Mahmud Shevket Pasha. He slept at nights in his office at the Sublime Porte. Djemal slept at the Military Governor's headquarters. The two had many a midnight talk over the telephone. Shevket's view was: "As regards our army, I don't think we must hesitate any longer to adopt the methods of the Germans."¹ Acting on this view, he invited General Liman von Sanders and a military mission to Constantinople. The mission arrived on December 14, 1913, shortly after the death of Shevket. Liman was given the extraordinary position of Commander of the First Army Corps at Constantinople. Djemal was convinced (a belief probably shared by other Young Turks) that the Entente Powers had promised among themselves that Russia should have Constantinople.² He thought that the British Government were deliberately delaying the completion and delivery of the battleships *Sultan Osman* and *Reschadieh* which were being built, for account of the Turkish Government, in English yards. The upshot of all this was that a secret Turco-German Alliance was signed on August 2, 1914, "but negotiations had been in progress long before the war." The Austrian Government had cognisance of the terms of the alliance. Italy was not informed of it.³

The Turco-German Treaty of August 2, 1914, bound Turkey to intervene immediately in any struggle in which Germany and Austria engaged. This being so, the affair of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* falls into its proper perspective. It was not the escape of these two ships and their taking refuge at Constantinople which decided the Turkish Government to join in the War. In some ways, the arrival of the two German warships was highly inconvenient, for the Turks must either intern them in accordance with the Law of Nations, or must openly go to war with the Entente. In point of fact the Turks, although bound by their alliance to go to war, wished to delay this act until they could complete the defences of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Djemal admits that if the Entente Powers had made an advance on Constantinople in August, 1914,

¹ *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman*, by Djemal Pasha (not dated), p. 67.

² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 109, Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei* (1920), pp. 33-5.

the downfall of the Ottoman Empire would have been "decreed at the very outset." It is therefore highly creditable (if one may so express the matter) to the Turkish capacity for diplomatic finesse, as well as for duplicity, that they were able to stave off for so long the delivery of an ultimatum, after they had impudently taken the *Goeben* and *Breslau* into their own service. That the Entente Powers allowed themselves to be put off with smooth answers for nearly three months is not creditable either to their intelligence or to their capacity for decision.

On August 11, 1914, the Turkish ministers were meeting for dinner at the house of the Grand Vizier. Talaat, Djavid and Djemal were the first to arrive. Enver came a little later, and remarked with the quiet smile that was characteristic of him: "Unto us a child is born". This did not convey much to Enver's auditors, so in answer to their feverish queries he told them that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had appeared off the Dardanelles, and desired leave to enter the Narrows. Djemal, as Minister of Marine, gave his consent. The Law of Nations, however, as Djemal naively admits, required Turkey either to intern the warships or to compel them to leave Turkish waters within twenty-four hours. The German Ambassador, von Wangenheim, refused to consent even to a feigned disarmament. To compel the ships to leave Turkish waters was impossible according to the Turco-German alliance: to do so, wrote Djemal, "conflicted as much with our interest as our duty". However, the conscience of this seeker after righteousness was satisfied by an ante-dated contract for sale of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. The sale and the false date were arranged that night by telegraph. The plan struck the statesmen as admirable: "every one breathed a sigh of relief."¹

The rest of the story is a tragic farce; the Turks, with their tongue in their cheek, gave soft answers of neutrality to the Entente, while the Entente Powers, with their eyes open, allowed themselves to be hopelessly duped. On August 4 (two days after the signature of the Turco-German Alliance) the Grand Vizier had assured Mr. Beaumont, British Chargé d'Affairs at Constantinople, that Turkey intended to observe "strict neutrality."² Public opinion in Constantinople was becoming inflamed over the

¹ Djemal, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1914 (*Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey* (Cd. 7628), No. 3.

question of the two Turkish warships which were being built in Great Britain, and which the British Government were requisitioning. The Porte issued a communiqué on this subject, distinctly hostile in tone towards Great Britain: the Grand Vizier, however, civilly informed the British Embassy that this strong attitude had to be assumed on account of the public feeling, but that it was not meant seriously.¹ On August 11 Mr. Beaumont reported the arrival on the previous evening of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Straits. There followed the demand on the part of the Entente Powers for the internment or dismissal of the German warships in accordance with the Law of Nations. Events at this time moved quickly, for on the same day, August 11, Mr. Beaumont was informed officially that the Turkish Government had bought the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*. There was at the time a British naval mission, headed by Admiral Limpus, at Constantinople. The members of the mission held executive posts in the Turkish Navy. On August 11 they were all replaced in their executive commands by Turkish officers.

The Entente Powers made a serious effort to satisfy any anxieties which the Porte might have by offering on August 16 that "if Turkey will observe scrupulous neutrality during the war, England, France and Russia will uphold her independence and integrity against any enemies that may wish to utilise the general European situation in order to attack her"²

This offer naturally had no effect on the Porte, which had already made its decision by the Treaty of August 2. The next serious development in the situation was owing to the fact that the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, although sold to Turkey, nevertheless retained their German crews. The Grand Vizier, in response to a remonstrance of Sir Louis Mallet, the British Ambassador, "deplored this breach of neutrality, which he could not deny". He begged for time, and promised to get rid of the German crews "gradually".³

The farce then proceeded another stage. On August 20 Djemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, visited Sir L. Mallet and, breathing a sigh of relief "at being able to talk freely," put forward a

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1914, No. 6, Beaumont to Grey, August 13, 1914.

² *Parliamentary Papers* (Cd. 7628), No. 17, Grey to Beaumont, August 16, 1914.

³ Mallet to Grey, August 15, 1914 (*Parliamentary Papers*, Cd. 7628).

demand for the abolition of the Capitulations—that is, the special privileges enjoyed by foreigners in Turkey according to treaty and custom. Two days later the Grand Vizier, in a burst of confidence, told Sir Louis that “he wanted all the support that the Triple Entente could give him.” The Entente Powers, still hopelessly winding themselves in the silken web of the Constantinople spider, offered to agree to the abolition of Capitulations as soon as a scheme of judicial administration, which should satisfy modern conditions, could be set up, and to give a written guarantee respecting the independence and integrity of Turkey. Meanwhile grain ships proceeding from Russian Black Sea ports to the Mediterranean were being stopped at the Bosphorus. On August 23 Sir L. Mallet learned that German officers were arriving at Constantinople, travelling via Sofia. The British Government, still unaware that the Turks had made their decision, induced the King to send a message to the Sultan, “expressing his deep regret at the sorrow caused to the Turkish people by the detention of the two warships which His Imperial Majesty’s subjects had made such sacrifices to acquire.”¹ Turkish mobilisation went on feverishly, but the Porte explained that this was a precaution in view of a possible attack on Turkey by the Bulgarians. The Grand Vizier admitted to Sir L. Mallet that the Germans were trying to force Turkey out of her neutrality, but he solemnly affirmed that they would not succeed; the Turkish Government “were determined not to fall into the trap”. By this time some hundreds of German sailors and marines, in addition to the crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, had arrived, according to Sir Louis Mallet’s information. The Grand Vizier told the British Ambassador that “neither he nor the Minister of Marine knew anything about the reported arrival of German sailors.”²

Although by the secret treaty of August 2 the Turks were bound to join in war at once, the Germans had agreed that the Porte should remain neutral until the Turkish army was fully mobilised. But as the German troops after the battle of the Marne had (to quote the ingenuous Djemal) “to retreat somewhat,” pressure was naturally put upon Turkey to intervene at once.³ The Porte was not unwilling to do so, because the first instalment

¹ *Ibid.*, Grey to Mallet, August 25, 1914.

² *Ibid.*, Mallet to Grey, August 27, 1914 (No. 43).

³ Djemal, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁴ *Ibid.* v. 129.

of a loan recently raised in France was now nearly exhausted,⁴ and therefore it was a convenient moment for having recourse to German resources. It is possible that all the money coming from Berlin did not go straight into the Turkish Treasury. Now, even at the eleventh hour, the Entente could have quashed the Turkish peril by making war at once. Sir Louis Mallet informed the Foreign Office on August 28 that the whole area of the Dardanelles, Constantinople and the Bosphorus was in process of becoming "nothing more nor less than a sort of German enclave"; all the same he stated that he and his colleagues (French and Russian) "still do not regard the situation as hopeless, and are of opinion that we should go on as long as possible without provoking a rupture".

The reasons for the strange forbearance of the Allies with Turkey seem to have been two. Firstly, Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, insisted that Great Britain must not be involved in war with Turkey until the Indian troops, which were on their way to France, were safely through the Suez Canal. Secondly, it was urged upon the Foreign Office that war with Turkey would seriously disturb the British Moslems of India.¹ Yet both these considerations should have been disregarded, because the Indian troopships could have been safely conveyed through the Canal anyhow; and as war with Turkey was almost certain, the British Moslems would have to be quieted by some means or other, as, indeed, actually happened a little later.

On September 8 Sir Louis Mallet was able to report to the Foreign Office that "in many respects the situation seems to show improvement." On the next evening he and the other Ambassadors received from the Porte a note announcing the abolition of the Capitulations. On September 15 Sir L. Mallet reported the Turkish Fleet as being "now entirely in German hands." Why then did the Entente still stand by idly?

By October 3 the Straits of the Dardanelles were closed to all commerce. The waters were sown with mines by German officers. The British Ambassador thought that the Turks themselves did not know the exact position of the mines. Nevertheless on October 22 Djemal, the Minister of Marine, thought it still worthwhile (as apparently it actually was) to telegraph to the British Embassy yet one more assurance of Turkish neutrality. Djemal

¹ Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, II, 170-1.

also referred to a rumour that Turkey had made an alliance with Germany: he "denied this absolutely." On October 29 the Russian Embassy reported the bombardment of Feodosia (in the Crimea) by Turkish torpedo-boats at dawn that morning. The Russian Ambassador, M. de Giers, was therefore instructed by his Government on October 30 to leave Constantinople with all his staff. On learning of this, the British and French Foreign Offices gave similar instructions to their Ambassadors. The Sublime Porte played the comedy out without a hitch. In a farewell interview with the British Ambassador the Grand Vizier, almost with tears in his eyes, confessed sadly that he had been left in the dark as to his colleagues' intentions.

The reply of Great Britain to the Turkish undertaking of war on the side of the Central Powers was the proclamation of annexation of Cyprus, and of a Protectorate over Egypt. Had this step not been taken with regard to Egypt, all Egyptians, owing to the Sultan of Turkey's nominal suzerainty, would have become technically enemies of Great Britain.¹

The intricate loves and hatreds of Balkan politics seemed, in the balance, to be distinctly favourable to the Germans. For Bulgaria, although she did not make war for another year, was already pledged to the German side. When Mahmud Muktar Pasha, Ambassador at Berlin, laid the Turco-German alliance of August 2, 1914, before the German Emperor for signature, His Majesty said with a "happy smile": "Now let me give you another piece of good news. Since this morning I've had in my pocket a letter from the King of Bulgaria in which he writes that he wants to make an alliance with me."² The Turkish Government itself had been negotiating for the last six months with a view to obtaining a treaty of alliance from the Bulgarians. So now everything promised well for the Central Powers. There was only one obstacle. The Bulgarian Government said that it would not actually intervene until it could see how the war was going to end. Not until the autumn of 1915 was the Bulgarian Government able to satisfy itself on this point.

¹ Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, II, 176-7.

² Djemal, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERVENTION OF ITALY

When the War broke out at the end of July, 1914, everybody wondered what Italy would do. It was known that she was in the *Triplice*, but that was all; and because the terms of the Triple Alliance were unknown except to the high officials of the Contracting Parties, it caused all the more anxiety. There was therefore great relief among Entente circles when the Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced that as the war undertaken by Austria had an aggressive object, it was in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and that in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.¹ Having said this much about the contents of the Triple Alliance, the mouths of the Italian statesmen shut again. The statesmen of the Central Powers were not more communicative. Even after Italy joined in the War, little more was disclosed. In the summer of 1915 the *Second Austrian Red Book* published four sections of the Treaty. Not until the War was over and the Revolutionary Government had opened the Austrian Archives was the full text of the Triple Alliance disclosed.

Italy's ambitions were well known, and they all seemed to make impossible any real league with the Central Powers. The treaties which brought about the union of Italy in 1860 and 1866 left large quantities of *Italia Irredenta* still to be conquered. The Austro-Venetian frontier, as drawn in 1866, was, from the strategical point of view, extremely unfavourable to Italy. The Trentino, although in Austrian hands, was Italian in race and language. Across the Adriatic were Italian-speaking towns, formerly part of the Republic of Venice, and only lost for Italy owing to the "crime"

¹ Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3, 1914 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1914, Cd. 7860). Proclamation of Neutrality by Italy, printed in *Austro-Hungarian Red Book* (No. 2), document No. 27. Sir James Rennell Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories* (Third Series, 1925), p. 204.

of the Treaty of Campo Formio by which, in 1797, Bonaparte had transferred Venice and its dominions to Austria. With regard to the Entente Powers the Italians had no feeling of irredentism. It is true that Nice and Savoy had been Italian until 1861, but these territories were on the French side of the Alpine watershed, and by the year 1914 were absolutely French in feeling.

After the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, the Central Powers, naturally, made great efforts to attract Italy over to their side. Austria offered to establish an Italian university at Vienna.¹ She hoped at least for benevolent neutrality. To bring this about, compensations would have to be offered to Italy; but the difficulty and irony of the situation lay in this, that all the compensations would have to be at the expense of Austria. Germany had nothing to offer. The Austrian Government did actually suggest that Italy, by joining the Central Powers, would acquire Savoy and Tunis at the expense of France. The Italian Government rejected this "offer."

Apart from their general and long-standing grievance with regard to the *terra irredenta*, another grievance dating from the Italo-Turkish (Tripoli) War of 1911 was still rankling badly in 1914. The Treaty of the Triple Alliance, as renewed for the last time in 1912, had stated (Article 7):

If, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and the Ægean Sea should become impossible, and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two Powers, based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the *status quo*, and giving satisfaction to the interests and well-founded claims of the two Parties.²

The Italian Government complained that during the Tripoli War in 1911 the Austro-Hungarian Government, basing its action upon

¹ Rodd, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

² Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary* (trans. Myers and Paul, 1920), I, 249-50. This Article 7 was also published in the *Second Austrian Red Book*, issued after the entry of the Italians into the War, in 1915.

Article 7 of the Triple Alliance, had restrained Italy "from carrying out several military and naval operations which would certainly have shortened the duration of that war."¹ Now Austria, in going to war with Serbia, was altering the *status quo* in the Balkans, without any previous agreement with Italy, and without offering any compensation. She had merely informed the Italian Government on July 23 that next day she would present an ultimatum to Serbia.² The Italian Government therefore (July 25, 1914) requested an early exchange of views with the Austrian Government.

Count Berchtold was an Austrian nobleman, formerly Ambassador at Petrograd, who had succeeded Count Aehrenthal as Foreign Minister in 1912. He has been described by an English observer as "a weak and wealthy Austro-Hungarian magnate of irreproachable manner and leisurely temperament."³ General von Margutti, who belonged to the inner circle of the Viennese court, described him as "that undoubtedly somewhat incompetent statesman." Take Jonescu, the Rumanian statesman, called him "a fine man, if you accept the type, elegant, very elegant, with good manners, and . . . that is all."⁴ Berchtold certainly was a gentleman; he conducted the business of the Austrian Chancellery with an absence of bluster and menace which compared favourably with the methods of the Wilhelmstrasse: but he was wholly given over to the war-party of Field-Marshal Conrad. He had blundered, under impulsion from the militarists, into the war with Serbia. Now he showed himself to be no match for the Italian Foreign Minister, Sidney Sonnino, who came to the Quirinal after the sudden death of the Marquis di San Giuliano on October 16, 1914.

The Italian Foreign Minister, Sonnino, was always considered to be an Anglophile statesman. His mother was an Englishwoman and he talked the English language perfectly. Actually he was an Italian patriot of a somewhat narrow type, a little cynical or Machiavellian in his outlook, although absolutely straightforward and honest. "I may not always say everything that is in my mind," he once remarked, "but I have a natural indisposition to

¹ *Italian Green Book*, 1915, No. 1 (Sonnino to Italian Ambassador at Vienna, Dec. 9, 1914).

² *Austro-Hungarian Red Book* (No. 2), document No. 4.

³ Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, I, 358.

⁴ *The Emperor Francis Joseph and his Times* (1921), p. 346. Jonescu, *Souvenirs* (1919), p. 20.

lie.”¹ His father was an Italian Jew; he was rich, educated, travelled. He had entered politics early in life, and knew how to estimate men and their motives. He was a determined, indeed an obstinate man, and his lack of pliability made his relations with the rest of the Allies, after Italy had entered the War, sometimes rather difficult. As one of those rare beings, an Italian Protestant, he was not a *persona grata* with the Vatican. With his handsome, refined, Jewish features, Sonnino was a striking but rather inscrutable personage. His inflexibility of purpose was of great value during the War in a poor country like Italy where the “defeatist” propaganda of the Socialists had so much chance to develop itself.

Berchtold tried to parry the diplomatic thrusts of Sonnino by saying that the occupation by Austrian troops of Serbian territory did not come within the scope of Article 7 of the Triple Alliance because such occupation was “neither of a temporary nor of a permanent character, but was merely momentary.” Whatever this meant, it was not going to move Sonnino from his tenacious insistence upon Article 7. Berchtold also said that the Austrian Government had no intention of “annihilating” Serbia. Sonnino had no difficulty in pointing out that “between the maintenance of integrity and of political and economical independence on the one hand, and annihilation on the other, there is a wide margin and it is precisely this margin that must become the subject and basis of negotiation and of agreement between ourselves and Austria in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.” The unfortunate, or rather incompetent, Berchtold, when confronted with this logical exposition in an interview of December 20, 1914, with the Duce d’Avarna, Italian Ambassador at Vienna, had to agree with it.

The truth was that Italy would be content with nothing less than the acquisition of the Trentino. At this point in the negotiations the agreeable personality of Prince Bülow reappears on the scene. He was one of the cultivated school of German noblemen with complete *savoir faire* and a good deal of superficial elegance. He had married an Italian wife, and since retiring from the position of Chancellor in 1909 had been living in Rome, where his beautiful Villa Malta became something like the centre of a *salon*.

Take Jonescu said that Marschall, Kiderlen-Waechter and Bülow were the three strong men of Germany. The first two were dead now. “In the intellectual desert of the German political world,

¹ Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories* (Third Series), p. 227.

Bülow was immense.”¹ After the outbreak of war, he was appointed (in December, 1914) Ambassador at Rome.

On December 20 Bülow came to see Baron Sonnino and assured him officially and privately that he agreed with the Italian Foreign Minister in his interpretation of Article 7. Italy would receive compensation “when Austria should have obtained any given results.” Sonnino stuck to his point. The compensation was due now, and it must be “the fulfilment of certain national aspirations”—Bülow, of course, knew that this meant the Trentino. Next—apparently on the same day as that of Bülow’s visit—Baron Macchio, Austrian Ambassador at Rome, dropped in at Sonnino’s bureau at the Quirinal. He was just about to go away on a short holiday to Vienna. Sonnino said that this was very convenient, as Baron Macchio could thus personally inform Count Berchtold of the state of feeling in Italy; and he took the opportunity of drawing the Austrian Ambassador’s attention to the representations which the Italian Foreign Office was making on the subject of Article 7 of the Triple Alliance. Baron Macchio, who had probably been flooded with memoranda on this subject from Count Berchtold (the Austrian bureaucracy was famous for the quantity of memoranda that it wrote), said that he was aware of these representations. Macchio hinted that compensation might be found at the expense of the Entente Powers. Sonnino crushingly replied that, “being neutral, it is not possible for us at present to discuss the matter on a basis of eventual compensation involving territory possessed at present by other belligerents, because that would be equivalent to our taking part as from to-day in the contest.” It was now perfectly clear that the question at issue was not whether Italy would join the side of Austria, but whether Italy would remain neutral or join the Entente. Sonnino was in a very strong position. The best that the Austrians could hope for was to buy (at a very high price) Italy’s neutrality. The Germans, naturally, were pressing Austria as strongly as they could. But the Austrian Government could be quite as obstinate as anyone else: it always has been.

Although, during these negotiations, the Trentino had been in everybody’s mind, Sonnino, and indeed the majority of Italians, by no means limited their aspirations to this. However, one thing at a time was sufficient. On January 11, 1915, Prince Bülow again

¹ Jonescu, *Souvenirs*, p. 159. Cp. Tardieu, *La Prince de Bülow* (1909).

called on Sonnino and said that the German Government was sending a special envoy to Vienna to persuade the Austrian Government to give up the Trentino. Sonnino absorbed this information, and, on the occasion of the next interview (January 14), remarked that the Trentino, in his opinion, could not by itself satisfy Italian popular sentiment: permanent harmony with Austria would only be obtained by the satisfaction of the irredentist formula of "Trent and Trieste." Bülow was thrown out of his calm by this cool remark. He begged Sonnino not to go on increasing his demands, because Austria would choose war rather than cede Trieste. It is not recorded what Sonnino said to this—probably nothing: such was his way. Mr. Lloyd George, later, called him "a terrible man." There was certainly something almost uncanny about his persistence, his taciturnity, and his acuteness in reading the mind of his opponent.

By this time Count Berchtold had been relieved of his portfolio (January 13, 1915), and his place at the Ballplatz had been taken by Baron Burian, who was described in court circles as a "dull bureaucrat."¹ Burian took up the negotiations and began by admitting the principle of allowing compensation to Italy under Article 7 of the Triple Alliance, but he drew attention to the fact that the Italian Government was still occupying the Dodekanese (twelve formerly Turkish islands, captured in the Tripoli War), and that recently (December, 1914) the Italians had occupied Valona in Albania. These points were met, however, for the Italian Foreign Office had a letter of Count Berchtold, dated May 22, 1912, waiving any Austrian claim to compensation on account of the temporary Italian occupation of the Dodekanese. As regards Valona, Italian troops were landed there "to put an end to the local anarchy."

On January 16 the German Mission, headed by General Count von Wedel, which was meant to persuade the Austrian Government to cede territory to Italy, arrived in Vienna. Neither Burian nor the other proud Austrians liked this interference very much. Moreover, Burian knew now that if he had offered the Trentino to Italy, the offer would not have been considered sufficient. Nevertheless, on March 9, 1915, Prince Bülow was able to inform the Italian Foreign Office that the Austrian Government had agreed "to enter into negotiations with Italy on the basis of the cession

¹ Margutti, *op. cit.*, p. 546.

of Austrian territory": but to this Burian attached the condition that no territory should be transferred until the conclusion of peace. There were many reasons for making this condition: one was (Prince Bülow divulged this) that Austria could not afford to discharge the Trentino conscripts who were serving in her army. Sonnino, however, declared that Italy could not agree to wait until peace came. The negotiations as they stood now left him with "little room for hope." It was later stated that by the end of February it had been known in Hungarian circles that war with Italy was inevitable.¹

On March 27 Baron Burian made the first formal proposal of cession to the Duke of Avarna at the Ballplatz. If Italy would undertake to observe a friendly neutrality until the end of the war, and to leave to Austria-Hungary complete freedom in the Balkans, then the Imperial and Royal Government would be prepared to cede to Italy territory in Southern Tyrol, including the city of Trent. The cession was to remain secret and was not to take effect until the end of the War. To these proposals the Italian reply was simple: first, Austria did not offer enough; second, any cession must take effect as soon as it was agreed to. The Italian counter-proposals, which included the cession of Gradisca and Gorizia in the Isonzo valley, and the establishment of Trieste as an autonomous State, were presented in the form of a draft treaty on April 8. The Austrian Government found them unacceptable. Accordingly Baron Sonnino, in a note dated May 3, gave notice to Baron Burian that Italy "resumes from this moment complete liberty of action, and declares as cancelled and as henceforth without effect her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary." Baron Burian refused to take cognisance of this denunciation, on the ground that the Treaty of Triple Alliance had a fixed duration until July 8, 1920. Sonnino pointed out, however, that Austria had broken the treaty by sending an ultimatum to Serbia and so interfering in the Balkans without "previous accord" prescribed in the oft-quoted Article 7.

It remained now for the Italian Government to define in accord with the Entente Powers the terms of its intervention on their side. Naturally, the Italian Ambassador in London, Marquis Imperiali, and the British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Rennell Rodd, had not been idle throughout the time of the Italian negotiations with Austria. Italy was looking not merely up the valley of the Adige

¹ Karolyi, *Fighting the World* (1924), p. 135.

but also across the Adriatic. The Entente Powers were not very sensitive about Italy's actions in the Adriatic. It is true that the Conference of London, in which the British Government took the leading part, had established the Kingdom of Albania, to be neutral and independent under the guarantee of the Powers (decision of December 20, 1912). The person chosen by the Powers was William of Wied, the head of a mediatised German royal family. He was thirty-five years of age in 1913, and was serving as a captain in the 3rd Regiment of Uhlans of the Prussian Guard, and was married to a daughter of the King of Württemberg. William arrived at Durazzo, the capital of his new kingdom, in March, 1914. He was one of those colourless men who occasionally pass across the historic scene and leave their name in its record. Almost as soon as he landed in Albania an insurrection broke out. He was practically confined to Durazzo until September 3, 1914, when he abandoned the country.

On October 30 a detachment of Italian marines was landed at Saseno, a small island opposite Valona, which the Conference of London had attributed to Albania. On December 25 Italian troops occupied Valona, on the Albanian mainland.¹

In a sense, events had been tending towards an intervention of Italy on the Entente side ever since August 2, when the Italian Government declared its neutrality, and so enabled France to withdraw 300,000 troops from her frontier with Italy.² The way in which the Governments of Austria and Germany took this declaration of neutrality caused grave preoccupation to the Chief of the Italian General Staff.³ Sonnino, who was not in office at the time, had broken forth into expostulations openly when he first heard, at the railway station of Rome, of the Government's decision to be neutral; when in office, however, he changed his mind and for some time was much less decided. The Premier, Antonio Salandra, did not shrink from the idea of war even in 1914. On October 19 of that year he made an oration to the Staff of the Italian Foreign Office in which he urged his hearers to put aside "every preoccupation, prejudice or sentiment except such as was inspired by exclusive and unlimited devotion to the country and by the

¹ Saseno and Valona were attributed to Italy by the London Treaty of April 26, 1915 (see below, pp. 24, 25). In August, 1920, the Italians evacuated Albania, but retained the island of Saseno.

² Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories* (Third Series), p. 221.

³ Cadorna, *La Guerra alla fronte italiana* (1921), I, 42.

sacred egoism for Italy.'" On December 3, at the reopening of the Parliament, he explained his view further, saying: "Our neutrality must not be inert and indifferent, but active and circumspect; not weak, but powerfully armed and ready." This, coupled with the remark in the same speech that "Italy has legitimate aspirations to affirm and sustain," showed the way the wind was blowing. The Socialists, who at first were neutralist, split into two. Late in 1914 Benito Mussolini founded *Il Popolo d'Italia*, as an organ of interventionist Socialists.²

It was, apparently, some time in February (1915) that Sonnino began finally to look upon war with Austria-Hungary as likely to happen. It was just at this time, however, that the former Premier, and chief of the Liberal party, M. Giolitti, in the now celebrated letter of January 10, 1915, balanced the possible results of intervention on the one hand and neutrality on the other so nicely that his followers (who formed a majority of the Chamber) were left without any firm principle. Giolitti put forward the view that Italy should get "a good deal," "enough," *parecchio*, out of the war, but might get it without fighting. Now, a *parecchio* was precisely what Austria was offering—not all the *terra irredenta*, but a useful slice of the Trentino—"not a bad thing," wrote M. Giolitti." Sonnino, however, went on his way, and on April 26 the secret Treaty of London (sometimes called the Adriatic Treaty) was signed. Article 1 stipulated that there should be concluded immediately a military convention between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, to fix the minimum of forces which Russia would employ against Austria-Hungary so as to prevent the concentration of that Power against Italy. This stipulation was necessary to ensure that if Russia decided to direct its principal effort against Germany, Italy should not be left to bear the whole weight of the Austrian attack.

Italy engaged to employ all her resources in waging war in common with France, Great Britain and Russia against all their enemies (Article 2).

Article 4 stipulated that in the treaty of peace Italy should obtain the Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol with the frontier of the Brenner, Trieste, Gorizia and Gradisca, Istria, the islands of Cherso, Lussin, Palazzuoli and others. Article 5 added to these

¹ Cp. Rodd, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

² *Ibid.*, p. 249.

³ Cp. *ibid.*, p. 244.

cessions the administrative province of Dalmatia to the south of Cape Planka, and the islands on the north and west of Dalmatia, with certain small exceptions. Valona on the coast of Albania and the little island of Saseno were also to be given to Italy. The Dodekanese, of which the Italians had been in occupation since 1912, was to remain to Italy in full sovereignty (Article 8). If the balance of power in the Mediterranean were altered by the partition of Turkey in Asia, Italy was to receive an equitable share (Article 9). If France or Great Britain augmented their territories in Africa, Italy could claim equitable compensation, especially by the settlement in her favour of certain questions concerning the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Erythrea, Somaliland and Libya (Article 13).¹ Italy was to receive a share in the eventual war-indemnity corresponding to her efforts and sacrifices.

Article 5 secured to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro certain territories on the Adriatic, in particular the Hungarian and Croatian coast (with the port of Fiume), the islands of Veglia, Pervichio, Gregorio, Golio, and Arbe, and all the coast from the south of Cape Planka to the mouth of the River Drin, containing the ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro; but Cattaro and its gulf were to be neutralised. Durazzo was to be attributed to a small Mussulman independent State of Albania.

By Article 15 the Allies promised to support the opposition which Italy would offer to any proposal tending to introduce a representative of the Holy See to the negotiations for peace and for the regulating of the questions raised by the War.

The treaty was to be kept secret and only the adhesion of Italy to the declaration of September 5, 1914 (Paet of London), was to be made public immediately after the declaration of war by or against Italy (Article 16). Italy declared that she would enter into the campaign as soon as possible and at latest within a period of one month after the signature of the present articles.² The treaty was signed by Grey, Imperiali, Benckendorff and Cambon.

¹ On July 15, 1924, a treaty was signed at London by the representatives of the British and Italian Governments. Great Britain ceded to Italy a portion of Kenya called Jubaland, i.e., a region extending from about 50 to 125 miles westward of the River Juba. The Juba had until then been the boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland (see Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, pp. 462-70).

² *State Papers, British and Foreign*, 1919, pp. 973-7.

On May 20 Signor Salandra, in a moving speech in the Italian Chamber (Giolitti being absent), obtained a vote of confidence in the Government by the votes of 407 deputies against a minority of 74.¹ In the Senate 262 voted for the Government, two against it. On May 22 Italy declared war upon Austria. For some obscure reasons connected with commerce and the rights of individuals by private international law, Italy and Germany did not enter into a formal state of war until August 27, 1916.

Diplomatists are as a rule a reticent kind of people, but somebody must have been loquacious with regard to the Adriatic Treaty. An able Southern Slav journalist, Francis Supilo of Fiume, got on to the track of the negotiations when he was at Petrograd in April.² The Serbian Legation at London knew of the treaty almost before the ink was dry upon it, and were vehement in their protests against the attribution of so much of Dalmatia to Italy. In reply to remonstrances made on behalf of the Southern Slavs, M. Delcassé, who was still Foreign Minister of France, remarked that the Entente Powers could not lightly have put aside the demands of a possible ally like Italy which could bring a million bayonets on to the field in addition, "shortly afterwards," to six hundred thousand Rumanians.³ The Rumanian accession was a surprise to even the best informed of the public; it took longer to come than M. Delcassé thought, but it came all the same, and would not have occurred without Italy.

To the Italians the Great War was the completion of their Wars of Liberation and Union. "I have never," wrote a diplomatist who was resident in Rome in 1915, "witnessed a more remarkable phenomenon than this uprising of the people. There had been nothing like it in Italy since 1859. The few witnesses surviving from that epoch pronounced the enthusiasm of 1915 to be greater."⁴

¹ Rodd, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

² Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, II, 64-5.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-7. For the Italo-Austrian negotiations in 1914-15, see the *Italian Green Book* and the *Austrian Red Book*, No. 2. They are published, in translation, in *Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, edited by J. B. Scott (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1916), Parts I and II.

⁴ Rodd, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

CHAPTER IV

THE CESSION OF CONSTANTINOPLE

Russia did not enter the War with the view of gaining Constantinople. This is proved by the offer, dated August 16, 1914, made by the British, French and Russian Governments, to give a guarantee of the independence and integrity of Turkey, on condition that she remained neutral.¹ But after Turkey, rejecting this offer, had made the wanton attack upon the Russians on October 28, 1914, and so began war, Russia was free to revert to her ancient ambition. It is true that the Papacy was believed to be unalterably opposed² to the prospect of the chief Power of the Greek Church gaining Constantinople, the "Second Rome," but neither the French nor the Italian Government was in the least likely to be careful for the susceptibilities of the Vatican. In Great Britain, on the other hand, the historic sentiment of the people, and especially of the Foreign Office, was wholly against giving Constantinople to Russia. Could this sentiment be overcome or be transformed in the course of the War?

The Russian Government, by the Pact of London of September 5, 1914, was bound not to enter into a separate peace with the Central Powers. The Government had entered into the engagement freely, without any stipulation for a reward. From the very first, indeed, it was clear that the Russians meant to unite to their Empire those parts of the ancient Poland which were in 1914 under Prussia and Austria.³ But, not unnaturally, many Russians hoped for more: the intervention of Turkey against them seemed to point the way to Constantinople.

For the first three years of the War, Russian foreign policy was in the hands of M. Sazonoff, described as a very honourable man,

¹ See Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, II, 173-4.

² Nekludoff, *Diplomatic Reminiscences* (1920), p. 118.

³ See Declaration of the Grand Duke Nicolas, August 15, 1914, in Mowat, *Select Treaties and Documents*, p. 65.

of incredible self-sufficiency and glowing incompetence.¹ This characterisation seems much too severe. Sazonoff was an experienced diplomatist. He had been Councillor in the Russian Embassy at London in the years after 1904, a very crowded period for Russian diplomacy, including the Russo-Japanese War and the Treaty of Portsmouth, and the "Octobrist" Revolution, which ended with the ministry of the straightforward, iron-willed Stolypin. He was later Vice Foreign Minister, assistant to Isvolsky, at the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and in 1909 he succeeded Isvolsky (who became Ambassador at Paris) as Minister. Sazonoff, who was married to a sister of Stolypin's wife, was a clear-headed man. He was delicate, having a weak lung, and he had frequently to go to Davos. As long as Stolypin was alive, Sazonoff's policy was firm and clear; but after that lamented Minister's assassination in 1911, the Government of the Tsar slipped back into mediocrity. Goremynkin, the Minister of the Interior (a portfolio which carried with it something like the Premiership), was an aged, indolent man. Sazonoff who was rather popular with the Cadets (or Liberals), soon lost the modest bearing with which he had started as Minister of Foreign Affairs; his growing self-esteem made his policy fussy, and therefore, at the time of the Second Balkan War, rather ineffective. He lost prestige in the Balkans, and accordingly when the Great War started he had no influence in either Bulgaria, Greece or Rumania.

After the Great War began Sazonoff did better. He entered into the Pact of London and adhered to it faithfully. The admirable proclamation respecting Poland, issued on August 15, 1914, was drafted in his office. Soon he began to spread his wings again, and to aim directly at Constantinople.

From the moment that Turkey entered into the War on the side of the Central Powers, Russia was under blockade. The German fleet commanded the Baltic and the Porte closed the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Obviously it was proper strategy for the Entente to attempt to clear either the Baltic or the Bosphorus, and on the whole the capture of the Bosphorus seemed to present rather fewer difficulties. Therefore from the very moment when Turkey joined in hostilities at the end of October, 1914, the Entente Powers began to take measures directed against the Straits.² The result

¹ Rosen, *Forty Years of Diplomacy* (1922), II, 191.

² Callwell, *The Dardanelles* (1919), pp. 1-3.

of this would, in reasonable probability, be the capture of Constantinople. The question naturally arose, what to do with it? It could, indeed, be restored to the Turks at the end of the War, but the Entente Powers, naturally, did not wish to have the risk always hanging over them of a closure of the Straits by the Porte. It could be neutralised, but the Entente could scarcely be expected to feel confidence in any promises of neutrality made by Turkey; and there seemed no other Balkan State which could be put in charge of Constantinople: Bulgaria and Greece were both pursuing policies which did not commend themselves to the Entente. Accordingly it was really impossible for France and Great Britain not to acknowledge the historic claims of Russia to Constantinople, in the event of that city being won by the arms of the Entente. Whether it were actually taken by French, British or Russian troops made no difference to the question. Each of the Entente Powers was putting its whole resources into the War; the direction of these resources into one area or another was merely a question of strategy. In 1914—15 all Russian military resources were occupied in the campaigns in Galicia and in Asia Minor.

In the last months of 1914 the Russian Government was pressing for a final settlement of the question of Constantinople. By the end of the year Great Britain and France seem to have given a promise that Russia should have the coveted city. Russia being a country where the mass of the people were not educated, the members of the comparatively small cultivated class, chiefly in Moscow and Petrograd, knew each other well, supplied most of the high bureaucrats, and discussed policy keenly in the *salons*. In the early months of 1915 the War was the all-absorbing subject in these *salons*, and in the buzz of conversation the name of Constantinople could often be heard. The Duma or Parliament which was in session resounded with patriotic speeches on the historic mission of Russia. Sazonoff was at his best in the Duma. Tolerant in his attitude, ardent and eloquent in his diction, he nearly always received applause from the Cadets as much as from the Conservatives.

Meanwhile things were beginning to go badly with the Russian arms. A retreat had to be made from East Prussia. In the Asia Minor theatre, a country of high, desolate mountains, almost incredible difficulties were encountered. The Russian industrial system was quite unequal to the task of producing munitions for

the armies. On February 20 M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador at Petrograd, and M. Sazonoff were crossing the Champ de Mars. Some companies of infantry were being exercised. They advanced with difficulty, although not carrying arms, over the snow. Alluding to their unarmed condition, M. Sazonoff remarked sadly: "These are not conscripts who are being straightened up: they are trained soldiers who in a few days will depart for the front—and see, *not one rifle*." Nevertheless the public remained constant to the war; "the Byzantine mirage" fascinated them. France and Great Britain had surrendered to it. They even hoped to bring Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who was still neutral, to acquiesce, and also to join in the War. But the mission of his nephew, the Duc de Guise, who was sent by the French Government to Sofia in February, could accomplish nothing.¹

The British Foreign Office had only involved itself so far as to promise that "the question of the Straits should be regulated in accordance with the wish of Russia." King George V, it is said, had been more explicit. He had said to Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, "Constantinople must be yours."²

At the beginning of March General Pau, the one-armed hero of the War of 1870, came to Petrograd by way of Salonica, Sofia and Bucharest, to present certain French decorations in Russia. The Tsar gave a banquet in his honour on March 3. It was a long affair, and the young Tsarevitch did not improve matters by making faces at his sisters to express his feeling of tedium. At last, however, it was over. The guests went into the drawing-room. The Tsar then drew the French Ambassador to the end of the *salon*, and said that he could not impose upon his people the terrible sacrifices of the War without giving them the recompense that they dreamed of. "The question of the Straits impassions Russian opinion.... I will radically solve the problem of Constantinople and the Straits." M. Paléologue inquired if the views of the Tsar had not changed concerning the questions which interested France. "Assuredly," replied the Tsar: "I desire that France shall issue from this War as great and strong as possible. Take the left bank of the Rhine; take Mayence; take Coblenz; go still further if you judge it useful." M. Paléologue was able to convey these assurances to his Government. Accord-

¹ Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars* (1921), I, 305, 307, 311.

² *Ibid.*, I, 312.

ingly on March 8 he received by telegram from M. Delcassé, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, an authorisation to assure M. Sazonoff that the French Government was ready to settle the question of Constantinople and the Straits as Russia wished.¹ The Conversations of M. Paléologue and the Tsar are strongly reminiscent of the Hamilton-Seymour Conversations of 1853.²

The negotiations between Great Britain and France on the one hand, and Russia on the other, with reference to the possession of Constantinople, proceeded parallel with the negotiations of the Entente with Italy. The Italians did not much like the notion of the Russians getting Constantinople. The Russian Government thought that the pretensions of Italy to Dalmatia were an offence to the Slav conscience. Actually, the one demand helped the other. When M. Sazonoff hinted to M. Paléologue a mild protest against the Italian demand, the French Ambassador replied: "We are not fighting to realise the chimæras of Slavism. The sacrifice of Constantinople is sufficient."³

The Convention concerning Constantinople and the Straits was comprehended in an exchange of telegrams and notes of March, 1915. The first is the telegram from M. Delcassé to M. Paléologue, already alluded to, dated March 8, in which the French Minister for Foreign Affairs affirmed the readiness of the French Government to settle the question of Constantinople and the Straits according to the wishes of Russia. On March 15 M. Sazonoff, in a telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, took note of this; and also stated that Great Britain had given her assent to the Russian demand, under reserve of safeguards for British economic interests. This assent was given in a Note sent by Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at Petrograd, dated March 12, for presentation to M. Sazonoff.

Having received the French and British assent to the Russian demand for possession of Constantinople and the Straits, M. Sazonoff, on his side, undertook that there should be free passage for goods in transit through these places, except for goods actually coming from or going to Russia.

The territory which Russia was to possess was to include the city of Constantinople, and all Turkey in Europe as far as the Enos-

¹ Paléologue, *op. cit.*, I, 315

² Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy*, 1815-1914, pp. 102-5.

³ Paléologue, *op. cit.*, I, 336.

Midia line, and in Asia Minor, the coast from the River Sakaria to a point on the Gulf of Ismid; in addition, the islands in the Sea of Marmora and Tenedos and Imbros.¹

Thus the dispute of centuries was settled as far as it could be done by diplomacy; Constantinople, the centre of diplomatic intrigue which had been poisoning the public life of Europe for generations, was to be taken from the Turk and put into the guardianship of a civilised Power. It was a heroic measure of the diplomatists and, as Sir Edward Grey stated in one of his Notes, involved a very real sacrifice on the part of England of her immediate interests, her historic sentiments, her political traditions. It was now the part of the soldier to complete the work of diplomacy. On April 25 the Allied troops made the memorable landing on the shore of Gallipoli. There, young life was sacrificed like water; the immortal garland of a glorious effort and a noble aim was gained, but not the guerdon of Constantinople and the Straits. Russia, too, had no sooner gained the promise from her Allies than she began to fail. On April 28, 1915, three days after the British and French landing on Gallipoli, Field-Marshal von Mackensen made an attack on the Russian line of the Dunajec, an attack which shattered a Russian army, precipitated a retreat through Galicia, and ruined the strength of the Russian military system.

¹ For the Agreements, see Documents in Niemeyer, *Die völkerrechtlichen Urkunden des Weltkriegs* (1918), II, 694-6, and Mears, *Modern Turkey* (1924), pp. 609-12. The Notes (which were secret) were made public by the Bolshevik Government in 1917 and 1918.

CHAPTER V

CONTRABAND OF WAR

In the Great War the opposing forces, physical and intellectual, were so nearly equal that there was something like a deadlock for the first three years. In former days wars were gained by one army destroying the enemy's army. But now there was little chance of this happening, so powerful was each army, so careful the organisation, so high the degree of intelligence focussed on countering every advance of the enemy. The war in Europe became an affair of siege-tactics; and, on the whole, it was the Central Powers who were besieged, and who vainly tried to break through the investing lines. In such a war the endurance of the home populations was strained as well (although not so much) as that of the field armies; and if the endurance of the population of one or other side collapsed, the War would be over. Consequently it became one of the objects of the contesting nations to shut out all supplies, whether of peaceful or warlike goods, from reaching their enemies. As the Entente Powers had command of the sea, they had the best chance of starving out their opponents. German and Austrian sea-borne trade (except in the Baltic) was absolutely suppressed from the beginning of the War; but there still remained the traffic by land and sea of neutrals with the Central Powers. Could the Entente Governments put a stop to this?

The condition of sea-borne trade in war according to International Law, the subject of many controversies and conventions since the time of Grotius, was governed at the outbreak of the War by the Declaration of Paris, made in 1856. This Convention was subscribed to by Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey, and subsequently by most civilised Powers except the United States. The Declaration of Paris stated:

1. Privateering is and remains abolished.

M: ED—3

2. The neutral flag covers enemy goods with the exception of contraband of war.

3. Neutral goods with the exception of contraband of war cannot be seized under the enemy flag.

4. Blockades to be obligatory must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a sufficient force really to forbid access to the coast of the enemy.

Until 1917, when the German navy assumed the offensive with an unrestricted submarine campaign, the pressure on sea-borne trade was almost entirely from the side of the Entente. Consequently the Entente Powers tended to give the narrowest scope or interpretation to the Declaration of Paris, while the Germans and the neutral States naturally gave it the widest interpretation. With regard to Rules 1, 3 and 4 the Entente Powers gave no trouble. Nobody thought of starting the expensive and hazardous enterprise of privateering (Rule 1). Neither the British nor the French Government ever declared a blockade of Germany (Rule 4). There were some local blockades, of German East Africa (300 miles of coast) so declared in February, 1915, and of Turkish, Bulgarian and Greek coasts in the Mediterranean (declared in 1915 and 1916). There was no legal blockade declared concerning the German coasts in Europe. The nearest approach to such a legal blockade was the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, declaring that no merchant vessel would be allowed to proceed to or from a German port. The ships and goods thus seized would be paid for by the British Government. That this system amounted to blockade was freely acknowledged by the Foreign Office.¹

After the first few weeks of the War there was no question concerning neutral goods sailing in ships under the enemy flag (Rule 3), because the enemy flag, except on ships of war, was not seen on the ocean. The Entente Governments (and in this respect the work mainly fell to the British Foreign Office and Admiralty) concentrated their attention on Rule 2: "the neutral flag covers enemy goods excepting contraband of war." The vital question was, what is contraband? At first the contraband list,

¹ No Order in Council used the expression blockade or formally declared a state of blockade to be in existence in regard to the German and Austrian coasts. But in diplomatic correspondence the British Secretary of State did say, "the British fleet has instituted a blockade" (Grey to Ambassador Page, March 13, 1915, in J. B. Scott, *Diplomatic Correspondence, etc.*, p. 42). In British official papers of the War the term "blockade" was often used.

as recognised by the British Orders in Council, was comparatively short; gradually it was extended. By the end of the War there was nothing of any use to the Germans which was not considered by the Entente to be contraband of war and as such liable to seizure and condemnation.

The argument of the Foreign Office in extending the list of contraband articles was logical and conclusive: it was that war was now being waged not against armies but against whole nations; and consequently any articles which added to the resources of the enemy nations were really munitions of war. Besides, each belligerent State commanded the services of all its inhabitants: although everybody was not in uniform and on active service, yet everybody was directly or indirectly employed in war-service. Therefore, the British Government contended, the distinction could not be maintained between goods intended for the military forces, and goods intended for the peaceful inhabitants, of the enemy country.

The Declaration of London, 1909, scheduled contraband of war under eleven headings.¹ The articles thus scheduled were arms and projectiles and other things easily recognised as munitions of war. But a subsequent clause stated that certain other goods "susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace" might, without notice, be treated as contraband of war: the goods thus scheduled ("conditional contraband") included foodstuffs, clothing, shipping, railway material.² Still another clause scheduled seventeen kinds of things which could *not* be declared contraband: among these were cotton, oil seeds, and rubber.

As a matter of fact, owing to the action taken by the House of Lords, Great Britain, when the War broke out, had not ratified the Declaration of London. One of the first acts of the State Department of the United States was to urge, in a telegram to the Embassies abroad, dated August 7, 1914, that the belligerents should adopt the rules of the Declaration.³ Nevertheless, Great Britain would probably still have declined to ratify it, but that France and Russia (as well as Germany and Austria) notified their adhesion to the Declaration. Accordingly on August 20, 1914, by an Order in Council of His Majesty, the King adhered to the

¹ Declaration of London, Chapter II, Article 22.

² *Ibid.*, Article 24.

³ Hendrick, *Life of Page* (1923), I, 373.

Declaration of London, under certain reserves. The chief reservation was to substitute a British list of contraband and conditional contraband for the list originally contained in the Declaration of London. The British list thus substituted did not really differ much from the Declaration list: it did not include cotton, oil seeds or rubber among the articles of conditional contraband: but it was prefaced by the saving words "until we do give further public notice." Under protection of these words, rubber and copper were added to the British list of conditional contraband by Order in Council of September 21, 1914, and, as absolute contraband, cotton was added on August 20, 1915, and oleaginous seeds and nuts on October 14, 1915. This Order in Council of October 14, 1915, was particularly precise as well as wide in its range; if neutral ships could find anything outside the schedule to take to the Germans they were welcome to do so: it could scarcely be a lucrative trade to either party.¹

The great diplomatic battle raged over cotton. Indeed there were two battles: one between the British Government and the American; the other, between the British Admiralty and the Foreign Office. The Admiralty (and, naturally, the War Office) were absolutely decided in favour of declaring at once copper and cotton to be contraband. They were right to press this view: it was their business. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, was absolutely decided in its view that nothing should be done to incur the enmity of the United States. Here, then, was the perpetual conflict which went on inside the ranks of all the belligerents, the conflict between military and political expediency. In no part of their conduct of the War did the British and French Governments show more skill: they adjusted the rival claims of the soldiers and the diplomatists, and were not afraid, on occasion, to give the diplomatists the preference. So momentous were the issues that hung on this adjustment that the German Ambassador at Washington, when all was over, seems to have held the view that the Entente won the War by subordinating military to political necessity, while the German Government lost the War by sacrificing politics to military necessity.²

¹ The relevant sections of the Declaration of London and the relevant Orders in Council are given textually in the Appendices of Pyke: *The Law of Contraband of War* (1915), pp. 253-99. Also *State Papers, British and Foreign* (1914), pp. 72, 100; (1915), p. 313.

² Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America* (on date), pp. 9-10.

The United States Ambassador at London saw a good deal of both battles: that between the fighting men and the diplomatists, and that between the Foreign Office and the State Department. He knew that the Admiralty was pressing Sir Edward Grey to authorise the stopping of United States cargoes to Germany; he sympathised with Grey's difficulties; yet he was bound to uphold the rights of the United States Government, the historic champion of the Neutral Flag. "I fight Sir Edward Grey about stopping cargoes," wrote Page towards the end of 1914, "literally fight."¹ Grey said to him, "You push hard," but he added, "you play fair."² On the other hand, Page was just as anxious as Sir Edward Grey to avoid a rupture between Great Britain and the United States. While standing up for the rights of the United States, he also advised the Foreign Office how to answer the State Department, and indicated the limits to which the Foreign Office or Admiralty could safely go. "In all this," writes Grey, "Page's advice and suggestion were of the greatest value in warning us when to be careful or encouraging us when we could safely be firm."³ With the views of the State Department on maritime law, Page had little sympathy. "God deliver us from library lawyers," he telegraphed to Colonel House.⁴

The dispute about cotton only concerned the crop of 1914. When the War broke out this crop was about ready for shipment. Contracts had been entered into. Much of the crop was going to England—there was no difficulty about shipping this; but much was also due to be shipped to Germany. Throughout the rest of the year 1914 these shipments from the United States to Germany were going on. British sentiment was naturally highly aroused by this, for cotton was a staple article in the making of explosives. British (and French) soldiers were being shot, British ships were being sunk, by projectiles containing explosive made from cotton. On the other hand, the American cotton growers and shippers were indignant at the idea that the British Government should step in and debar them from fulfilling their contracts with German firms or with neutral countries through which, perhaps, cotton might pass to Germany.

¹ Hendrick, *Life and Letters of W. H. Page* (1923), I, 365.

² *Ibid.*, III, 191.

³ Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, II, 110.

⁴ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, arranged by Charles Seymour (1926), I, 305.

There were two great dangers which might come upon the Entente Powers if opinion in the United States was seriously aroused against the Entente policy in the cotton question. One was that the United States Government might prohibit the sale of munitions of war by Americans to the belligerents. Such a prohibition would have suited the Central Powers, for the British Navy prevented them from getting American munitions, which were, of course, contraband of war. Much pressure was brought to bear on the Administration of Washington to place an embargo on the export of warlike material.¹ The refusal to declare an embargo was, partly at least, dictated by self-interest. "I hope the President never gives in on the arms question," wrote Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House; "if he ever gives in on that, we might as well hoist the German eagle on the Capitol."²

The second danger which might have been provoked if the Foreign Office in 1914 had put cotton on the list of contraband was that the United States might reply by arranging naval convoys for American merchantmen. Such convoys would have made it impossible for the British to stop American merchant ships and to examine their papers, without producing some incident like those which gave rise to the War of 1812. It is believed that if Congress had either placed an embargo on the export of munitions, or had instituted convoys for American shipping, the Entente Powers "would have lost the war in the spring of 1917."³ Blockade of Germany," writes Lord Grey, "was essential to the victories of the Allies, but the ill-will of the United States meant their certain defeat."⁴ When cotton was finally made contraband (with a guarantee of a minimum price) by the Allies in 1915, the Germans at once found a substitute. Lord Grey's opinion is: "Had we made it [cotton] contraband in 1914, we should have run all the risk I have described and gained nothing."⁵

The influential Councillor of the State Department, Mr. Lansing, was prepared to stand up for his view of the rights of the United States in a way that was very inconvenient for Great Britain. Mr. Lansing was a good lawyer, versed in the precedents of the

¹ Statement by W. J. Bryan, Secretary of State, published in *Current History*, Vol. II (1915), p. 1178. Grey, *op cit.*, II, 116.

² *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 23.

³ Hendrick, *Life of Page*, I, 368.

⁴ Grey, *op. cit.*, II, 64.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

Law of Nations. In the Notes which the State Department sent to the Foreign Office (largely the work of Mr. Lansing) the case of the United States was argued in a strict and somewhat acrid legal manner that jarred seriously on the war-jangled nerves of the British diplomatists. One of the Notes, concerning the Declaration of London, was, as originally drafted, so strongly worded that the President would not give his approval. He showed the Note to his friend Edward House, who urged that the British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, should be taken into conference. This procedure, somewhat unusual in diplomatic circles, was adopted. Colonel House saw the British Ambassador and showed him the Note. Sir Cecil urged that it should not be sent in that form: he went so far as to say that the Note as it stood would appear like a challenge to fight.¹ Colonel House went back to Mr. Wilson, who referred the Note to Mr. Lansing for re-drafting. When returned to the President, it was still considered to be too strong. Between them, however, Mr. Wilson and Colonel House softened it into something which the American Ambassador could, without much anxiety, hand to the British Foreign Secretary. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice told Colonel House at Washington that if the Note as originally written had been presented to Sir Edward Grey "it would almost have been a declaration of war."²

In a dispatch a little later (dated October 16, 1914) Mr. Lansing made the curious proposal to Page that Great Britain should be advised (1) to accept the Declaration of London without reservation; and (2) to issue a subsequent proclamation "interpreting" the Declaration as she chose. When Page dutifully conveyed this message to Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary bluntly, and with some signs of irritation, said: "Do you mean that we should accept it [the Declaration], and then issue a proclamation to get around it?"

Page felt this reply deeply, because, honest as the day himself, he felt that in this particular negotiation he had been charged with a dishonest mission. Mr. Lansing had instructed him to convey the suggestion about "interpreting" the Declaration of London, "stating very explicitly that it is your personal suggestion and not one for which your Government is responsible." Against these words in the dispatch Page wrote as a comment: *This is not*

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 308.

² *Life of Page*, I, 378 (House to Page, October 3, 1914).

true. Lansing's dispatch had continued: "Let the British Government issue an Order in Council accepting the Declaration without change or addition. Let this Proclamation be followed by another Order in Council, of which the United States need not be previously advised." Opposite this Page's written comment was: *Hardly frank*.¹ It did not take Sir Edward Grey more than a moment to see through this.

The British Navy has always been something of a dominating (only unfriendly critics would say, domineering) influence on the high seas. On this account, the people of the United States, who have a fine naval tradition, have always scrupulously examined the attitude of the British Navy towards their shipping, and have been, quite naturally, a little sensitive about it. On the other hand, because the French Navy has never been powerful enough to claim command of the sea and because of the friendship of the War of Independence, the people of the United States have not been quite so sensitive regarding the acts of the French Ministry of Marine. Reflecting on this natural and intelligible piece of national psychology, Mr. Page was able to guide both his own Government and that of Great Britain out of a very embarrassing difficulty.

An Act of Congress passed at the opening of the War permitted foreign-built ships to be transferred from their existing registry to the registry of the United States.² This fact could easily have very momentous repercussions on the European War. Such a transference, however, merely to enable quondam German ships to sail the high seas and to trade with the mother country could scarcely be regarded as a *bona fide* transference to American registry. The British Government was bound to protest against it. On the other hand, the American Administration and public were properly jealous of their right to admit foreign shipping to their registry.

Such was the condition of affairs when Mr. E. N. Breitung of Michigan, in January, 1915, purchased the Hamburg-American cargo-ship, *Dacia*, registered it as an American ship, and loaded it with cotton for Germany. If the Entente Powers concurred in this, a precedent would be established for the admission to the

¹ Hendrick, *Life of Page*, III, 186-7.

² *The New International Year Book* (New York), for 1914, p. 725.

benefits of the United States flag of all the German ships which were lying in American harbours, unable to go out because of the watching British cruisers. On the other hand, if Great Britain should seize the *Dacia*, she would step straight into a bitter controversy with the United States—"and this would serve the German purpose quite as well."

The biographer of Page has stated his opinion that the affair of the *Dacia* was as serious as the *Trent* affair of 1861.¹ Great Britain would do almost anything to keep the goodwill of the United States, but she simply could not let the *Dacia* go through to Germany. Page said that the discussion which he had with Sir Edward Grey on this question was "the most ominous conversation I have ever had with him."²

The Foreign Office and Admiralty knew all about the *Dacia* affair. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, who regarded the Washington Embassy and the maintenance of Anglo-American friendship as the crown of his life-work, had, with a heavy heart, to inform the State Department that the *Dacia*, if she sailed for a German port, would be seized. The atmosphere remained tense at Washington. Over in London there was gloom and anxiety: the newspapers kept the public on the tiptoe of expectation. There was no Jingoistic spirit in Great Britain. Nobody thought recklessly of the prospect of facing a hostile United States.

One day Page "dropped into" the Foreign Office, as he had formed something of a habit of doing. He was admitted into Sir Edward Grey's room. The two men had become friends, and Page's visits were not always official. Even Sir Edward Grey's constitution required rest, and he was the better for a few minutes' unreserved talk now and then.

"Have you ever heard of the British fleet, Sir Edward?" Page remarked.

The British Foreign Secretary was puzzled, and could only answer with a vague affirmative.

"Don't you think it's had too much advertising?" was the American Ambassador's next query.

Sir Edward was now quite unable to follow the trend of thought. He was hopelessly overworked in those days, and Page's *persiflage* amused him even if he did not always take its point.

"France has a fleet too, I believe," was Page's next step. Sir Edward must have seen the drift of thought now, but he let Page go on.

¹ Hendrick, *Life of Page*, III, 223.

² *Ibid.*

"Well," said the American Ambassador, "there's the *Dacia*. Why not let the French fleet seize it and get some advertising?"¹ Wireless did the rest. The *Dacia* was met and taken into custody by a French warship, and no diplomatic trouble ensued.

As regards the Declaration of London, the view of the British Admiralty was gradually adopted by the Foreign Office and was, on the whole, steadily maintained. Not only were cotton and oleaginous seeds made contraband by Proclamation of August 20 and October 14, 1915, but a Proclamation of March 30, 1916, further whittled away the degree of adhesion to the Declaration of London made in the Order of October 29, 1914. An Order of April 13, 1913, next abolished the distinction between absolute contraband, goods destined for the fighting forces, and conditional contraband, goods which were to be treated as contraband if not used exclusively by the civilian population, on the ground that practically all the population was taking part, directly or indirectly, in the War.

The Proclamation named 169 commodities or classes of commodities which were declared to be Contraband of War. The list, arranged alphabetically, looks like an absolutely complete catalogue of everything necessary to physical existence.²

Colonel House when at London in May, 1915, had told Sir Edward Grey that there would have been a great risk of Congress placing an embargo upon the export of munitions, if the Germans had not angered people even more by their submarine policy. House proposed that the British Government should agree to remove their prohibition of the import of foodstuffs by sea into Germany provided that the German Government should undertake to abandon its submarine policy and also the using of asphyxiating gas. Sir Edward Grey was favourable to the proposal, although he was uncertain whether he could induce the Cabinet to agree. When Colonel House placed the proposal before the German Foreign Office he received a "brusque refusal." Sir Edward Grey's comment to House upon this was: "It settled the German contention that they were compelled to wage their sub-

¹ *Life of Page*, I, 395. Colonel House suggested later that the French Ambassador at Washington, M. Jusserand, might come out more prominently in the blockade question, and so direct the attention of the Americans to the French blockade policy, instead of the British. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 57.

² *State Papers, British and Foreign* (1916), pp. 180-6.

marine policy against Great Britain because she was endeavouring to starve 65 million non-combatants.”¹

The other neutral states besides the United States had their grievances: Sir Edward Grey, whose Notes could be of the politest character, could also, on occasion, write with almost aggressive severity. On December 15, 1915, he began a series of Notes addressed to the Swedish Government with reference to the seizure by British authorities at Kirkwall of parcels containing rubber, consigned to Sweden. The Swedish Government protested vigorously, and demanded arbitration during the War on the question of the detention, but Sir Edward Grey refused any concession which would endanger the right of search.²

Towards the end of the War an awkward situation arose between the Entente Powers and Holland. In June, 1918, a convoy of Dutch Government passengers and goods was about to proceed from Europe to the East Indies. The Dutch authorities had, in response to some public demand, imprudently stated that “the commander of the convoy would not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships.” The British Government, in concert with the French Government, relieved the Dutch authorities of embarrassment by agreeing “to waive their right of search in this particular case,” after being satisfied, by the submission of Dutch papers, of the innocent character of the voyage. The Dutch Government expressed its pleasure at this announcement, and took note that no point of international law was involved.³

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 444-6, 448, 450, 453; II, 16.

² The correspondence is in *State Papers, British and Foreign* (1916), 531-59.

³ *State Papers, British and Foreign* (1918), 533-44.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNITED STATES IN 1915 --1916

The aloofness of the United States from the affairs of Europe is a fact caused both by tradition and by geography. The tradition was started by George Washington's Farewell Address, and Thomas Jefferson's Inaugural, which contained the famous warning against "entangling alliances." Geography is even stronger than tradition. An Englishman or a Frenchman requires to be only a few days in America to feel how far away Europe is, what a thick curtain of sea and air shuts off the Old World from the New. When the European War broke out, crowds, always interested in anything new, gathered in the streets of the great American cities to watch the bulletins; people tried to imagine Germans in "field grey" uniforms and *pickelhaube* helmets filing through the streets of Liège; it was as easy to imagine what things were like when the Assyrians marched into Egypt or the hordes of Ariovistus crossed the Rhine to attack Cæsar's legionaries. Nevertheless, there were thoughtful Americans who saw that vital American interests were deeply involved.¹

Since the chivalrous Lafayette came to help in the War of Independence there has been a tradition (not indeed very active) of friendship between the United States and France. With the Germans the people of the United States are said never to have felt much affinity, in spite of the number of Teutonic immigrants into America and in spite of the number of American scholars who used to be trained in Germany. Lack of knowledge of foreign languages adds to the remoteness of the Americans; few understand German; even French, the language of diplomacy, was not, within the eight years of one German Ambassador, spoken by a single Secretary of State.² In Washington M. Jusserand (the French

¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1914, p. 10. The argument here is that Germany's desire for a "place in the sun" would lead her equally, if she won the War, to demand Hawaii and other American possessions. Cf. Roosevelt, *America and the World War* (1916), p. 13.

² Bernstorff, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16. He was Ambassador at Washington from 1908 to 1917.

Ambassador from 1902 to 1925) always spoke English. The only European nation which the Americans could understand was the British. Moreover it was (and is) a cardinal point of British policy to do nothing which would estrange America. King George V said to Mr. Page, when the Ambassador first came to London: "I don't want anything done that will cause us to be misunderstood by your people"¹ This was a year before the European War broke out.

The German Ambassador who was at Washington for the first three years of hostilities says that three factors decided the attitude of Americans towards the War: there was, firstly, the pacifism of the ordinary American, who is usually all in favour of his country remaining at peace, because he knows that the United States is prosperous, and he does not want to lose that prosperity. Secondly, there was the inflammability of opinion of the Americans, always impulsive, sentimental, sensitive for their national honour. Thirdly, there was the "English background" of American civilisation, thought, habits. Count Bernstorff says that "even if he had wished to do so, Wilson would not have declared war on England."

On the other side of the Atlantic affairs were not much different; that is to say, while the British Foreign Office had a fairly good acquaintance with American life, and had a very up-to-date American section, at the Wilhelmstrasse the two highest officials under the Chancellor had scarcely any acquaintance with American society. Herr von Jagow, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a cultivated gentleman, took to reading novels and books of travel when the war broke out in 1914 in order to gain some knowledge of American life. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary, had stayed two days at San Francisco and three days at New York, when crossing the continent of America about fifteen years before, on his way home from Shanghai. "He seemed to think that this trans-continental trip had given him an intimate knowledge of the American character."² Doubtless, the German Ambassador at Washington would have said that the State Department was equally ignorant of German affairs. Even Mr. Wilson, probably the most highly educated of the American Presidents, and the author of a book which dealt with European governments, had no profound knowledge of European affairs.³

¹ Hendrick, *Life of Page*, III, 30.

² Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany* (1917), p. 423.

³ Charles Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (1921), p. 25.

Wilson's portrait is familiarly known on both sides of the Atlantic: the figure of a well-dressed man, clean-shaven, the face of the best type of "college professor." Mr. Wilson had a thoughtful, refined countenance, a humane expression; a firm mouth with a decided chin; pince-nez giving as it were an extra touch of distinction to a face that would attract notice anywhere. It might perhaps not be unfair to say that there were three things about him which, in combination, made him uncommon among statesmen: intellectual power, obstinacy and loneliness. His health was not very good and he did not care much for society; instead of making the daily meals at the White House a means of conversation with the outside world, of intense political and social intercourse, as Roosevelt did, Mr. Wilson lived very simply with members of his own family, saw scarcely any people, was kind and considerate and anxious to understand the point of view of others when he did meet them (which was not very often), and lived in what Ambassador Page called the village college professor's style: the habits of the Princeton scholar.

The eloquence, at once natural and cultivated, of Mr. Wilson, his strong literary sense, made his speeches and messages a wonderful medium for conveying lofty, refreshing sentiments to the weary peoples of the Old World for whom wars were shattering their ideals. Sometimes, however, his remoteness from ordinary life, as well as his desire to find striking expressions, led him into making phrases which jarred on people's feelings, and at the same time called forth ridicule. "We shall not, I believe, be obliged to change our policy of *watchful waiting*."¹ "There is such a thing as a man being *too proud to fight*."² Sometimes he seemed to be mastered by his own phrases, and he said things which, looked at closely, had very little meaning: "The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the *acid test* of their good will."³ Yet when all deductions are made, Mr. Wilson's speeches must be recognised as having been messages of hope and healing to the battered and lacerated peoples of Europe with whom he was associating himself in the great fight.

¹ Message to Congress, December 2, 1913, with regard to Mexico.

² Speech at Philadelphia, May 10, 1915.

³ Address to Congress, January 8, 1918. "Acid test" occurs in No. VI of the Fourteen Points. The Speeches down to April 6, 1918, are in Scott, *President Wilson's Foreign Policy* (1918).

That Great Britain and Germany, or France and Germany, might clash together was recognised as an imminent danger for some years before the War. Mr. Wilson was alive to the danger, and made an effort, by the House Mission of May, 1914, to avert it.¹ In the first Address to Congress after the outbreak of the European War, Mr. Wilson, while pointing out that America was at peace with all the world, drew attention to two facts: Firstly: "Now, when we need ships, we have not got them"; secondly: "We must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry, trained and accustomed to arms."² At this early date he was contemplating the possibility of having to take part in the War. His private secretary stated later (1916) that Mr. Wilson was influenced in his policy of abstaining from intervention in Mexico by the desire to keep his hands free for a probable greater intervention. In 1916 the President told his secretary: "It begins to look as if war with Germany is inevitable."³

At Berlin, when the War broke out in 1914, the German Emperor gave the American Ambassador on August 10 a curious document, for transmission to President Wilson, in which the Emperor stated that Belgian neutrality *had to be violated for strategical reasons*. The Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, had said this too in his Reichstag speech of August 4, but had insisted that France had begun war before this. The Kaiser, writing six days later to Mr. Wilson, did not put forward any claim that France had begun hostilities first.⁴ The Emperor's message was not made public; but even so, Count Bernstorff, Ambassador at Washington at the time, stated: "It was to be expected that public opinion in America would range itself overwhelmingly on the side of the Entente. As a result of the violation of Belgian neutrality, this happened far in excess of expectation."⁵ It is stated that on hearing of the invasion of Belgium Mr. Wilson had deliberately to restrain his impulse to champion a cause which, he felt, involved the civilisation of the world.⁶

In public, he might perhaps have expressed his horror, with his

¹ See *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 249, and Mowat, *Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States* (1925), p. 341.

² December 8, 1914, in Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 74, 80.

³ Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him* (1921), p. 159.

⁴ Document and criticism in Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, pp. 200-7.

⁵ Bernstorff, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁶ Tumulty, *op. cit.*, p. 226. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 49-50.

admirable gift of putting ideals into words. The American Ambassador in London felt the omission to do so very keenly. Theodore Roosevelt had the same feelings. "I regard with horror," he wrote to Sir Edward Grey, "the fact that this Government has not protested under the Hague Conventions as to the outrageous wrongs inflicted upon Belgium."¹

The Diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Germany after the outbreak of the European War may be taken to begin with a Note of August 5, 1914, identical with that sent to other belligerent governments, suggesting the advisability of observing the Declaration of London. On August 19 the German Government agreed to do so, provided that other belligerents did likewise. Subsequently (October 24, 1914), the United States withdrew its suggestion that the Declaration of London should be adopted as a temporary naval code, because the belligerents had refused to adopt it without modifications. The United States therefore declared that the rights and duties of its Government and citizens would be defined by the existing rules of international laws and by existing treaties.²

No serious trouble arose between Germany and the United States until after February 4, 1915, when the Imperial Government gave notice that they would treat the waters around Great Britain and Ireland as a war zone. In reply, Mr. Bryan, the United States Secretary of State, on February 10, drew the attention of the Imperial Government "to the critical situation...which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens." It appears likely that this firm and very proper statement must have been drafted by the strong-minded Mr. Lansing.

The next serious event was a mysterious and disquieting notice, published above the superscription of the *Imperial German Embassy, Washington, D.C.*, and dated April 22, to the effect that: "Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies, and Great Britain and her allies...and that travellers sailing in

¹ Letter of Feb. 1, 1915, in Grey, *op. cit.*, II, 154.

² For the above and subsequent correspondence see Scott, *Diplomatic Correspondence between the United States and Germany, 1914-17* (1918). A temperate statement of the British and American points of view is given by C. E. Fish in Chapter XV of the *War Book of the University of Wisconsin*.

the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk."¹ This notice, although dated April 22, did not actually appear in the Press (by what Count Bernstorff calls "one of those fatal coincidences beloved of history") until May 1. This was the very day on which the *Lusitania*, a liner of the Cunard Steamship Company, sailed from New York. Count Bernstorff declares in his book that the warning was quite general and had no reference to the *Lusitania*. At 2.30 p.m. on May 7 she was torpedoed by a German submarine off the south coast of Ireland. Of her 1,153 passengers, 783 were drowned or otherwise killed, and of these more than one hundred were American citizens. The critical situation which Mr. Bryan envisaged in his Note of February 10 had arisen.

The State Department was bound to take notice of this, but the dispatch that Mr. Bryan directed to the German Government on May 13 was curiously inconclusive and vapid, especially when put side by side with the brave (and grave) warning conveyed in the Note of February 10 to Germany. Instead of going on to face the "critical situation" foretold in his Note of February 10, Mr. Bryan merely wrote: "It [the United States Government] *confidently expects* that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence."² There was, however, something a little stronger at the end: "The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or *act* necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States."² If President Wilson was responsible for this bellicose touch, it was too much for Mr. Bryan, who resigned on June 8, 1915. The Note made all the less impression on the German Foreign Office because Dr. Dumba, Austrian Ambassador at Washington, telegraphed to Herr Zimmermann that Mr. Bryan had told him that the Note was not meant seriously. Mr. Bryan had at least gone so far as to propose writing a letter to this effect, but Mr. Wilson had refused to sign it.

¹ It was originally intended that the German Consulate at New York should issue the warning. But apparently the Consulate was unwilling, so Count Bernstorff took the responsibility of publication upon himself—Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, p. 115.

² The italics are, it is scarcely necessary to say, not in Mr. Bryan's dispatch.

However the idea got about, Herr Zimmermann believed it, and told Ambassador Gerard, who passed on the information to the United States Embassy at London.¹

Mr. Gerard expected that the United States would immediately break off diplomatic relations with Germany, and he prepared to leave Berlin. Count Bernstorff at Washington was very apprehensive also, and thought that the best that could be made of a bad piece of work was to apologise and to say that it was a mistake. Unfortunately for Germany, as it seemed, Dr. Dernburg, head of the German propaganda in the United States, in a speech at Cleveland defended the destruction of the *Lusitania* on the ground that she was carrying munitions. "This speech aroused a storm of execration throughout the country."² Colonel House, who was in London on a peace mission to Great Britain, France and Germany, wrote on May 30 (1915) to Mr. Wilson: "I have concluded that war with Germany is inevitable," and he at once determined to return to America.³ He not merely thought war inevitable, but just and noble. "America has come to the parting of the ways, when she must determine whether she stands for civilised or uncivilised warfare." This was a telegram of Colonel House to Mr. Wilson, which he showed to Mr. Balfour in London. House was treating the British Government as, at any rate, a potential ally.⁴

The next Note from the State Department (June 9) was written by Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State *ad interim* (he was soon appointed definitely). Mr. Lansing's stiff and precise phraseology, which was gall and wormwood to the British Foreign Office (itself most mellifluous when its case was weakest), was now employed in a more gratifying way in meeting the German contentions. He had no difficulty in pointing out that it was the business of the United States Government to see that ships did not sail from American ports with false papers; that the *Lusitania* would not have received clearance if she had not been entitled to it; and that if the German Government had evidence of the United States having failed to perform its duties thoroughly, "the United States sincerely hopes that it will submit that evidence for consideration." The Note then declared that "the Government of the United States very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representation of its note to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May."

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 451; II, 6.

² Bernstorff. *op. cit.*, p. 118.

³ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 453-4. ⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 434, 438.

The reply of the German Government (July 8) was really insulting. It did not produce any evidence in support of its charges against the character of the *Lusitania*. Instead, in case the United States could not get together enough shipping of its own to transport those of its citizens who had to cross the Atlantic, the "Imperial German Government is prepared to interpose no objections to the placing under the American flag by the American Government of four enemy passenger steamers for the passenger traffic between America and England." These four ships would be assured "free and safe passage." The State Department's reply was that it "cannot accept the suggestion." This Note (July 21) also stated: "The Government of the United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the *Lusitania*."

Colonel E. M. House, who through his unique position in the political and social life of America had exceptional opportunities for gauging public opinion, has said that the people of the United States would have authorized a declaration of war after the sinking of the *Lusitania*.¹ But the "storm of execration" which Count Bernstorff mentions was not permanent: and the moment for intervention passed away.

The sinking of the British liner *Arabic* on August 19, 1915, by a German submarine brought about another crisis. Two American citizens lost their lives. If the German Government would not disavow the act, the United States Government would have been bound, in conformity with its former Notes, to break off diplomatic relations. On this occasion it was Count Bernstorff who saved Germany. He used all possible pressure to induce the unwilling and unbelieving Berlin authorities to disavow the act of the submarine commander. "The situation is more tense than it has ever been," wrote House to Grey on September 14, "and a break may come before this letter reaches you."² However, on October 2 Bernstorff telephoned to House that he had obtained the necessary disavowal from Berlin. "If it had not been for his patience, good sense and untiring effort," wrote House to Gerard on October 6, "we would now be at war with Germany."³

Between this date and January 31, 1917, when Germany an-

¹ Grey, *op. cit.*, II, 125. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 434, 453-4.

² *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 45.

³ *Ibid.*

nounced the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare, there was only one other occasion when military intervention of the United States seems to have been likely to occur.

In February, 1916, Colonel House, at that time the chief, perhaps the only, friend of President Wilson, was in London, working as his wont was, silent, effective, self-effacing. His first great peace effort, made at London, Paris and Berlin in the spring of 1915, had been utterly wrecked by the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*.¹

Grey, who began work at seven in the morning and continued late at night, usually "broke off work by seven in the evening and took things easily" at his house for an hour before dinner. In this "free" hour he was always ready to see Colonel House, and many conversations took place. Grey writes:

House left me in no doubt from the first that he held German militarism responsible for the war, and that he regarded the struggle as one between democracy and something that was undemocratic and antipathetic to American ideals.²

It was in the course of one of these numerous conversations that the two statesmen agreed upon the drafting of a paper, which was to become famous later as the House Memorandum (February 22, 1916). The Memorandum (with one alteration made by Mr. Wilson) stated:

Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a conference should be summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany.

Colonel House expressed the opinion that if such a conference met it would secure peace on terms not unfavourable to the Allies; and if it failed to secure peace, the United States would [probably] leave the conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies, if Germany was unreasonable.

When Lord Grey first published in 1925 this now famous Memorandum there was naturally much discussion concerning the alteration made by Mr. Wilson. The publication of *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* has disclosed that it was the insertion of the word "probably" at the end of the second paragraph. The insertion had no special significance. It merely brought the second paragraph into conformity with the sense of the first, which stated in the original version that in certain circumstances the United States

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 433. ² Grey, *op. cit.*, II, 124.

would "probably enter the war against Germany." As by the Constitution, the right to declare war resides only in Congress, the President himself could not, in so many words, absolutely pledge his country. That the British Foreign Office knew of Mr. Wilson's sincere intention is proved by the cable-message which House sent to Grey from Washington on March 8, immediately after he had made his report: "He (the President) authorises me to say that, so far as he can speak for the future action of the United States, he agrees to the memorandum with which you furnished me." It was legally impossible for the President to commit himself and the United States further.¹

"Thus," comments the editor of Colonel House's Papers, "did Opportunity knock loudly upon the door of the Allied Cabinets. . . . This offer was being made at a moment when the United States was being anathematised for its supreme indifference to the cause of justice and humanity. Roosevelt thundered his imprecations."

To all this President Wilson had made no public response, had essayed no self-justification. But in private, the offer which he made through Colonel House was the most complete of responses.²

It was the view of Colonel House that if the Germans as well as the Entente Powers would agree to go to such a conference, the peace-terms mediated by the United States would include the restoration of Belgium and Serbia, the transference of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, and of the Italian-speaking districts of Austria by Italy. Germany would retain some colonies, perhaps gain some.³

The tragic fate of diplomacy in time of war is that it has to work silently, meticulously, carefully, taking long views and therefore slowly, while every day men's lives are being lost, and the degree of human anguish is deepened. It required time for the French and British Governments to exchange views. Then, as the French resistance at Verdun hardened, and as the great Somme offensive was being prepared, the tendency was to wait until the summer campaigning season was over. By the time the Allies as a whole might have been ready to enter into the House proposal, the Memorandum was already out of date. The Asquith Govern-

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 201-2. Cp. Hendrick, *op. cit.*, III, 289-90, where it is wrongly stated that the first "probably," at the end of the first paragraph, was inserted by Mr. Wilson.

² Seymour in *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 204.

³ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 170 and note.

ment in England was falling. A new and perhaps more optimistic Ministry, that of Mr. Lloyd George, came into office on December 7, 1916. Five days later the German Government announced that it was prepared to enter into negotiations for peace, but without specifying any terms. Their attitude seemed to render any conference useless from the point of view of the Entente, who were determined to get back Alsace and Lorraine. It was now not worth while for President Wilson to summon the conference, which was outlined in the Grey-House Memorandum of February 22, 1916. For either the Germans would not come, or if they came, they would refuse to cede Alsace-Lorraine;¹ the United States would then join in the War as a belligerent, but meanwhile the inevitable pause in hostilities caused by the conference might have completely disorganised or disintegrated the war-effort, or the "war-will" of the Entente peoples. By the end of 1916 President Wilson must have seen clearly that the United States would soon be fighting, as happened two months later; it was better, therefore, that his country should enter into hostilities that were being pursued steadily by united allies than into a war just re-started after the delays, the disappointed hopes, the intrigues, quarrels, vacillations of an unsuccessful peace-conference.

It is said that Colonel House envisaged one other moment, in addition to that mentioned in the Memorandum, when the United States might have entered the War in 1916. Shortly before the drafting of the Memorandum he had been in Paris and had seen M. Briand. The United States, said Colonel House, could not allow Germany to win the War. If France would notify the United States that American military assistance was indispensable in order to prevent the triumph of Germany, such aid would be forthcoming. The only condition attached to this offer was that the notification must come in time to enable American assistance to be decisive. "The proposal amounted to a demand that France, in case she was able to see her approaching destruction far enough ahead, should, so to speak, sound the tocsin, in which case the country would hasten to her assistance. The French Republic never sent such a message."²

¹ Prince Bismarck in 1925 told House that Germany "would not have considered these terms for a moment." Note by Seymour in *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 273.

² Hendrick, *op. cit.*, III, 288-9 Cp. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 163.

CHAPTER VII

DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKAN PENINSULA

Bulgaria emerged from the Second Balkan War disappointed and full of resentment against her former Allies.¹ That Turkey was permitted to regain Adrianople was a diplomatic victory for Germany, and strengthened German influence at Constantinople: it was almost fatal to King Ferdinand's position in Bulgaria.² This sinister personage, a curious mixture of political gambler and millionaire, was not likely to let bygones be bygones. He was soon silently weaving new schemes, always, however, with his eye on some safe retreat where his bankers could maintain him in elaborate and artistic comfort for the rest of his life.

When the Great War broke out all the Balkan States were at sixes and sevens with each other. The result was disastrous for Europe, and justified the warning and prophecy which an aged French politician made to M. Guéchoff in 1912: "Your *bloc* of four Balkan States is called upon to exert a preponderating influence on the unstable European equilibrium; this *bloc*, once broken, will become the shuttlecock of the ambitions of the great European States."³

That Ferdinand of Bulgaria offered a military alliance to Germany in August, 1914, is stated by Djemal Pasha in his *Memoirs*.⁴ By the revised Bulgarian Constitution of 1911, foreign policy was completely in the hands of the King⁵; he may therefore have had formal agreements with Germany or Austria-Hungary, of which neither his own people nor the rest of the world would

¹ See Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914*, p. 280.

² Nekludoff, *Diplomatic Reminiscences*, 210-11, 217.

³ Guéchoff, *La Genèse de la Guerre mondiale* (1919), p. 119. M. Guéchoff was Premier of Bulgaria in 1911-12, and was one of the makers of the Balkan League.

⁴ Djemal, *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman*, p. 127. See also Theotokes to King of the Hellenes, August 4, 1914, in *Livre Blanc Grec*, No. 19.

⁵ See *Serbia and Europe, 1914-25*, edited by Marcovitch (1920), p. 176.

know. It appears fairly certain that Ferdinand's secret relations, in the years immediately preceding the World War, were with the Austro-Hungarian Government: that together, they were planning to make impossible a greater Serbia.¹ The Greek Minister at Berlin (M. Theotokes, who inclined to the German interest) reported on June 25, 1914, that an agreement between Austria and Bulgaria appeared to have been concluded. Three weeks later, the German Minister at Athens officially confirmed this view.² A long and unwary manifesto issued in Bulgaria on her entry into war on October 3, 1915, claimed that "our hitherto loyal neutrality has been the cleverest policy during the present war and has brought our land sufficient advantages"—the chief advantage being adequate time to get ready for fighting.³ When King Ferdinand actually drew his sword, it was at a skilfully chosen moment, fatal to the Serbian army which was just holding its own with the Austro-Hungarian enemy in front.

Not merely had the Serbs and Bulgars a ground of serious quarrel, but there was friction between the Serbs and Greeks. The Serbs unwillingly acquiesced in the annexation of Salonica by the Greeks. However, the opposition to Bulgaria made them allies. During the dispute which led to the Second Balkan War, Greece and Serbia had made a secret treaty of alliance, dated May 19, 1913. This was stated in the preamble to be "a purely defensive accord." It had a legal limit of ten years, subject to the right of either Party to denounce it by giving six months' notice. By Article 1 the Contracting Parties mutually guaranteed their possessions. They undertook that if an unprovoked attack was made upon one of them, the other would come to the aid of its ally with its entire military forces.⁴

When the European War broke forth, the Premier of Greece, M. Venizelos, was in Munich on the way to Brussels, where a meeting was intended to take place with the Grand Vizier of Turkey relative to the Ægean Islands. In reply to a telegram from M.

¹ See Pinon in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. XIII, Feb. 1, 1913, p. 580 ff. Notice that this article was written *before* the World War.

² *Livre Blanc Grec* (trans. Paris, 1918), No. 13 (Theotokes to Streit, July 25, 1914), also Nos. 25, 26.

³ The whole Manifesto is given textually in Müller-Meinungen, *Diplomatie und Weltkrieg* (1917), II, p. 778 ff.

⁴ Text in Guéchoff, *La Genèse de la Guerre mondiale*, pp. 161-5. *Livre Blanc Grec*, pp. 5-25.

Pashitch, Premier of Serbia, M. Venizelos replied that he would submit to his Council of Ministers and to the King a proposal in favour of the intervention of Greece in the War, if Bulgaria should attack Serbia.¹

The Serbo-Greek Treaty of Alliance of May 13, 1913, was, literally interpreted, a treaty of mutual guarantee against an unprovoked attack by any third Party; but, in effect, it was interpreted as only guaranteeing the two States against an attack from Bulgaria. But even with this limited interpretation of the Treaty M. Venizelos was unable to have his own way when the time came for intervention against Bulgaria. King Constantine absolutely refused. His sympathy, as he had stated in a telegram to his brother-in-law, the German Emperor, at the opening of the War, was on the side of the Emperor: "I can never forget that we owe to him Kavala."²

If King Constantine had been a man of high capacity his career would now be regarded as one of the great tragedies of history. But being only a man of moderate capacity, he arouses little interest, even in his most fateful decisions, his most tragic failures. This big, breezy man, with the blunt, military manner, the hasty temper, the agreeable camaraderie, had once many friends, and he undoubtedly had his country's interest at heart. But he had, as a ruler, three great faults: firstly, he was not able always to see the proper decision to be made (indeed few people can do this). Secondly, he was incredibly obstinate: having made a wrong decision, he never swerved from it. Thirdly, he was blindly conceited, so that he was prepared to stake the existence of his kingdom upon his own unaided judgment, and on his own ability to carry his plans into effect. Those things being said, it is fair to put the case for Constantine. Apart from his personal sympathy with the German military and authoritarian system, he honestly held that the good of his kingdom lay in a neutral course. He saw two mighty groups of Powers fighting against each other. If either group were going to win, he thought that the Central Powers would do so. But if he joined either group, his own weak country, before the final victory, might become the sport of hostile

¹ Speech of Venizelos in Greek Parliament, Sept. 21-Oct. 4, 1916. Venizelos to Alexandropoulos, July 26, 1914, in *Livre Blanc Grec*, No. 15. Text in *Greece in Her True Light* (New York, 1916), p. 42 ff.

² Aug. 7, 1914 (not published until 1917). *Livre Blanc Grec*, No. 21.

armies, might be sacked and ravaged like Belgium or Northern France. He was not going to risk that. So he took the course that led eventually to exile, to the fall of his dynasty, and almost to the ruin of his country.

M. Venizelos was of a different type, for he possessed the supreme quality which, when united with strength of character and power of leadership, makes a man a statesman, deserving the title of great. This supreme quality is the ability to judge, amid the complex and conflicting facts of the present, what is the right course to pursue for the future. Ordinary men, men of respectable talent, can deal with the events of each day, can carry through the higher routine of government. But only a few exceptional men can make the right decisions for years ahead, can set a course which will decide the issues of fate beneficently for generations unborn. Among these few great statesmen, M. Venizelos must be included. He has had decisions of appalling difficulty to make; and so far as a historian can judge, he has always been right, although either the passions of the populace or the feebleness of his country's resources, or sometimes simply ill-luck, have prevented him from carrying his decisions into effect.

At first M. Venizelos hoped to reconstruct the Balkan Alliance by inducing his own Government and that of Serbia to make certain territorial concessions in Macedonia to Bulgaria. This design, however, failed. The concessions, especially those which Serbia was prepared to offer, were not sufficient to induce the Bulgarian Government to maintain its neutrality. Then came the Bulgarian invasion of Serbia in October, 1915. The Greek Government had to decide what its action would now be, in view of the Serbo-Greek Treaty of Alliance.

Three times already had the Greek Government been compelled to make the fateful choice between war and peace—in August, 1914, when M. Venizelos had himself advised in favour of neutrality; in January, 1915, when he had definitely recommended that King Constantine should declare war on the side of the Entente,¹ and in March, 1915, at the time of the Dardanelles Expedition. On this last occasion King Constantine, in refusing intervention, was influenced by a warning that came to him from M. Sazonoff. This was to the effect that Russia would look upon any participation of Greece in the taking of Constantinople as

¹ Document in Crawford Price, *Venizelos and the War* (1917), p. 61 ff.

extremely undesirable.¹ When Venizelos found his advice rejected by the King, he resigned. The ill-fated M. Gounaris became Premier.

Before the Bulgarian invasion of Serbia, Venizelos had come back into power. At the end of August, 1915, he was again Premier. In September, as Bulgaria was mobilising her forces, the Greek mobilisation was ordered to take place too. The Greek General Staff, however, objected that the Serbo-Greek Treaty of Alliance was not operative, unless Serbia would supply the 150,000 men stipulated in the military convention attached to the Treaty. The Serbs obviously were not in a position to do so. Accordingly M. Venizelos asked² the Ministers of France and Great Britain (September 23, 1915) if their Governments would provide the men. The answer was that French and British divisions would be sent, although the full number of 150,000 men could not be made ready at once. This was what might be called the legal ground of the Salonica Expedition. It had, as might be expected, been foreseen and prepared for; the first Entente forces began their landing at Salonica on October 3. The Greek Government made a protest, *pro forma*, against this, in order to preserve its neutrality until the *casus fœderis* should present itself. This *casus fœderis* was the actual intervention of Bulgaria, which took place on October 3. M. Venizelos advocated active co-operation with Serbia, in a vigorous speech made in the House of Representatives on October 4. On the following day King Constantine sent for him and exacted his resignation.

M. Venizelos was succeeded as Premier by M. Zaïmis, a prudent, taciturn statesman who never involved his country or himself in any serious crisis. He maintained the policy of neutrality. M. Venizelos, on the other hand, was quite unrepentant. He held that the Greek army, co-operating with the Serbian until the Entente troops could have come up in force from Salonica, would have averted the tragic rout of the Serbs in October-November, 1915, and the almost complete loss of Macedonia. He had the confidence of the bulk of the Greek people; his party was in a majority in Parliament. In November his party defeated that of M. Zaïmis, who resigned office; but the Zaïmis Cabinet (and policy)

¹ Statement of Greek *chargé d'affaires* at Petrograd, in *Revue Politique*, Jan. 2-15, 1916, *apud* Crawford Price, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

² Statement of Venizelos, *Kiryx*, April 23, 1916, in Price, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

practically reappeared again under the premiership of M. Skouloudis. This was the end of Constitutional Government in Greece. The King dissolved Parliament. New elections were held on December 9. The Venizelists, in protest, abstained from voting. They would surely have done better to have used their strength to return a majority to the House. M. Skouloudis remained as Premier.

Parliamentary Government was now impossible. Britain, France and Russia, the Three Protecting Powers named in the Treaty of 1863 which established the Glucksbourg dynasty, now refused to consider the treaty binding. For in it Greece was declared to be an Independent, *Constitutional* State; but now, it was no longer constitutional. The Entente Powers therefore kept their troops at Salonica, and occupied Corfu as a refuge for the Serbian Government. From that lovely island, King Peter and M. Pashitch could look over the strip of blue water to the mainland, whither they never despaired of returning.

On May 26, 1916, there took place what is perhaps the most astounding act in the long drama of Balkan politics. A Bulgarian force came down to Fort Rupel, which commanded the Struma entrance into Southern Macedonia. Rupel was strongly fortified and was held by a thousand Greek troops. They surrendered without a blow. The *Greek White Book*, published after Venizelos returned to power in 1917, gives documents showing that the surrender of Rupel was pre-arranged between King Constantine's circle and the Bulgaro-Germans. The approaching occupation of Rupel was announced by the German Minister at Athens, Count Mirbach-Harff, to M. Skouloudis on May 23. M. Skouloudis acknowledged the Minister's communication on the same day, and took note of the conditions which Germany undertook to observe.¹ This brought upon Greece the misfortune of a blockade by the Entente, to force the King to hold new elections and to have a more sympathetic Cabinet. M. Skouloudis resigned on June 23, and M. Zaïmis again became Premier. But the new Government did not prove more *sympathique* than the last. Greece was half starved; the children turned into beggars whimpering after strangers for "currants" (*staphudia*), but King Constantine only grew in bitterness. He was not actively unneutral himself, but the Greek bays and islands became refuges for German submarines,

¹ *Livre Blanc Grec*, Nos. 48, 50.

and there was nobody to stop this. The most humiliating blow of all came when on September 15 the Bulgarians, having occupied Eastern Macedonia, coolly deported the whole Greek division of 8,000 men who were stationed at Kavala. The Greek soldiers were taken to Germany and were interned at Görlitz. All this happened without Greece and Bulgaria being at war.

At last M. Venizelos, despairing of his country under the prevailing administration of King Constantine, left for his native island of Crete, and proclaimed the establishment of a Provisional Government (September 27, 1916). He invited the King to place himself at the head of the national movement to restore Greece which was now "ragged, decomposed, dying." In October he passed with Admiral Condouriotis, a hero of the Balkan Wars, to Salonica and instituted a Cabinet of National Defence. Most of the Greek garrisons which remained in Macedonia accepted his authority. On November 24 the Provisional Government declared a state of war existing between Bulgaria and her Allies.

For months the relations between the Entente Powers and Greece had been tensely strained. French and British warships were in the Straits of Salamis; Entente Notes demanded as guarantee of Greek neutrality the surrender of stated amounts of Greek heavy arms. The Cabinet of King Constantine, now directed by a Professor of the University of Athens, Spiridon Lambros, acceded to most of the Entente's demands. On December 1, 2,000 French and British marines were landed at Phaleron. They marched towards Athens to receive the surrendered Greek guns. Suddenly from the heights on either side and in front they were fired upon by Greek machine guns. The Entente troops took cover and attempted to reply. French destroyers began shelling the Greek heights but did little damage. A long-distance battle went on from the forenoon until 7 p.m., and only stopped after the Entente destroyers had begun shelling the King's Palace. The losses to the Entente troops were about 130 killed and 300 wounded.

The sands were running out; the "battle" of December 1 looked like being the end of King Constantine's reign. Yet an extreme crisis was staved off by an official Greek apology, and by a march of Greek troops who saluted Entente flags on the Zappeion on January 29, 1917. King Constantine would have undoubtedly fallen, but for the scruples of the Russian Government (Constantine was the son of a Russian Grand-Duchess) and of the Italian Govern-

ment, who feared the "nationalist" aims of the Venizelists in the direction of Southern Albania.¹ But in March, 1917, the Russian Revolution took place and the Tsar Nicolas II abdicated. M. Venizelos gave assurances to the Italian Government of the moderation of his territorial aims. To make things quite sure, the Italian Government proclaimed the independence of Albania under the protection of Italy (June 4). The Russian Revolution of March, 1917, forestalled further opposition from the Tsar. The entrance of the United States into the War on April 6, 1917, was a guarantee that no protests would come from that quarter. So in June the Entente Powers sent a High Commissioner, M. Jonnart, to Athens, with full powers to deal with the Greek situation.

M. Jonnart (who had plenty of Allied ships and men at his disposal) acted with extreme decision and promptitude. On June 11 he communicated to the Greek Premier (who was again M. Zaïmis) the decision of the Entente Powers that King Constantine must abdicate the throne. M. Zaïmis was probably the best man for the difficult duty of carrying through the transition to a new *régime*. He does not admit the public to his confidence, so no one knows what took place at the scene between him and the King. Constantine's temper was always explosive; and now, for nearly three years, his nerves had been racked by exciting, desperate, humiliating, tragic battles of diplomacy with the Entente Powers. M. Zaïmis induced him to drink the last dregs of the cup of humiliation. On June 12, in a dignified manifesto, in which, however, he perhaps rather obviously put on the martyr's mantle, the King announced his abdication. He left Greece two days later in a Greek transport with his wife and eldest son. He withdrew to Switzerland. His second son Alexander, who, aged twenty-four, was too young to have committed himself to either side, was recognised by the Entente as King. On June 24, on M. Jonnart's advice, King Alexander invited M. Venizelos to come from Salonica and to form a Government. On June 25 M. Venizelos arrived at the Piræus. He announced that the period of unconstitutional rule at Athens was ended. Greece was to be again a free, monarchical and constitutional State. On June 30 Greece officially broke off diplomatic relations with the Central Powers. The great Cretan who had never, in the darkest days of the War, swerved

¹ Italy opposed to the last the deposition of King Constantine. Page to Wilson, June 22, 1917 (Hendrick, *op. cit.*, III, 381).

from his original decision to join the Entente side now at last received full powers to act.

Montenegro had joined in the World War in 1914 along with Serbia, but its conduct did not satisfy its allies. The main task of the Montenegrin army was to defend Mount Lovchen which overlooked and commanded the Austrian port of Cattaro. In January, 1916, the Austrians captured Lovchen. It was reported that negotiations were going on between Montenegrin authorities and the enemy. The Montenegrin army, which could have been safely evacuated to Corfu or Salonica, was retained on the mainland by King Nicholas, and was made prisoner by the Austrians. King Nicholas found a refuge in France and passed there the rest of the war-period on a subsidy paid by the French, Italian and British Governments.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PEACE EFFORTS OF 1915-1916

In the first months of the War peace, although often mentioned, was not expected. The vast masses of men, the complex machinery of modern government, the magnitude and also obscurity of the issues involved, made the "winding up" of hostilities an insuperable task for the time being: the War was like some frightful, huge machine which some one, by pressing a button, had set in motion, but which nobody knew how to stop. Yet there were people working for peace from the outset.

The first opportunity seemed to come after the battle of the Marne. From the beginning of the War President Wilson had indicated clearly his readiness to act the part of mediator. Colonel House was ready, as soon as an opportunity appeared, to put forward proposals for the combatants to consider. On September 6, actually while the battle of the Marne was being fought, the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, said that "the Germans were making a mighty effort to gain a decisive victory in France, and that, when that was accomplished, they would be ready to consider overtures for peace."¹ The Battle of the Marne turned out to be a defeat for the Central Powers. It was not, however, decisive. "Outside opinion" considered it to be "rather the saving of Paris than a great victory; an arrest of the German advance rather than a turning of the tide."² The Germans themselves, as can be judged from the memoirs of their commander, von Kluck, did not regard the Marne as a decisive defeat.³ They were therefore not prepared to accept such terms as the Allies would have offered. In particular they could not possibly have considered terms

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, edited by Charles Seymour (1926), I, 323.

² Grey, *op. cit.*, II, 164.

³ A. von Kluck, *The March on Paris*, 1914 (1920), p. 145 ff.

involving the destruction of Prussian military power; and this, rightly, was the thing which Great Britain and France, amid all vacillations, kept in view. Page was really correct when he wrote in his vigorous way to House a week after the battle of the Marne: "You needn't fool yourself; they are going to knock Germany out, and nothing will be allowed to stand in the way. And unless the German Navy comes out and gets smashed pretty soon, it will be a longer war than most people have thought."¹ So the moment of the Marne passed without any serious effort at peace.²

This opportunity, if indeed it was one, vanished in an instant. The belligerents set themselves to a furious contest for mastery before winter should close them in. The Pope, Benedict XV, however, by reason of his international character and his eminent public position, was able first to command attention with suggestions for peace. In a pastoral letter issued early in September he exhorted the rulers to make peace; and in an encyclical, published on November 16, he denounced this and all wars as being "due to the idea that material welfare is the only object in life." He took occasion in the same document to renew the papal protest "against the abnormal situation in which the vicar of Christ is placed in Rome."³ It had already been reported that the Pope was taking steps to be represented at the Peace Conference, with a view to obtaining some regulation, under international guarantee, of his status in Rome.⁴ The report was denied, but it made an impression on the Italian Government. When, a few months later, Italy made a treaty with the Entente for intervention in the War, one article stipulated that the Papacy should not be permitted to take a part in the peace settlement. On December 7 (1914) it was reported at Rome that His Holiness was trying to arrange a Christmas truce, but that he had little hope of succeeding; and on December 24, when receiving the Cardinals, he had sadly to admit that "this Christian initiative was not crowned with success."⁵ Nevertheless, the Powers which hitherto had not been

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 333.

² Cp. *The Diary of Lord Bertie*, edited by Lady A. G. Lennox (no date), I, 36-44. Lord Bertie makes it clear that there was no talk between Great Britain and France after the Marne about immediate peace.

³ *Times*, Nov. 17, 1914.

⁴ *Corriere della Sera*, No. 8, 1914, quoted in the *New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1914.

⁵ *Times*, December 8, 26, 1914.

in direct diplomatic relations with the Papacy were taking steps to remedy this. On December 12 the British Government announced the appointment (from the old Catholic family of Howard) of an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Vatican. France did not send an ambassador to the Vatican until May, 1921.

Down to the end of the year 1916 no great effort to mediate a peace was made, but there were places where peace agencies, official or unofficial, never lost touch with each other. One such place was Switzerland, a State perpetually neutral according to the treaties of 1815, and one which was in a position to have her neutrality respected. By a Declaration of August 4, 1914, the Swiss Government proclaimed its determination to defend its neutrality, and declared that, if necessary, it would exercise its right, under the treaties, of occupying Upper Savoy.¹ Actually, Swiss neutrality was completely respected during the War, and the country was an oasis in the midst of strife. It was, consequently, a place where not merely neutrals, but even citizens of the belligerent nations could meet. Geneva, which is more cosmopolitan than the capital, Berne, was the usual place for such meetings. The head offices of the International Red Cross Society are at Geneva; the city was therefore the centre of much of the relief-work connected with the War. It has always been a favourite abode of political exiles, anarchists like Bakhunin, Communists like Lenin, legitimists like King Constantine or the Emperor Charles of Austria. During the War officials, bankers, politicians, professors, men of means and leisure passed through Switzerland or sojourned for a time in one or other of its pleasant cities. Much quiet conference went on, sometimes between people with an official authorisation, sometimes between influential private people, who, if their mission succeeded, would find means to have it officially taken up. On Swiss soil "tentative" offers could be made without the State which (unofficially) made them being committed. An English Member of Parliament, formerly in the diplomatic service, would be in a Geneva hotel, when some educated Turk, with an assured Western manner, would open his bosom (stating carefully that he was only a private person), and would sketch the possible lines along which the Turkish Government might make peace. Such conversations were usually put on record by

¹ Text in Grunberg, *La Suisse neutre et vigilante* (1917), p. 129.

one or other of these private ambassadors and found their way to the Government at home and sometimes were preserved in its archives. Besides these conferences in that cloudy area between an official and a purely private venture, there were some duly authorised and serious conferences in Switzerland, like the Revertera-Armand,¹ and the Smuts-Mensdorff discussions.

In the year 1915 there was no highly organised effort at breaking off the war by negotiation. The belligerents were not yet exhausted: each side had still fair hopes of winning. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was the first to show a sign of weakening in its war-effort: its resources were not adequate to years of intense hostilities.

During the negotiations which went on in the spring of 1915 between Italy and Austria concerning the compensation for Italy's neutrality, a message came from the Italian Ambassador at Berlin: "from certain indications clearly confirmed from an authoritative source, I gather that Germany would not refuse to treat for peace with Russia."² (Germany would not refuse to treat (in terms satisfactory to her), but probably Austria was the mainspring of the affair. On April 13 the Italian Ambassador at Sofia telegraphed: "Rumours are in circulation of a possible separate Austro-Russian peace." Such a peace was said to be the talk of Viennese political circles.³ At Petrograd the French Ambassador got wind of the movement too. On March 28 M. Paléologue makes an important entry in his diary: the Tsar had just shown to M. Sazonoff (who showed it to M. Paléologue) a letter from Prince Gottfried von Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at Berlin, formerly *attaché* at the Austrian embassy at Petrograd. Prince Hohenlohe, after adverting to the pacific dispositions of the Court of Vienna, suggested that the Tsar should send a person in his confidence to Switzerland to meet an emissary of the Emperor Francis Joseph. "This letter," said M. Sazonoff to M. Paléologue, "shows how low the Austrian morale is. It will, however, remain unanswered. The old Francis Joseph is not yet sufficiently disgusted with the war to resign himself to the conditions which we intend to impose on him." M. Paléologue was privately of opinion that this peace-tentative should have received

¹ See Manteneuer, *L'Offre de Paix Séparée de l'Autriche* (also English Trans., *Austria's Peace Offer*): see below, Chap. XI.

² Ballati to Sonnino, April 2, 1915 (*Italian Green Book*, No. 61).

³ *Ibid.*, No. 68.

more attention: he wrote in his diary: "Will the uncertain support which we count on from Italy be equivalent to the immediate and irreparable injury which the defection of Austria would inflict upon Germany?"¹

Early in 1916 Colonel House after visiting Berlin and Paris made his celebrated proposal to Sir Edward Grey for the holding of a peace conference. But the idea came to nothing.²

The first public offer of peace was made by the German Government on December 12, 1916, in a Note addressed to the Government of the United States. This Note had been in preparation for some months, and had, as the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, stated later, been suggested in the previous October by the Emperor William. The text of the Emperor's Note of October 31, 1916, has been published.³ The statement is confirmed by the account of the United States Ambassador in Germany. In September, 1915, Mr. Gerard had told Herr von Jagow, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Mrs. Gerard was going to America. Herr von Jagow therefore "insistently urged" Mr. Gerard to go too, "in order to make every effort to induce the President to do something for peace."⁴ Mr. Gerard went, and thus it happened that the German Peace Note of December 12 was not delivered to him but to the United States *Chargé d' Affaires* at Berlin. It is remarkable that the German Government, having encouraged the President of the United States to try and make peace, should then issue a manifesto on its own account, thus forestalling the announcement which it knew that Mr. Wilson was likely to make.⁵ Herr Zimmermann, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said that the offer was meant to eliminate Wilson as a mediator of peace.⁶

The Peace Note of December 12, 1916, pointed to the ruin which threatened Europe if the war continued much longer. It alluded to the proof of "indestructible strength" which Germany and her

¹ Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars*, I, 335-6.

² See above, p. 52.

³ *Official German Documents relating to the World War* (Reports of Sub-Committees of the German Constituent Assembly), trans. by Carnegie Endowment (1923), I, 158.

⁴ Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, p. 346.

⁵ *Official German Documents relating to the World War*, I, 154-5 156-7, 129 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 133.

allies had given, and it mentioned, modestly enough, Germany's "considerable successes at war." In particular it drew attention to "the recent [Rumanian] diversion in the Balkans," which was "speedily and victoriously thwarted." Ready if necessary to carry on the war, the Central Powers, "animated by the desire to stem the flood of blood," proposed to enter now into peace negotiations. If, notwithstanding, the war had to go on, then Germany and her allies solemnly disclaimed any responsibility before mankind and history. No terms were stated, but the Central Powers felt "sure that the propositions which they would bring forward, and which would aim to assure the existence, honour and free development of their peoples, would be such as to serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace."

The German peace-offer, which was published in all important newspapers, appealed to the heavily burdened peoples of every belligerent State. But the Entente Governments received it very coldly. They appear to have been moved chiefly by two reasons: firstly, the German Government had made their offer at the moment when they happened to be in possession of nearly all the best "pledges": Antwerp, Brussels, North-Eastern France, Belgrade, Bucharest. If the proposed peace was to be based upon the apparent advantage of the German military situation, it would not in the remotest degree satisfy the Entente. Perhaps, however, the German Government would allow for the fact that the resources of the Entente were greater, and that time was on their side. But if so, the Germans gave no indication of being conscious of this. Thus the second reason for the coldness with which the Entente received the proposal was the absence of any actual terms of peace in the Note of December 12.

This was the fundamental error made by the German Government in all its peace-efforts. It refused to commit itself to any definite terms.¹ It could not resist the ordinary bargainer's temptation of trying, by not disclosing its "price," to secure more than the lowest it was prepared to accept. Yet the German Government must have known that unless it stated definite and reasonable terms the Entente would not really stop the war. The Entente could not afford to stop hostilities even for a month in order to negotiate on the undisclosed German terms; for if their terms

¹ Cp. Freiherr von Liebig, *Die Politik Bethmann-Hollwegs* (1919), p. 83 ff.

proved unacceptable, the Entente would have been tricked: they could never have induced their people to resume the war. It was probably the demands of the General Staff for vast strategical annexations which prevented the level-headed Bethmann-Hollweg from laying down in public a definite proposal of moderate peace-terms. Even Baron von Kühlmann, when he knew that Germany had lost the war, and when he was sacrificing his career to say so in his famous speech of June 25, 1918, could commit his Government no further on Belgium than to state: "We must decline to make, as it were, a prior concession by giving a statement on the Belgian question which would bind us without in the least tying the enemy."¹

President Wilson's Note, which he had long had in preparation, was dated December 18, 1916; being sent by cable, it was presented in the capitals of the belligerents almost immediately. He was "somewhat embarrassed," the President stated, by the coincidence of the German overtures, which thus seemed to be connected with his. There was, however, no connection in the origin of the two peace-notes so far as the President was concerned.

The President's suggestion was that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal. The President, the Note continued, "takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world." The President noted also that each side was ready to consider the formation of a League of Nations. He alluded in moving language to the tremendous losses in the war, and to the dark future of the civilisation of the world, if the war went on. "And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated."

The German Government answered one week later. But it adhered to its policy of naming no terms. It took note of the "highminded" suggestion made by the President of the United States, and stated its own view that "an immediate exchange of views seems to be the most appropriate road in order to reach the

¹ Cp. also the vague and varying outline of peace-terms in Ludendorff, *The General Staff and its Problems*, Chaps. XI, XIII, especially pp. 419,

desired result." It therefore proposed an immediate meeting of delegates of the belligerent States at some neutral place.

The Entente Powers replied to the German peace-offer on December 30, and to Mr. Wilson's Note on January 10, 1917. In their reply to the German offer they wrote: "a mere suggestion, without statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace." The Entente Governments refused to take the offer seriously: "In reality these overtures made by the Central Powers are nothing more than a calculated attempt to influence the future course of the war"; they were also meant "to justify in advance in the eyes of the world a new series of crimes—submarine warfare, deportations, forced labour, and forced enlistment of inhabitants against their own countries, and violations of neutrality." The Entente Governments therefore "refuse to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere."

The tone of this reply was somewhat scornful; its arguments, although sincere, somewhat superficial. In their reply to President Wilson's Note, the Entente Powers wrote more carefully and sympathetically. They went further—they stated, fairly precisely, their war-aims. These were: the restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Rumania, with just reparation; the reorganisation of Europe, guaranteed by a stable *régime* and based on respect for nationalities; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanes and Czecho-Slovaks, from foreign domination; the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilisation.

Lord Grey says in his memoirs that the year 1916 had been terribly difficult. The Germans had won on nearly every field. Yet in the spring of 1917 the undaunted Entente named terms which could scarcely have been more drastic had they been in occupation of Berlin.

In case the terms of the Note were not sufficiently exact, Mr. Balfour, who had succeeded Sir Edward Grey as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, proceeded to dot the *i* of each term in a dispatch or covering letter (along with a translation of the answer to the German Note) to President Wilson, on January 10, 1917.

In this dispatch the Entente Powers for the first time put for-

ward officially and in so many words the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France as one of their war-aims: "We may hope that the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of Italia Irredenta to Italy, or any other of the territorial changes indicated in the Allied Note." The reform of international relations would be impossible if peace were based on the success of the Central Powers, or the temporary "war-map" that they had created. "Such a peace would mean the triumph of all the forces which make war certain and make it brutal."

For a durable peace can hardly be expected unless three conditions are fulfilled. The first is that the existing causes of international unrest should be as far as possible removed or weakened. The second is that the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples. The third is that behind International Law, and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardest aggressor.

The Belgian Government, which was not one of the Allies under the Pact of London, sent a separate reply to President Wilson's Note. The President's remark that the belligerents, judged by their public statements, appeared to be pursuing the same aims, evidently rankled in the Belgian mind as it did in that of the Entente Powers. "The example of Belgium unhappily demonstrates," said the reply, that the aims of the belligerents were very different. Her Government was convinced "that, at the final settlement of this long war, the voice of the Entente Powers will find in the United States a unanimous echo to the claims of Belgium, the innocent victim of German ambition and of German greed, to the rank and position that are marked out for her among the civilised nations by virtue of her blameless past, by the valour of her soldiers, by her fidelity to honour, and by her people's remarkable aptitude for work."

On the rejection of her peace-offer by the Entente Powers Germany issued a vigorous statement to the Neutrals. She protested that she had made "an honest attempt to terminate the war"; she disclaimed responsibility for the continuance of bloodshed; and she denied that the Entente Powers could claim to be the champions of small nations considering "the fate of the Irish people, the destruction of the freedom and independence of the Boer

Republics, the subjection of Northern Africa by England, France and Italy, the suppression of foreign nationalities in Russia, and, finally, the oppression of Greece, which is unexampled in history. ' The Germans had a right to criticise the Entente policy in Greece, but the phrase *unexampled in history* must have made the statesmen who read it a little doubtful of the German sense of proportion.

On January 22, 1917, President Wilson delivered an address to the Senate, alluding to the "identic note" which he had recently sent to the belligerent Governments. He was still seeking a means to a final peace. On paper, the assurances given him by the belligerents were satisfactory:

But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all,—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory.¹

The text of the speech was sent to Ambassador Page in London several days before it was spoken, in order that he might have it printed in some of the more pacifically minded newspapers. Page approved of the speech as a whole, but thought that the phrase "peace without victory" was not happy. He immediately sent a cabled message to Washington, respectfully deprecating the use of the phrase. Mr. Wilson, however, took no notice of Page's remonstrance, and "peace without victory" was spoken two days later. "There are probably few Americans to-day who do not regard this phrase as one of the greatest mistakes of President Wilson's career."² The speech was delivered only twelve days before diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany were severed.

¹ Full text in *President Wilson's Foreign Policy, Messages, Addresses and Papers*, edited by J. B. Scott (1918).

² Hendrick, *Life of Page*, III, 316. Page's message of remonstrance was received at Washington at 8.50 p.m. on January 20.

CHAPTER IX

THE COLLAPSE OF RUSSIA

"The Russian lacks staying qualities," wrote Page to Wilson on October 29, 1914; "he quits, sometimes, just before victory."¹

The War put a terrific strain on the resources, moral and material, of all the belligerent Powers: it was only a question of time before one or other of them should succumb under the strain. Many people believed that the Entente Powers would endure the pressure longest; but in actual fact it was Russia which collapsed first. The Tsarist bureaucracy threw its whole weight into the War. The effort of 1915-16 may be regarded as its swan-song. Corrupt, cumbersome, misdirected, the Tsarist bureaucracy did, in spite of all, make one magnificent, prolonged effort. It drained the country of its resources, it swept the men of the country—17,000,000 of them—into the all-devouring army, it maintained the pressure on a war-weary, half-famished, half-frozen people, until the bow snapped.

Everything was against Russia in the War. The country could not finance its own hostilities, it could not munition its own armies. Turkey's intervention on the side of the Central Powers resulted in the closure of the Dardanelles, and the blockade of Russia on the south. The Germans already practically blockaded Russia in the Baltic: only the meagre opening on the White Sea was left. Something was hoped from the intervention of Rumania. But it soon became evident that no relief could come from this quarter.

When the War started Rumania was, by a treaty made in 1883, a member of the system of the Triple Alliance. The aged King Charles, who had begun his active career as a Prussian officer, died on October 10, 1914. His political testament is said to have been: "I am a Hohenzollern, and our pledges to the German Emperor to observe neutrality must stand even though an enlarged kingdom

¹ *Hendrick, op. cit., III, 168.*

might result from our intervention.”¹ Under his nephew and successor Rumanian policy took a different orientation. M. Take Jonescu, an Ententophil ex-premier, stated unofficially but quite confidently that Rumania would join the Entente: “the only matter under discussion being the precise date.”

It took the Rumanian Government a considerable time to shake itself loose from the trammels of the Triple Alliance and to arrange suitable terms with the Entente Powers. At length, however, everything was ready, and on August 27, 1916, Rumania declared war on the Central Powers. She had a guarantee that her territorial aspirations over Transylvania would be favourably considered at the Peace Conference. However, the invasion of Transylvania by the Rumanian army had only a brief success. The German General Staff astonished Europe by detaching sufficient men from the Somme front, from Verdun, and other dangerous places, and by sending General von Falkenhayn with a powerful army to the Carpathians. There followed an appalling series of disasters to the Rumanian army. The Rumanian Government had to evacuate Bucharest. All Wallachia was lost. At last stability was reached on the line of the Sereth, on the border of Moldavia. The Rumanian Government made its seat at Jassy on the Pruth. It was in no position to help Russia.

A prolonged, unsuccessful war was the one thing necessary for the success of a revolutionary attempt. In 1905 the attempt was nearly successful, after the Russo-Japanese War. From 1907 to 1916 a Duma or Parliament was in existence, a concession made by the Tsar in 1906. But there was no system of responsible government. The Emperor's Council of Ministers always consisted simply of bureaucrats. Witte, Stolypin, Goremykin, Sazonoff and the others were all merely high civil servants. The Government was blamed by the public for the tragic failure of the Carpathian campaign of 1915 and for the awful losses in the retreat, which were largely due to lack of equipment and munitions. The assumption of supreme command of the Russian armies by the Tsar in September, 1915, was probably a mistake: it made the Tsar personally responsible for future military disasters, and by taking the Tsar to the military headquarters it left the Tsaritsa, not a very wise woman, supreme in ministerial circles at Petrograd. The Court was discredited by the presence and influence of the

¹ *New York Times*, Dec. 2, 1914.

dissolute peasant-monk, Rasputin, who was murdered in December, 1916.

The Tsarist Government, feeling its weakness and the coming storm, apparently began to make some sort of overtures for peace with Austria, in October, 1916.¹ Before this, Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, had perished at sea on his way to Russia (June 5, 1916). Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had decided to go to Petrograd himself at the end of the year, but he was prevented by the fall of the Asquith Government.²

The overtures of Russia towards the Central Powers were suspected in France and Great Britain, but were energetically denied. At last, in order to brace the administrative system for a more efficient prosecution of the war, a *coup d'état* was planned by some of the Grand Dukes and Generals, with the object of removing the Tsar and Tsaritsa from the control of affairs. The conspirators, however, were forestalled by a rising from below, on March 11, 1917, by workmen and soldiers of the Petrograd garrison.³

The Russian Revolution was at first accomplished with comparatively little bloodshed. It was taken into control by a coalition of the Constitutional-Democrat Party (the "Cadets" or Liberal Bourgeois) and the moderate Socialists (the "Social Revolutionaries"). These secured the abdication of the Tsar, formed a Provisional Government, and intended in due time to summon a Constitutional Assembly with a view to establishing Russia as a bourgeois republic on the model of France. Meanwhile, although the country was exhausted and the soldiers unwilling to fight, the Provisional Government honourably resolved to adhere to the Pact of London and to prosecute the war in common with the rest of the Allies. Nevertheless they took a step which relaxed discipline and helped to make the prosecution of the war impossible; Order No. 1 of the Ministry of War of the Provisional Government, dated March 22, 1917, abolished the death penalty for military insubordination.⁴

In July, 1917, the "Cadet" Provisional Government of Prince Lvov was succeeded by a moderate Socialist Government under

¹ These overtures were made public in the *Pester Lloyd* on February 28, 1919: see Lowes Dickinson, *Documents and Statements relative to the Peace* (1919), p. xxiii.

² Grey. *Twenty-five Years*. II, 130, 133.

³ Milinkov, *Russia, To-day and To-morrow* (1922), Chap. I.

⁴ See Gourko, *War and Revolution in Russia* (1919), p. 328.

the eminent advocate, Alexander Kerensky. The extreme Socialists, however, were working against his Government.

In 1909 a visitor at Vevey met a bullet-headed man with a domelike forehead and ruthless lips.¹ The face of the stranger, who was called Nicolai Lenin, made an impression on the tourist who wrote an account of it. When the War broke out Lenin—he had for years been an exile from his native land—was in Austria, trying to stir the workers to rebellion. The Austrians put him in prison for a time. He was released and went to Switzerland. By the end of the winter of 1916-1917 the Central Powers were feeling very depressed; the Entente were confidently expecting a speedy victory. The Russian Revolution seemed to give the chance of a respite to the Central Powers. The Revolution was loyal to its military obligations, but it might be corrupted. Someone suggested that the various Russian exiles—Socialists, Communists, Anarchists—might be allowed a safe passage back to Russia, in the hope that they would disintegrate the Russian power. In April, 1917, Lenin was conveyed by special train through Germany to Russian territory. The experiment was successful; it resulted ultimately in Russia going out of the war. It had other results—social, economic, political—which the Germans foresaw to be possible, and which, apparently, the German General Staff thought to be more than equivalent to the military advantage. General Ludendorff has written:

I could not doubt that the disintegration of the Russian army and nation involved an extraordinary risk for Germany and for Austria-Hungary.... By sending Lenin to Russia our Government had assumed a great responsibility. From a military point of view his journey was justified. But our Government should have seen to it that we were not involved in her fall.²

The organisation of the journey of Lenin and the rest of the trainload of Socialists was, apparently, arranged by the Swiss Socialist party, and chiefly by Federal Councillor and pacifist Fritz Platen. Lenin had also been helped by the Swiss Socialist editor of the *Berner Tagwacht*, Robert Grimm. Three German officials accompanied the sealed train of Russians across the Swiss frontier.³

On November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks, organised by Lenin, upset the Provisional Government and began their régime of terror.

¹ P. H. Box, *Three Master Builders and Another* (1925), p. 21.

² Ludendorff's *Own Story* (1919), II, 126.

³ Albert Rhys Williams, *Lenin* (1919), p. 38; Wilcox, *Russia's Ruin* (1919), pp. 238-9.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire was in a very bad way; Count Czernin had told the Emperor Charles in April (1917)¹ that it could not maintain the war for another winter. Czernin's hope was in a possible German success in the West—a breaking through the Franco-British lines, leading to the capture of Calais and Paris. "I at any rate cannot believe that the Entente, after losing Paris and Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as *inter pares*."² But in order that a German attack in the West should succeed, the Eastern Front must be freed from hostilities. On November 17, ten days after the Bolshevik Revolution, Czernin wrote from Vienna to a friend:

I have during the last few days received reliable information about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews, with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country that is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the most interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make peace, and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for they cannot carry on the war.³

The Austrian Government did not like the idea of treating with the revolutionary, communist Lenin. Czernin recognised that "this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe." He would have preferred "to march on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the power: peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our own salvation." So the Austrian had to pocket his pride and deal with the communist: "I cannot take a Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had."

On December 19, 1917, Czernin and his colleagues and staff set forth to go to Brest-Litovsk, where General Hoffmann, Herr von Kühlmann and other German officials were, and where they would all meet a Bolshevik delegation.

The Russian Commander-in-Chief, General Dukhonin, was superseded by Ensign Krylenko, Bolshevik Commissary of Military Affairs, on November 20 (1917). On December 1 Dukhonin was murdered by soldiers under Krylenko's eyes.

The Bolsheviks had already proclaimed, as their guiding principles for making peace, no annexations, no indemnities, open

¹ See Speech of December 11, 1918, in *Ottokar Czernin über die Politik während des Weltkriegs* (no date), pp. 10-11.

² Czernin, *In the World War* (1919), p. 214.

³ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

diplomacy, and the right of peoples to self-determination, even if this involved secession.

An Armistice was concluded on December 15 (1917).¹ One of the conditions which the Russians demanded was that no German ~~troops~~ stationed along the Eastern Front should be transferred to the West. General von Hoffmann, ~~in~~ charge of the German Armistice negotiations, made no difficulty about agreeing to this, because he had already given orders for the bulk of the German troops to be sent to the Western Front. Therefore Article 2 of the Armistice prohibited transfers of troops "unless such transfers had already been begun at the moment of the signing of the Armistice."²

General von Hoffmann also agreed with the Russian Commissioners, in order to secure open diplomacy, that at the end of each session of the peace-conference a full report, drafted by agreement between the two parties, should be issued telegraphically to the public.³

The Russian Armistice delegates also demanded the right of free admission for Bolshevik literature into Germany. General von Hoffmann was "obliged to refuse this," but stated that he was "quite willing to assist in the export of this literature to France and England."

As the Bolsheviks had not yet definitely repudiated the debts and contracts of the former Tsarist Government, they did disingenuous lip-service to the Pact of London by proposing first a "general peace" to include their Allies—France, Great Britain and the rest. The German military party demurred from the proposal for a general peace, for that would mean no annexations from France, Belgium or England: they "could not think of ending the war in this *unprofitable* fashion." Count Czernin, who reports this, and who knew that the Central Powers had long ago lost the war, adds: "It is intolerable to have to listen to such twaddle."⁴

Brest-Litovsk was a fortress of Russian Poland occupied by German troops. Czernin thus describes it:

This is a curious place—melancholy, yet with a beauty of its own. An endless flat, with just a slight swelling of the ground, like an ocean

¹ Text in *Text of the Russian Peace* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 1, and *Current History*, Vol. XIV, p. 11.

² *Text of the Russian Peace*, p. 2, and Hoffmann, *The War of Lost Opportunities* (trans. 1924), p. 199.

³ Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

⁴ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

set fast, wave behind wave, as far as the eye can see. And all things grey, to where this dead sea meets the grey horizon. Clouds race along the sky, the wind lashing them on.

In this place of grey monotony, the Conference began on December 20, 1917, in the former Russian theatre. The delegates of both sides met each other at certain meals. The first plenary session was held on December 25. The Central Powers accepted the proposal of the Bolsheviks for a general peace, based on the principle of no forcible annexations and no indemnities; the German Government only accepted the idea of a general peace because they were fairly sure that France and Great Britain would reject it.

We had to break the Entente officially with a view to making a separate peace with Russia. To this purpose applied the declaration of December 25, which represented a move in the political game which had begun in the East.¹

As a matter of fact, the Governments of the Entente countries took no notice of the proposal.

The chief German delegates were Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who seems to have been mainly a figure-head; General von Hoffmann, who struck Count Czernin as expert, energetic, calm and able, but a little brutal; and the sagacious Herr von Kühlmann, who was the chief representative of the German Empire. There were also Bulgarian and Turkish delegates. On the Russian side were Yoffe, a Jew, recently liberated from Siberia; Kameneff, a brother-in-law of Trotsky, also liberated from prison; and Madam Bizenko, the murderess of a Governor. She was silent and reserved and seemed to take little interest in the proceedings of the Conference, but whenever the International Revolution was mentioned, her expression altered: she became tense and eager like "a beast of prey seeing its victim at hand and preparing to fall upon it and rend it."

Yoffe too showed a keen interest in the idea of a world-revolution, and persisted in introducing it into the discussions. Czernin told him sharply that if the Russians wished to interfere with Austrian internal affairs they had better go back by the next train. "Herr Yoffe looked at me in astonishment with his soft eyes, was silent for a while, and then in a kindly, almost imploring tone that I shall never forget, he said: 'Still, I hope we may yet

¹ Ludendorff, *The General Staff and its Problems*, II, 539. Cp. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

be able to raise the revolution in your country too.'"¹ With this friendly thought in his mind, Yoffe passed on to the business of the day. Czernin thought that the Bolsheviks were not quite honest.

At first things did not go very well at the Conference. The Bolsheviks demanded that the Germans should evacuate Poland, Courland and Lithuania, and allow a plebiscite to be held there to determine the destination of the provinces. To this the Germans could not agree. "Those countries form part of the German munition establishment." The Bulgarian allies of Germany gave trouble: they did not wish to subscribe to the non-annexation principle. This apparently was characteristic of the Bulgarians all through the War: "They wanted everything and would give nothing in return."² "They had entered into the War with the object of annexations, and they had no intention of resigning them."³ However, they were compelled to give way: but the Bolsheviks did not. On December 28 the Conference went into vacation until January 6. The delegates returned to their respective capitals.

Czernin, after a brief sojourn at Vienna, arrived back at Brest-Litovsk on January 3, 1918. On the way he had received a telegram stating that the Bolsheviks wished to remove the Conference to a neutral place, for instance Stockholm. He and Kühlmann agreed to reject the Bolshevik suggestion. There was considerable anxiety lest the Bolshevik delegation should not return to Brest-Litovsk. "Certainly," notes Czernin, "if the Russians do break off negotiations, it will place us in a very unpleasant position." That evening, however, it became known that the Bolshevik delegation was returning, with Trotsky at its head. "It was interesting to see the delight of all the Germans at the news."⁴ Evidently a Bolshevik separate peace was worth a great deal to them. Trotsky himself was now the head of the Russian delegation for making peace. He at once put a stop to the informal walks and daily dinners of the Russian and German plenipotentiaries. For the rest of the Conference the Russians dined by themselves.

A Ukrainian delegation had recently arrived. Conferences

¹ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

² General von Stein: *A War Minister and his Work* (undated), p. 233.

³ Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

⁴ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

between them and the Central Powers began on January 6. All that the Ukrainians cared for was to have their independence recognised; all that Austria cared for was to have peace and the old Austro-Ukrainian frontier. So there were no particular difficulties in the way of this negotiation. The Bolsheviks were more troublesome. They still hankered after Stockholm, where "it would have been utterly impossible to keep the Bolsheviks of all countries from putting in an appearance." Czernin arranged on January 8 with the German delegation "to demand the continuation of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the form of an ultimatum." The Bolsheviks submitted. General Hoffmann, "elated at the success of our ultimatum to Russia, wished to go on in the same fashion and *give the Russians another touch of the whip*." But Czernin and Kühlmann were against this.¹

In spite of the fact that the Bolsheviks had at this time no military power (the Russian army having been practically broken up) the negotiations at Brest dragged on for a surprisingly long time. On January 12 General Hoffmann sharply reminded them of the realities of their situation. "The German armies were far within the Russian borders." Czernin thought this a mistake: he calls it Hoffmann's "unfortunate speech."² The General himself, however, was very proud of it; he had been "working on it for days." He was a curious-looking man: tall and broad, with an intelligent countenance, pince-nez, a large, perfectly firm mouth—he was the embodiment of expert ability, unencumbered by human weaknesses or sentiments: a sort of mechanical Martian with a brain.

On January 21 there was another interval. The hard-working Czernin went back to Vienna, and heard and saw how bad things were there. On the 28th he was back in Brest again. Trotsky arrived next day, as insolent and as shrewd as ever. He knew that revolution was brewing in Austria and Germany. The Bolsheviks, in fact, expected a world-revolution to break out in a few weeks; they were now merely prevaricating with peace negotiations, in order to give the world-revolution those necessary weeks to mature.³ At last the German Government, not without reason, lost patience. It had discovered an appeal by the

¹ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

² *Ibid.*, p. 237; cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-19, and Nowak, *The Collapse of Central Europe* (1924).

³ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

Bolsheviks to the German soldiers, inciting them to revolt, to murder the Kaiser and his generals, and to join the Soviets. This brought a telegram to Brest from the Kaiser bidding the delegates to demand Courland and Lithuania and Livonia and Esthonia, without any regard to self-determination. Before the rupture took place peace was signed with the Ukraine (February 8) on distinctly good terms for the Ukrainians, who knew that Austria simply had to make peace in order to get corn: "the peace with the Ukraine was made under pressure of imminent famine." It was popularly and gratefully called the "Bread Peace" (*Brotfrieden*) in Vienna.¹

On January 10 Trotsky refused to sign the "Annexationist Treaty" submitted to him by the Central Powers. At the same time he officially declared the state of war with the Central Powers at an end. Commander-in-Chief Krylenko issued the order for demobilisation. Thus war had been ended, but peace had not been made. The Germans—nor indeed anyone else—could not understand this condition of affairs, one that was neither war nor peace. "Kühlmann, notwithstanding all his self-control, was bewildered."² However, the Germans soon recovered from their surprise. The shadow-land of the Bolshevik mind, envisaging a condition which was neither war nor peace, would yield to the reality of facts. On February 18 the Germans declared the armistice at an end.

There followed what was surely the greatest humiliation ever suffered by a people. The German army simply advanced over Russia unresisted. The strong places—Dvinsk, Minsk, Reval, Pskov—surrendered without a blow.³ The German troops marched right into Finland, an independent State since December 7, 1917. Petrograd might be attacked and fall any day. Force aided diplomacy. The Bolsheviks had to capitulate. They had calculated that either the German military authorities would not start a campaign during winter, or else, if the campaign did begin, that the German troops would fraternise with the Soviets. Thus "the last hope was gone."⁴ So the Bolsheviks agreed to sign, on the ground that "it would be a rash adventure to enter upon a Holy

¹ Czernin, *op. cit.*, pp. 240, 249, 251, 257.

² Tirkova-Williams, *From Liberty to Brest-Litovsk* (1919), p. 474.

³ M. P. Price, *Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution*. Mr. Price's book is passionately in favour of the Soviets.

⁴ Price, *op. cit.*, p. 239. Verstraete, *Mes Cahiers Russes* (1920), p. 260.

War against German Imperialism, on the chance of a social revolution breaking out in Germany in the next few months.¹ A radiogram announced the surrender. On March 3 Trotsky, futilely protesting "this is a peace dictated by armed force," signed the treaty at Brest-Litovsk.

The treaty, although annulled later by the Conference of Versailles, is of considerable historical interest. Article 1, in spite of Trotsky's "no war and no peace" announcement of February 10, declared that the state of war between the Central Powers and Russia was ended. By Article 3 Russia disinterested herself in all territories west of a line marked on an appended map. The countries outside this line were Courland, Lithuania and Poland. Russia undertook "to let Germany and Austria determine the future fate of these territories in agreement with their populations". Russian troops were also to be evacuated from Lithuania, Esthonia and Finland (Article 6). When the treaty came before the Reichstag for ratification on March 19, the Chancellor, Count Hertling, explained Article 3, thus: that Courland and Lithuania were already united to Germany, while Livonia and Esthonia would, it was hoped, be in "close and friendly relations" with her. The Ukraine had already been acknowledged by treaty (February 8, 1918) to be independent. The destiny of Poland was not yet settled. On March 7 Germany by treaty acknowledged the independence of Finland.

By Article 6, Russia undertook to make peace with the Ukraine and to recognise the Ukrainian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In a supplementary treaty, signed on August 27, 1918, with the Central Powers, Russia undertook to pay to Germany a sum of 6,000,000,000 marks (£300,000,000) "as compensation for the loss to Germany caused by Russian measures."

Kühlmann's idea was that the territories which detached themselves from Russia should become "State-entities." Even if they did not "determine themselves" to join the German Empire, they would almost certainly receive the impress of German culture and administrative methods. They would thus form a ring or belt of client States on Germany's eastern frontier. If the Entente had not gone on with the war to the bitter end, Kühlmann's plan would have been realised in fact.

With the collapse of Russia, Rumania was absolutely cut off

¹ Proclamation of Lenin, February 23, 1918, in Price, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

from all assistance. Nevertheless, the Rumanian problem was not simple for the Central Powers. Since its disasters in Wallachia in 1916 the Rumanian army, under General Averescu, had been reorganised; "the Rumanians held very strong positions, the morale in the army was excellent, and in the last great attack on Maracesti [August, 1917] Mackensen's troops had suffered very severely."¹ The Austrian Government, moreover, did not wish to press Rumania so hardly as to produce a revolution and the fall of the Rumanian throne: "there was already then a certain fall in the value of kings in the European market, and I was afraid it might develop into a panic if we put more kings off their thrones."² A preliminary treaty of peace was signed on March 5, 1918, at the castle of Buftea near Bucharest; and the Final Peace, known as the Treaty of Bucharest, was signed between the Central Powers and Rumania on May 7. This peace was considered by Count Czernin and Kühlmann to be more favourable than the Rumanians deserved; to the Rumanians it was the wreck of practically all their hopes. The Austrians annexed the passes leading from Transylvania into Wallachia, the Bulgarians were to receive the Dobruja as far north as the nearest Danube mouth.³ For this loss, Bessarabia, which (unofficially) the Central Powers "authorised" Rumania to annex, was poor compensation. Germany, being unable, owing to distance, to annex anything from Rumania, contented herself by writing off all the Rumanian claims for goods and services requisitioned by German troops.

¹ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

² *Ibid.*, p. 261.

³ The Bulgarians were only promised in the treaty that part of the Dobruja which Rumania had taken from them in 1913. The rest was ceded by Rumania to the "Allies," that is, to Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria. Presumably Bulgaria would receive this too, in return for some favours conceded to her allies.

CHAPTER X

THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES

At the very time when Russia was beginning to collapse, in the spring of 1917, the United States was entering the War. This, indeed, is one of the most dramatic events in history. The nation which had foresworn every sort of entanglement with Europe and had remained rigidly aloof throughout the whole of its independent existence, now stepped into the European arena, and sent its sons to the battlefields of France.

"Official" opinion, the opinion of the Administration of Mr. Wilson, was undoubtedly in favour of the Entente. In a letter sent from London on October 6, 1914, Ambassador Page proposed to Mr. Wilson that the United States should support Great Britain, diplomatically and economically, and so bring a speedy end to the War on such terms as seemed fair.¹ Page, as is well known, was strongly Anglophile, and in the War was passionately convinced of the righteousness of the Allies' cause. Colonel House, a dispassionate observer, and the close confidant of Mr. Wilson, was also quite clear in his mind that the Allies were right. Lord Grey, who had many meetings with House after the outbreak of war, writes: "He left me in no doubt from the first that he held German militarism responsible for the war."² Nor were Mr. Wilson's views different from those of his friend. "I found him," wrote Colonel House on August 30, 1914, "as unsympathetic with the German attitude as is the balance of America. He goes even further than I in his condemnation of Germany's part in this war, and almost allows his feeling to include the German people

¹ Hendrick, *op. cit.*, III, 173.

² Grey, *op. cit.*, II, 124. A reasoned statement of the attitude of educated people in the United States towards Germany and the War is contained in the *War Book of the University of Wisconsin*, a series of ably written and well documented essays written in 1917-18 by members of the Faculty of the University.

as a whole rather than the leaders alone.”¹ When Colonel House remarked to Mr. Wilson in November, 1915, that Italy and Rumania would soon join the Allies, he expressed pleasure at this, and hoped these two countries would not delay long.² Among private individuals, it was only to be expected that there would be considerable diversity of opinion. Nevertheless, the view of Charles W. Eliot, former President of Harvard and probably the best known and most respected among the academic class of America, must have been shared by many people. On August 6, 1914, he addressed a letter to Mr. Wilson, proposing “a combination of the British Empire, the United States, France, Japan, Italy and Russia in offensive and defensive alliance to rebuke and punish Austria-Hungary and Germany for the outrages they are now committing, by enforcing against those two countries non-intercourse with the rest of the world by land and sea.”³ Mr. Wilson was impressed by this proposal and read the letter to his Cabinet, but did not feel that he could depart from the policy of strict neutrality. The truth is that Mr. Wilson, although convinced that Germany was wrong, was not interested in European affairs nor, at first, apparently, in the War. On the October 22, 1914, Colonel House wrote in his *Journal*:

I am sorry to say, as I have said before, that the President does not seem to have a proper sense of proportion as between domestic and foreign affairs. I suppose it is the Washington atmosphere that has gripped him as it does everyone else who lives there, and the work of the day largely obscures the tremendous world issues that are now before us.⁴

In some ways official relations with the Central Powers were better than with the Allies. Neither Germany nor Austria could seriously interfere with trade between the United States and Great Britain; while the Allied navies could, and did, stop all trade between the United States and the Central Powers, except through neutral countries. Even the trade through neutral countries was closely restricted by the application of the doctrine of “continuous voyage” to it, and by the “rationing” of overseas supplies to those States. Therefore if American business men were, as a whole, not unfavourable to the Allied cause, it was not because the Allies had been particularly careful of their economic interests.

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 293.

² *Ibid.*, I, 300.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 287-8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 296.

The series of maritime incidents from the sinking of the *Lusitania* down to the proclamation of unrestricted submarine war on February 1, 1917, went far to make American neutrality impossible. The "House Memorandum"¹ of February 22, 1916, proves that official circles in the United States contemplated intervention, if it became clear that Germany would not consent to reasonable peace-terms. President Wilson's Peace Note of December 18, 1916, probably had the effect of clearing his mind and bringing him to a decision. He could now feel that he had done his best for peace, that he had obtained from the Allies a clear statement of their war-aims,² but none from the Central Powers; that, having conclusively demonstrated his fairness to both sides, he could now go forward and support the cause which he had always believed to be just.

Mr. Wilson was very much afraid lest his neutral and impartial state of mind should be affected by contact with other people. After the sinking of the *Lusitania* (May 7, 1915) he carefully secluded himself, not merely from his Cabinet, but from the public. It was on May 10, 1915, that he made the famous "too proud to fight" speech. The Department of State was also strictly impartial. The celebrated American artist, Sargent, resident in London, wished to return his German orders to the Kaiser, and asked Ambassador Page to arrange this through the State Department. Page sent off a message by cable to Washington (June 22, 1915). The Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, replied:

Not matters with which Department or its officers abroad can have any connection.

Sargent should reimburse Embassy for your telegram and pay for this reply five dollars.³

British-American relations were made more difficult than might otherwise have happened owing to the fact that the regular channels of communication were not wholly satisfactory. Ambassador Page at London was so warmly and outspokenly in sympathy with the British cause that the State Department discounted his reports. "As soon as our affairs with Great Britain become less acute," wrote House to Wilson, "I think it would be well to send for Page and let him have thirty or forty days in this country.

¹See above, p. 52.

³Hendrick, *op. cit.*

²See above, p. 72.

The war has gotten on his nerves and he has no idea what the sentiment of the people in this country is in regard to it.”¹

At the Washington end of the line of communication things sometimes went wrong too. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was an accomplished diplomatist, a high-minded gentleman, a true patriot, a scholarly poet. He regarded the Washington Embassy as his great work; he served his country nobly, and he paid for his service with his life. There were times when ill-health made the work almost intolerable; and on one occasion he seems to have thoroughly lost self-control. House and Spring-Rice had arranged to meet privately in the home of a third party. Spring-Rice broke out against the United States. He actually used the terrible word “war” as a possibility between the United States and Great Britain. His words were: “No matter how low our fortunes run, we will go to war before we will admit the principle of blockade as your Government wishes to interpret it.” House happened to mention Bernstorff to the British Ambassador.

This put him in a fine rage, and he said: “I would be glad if you would not mention Bernstorff’s name in my presence again; I do not want to talk to anyone who has just come from talking to him or to Germans. At this moment I do not know how many of my relatives have been killed in England by the raid of the German Zeppelins last night.” At this point [continues Colonel House] I lost my temper, and told him I regarded his remarks as an insult, and I would not permit him to say such things to me. I denied that he represented either his Chief or his Government, and declared that his views were not their views, and I knew of no official anywhere who was serving his country so badly as himself. He replied that if I felt that way, he had better relinquish his post and go home. I advised him to use his own discretion as to that, but, as far as I was concerned, I did not intend to have any further discussion with him.

After this not very dignified episode, the British Ambassador saw the absurdity as well as the seriousness of his remarks, and asked Colonel House to forgive him. He explained that he was suffering from private anxieties. The austere House replied “that he should be able to look at public affairs quite apart from his private interests.” Spring-Rice begged House to regard him as a friend, and after leaving, went straight to the State Department and asked a high official there to go to House and smooth over the incident. This the high official did. House generously said that he “was sorry it had happened and had forgotten it.”

¹Aug. 4, 1915. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 62.

However, he remembered sufficient to record it in his Journal before he went to bed.¹

Another channel of communication in addition to the regular channel through the Ambassadors was established between Grey and House. They arranged (June 6, 1915) a cipher, and corresponded directly with each other in code. House was the only non-British citizen who ever received a Foreign Office cipher code.²

The British restrictions upon sea-borne trade were also causing extreme irritation in the United States. "If we are to have war, let it be with Germany by all means," notes Colonel House in his Journal, November 17, 1916: he adds, however: "I will confess that the Allies are irritating almost beyond endurance."³ As a matter of fact, the German Government had shortly before this given notice of an intention which would make fairly certain America's participation in the war. On October 18, 1916, Count Bernstorff had confidentially communicated to Colonel House a memorandum of the German Government. This stated that if President Wilson had no immediate purpose of offering his good services to the belligerents for the promotion of peace, the German Government might have to resume the freedom of action which she had reserved to herself in the Note of May 4. This statement meant that Germany would resume freedom to sink merchant ships without warning. "Thus," comments the editor of Colonel House's papers, "at the moment when the Allies...seemed to be pushing America back into a policy of isolation, Germany threatened to drag us into active belligerency by the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare."⁴ The memorandum was issued shortly before Mr. Wilson was elected President for a second term.

The action which did in fact bring about a severance of diplomatic relations was the notification, on January 31, of unrestricted submarine warfare around the British Isles, and in certain other zones off France, Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean. The course of events leading to this momentous issue is known from the investigations of the Committee of Enquiry established by the German National Constituent Assembly after the War:⁵ it was as follows:

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 75-8.

² *Ibid.*, II, 54, 128.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 327.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 336.

⁵ Reports published as *Official German Documents relating to the World*

On January 3, 1917, Count Bernstorff, Ambassador at Washington, telegraphed to the German Foreign Office that Colonel House, acting for President Wilson, had asked for confidential information concerning the conditions of peace. Herr Zimmermann, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was in no hurry to answer. At last, on January 7 (1917), he replied, telling Count Bernstorff "to handle the question concerning our communication of our peace conditions in a dilatory fashion."¹ He was to state that the German Government was convinced that it could carry the war "to a victorious end."

On the day following upon Herr Zimmermann's telegram the German military leaders met in council with Hindenburg and "determined unanimously upon the unconditional carrying-out of the unrestricted U-boat warfare" (January 8).² On the 9th, at Pless, the final decision was formally taken to begin the unrestricted U-boat warfare on February 1. If the Chancellor would not co-operate, "a change of chancellors would be undertaken." Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, against his better judgment, yielded now to the military party as he did in 1914 regarding the invasion of Belgium. All those who took part in the Pless decision "saw perfectly clearly that the result of this determination would be war with the United States."

"It must be. We are counting on the possibility of war with America and have made all preparations to meet it," are the words of Hindenburg, and he adds: "We are prepared to meet all emergencies."... The Chancellor offered no opposition to the resolution reached.³

Having resolved on a policy which, in their own view, made war with America inevitable, the German Government then, at last, sent to President Wilson the thing for which he had been asking for months, namely the terms upon which Germany would make peace with the Allies. When he received this message Mr. Wilson did not yet know that unrestricted U-boat warfare had been determined upon, and that his own country would therefore be soon engaged. But the communication of Germany's terms must have made him despair of the German spirit. For they made no approach whatever to the terms as stated in the Allies' Note and

War, translated and issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1923. Quoted here as "Official German Documents."

¹ *Official German Documents*, I, 137.

² *Ibid.*, I, 138.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 138.

the covering letter of Mr. Balfour, sent to Mr. Wilson on January 10, 1917. The German Government said that had their peace-offer of December 12 (1916) been accepted they *would have been* willing¹ to enter into negotiation with the Allies on a basis of mutual restoration of all conquests, with, however, special safeguards for Germany with regard to Belgium and the frontier of Russian Poland.² Colonel House's remark on the communication was: "It is absurd to call the letter an answer to our request for peace terms." Two days after delivering this communication to Mr. Wilson, Count Bernstorff announced that unrestricted warfare would begin. The German Government was bound by its conscience to do this "in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense and not to wrong its own people."³

To this the Secretary of State had an easy reply to make (February 3). He drew attention to the Note which the United States Government had, on April 18, 1916, addressed to the German Government after the sinking of the *Sussex*; in this the United States had declared:

Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.

Mr. Lansing next pointed out that the German Government had thereupon agreed not to sink ships without warning. But now Germany had intimated that all ships met within certain zones would be sunk. "In view of this declaration," continued Mr. Lansing, there was no alternative "consistent with the dignity and honour of the United States" but to take the course which it said that it would take, namely to sever diplomatic relations. "The President has therefore directed me to announce to Your Excellency that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed."

Count Bernstorff's passports were delivered to him. He gave the affairs of Germany at Washington into charge of the Swiss

¹ The italics are in the German Report.

² *Official German Documents*, II, 1049. *The Intimate Paper of Colonel House*, II, 434.

³ German Ambassador to the Secretary of State, January 31, 1917, in *Diplomatic Correspondence between the United States and Germany, 1914-17*, edited by J. B. Scott (1918), p. 299.

Legation. After the delay necessitated by securing a passage and obtaining a safe-conduct from the Allied Governments,¹ he sailed from New York on February 15. He left behind him the reputation of a philosopher and a sportsman. He had fought his country's battle with good humour and patience. Colonel House wrote some time before:

Bernstorff is the only Ambassador of the belligerent countries that seems to have any sense of proportion and who never criticises this Government in the slightest for anything that occurs. He takes what comes philosophically and tries to make a favourable impression if possible. The others seem at times to say what they can to irritate.²

For two months Germany and the United States had no diplomatic relations with each other, yet were not at war. Thus time was gained for the Germans. The reason why war was not at once declared by the United States was that Mr. Wilson would not force this step until Germany should not merely threaten to sink American ships without warning, but should actually put the threat into execution. As late as January 4, 1917, he said to Colonel House: "There will be no war.... We are the only one of the great White nations that is free from war to-day, and it would be a crime against civilisation for us to go in."³ "I refuse to believe," he told Congress on February 3, "that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do." To Colonel House he spoke of Germany as "a madman that should be curbed." House asked "if he thought it fair to the Allies to ask them to do the curbing without doing our share. He noticeably winced at this, but still held to his determination not to become involved if it were humanly possible to do otherwise."⁴

Mr. Wilson had not long to wait. On the same day as he made his speech to Congress (February 3, 1917) the American steamship *Housatonic* was sunk by a submarine. Naturally opinion in the United States hardened.

Since the fall of President Porfirio Diaz in 1910 Mexico, "the great Indian Republic," as Ambassador Page called it, had been in a most disturbed condition, and many offences were committed

¹ Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, p. 335. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 446.

² *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 396 (Dec. 4, 1916).

³ *Ibid.*, II, 412.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 440.

against citizens of the United States, as well as against the nationals of other States. In March, 1916, Villa, one of the Mexican revolutionaries, raided Columbus, New Mexico. In reply to this the United States Government, with the assent of the Government of President Carranza of Mexico, sent a punitive expedition under General Pershing across the Mexican border. The expeditionary force did not find Villa, but it came into collision with some of Carranza's forces. War with Mexico was, however, avoided and the United States troops were withdrawn in June, 1916, after what appeared to be a somewhat futile adventure.¹

Early in the course of the War the British Government had obtained a copy of the German cipher code which was used for messages between the German Government and the Embassy in Washington, and between the Washington Embassy and the German Legation in Mexico. The communications of Count Bernstorff to Minister Eckhardt at Mexico City, if only they could be obtained by the British agents, could be deciphered; and this regularly happened. Among others a particularly important message of the German Secretary of State, Zimmermann, to Bernstorff for transmission to Eckhardt, dated January 16, 1917, was obtained. It stated:

We intend to begin on the 1st February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavour in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President [Carranza] of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves.

The British Intelligence Service was thorough in its methods. It did not have to rely upon only one edition of the Zimmermann telegram: it obtained a copy in no less than four ways. One way was by purchase in Mexico City: naturally the name of the seller has never been disclosed. Another copy was obtained by British operators picking up messages transmitted by Germans through the American Long Island Wireless Station. A third

¹ See Rippy, *The United States and Mexico* (1926), pp. 340-1.

copy was gleaned from the cabled messages sent from Stockholm to Buenos Ayres and transmitted through the Swedish Legation there to Bernstorff at Washington. A fourth copy was obtained from a cabled message (in code, of course) which the American Embassy at Berlin innocently transmitted for the German Government, and sent through England. Whether Herr Zimmermann used any other channels to forward his precious telegram is not known. The four which he used seem to exhaust all possibilities. At any rate, the four copies were enough for the British Government. They were deciphered and passed on, through Ambassador Page, to the United States Government.

As late as March 22, 1917, nobody knew what President Wilson was going to do, although House wrote to Page on the previous day, "as far as we are concerned we are in the war now even though a formal declaration may not occur until after Congress meets, April 2."¹ Mr. Wilson apparently did not make up his mind finally until March 27, when he asked Colonel House whether "he should ask Congress to declare war, or whether he should say that a state of war exists and ask them for the necessary means to carry it on."² House advised the second course, but Mr. Wilson adopted the first.

Thus the United States stepped forth, not indeed as an Ally, but as an Associated Power. "The day has come," concluded the President, "when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles which gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured."

It is one of the curious facts of history that Germany had refused to sign the "Bryan Treaty" in the spring of 1914. Had she assented then to this arbitration pact (as Great Britain did) the United States would have been unable to commence hostilities until one year after the dispute had come to a head. When Colonel House at Potsdam, in May, 1914, asked why Germany had not signed the Treaty, the Kaiser had replied: "Germany will never sign such a treaty. Our strength lies in always being prepared for war at a second's notice. We must not resign that advantage and give our enemies time to prepare."³

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 462.

² *Ibid.*, II, 464.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 256 note.

CHAPTER XI

AUSTRIA IN THE TOILS

Germany was always recognised as the chief force in the Central Powers. Yet the diplomatists, no more than the soldiers, could not afford to neglect Austria. Comparatively early in the war, in September, 1915, the Austrian Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dumba, was sent home by the United States Government for complicity in plots to cripple munition plants. A new Austrian Ambassador did not arrive until February, 1917, and then, because Austria did not clearly dissociate herself from Germany's submarine policy, President Wilson would not allow him to present his credentials.¹ Nevertheless the United States did not declare a state of war in existence with Austria until December 7, 1917.

Yet the Austrian Emperor and Count Czernin were fully convinced that Austria must try and make peace before the year 1917 was out. That Austria, with both its Emperor and its Foreign Minister resolved on making peace, was unable to do so is one of the most remarkable facts of diplomatic history.

The Archduke Charles succeeded Francis Joseph as Emperor on November 21, 1916. He was a good, dutiful man, who suffered through being conscious that his capacity was not quite on a level with his position. An aide-de-camp of Francis Joseph tells how Charles, during the war, while still Archduke, on his visits from General Headquarters to Schönbrunn used to joke about the pessimism at Headquarters.

"The further you get from the front the less confidence do you find. You've got to be at the front to realise that we shall and must win!"

The Archduke seemed to look round for some approving comment. None was forthcoming. It was the end of November, 1914. Bitterly disappointed, he made for the door, and said as he turned the handle:

"Courage is what's wanted!"

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 450.

As he disappeared, Baron von Bolfras shook his head and remarked :
 "It's too easy to talk ! There's plenty of courage, but there's one thing we need far more, and that's *luck* ! The question is: will *he* bring it ?" ¹

Poor Emperor Charles had no luck. From the moment when he came to the throne, he began seriously to work for peace, and said so in his first proclamation.² One of his earliest acts was to dismiss Baron Burian and to appoint Count Czernin as Foreign Minister. It was the time when the German Government was making up its mind to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare.

The Austrian Government when informed of this plan disapproved of it, but could not decline to agree. "This was one of those instances that prove that when a strong and weak nation concert in war, the weak one cannot desist unless it changes sides entirely and enters into war against its former ally."³

The Austrian Monarchy was crumbling, yet the chances seemed favourable to prospects of peace. Russia, which had begun hinting at overtures in the previous October,⁴ renewed its obscure messages through a neutral State on February 25, 1917. But before the matter could go any further the Russian Revolution occurred, and the Tsar abdicated.⁵ In April Czernin presented a Memorandum to the Emperor in which he said:

It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an end. . . . Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to separate us from our Allies, in which step I took the responsibility because Your Majesty is incapable of any dishonourable action. But at the same time Your Majesty instructed me to notify the statesmen of the German Empire that our strength is at an end, and that after the close of the summer Germany must not reckon on us any longer.⁶

Yet Austria, determined to make peace before the year 1917 was out, actually remained in the war until revolution and final defeat came together in the autumn of 1918. The German Reichstag, it is true, on July 17, 1917, passed, by 214 votes to 116, a

¹ Margutti, *The Emperor Francis Joseph and his Times* (Eng. Trans., no date), p. 340.

² Nov. 22, 1916. Text in Manteneyer, *Austria's Peace Offer* (1921), p. 33.

³ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁴ See above, p. 76.

⁵ Czernin, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-2.

⁶ Czernin, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-50. Cp. Speech of Dec. 11, 1918, in *Ottokar Czernin über die Politik während des Weltkrieges*, p. 10. Prince L. Windischgrätz, *My Memoirs* (1921), p. 143.

resolution in favour of "a peace of understanding," without "forced annexations of territory." Such a peace was impossible. For one thing, the Entente Powers would not agree to it; for another the German Government itself, in spite of the Reichstag, would not agree. Ludendorff's view was that "if Germany makes peace without profit, then Germany has lost the war."¹ Herr Michaelis, a tough and seasoned bureaucrat, who succeeded Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor in July, 1917, had the same view. He agreed that Germany could not give up Alsace-Lorraine, and that she must have some military and economic, if not political, power over Belgium, and over Courland, Lithuania and Poland, as well as economic influence in the French Longwy-Briey basin.²

Meanwhile the Emperor Charles was pursuing his peaceful aim, even independently of Germany. The great difficulty was to get into touch with the Entente Governments, for the war had broken off all intercourse, private as well as public. Charles's wife, however, the Empress Zita, had two brothers fighting in the Belgian Army; and it was thought possible to use one of these as intermediary for a peace-offer to the Entente.

These two brothers of the Empress Zita were the Princes Sixte and Xavier of Bourbon-Parma. This younger branch of the House of Bourbon had ruled the Italian Duchy of Parma from the middle of the eighteenth century until it was expelled by revolution from the throne in 1859. Since then the family had lived chiefly in Austria. Prince Sixte was a brother of the Duke of Parma, and when the war broke out he was twenty-eight years old. He had years before this made France his country—holding that a Bourbon must always be French—and had been living for ten years in Paris. He studied at the University of Paris, and gained the degree of Doctor of Laws. It was in 1911 that his sister Zita married the Archduke Charles, who became later the Emperor Charles.

When the war broke out, Prince Sixte, who was an adventurous traveller, was staying at Schwarzau, the family seat in Austria, on his way to the Caucasus. With him was his younger brother, Xavier; Sixte and Xavier were inseparable. They at once decided to return to France, but only obtained permission to leave Austria

¹ Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

² Letter to Czernin, August 17, 1917, in Michaelis, *Für Staat und Volk* (1922), pp. 332-5.

through the intervention of their brother-in-law, the Archduke Charles, who had just become heir to the Austrian throne. They arrived in Paris on August 29, 1914, after the French defeat at Charleroi. From that moment Prince Sixte seems to have had the idea that the pressure of the enemy on France should be eased and the war shortened through a separate peace being made with Austria. "But as long as Francis Joseph lives, that will be impossible," he said.

Being refused permission to join the French Army (owing to the anti-royalist laws), the two princes tried the British War Office; refused in this, they tried the Belgian Army, and were at first allowed to become stretcher-bearers, but later received commissions as *sous-lieutenants* in the artillery. Life on the Belgian front, however, did not prevent Sixte from still thinking over his design to detach Austria; and when the Emperor Francis Joseph died on November 21, 1916, the ground was already, to some extent, prepared.

In May of that year the Princes Sixte and Xavier had come into indirect touch with the President of the French Republic when he sent them the Croix de Guerre. In October they went on leave to Paris, and in a conversation with a member of the Cabinet, M. de Freycinet, Prince Sixte put forward his views. These were that the Central Powers depended entirely upon Germany: "it is necessary to beat *one* head." The important thing therefore was to detach Austria: if Austria fell away from the Coalition, Turkey and Bulgaria would be cut off from Germany and would fall away too. Thus the Entente Powers could concentrate their efforts on defeating Germany and on taking the Imperial Crown from the Hohenzollern family; it was the interest of the Entente to break up Prussian domination, but it was not their interest to destroy the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus the object of Prince Sixte was twofold: (1) to enable the Entente to meet Germany alone and so to defeat her quickly; (2) to preserve the Austrian Empire, which could not stand the strain of a prolonged war.

The young Emperor of Austria, immediately after his accession, issued a proclamation saying: "I desire to do everything to banish, in the briefest time, the horrors and sacrifices of the war." A few days afterwards Prince Sixte's mother, the Dowager Duchess of Parma, who was also mother of the Austrian Empress,

wrote to the Prince desiring urgently to see him (December 16, 1916). Accordingly Princes Sixte and Xavier, having disclosed the message to the King of the Belgians, obtained leave, and with the full knowledge of the French Foreign Office came to the *rendezvous*, Neuchâtel, on January 29, 1917. There they met the Duchess (at 7 Rue Pommier), who informed them that her son-in-law, the Emperor Charles, was desirous of making peace, and wished the Princes personally to come to Vienna to see him. Everything was already arranged for the visit and for keeping it absolutely secret. If the princes (who, it must be remembered, were combatant officers on leave from the Belgian line) did not think it possible to come to Vienna, a person in the confidence of the Emperor Charles could come to Switzerland to meet them.

The princes returned to Paris to consult the authorities there, who urged them to continue the negotiation. Returning to Neuchâtel on February 12, they met the confidant sent by the Emperor (on February 13). This was Count Erdödy. Prince Sixte, who, although only thirty years old, displayed mature wisdom and prudence from first to last, advised that the Emperor should announce by public decree that he was willing to make peace jointly on certain conditions. Thus Germany would be faced with a *fait accompli*. If, however, the Emperor did not feel himself to be in a strong enough position to do this, he could continue the negotiations secretly, and prepare for peace by stating to the Entente what terms he contemplated.

On February 21 Prince Sixte had another interview with Count Erdödy at Neuchâtel. Erdödy brought letters from the princes' mother, from Count Czernin, and from the Emperor Charles, all urging him to come to Vienna; half an hour's direct conversation with the Emperor, it was said, was worth two indirect.

So far, the negotiation on the Austrian side was known only to the Emperor, Count Czernin, and the Duchess of Parma; on the French side to M. Poincaré (President), M. Jules Cambon (Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and to M. William Martin, Director of the Protocol. M. Poincaré, at a meeting with Prince Sixte at Paris on March 5, 1917, said that he must now confide the matter to his own premier minister, M. Briand, and to the heads of the Russian, British, and Italian Governments. "*M. Lloyd George*," said the President, "*est un homme discret.*" There might be some difficulty about Italy.

For Russia, the Tsar only need be communicated with. For the moment simply indefinite intimation was to be given to France's allies that an offer of peace had been received.

After another interview with M. Poincaré, the Prince was able to put down in writing the minimum terms which the Entente Powers required from the Emperor Charles. Equipped with this document, and with extended military leave from the Belgian Army, Sixte and Xavier again set out for Switzerland, and arrived at Geneva on March 15. Count Erdödy was awaiting them, and the Emperor Charles's overture was discussed at length. But Erdödy's instructions went further than discussion: "this time," he said, "it is absolutely necessary that you come to Vienna." There was a very real danger that the journeys to Switzerland and the interviews at Neuchâtel and Geneva would attract the attention of Germany, and so spoil the whole negotiation. The two princes therefore resolved to go to the enemy's capital. The Emperor Charles gave his word of honour that they could leave Austria as freely as they would enter it.

On March 20 the two princes informed Erdödy that they would go to Vienna. They started the same evening. Naturally the greatest secrecy was observed: the colonel of police at the frontier had a direct order from the Emperor to let the Count Erdödy and his companions pass without question. Partly by train, partly by motor-car, the princes arrived at Vienna on March 22. They stayed at Count Erdödy's house. That same evening Count Erdödy went out to Laxenburg, a favourite palace of the Habsburg Emperors, a few miles from Vienna, and delivered to the Emperor the letter which Prince Sixte had prepared, outlining the Entente terms.

Next day, March 23, the important interview took place. The princes had remained all day in Count Erdödy's house. In the evening they set out in a closed car for Laxenburg. All was dark. Snow covered the ground. "The auto stopped at an outer court, and an old captain of the Guard, who had the absolute confidence of the Emperor, led them over the park, to the principal façade of the château." They entered by a small door opening on to the staircase of the private apartments of the Emperor and Empress.

Prince Sixte and the Emperor had a long conversation. The views of Charles as regards Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and Serbia were found to be practically the same as those of the Allies. With

regard to Italy, there might be a difficulty ; public opinion in Austria was not prepared for great cessions of territory to be made. With regard to Germany, Austria must in the first instance offer to bring her into the proposed peace: " I mean to be *correct* to the very end," said Charles, " as I shall always be later with you others [the Entente Powers], when we are joined together."

A little later Count Czernin, the Emperor's Minister for Foreign Affairs, was introduced ; tall, thin, cold, in frock-coat. Czernin was ready to make peace too, but he would not be precise. However, the Emperor promised that Prince Sixte should have the precise offer of Austria on the morrow.

Next day, March 24, the princes again visited the Emperor at Laxenburg, and received the written proposals. About these the most absolute secrecy was to be observed ; any disclosure of them would force the Emperor, in order to put himself right with the Germans, to send Austrian troops to the French front ; and this would compromise the whole negotiation. The interview ended, and on the same night the princes, bearing the Emperor's precious letter, left the enemy capital under the snow and were escorted by Count Erdödy into Switzerland. They arrived in Paris on March 30.

The letter which Prince Sixte brought with him was a fair offer of peace at any rate to France and England. The Emperor Charles wrote:

" France has shown force of resistance and a magnificent *élan*. We all admire, without reserve, the admirable traditional bravery of her army, and the spirit of sacrifice of all the French people."

The Emperor then proceeded:

" I will support, by all means and using all my personal influence with my allies, the just French claims relative to Alsace-Lorraine."

Belgium was to be reinstated in full sovereignty, with compensation for her losses. Serbia was also to be reinstated and to be assured " an equitable and natural access to the Adriatic."

With regard to the future of Constantinople, which the Entente had promised to Russia, the Emperor reserved his proposals, in view of the Revolution which had occurred about a fortnight before in that country. With regard to Italy, he wrote nothing at all. He had explained to Prince Sixte that the Trentino might be ceded, but he would not go so far as to offer Trieste. The Emperor's letter was written in pencil, in the French tongue.

Such were the proposals which Prince Sixte was now able to place before the French Government, and there seemed to be a good chance of their being accepted in England as well as in France. Unfortunately, just about this time (actually on March 19) the French Premier, M. Briand, who had been kept *au courant* with the negotiations by M. Poincaré, fell from office and was replaced by the veteran parliamentarian, Ribot.

On March 31 Prince Sixte put before M. Poincaré, at the Elysée, the Emperor's letter and the results of his conversation at Laxenburg. M. Ribot, the Premier, did not come to the interview, but M. Jules Cambon, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was present. MM. Poincaré and Cambon were of opinion that the Emperor's proposals offered the basis of a preliminary separate peace with Austria, if a satisfactory arrangement could be made for Italy. On April 11 M. Ribot met the English Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, at Folkestone, and read to him the letter of the Emperor Charles. Mr. Lloyd George undertook to keep the matter secret. As M. Paul Cambon remarked later to Prince Sixte, Mr. Lloyd George was not "haunted by the fetish of constitutionalism," and was ready, in the interest of all, to keep the Emperor's letter secret even from his own Cabinet. The only thing that now remained to be done was to tackle the Italian question. It was agreed not to inform Italy about the personal intervention of the Emperor Charles (in order to safeguard the Emperor's confidence), but merely to inform Baron Sonnino that an offer of separate peace had been made; the known presence of the veteran Austrian diplomatist, Count Mensdorff, in Switzerland was a sufficient cover to this mention of a separate offer.

It happened that a meeting at St. Jean de Maurienne had already been arranged for April 19. MM. Ribot, Lloyd George, and Sonnino were to meet to discuss the military situation. On April 18 Mr. Lloyd George arrived in Paris, and Prince Sixte had a conversation with him at the Hôtel Crillon. Their views on the Austrian offer seemed to be in perfect agreement. Prince Sixte, who knew the risk—even of assassination—which the Austrian Emperor was running through personally intervening, urged the necessity of keeping the matter secret. "Mr. Lloyd George, who was leaning against the chimney, came forward to the Prince and said gravely, *I promise*, and held out his hand." The promise was kept.

The meeting at St. Jean de Maurienne took place; and return-

ing from it, on his way through Paris, Mr. Lloyd George again spoke to Prince Sixte. He narrated the result of the meeting with Baron Sonnino: the Italian Foreign Secretary had absolutely refused to make any separate peace with Austria, unless the full war-aims of Italy were to be realised. But Mr. Lloyd George thought that there was room for negotiation here, and he was ardently desirous that Prince Sixte should continue to keep in touch with Austria. M. Ribot, however, thought that there was no more to be done. For him the matter was at an end, and on April 22 he sent to the Prince, through M. Jules Cambon, a refusal, in the name of the French Government, of the Emperor Charles's offer. It is a curious fact that from the beginning of the "Sixte" affair, until the refusal of April 22, M. Ribot never once himself consented to see the Prince.

Although the President, M. Poincaré, still hoped that something might result from the Austrian peace-offer of March 24, 1917, M. Ribot, the Premier, had made up his mind that it would lead to nothing. The omission of the Emperor Charles to make a definite offer to Italy, and the refusal of Baron Sonnino to consider anything less than the whole Italian claim, were alike, in M. Ribot's eyes, fatal to the Austrian plans. Perhaps correct in these views, M. Ribot was certainly wrong in doubting, as he did, the good faith of the Austrian Emperor (speech in the *Chambre des Députés*, May 22, 1917). Charles was perfectly sincere in his intentions, and acted throughout the whole affair as an honourable gentleman. Mr. Lloyd George held this view, and even after the French refusal of April 22, he encouraged Prince Sixte not to drop the negotiations. The French Foreign Office likewise, through M. Jules Cambon, encouraged the Prince to continue, and gave him every facility.

Accordingly Prince Sixte wrote another letter to the Emperor Charles, explaining that the Austrian peace-offer had failed because it was defective with regard to Italy. On April 25 he met Count Erdödy at Zug, explained the situation to him, and handed him the letter. On May 4 Erdödy returned to Switzerland and met Prince Sixte, this time at Neuchâtel. He brought a reply which was, to a certain extent, satisfactory, from the Emperor Charles. Charles said definitely that he would make a separate peace, whether Germany liked it or not. With regard to Italy he was ready to make concessions, but not so great as were asked for.

The Prince then resolved to pay a second visit to Vienna in wartime. He left Neuchâtel at once (May 5) with Count Erdödy, crossed the Swiss frontier on the 6th, and arrived in Vienna on the 7th. On the 8th he met the Emperor at Laxenburg.

Prince Sixte and the Emperor discussed the Italian question. Austria could cede the Trentino, but only in return for compensation. Prussian (formerly Austrian) Silesia was suggested; but Charles said that he could not consent to be paid at the expense of his ally. An Italian colony was suggested, such as Erythrea—a possession of no great value to Italy, as Prince Sixte knew, for he had been to Erythrea; he seems to have been everywhere.

The result of this second visit of Prince Sixte to Vienna was that he brought away another autograph letter (the second) from the Emperor Charles, envisaging the possibility of ceding the Trentino to Italy; and a covering letter from Count Czernin with regard to compensation, ending with a statement that Austria was prepared to make a separate peace (May 9, 1917). The Emperor asked that the regular diplomatists should formally take up the task of settling the preliminary terms of peace, in Switzerland, about the middle of June. Such was the news which Prince Sixte was able to take back to the French President in the last weeks of May.

On May 20 Prince Sixte had an interview with M. Poincaré at the Elysée Palace. This time M. Ribot was present, "tired, old, with yellow glasses which he is always taking off and on—sees all the difficulties of things and only the difficulties." The President, however, was still favourable to the continuance of the negotiations, though he thought that it would be difficult to induce the Italians to surrender a colony in return for the Trentino.

At the close of the interview with M. Poincaré, Prince Sixte said that he would be happy to receive a reply in due course to the Emperor's letter. He would also pay a visit to Mr. Lloyd George, with the object of asking for a reply from England.

On May 22 Prince Sixte crossed over to London. Everybody was busy in those days, and things had to be done quickly. At 11.45 on the morning of the 23rd the Prince received a message from the French Embassy, asking him to be there at 11.50. After receiving some information from M. Paul Cambon and preparing his papers, Prince Sixte went on to Number 10 Downing Street. "The house in which for three hundred years the English Government has lodged its Premier is *assez petite*," wrote the Prince in

his report. Mr. Davis, the Prime Minister's chief secretary, introduced him into Mr. Lloyd George's study, where he waited two minutes. The Prime Minister then came into the room, and asked to see the Emperor's last letter: when he came to the passage concerning Italy, he shook his head; the offer was scarcely sufficient. As for the Emperor's idea of sending a regular diplomatist to negotiate preliminaries of peace in due form in Switzerland, he thought very little of it. "The diplomats are only made for losing time," he said: "we shall only lose time by sending men who cannot speak in the name of their countries." He wanted the responsible ministers to go: why could not M. Ribot and himself meet Czernin? Prince Sixte, in view of M. Ribot's attitude, thought this impossible.

The interview terminated, and the Prince went off to a hasty lunch. At 2.45 he was back at Number 10 Downing Street, from which the Prime Minister was going to take him to see the King. Mr. Lloyd George appeared in frock-coat and tall hat. The Prince and the Premier then set off in a motor-car for Buckingham Palace. Nothing has been reported about the audience with the King, whom Mr. Lloyd George had from the start kept informed of the Austrian negotiation. The French had confidence in King George: "an excellent man, honest and straight" (those were M. Paul Cambon's words).

Mr. Lloyd George's plan was that the French and British Prime Ministers and the King of Italy should meet somewhere on the French front, and arrange a common basis of peace with Austria. The Prince was to see the Prime Minister once more, to hear his views. Meanwhile Sixte went to Ryde in the Isle of Wight for a few days' rest. He returned to London, May 30, in time to go to lunch at 10 Downing Street. The company was practically the War Cabinet: Lord Stamfordham, "small white moustache, speaking little"; Mr. Bonar Law, in a blue suit, "very simple and good-natured"; Lord Curzon, "*très lord*," but "very sympathetic, talking well and fond of historical reminiscences"; Sir Edward Carson, "very large, a rather suffering face, meditative." Lord Reading was also present. The conversation at lunch was always pleasant and interesting: "one felt that one was among well-bred people." Mr. Bonar Law seemed to be the only person who was familiar with the careers of the various French ministers. After lunch, Mr. Lloyd George talked to Prince Sixte apart for a

few minutes, and said that he was expecting every day that the King of Italy would come to a conference of the Allies (M. Sonnino, of course, would be present with his sovereign). It would be found, he said, that King Victor Emmanuel would not be intransigent. "The King has different ideas from M. Sonnino. You will see we shall get something done with the King"; and, shaking his hand, Mr. Lloyd George repeated: "M. Sonnino is violent, too violent." He asked the Prince to wait another day in London, to hear the reply of Italy. The reply came, sent (naturally) through the office of Baron Sonnino. Curious to say, the reply was evasive. Mr. Lloyd George sent off a special courier to Italy to get a definite answer, and again asked Prince Sixte to wait a few days. But the Italian Government would not fix a precise date for a meeting. Sonnino would not move. "That inflexible man does not wish to come," said Mr. Lloyd George. "Evidently he divines something" (*Évidemment, il flairé quelque chose*). So Prince Sixte had to leave London, as he had left Paris, without any message to convey to the Emperor Charles in answer to the Austrian Emperor's last letter. But Mr. Lloyd George promised to let him know as soon as the meeting of the French and English Premiers and the King of Italy was arranged. That meeting, however, never took place while the Austrian peace-offer was open; and no reply was ever given to the Emperor's letter of May 9. The Prince left London on June 5, 1917, for the Belgian front and resumed his duties in the artillery until the end of the war. The negotiations of Prince Sixte were at an end, and his only anxiety about them now was that the Emperor Charles's confidence should be respected.

On September 9, 1917, M. Ribot's Government fell, and was succeeded by a Ministry, destined to endure for only two months, under M. Painlevé. The new Premier knew nothing about the Sixte dossier, which reposed behind the handsome, silent walls of the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* on the Quai d'Orsay. On November 13 (1917) M. Painlevé resigned, and the now celebrated Ministry of M. Clemenceau began. M. Clemenceau, like the preceding Premier, was totally ignorant about the negotiations of Prince Sixte. The Emperor Charles's confidence was being scrupulously respected.

It happened that when M. Clemenceau came into office in November, 1917, a semi-official peace negotiation was actually going on between France and Austria. This was quite independent of

the affair of Prince Sixte, which was to all intents and purposes dead and buried. The new negotiation was due to the initiative of Count Czernin, who was making use of Count Revertera, a professional Austrian diplomatist, on the retired list. Revertera had a friend in Paris, the Count Armand, who belonged to the second bureau of the French General Staff. Revertera and Armand met in Switzerland on August 7 and again on August 22 (1917). It was a curious kind of negotiation, carried on by the French War Office, with Notes drafted under the direction of Foch and his military colleagues. The Foreign Offices of France, Great Britain, and Italy were in touch with the affair, although not actually conducting it. In any case, the Revertera-Armand affair came to nothing because the Austrian Government still refused to cede Trieste unreservedly. The negotiation was not, however, quite finished by the time M. Clemenceau became Premier; and on November 16, when informed of the matter, he said, or rather wrote, in his laconic style: *listen, say nothing*—for it was always worth while to hear any offer that Austria might make.

The last (and quite ineffective) Revertera-Armand conversation took place at Fribourg in the Swiss canton of that name on February 25, 1918. Less than a month afterwards the grand German offensive began (March 21). The military attack, which was at first brilliantly successful, could be assisted by a political attack. M. Clemenceau was the keystone of the arch of France's war-government now. If he could be made to fall, the *moral* of the French people might break too. Such, at any rate, appears to have been Count Czernin's idea. In a speech to the Vienna Municipal Councillors on April 2 he stated that before the great offensive (which was now in progress) began, M. Clemenceau had asked Count Czernin if Austria would enter into negotiations for peace on condition of France gaining Alsace-Lorraine.

When M. Clemenceau, who was at the French front, heard on April 4 of the Austrian statesman's speech, he merely telephoned back to Paris in his brief, emphatic style: "Count Czernin has lied" (*le Comte Czernin a menti*).

Count Czernin was quite entitled to use every fair means to discredit his adversary; but it was neither fair nor accurate to refer to the Revertera-Armand negotiation as a French peace-offer. M. Clemenceau, who was not merely the most determined war-leader of France, but also a man of a naturally somewhat "short"

temper, was furious. When Count Czernin justified, or attempted to justify, his statement by publicly disclosing the Revertera-Armand negotiation, M. Clemenceau had every reason to feel more indignant still. And it was just at this moment that he received from the French Foreign Office the account of the Prince Sixte negotiation which they had for some time been preparing for him. Here, at the very time when Count Czernin was accusing M. Clemenceau of asking for peace and then of preventing it by insisting on gaining Alsace-Lorraine, the French Premier had in his hands a *dossier* of letters from the Emperor Charles and Count Czernin offering to make peace on the basis of the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France.

M. Clemenceau, who did not know that secrecy had been promised, might have replied by disclosing the Emperor Charles's offer. He did not do so, however, but he gave Count Czernin a warning that the French Government could make a disclosure of a much more damaging kind than anything which the Austrian Government had to say. M. Clemenceau reminded Count Czernin in a public Note (April 6, 1918) that "only two months before the Revertera affair" there was "another tentative of the same order by a personage of a rank much above his own." This warning ought to have been sufficient to close the mouth of the unhappy Austrian minister, even if he had not been (as he was) a diplomatist trained in the school of caution. But he still tried to throw upon France the blame of continuing the war. He replied in a public Note (April 8) to M. Clemenceau's last Note: that there had been a negotiation before the Revertera affair, but that also "had equally come to no result"—tacitly suggesting that here too only France's obstinacy in demanding Alsace-Lorraine had prevented peace. This, at any rate, was how M. Clemenceau understood Count Czernin's Note, and it was too much for him to bear. He replied by a public Note (April 9):

It is indeed the Emperor Charles who in a letter of the month of March, 1917, with his own hand, gave his adherence to the *just French claims relative to Alsace-Lorraine*. A second Imperial letter states that the Emperor was in accord with *his minister*.

By this time M. Clemenceau had been informed by the President, M. Poincaré, of the promise to keep the Emperor's offer secret. But he held that Count Czernin's conduct released the French Government from that promise. M. Clemenceau stated

his point of view to two of Prince Sixte's friends, who asked that the secret might be kept. The Premier said:

The Germans wish to get rid of me. Czernin has put himself at their service in publishing this lie. I am attacked. I find an arm; I indicate that I have it. I have the right to make use of it. I give a warning to the Emperor, and if he does not make his minister keep silence, I will use it.

A remarkable fact about the whole affair is that no copies had been kept in the Vienna Chancellery either of the Emperor's two letters or of Count Czernin's covering letter; and, perhaps more remarkable still, both the Emperor Charles and his minister had forgotten what they had actually written. Therefore, when M. Clemenceau, in the Note of April 9, stated that the Emperor and his minister had concurred in agreeing to the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, Count Czernin emphatically replied: "The absurdity of that assertion is evident. The assertions of M. Clemenceau concerning proposals made by the Emperor Charles in a letter are lies from one end to the other" (Note of April 11). This statement inevitably brought about the publication by M. Clemenceau of the Emperor's letter to Prince Sixte of March 24, 1917.

It will be supposed that the damning publication of this letter, with its plain statement—"I will support, by all means and using all my personal influence with my allies, the just French claims relative to Alsace-Lorraine"—would be sufficient to close the controversy. But no, Count Czernin would not accept the evidence of the printed text. On April 13 he replied, with a degree of obstinacy that is almost stupefying, "The letter of His Majesty, published by the President of the Council of French Ministers, is falsified."

But the Emperor Charles, who was a thorough gentleman, would not leave his brother-in-law under Czernin's mean insinuation of forgery. Charles had forgotten what he had written, but he did not allow this fact to overcome his sense of justice: on April 13 he made Count Czernin publish a Note stating: "The character of Prince Sixte de Bourbon, which is well known to the Emperor, excludes all possibility of falsification. Neither he nor any other personality has been yet accused of it." On the same day Count Czernin resigned.¹

¹ The whole affair is very fully related with documents in *L'Offre de Paix Séparée de l'Autriche* (Paris, Plon-Nourrit), written by M. de Mantensyer,

The peace-effort of the Emperor was probably doomed to failure from the first. The German military party would not make peace. Austria could not act alone. As Count Czernin explained later, Austria lay like a solid block between Germany and her allies, Turkey and Bulgaria ; also between Germany and the supplies of oil and corn in Rumania. If Austria had made peace with the Entente she would have had to join in the blockade of Germany. The German General Staff had foreseen this and had already sent some divisions of troops towards Bohemia and towards the Tyrol " to prepare for us the same fate as Rumania's."¹ Austria could not face a devastating attack of German armies. Germany held her in a vice.

one of the friends of Prince Sixte who assisted him in the negotiations. The English translation, with the title *Austria's Peace Offer*, 1916-17, is published by Messrs. Constable & Co. The work contains photographic reproductions of the Emperor Charles's autograph letters of March 24 and May 9, 1917, and also of the autograph letter of Count Czernin, May 9. This last letter was not alluded to by M. Clemenceau in his revelations of April, 1917, because the copy of it, which had been deposited in the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères*, could not be found.

¹ *Ottokar Czernin über die Politik während des Weltkrieges* (Speech of Dec. 11, 1917), p. 5.

CHAPTER XII

THE YUGOSLAVS

At the opening of the Great War Russia was the greatest Slav state, and Serbia was the second most powerful. There were, however, many Slavs who were under neither Russia nor Serbia. These were mainly under Austrian rule, in Galicia, Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, Slavonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The northern group, the Poles and the Czechs and the Slovaks, had their own national ideals and aspirations. The southern, the Croats and Slovenes, and also the Serbs of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia (along with the Serbs of Serbia), formed one geographical and "cultural" group, and some came to be known as the Southern or Yugo Slavs. At first the Yugoslavs under Austrian rule might have been content with union and autonomy in a federal Habsburg State. But as the War went on, and as the breaking-up of the Habsburg Empire seemed to be the only way to attain the unity of the Yugoslavs, they began to work for this end. Austria was to be dismembered and the Yugoslavs joined with their brethren in Serbia. Whether the great Yugoslav State which would thus be made would have a federal or a unitary constitution was not decided. The Yugoslavs outside Serbia would probably have preferred a federal constitution.

The territory inhabited by Yugoslavs outside Serbia was fairly well defined: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia. All of this was subject to the Austro-Hungarian Government, Croatia and Slavonia being actually administered by the Magyar Government. The chief difficulty—apart from the military problem of defeating Austria—came from the Treaty of London (the "Adriatic Treaty") of April 26, 1915. By this the Entente Powers promised that Italy should have most of the Dalmatian coasts and islands southward to Cape Planko. From the moment when this treaty became known (it was known practically as soon

as the ink on it was dry) ¹ the Yugoslavs and their friends worked incessantly to have it revised.

As soon as the War began, hopes were naturally raised that the Yugoslavs under Austrian rule might become free to join a "Greater Serbia." Towards the end of the year 1914 a Croatian Committee was founded at Rome. Its chief members were Doctors Trumbitch, Hinkovitch and Vojinovitch. Dr. Ante Trumbitch, the most important member, had been formerly Mayor of Spalato, and member for Zara in the Austrian Parliament, and was the author of the Fiume Resolution of October, 1905, by which the deputies of Croatia, Dalmatia and Istria demanded union under the Government of Hungary. Since then Trumbitch's views had developed, and he was now working for the union of all the Yugoslavs in one state. After the signature of the Adriatic Treaty (of which he very soon had knowledge) the committee removed to London, and in May, 1915, established itself there as the Yugoslav Committee, with Trumbitch as President. It proclaimed that "the Yugoslav peoples, known in history as the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, are all members of one and the same nation, with all the necessary conditions for the formation of an independent state."²

Besides Trumbitch, a guiding spirit in the Yugoslav Committee was Frano Supilo. He was born in Ragusa in 1870, and had grown up without any regular education. He went into local journalism, made a name, and in 1900 was called to Fiume to be head of the newly founded Croat journal, the *Novi List*. He was one of the chief movers in the libel action which in 1909 helped to expose the forged documents of the "Friedjung Case." Supilo was, of course, a marked man in the eyes of the Austrian Government. On the eve of the War he was on holiday, walking in the Tyrol. He crossed to the Italian side of the border to await events. When War came he decided that the hour for him too had struck. He went to Rome, then to London, Paris, Petrograd. Henceforth his life was like that of Mazzini and the men of the Risorgimento whom he so much admired. Supilo was a big, lumbering Dalmatian peasant, whose outward appearance gave little sign of the fire that was in him. But his English, as well as his Yugoslav, friends saw in him a genius. One of his achievements was to discover the

¹ Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, II, 64-5.

² *The Southern Slav Programme* (London, 1915), issued by the Yugoslav Committee, p. 13.

terms of the Adriatic Treaty even before it was signed.¹ He did not live to see the realisation of his hopes. He died in 1917.²

One of the organs of the Yugoslav movement was, naturally, the Serbian Government which was established at Corfu after the loss of all Serbian territory in the autumn of 1915. The King of Serbia, Peter, was too old and failing to have any power. The Prince Regent, Alexander, was an open-minded man: but the chief power in the Serbian Government, a power which, apparently, nothing could really shake, was Nikola Pashitch. This Nestor of Balkan politicians was extremely tenacious, of a rather narrow Serbian point of view. He distrusted all schemes for federation. He worked for a unitary Greater Serbian State. It may be that M. Pashitch was right. At any rate he made up his mind and kept to his resolve. The new Yugoslav kingdom when it came into existence was to have a centralised Government in Belgrade. He was not absolutely without compromise, but he never went very far along this road. He expected the others to come into line with him; and on the whole they did.

It was in Great Britain that the most powerful support was given to the Yugoslav Committee, although the support given in France, particularly by M. Franklin-Bouillon and his friends, is not to be depreciated. In London an influential group of journalists and politicians founded a weekly journal in October, 1916. It was called *The New Europe*, and was chiefly devoted to the affairs of the Czechoslovaks and Southern Slavs. Shortly afterwards the Serbian Society of Great Britain was founded in a meeting held at the Mansion House on October 24.³ Lord Cromer became chairman of the Society. Some of its members (all of whom had to be British) were not merely men of influence; they were extremely active, were in touch with important men in Entente Governments, and made numerous journeys abroad in the Yugoslav interest.

It was largely owing to the efforts of the Serbian Society of Great Britain that M. Pashitch was induced to invite Dr. Trumbitch, the head of the Yugoslav Committee, to Corfu. Out of this meeting came the famous Declaration of Corfu, July 20, 1917, in which Pashitch and Trumbitch as "the authorised representatives

¹ Steed, *op. cit.*, II, 64-5.

² Biographical notice by R. W. Seton-Watson, in *Europe in the Melting-Pot* (1919), p. 377.

³ Steed, *op. cit.*, II, 126.

of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes " recognised the desire of their people to constitute an independent, national State. This State was to be called " The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." The Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Mussulman religions were to be free. The kingdom was to include all territory inhabited by the Yugoslav people.¹

The Declaration of Corfu was the Yugoslav answer to the Adriatic Treaty of April, 1915. It was also designed to satisfy the scruples of the Roman Catholic Croats, by securing them freedom of religion and the insertion of their name in the title of the kingdom. The Yugoslav Committee in London next set itself to the task of finding a middle term between the Declaration of Corfu and the Adriatic Treaty. When Signor Orlando, the Italian Premier, visited London in January, 1918, an interview was arranged between him and Dr. Trumbitch. It was not always clear what Signor Orlando's policy would be, but he could always be relied upon to be conciliatory. The end of the interview was that Trumbitch was invited to Rome.

An Italian Parliamentary Committee had arranged with M. Franklin-Bouillon's Committee at Paris that a Congress should be held of all the peoples subject to Habsburg rule. The Congress was to meet at Rome early in March, 1918. It was to this meeting that Dr. Trumbitch went at Signor Orlando's invitation. The British Serbian Committee was represented there in strength. M. Franklin-Bouillon and Dr. Benes were also present. The assembly was called " The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary." Its sessions were held in the Capitol from April 8 to 10.

The meetings were somewhat stormy, but eventually they agreed upon certain formulæ which were issued on April 10 as the Pact of Rome. The important clause was:

In the relations between the Italian nation and the nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, known also under the name of the Yugoslav nation, the representatives of the two peoples recognise that the unity and independence of the Yugoslav nation is a vital Italian interest, as the completion of Italy's national unity is a vital interest of the Yugoslav nation.

The Poles who were present at the Congress made a declaration on their own account, and also associated themselves with the Italo-Yugoslav declaration. The union thus attained was a remarkable achievement, and had, undoubtedly, a deep effect on the unstable

¹ Steed, *op. cit.*, II, 166.

Austrian Empire. Credit must be given, as well as to the people who composed the Congress, to the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, a leading Italian newspaper which had been publishing powerful articles in favour of an Italo-Yugoslav *rapprochement*. The understanding which was reached was not perfect. Many troubles had to be passed through, at the Peace Conference and after, but the Pact of Rome was the basis of the settlement that was ultimately attained.

The Yugoslav Committee did important work not merely in Entente circles, but inside the Austrian Empire. It was able to communicate with prominent people in Croatia (chiefly through Swiss channels). Its efforts undoubtedly contributed to the disintegration that finally came upon the Austrian Empire in the autumn of 1918.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT

The creation of the State of Czechoslovakia is surely one of the most encouraging results of the War. If the Habsburg Monarchy was to be broken up (as seemed inevitable) the danger of minute morcellation was serious. Central Europe might have been "Balkanised" into jarring atoms. Fortunately, a large, powerful State was made out of the Czechs (the Bohemians who had been under Austria), the Slovaks (who had been under Hungary), and some minorities of Ruthenians and Germans who, geographically and economically, fell naturally within the new State. Czechoslovakia became a pivotal State, powerful enough to make itself respected, solid enough to be a pillar of stability in what might otherwise have been a fluid part of Europe. Credit must also be given to Hungary, which, although reduced in size by the treaties of 1919, nevertheless remained a compact, orderly State, unexpectedly inclined to peaceful solutions.

The Czech or Bohemian nation had been an independent kingdom until 1526, when with Hungary, then also an independent kingdom, it suffered the great defeat of Mohacs at the hands of Solyman the Magnificent. From that time Bohemia was ruled by the same Habsburg sovereign as ruled in Austria. The Czechs, however, who were in Southern Silesia and Moravia as well as in Bohemia, were always restive under Austrian rule, and aspired to national unity and independence or at least to unity and autonomy. During the War they attained their aims through a magnificent effort of self-help. Intellectual capacity and firm character were widely spread in this effort; the brain and will were those of Dr. Masaryk.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was born at the Moravian town of Hodonin in 1850. His father was a ranger or gamekeeper on one of the Imperial estates. Young Masaryk was apprenticed to a

key-maker in Vienna, but later, with the help, it is said, of the parish priest at home, was able to attend the Universities of Vienna and Leipzig. He was a distinguished student, and rose to be Lecturer in Philosophy at Vienna. His first published work to attract attention was "a study on Suicide as a pathological symptom of the condition of contemporary Europe": he concluded that the cause was "the decay of religious sentiment."¹

From 1882 Masaryk was Professor of Philosophy at the Czech University of Prague. He gradually won enormous influence and became a national figure. He was noted for his moderate views and judicious temperament. There was nothing of the firebrand about Masaryk, but he had a standing belief in the value in the sight of God and man of a nation's "soul." His elaborate work on *The Spirit of Russia*, published in 1913, shows his deeply philosophical view of nationality. At Prague Masaryk's influence was quickly dynamic not merely on the Czechs, but on the Southern Slavs of Austria. The advocates of the unity of Croat and Serb were mainly pupils of Masaryk, "the lonely Slovak at Prague who, a mixture of Tolstoy and Whitman, seems to some a heretic, to others an ascetic, and to all an enthusiast."²

When the War broke out Masaryk knew that the hour for the Czechoslovaks had struck. He left Prague in December, 1914, passed into Italy, and staked everything on the policy of identifying his people's cause with that of the Slavs.

From Italy Masaryk went to Paris, where with Dr. Benes and Colonel Stefanik he formed the Czechoslovak National Council. There followed an intense and heroic effort, steadily maintained, to obtain recognition from the Entente and to help the Entente to victory. It was found that the suppressed Czechoslovak nation could negotiate and that it could fight. It was not simply asking for support from the Entente; it was giving actual help. The Czech soldiers in the Austrian army passed over to the enemy; others were taken prisoner in the normal operations of the war. By the end of the year 1915 some 75,000 or 100,000 Czechoslovaks were within the Allied lines. They offered themselves for military service, were formed into national legions, were put in French or Italian or Russian uniform and took their place in the firing line.

¹ *Times*, biographical notice, Dec. 2, 1918.

² Hermann Bahr, *Dalmatinische Reise* (1909), p. 70, quoted in *Times*, Dec. 2, 1918.

They were undergoing voluntarily more than the ordinary risks of war. Capture by the Central Powers sent them to execution, for they were all Austrian subjects.

Before he definitely went into exile, Masaryk, still Professor in Prague, had begun weaving his web. It was after the battle of the Marne, which destroyed the "legend of German invincibility," that a thick-set, squat, unshaven man waited upon a prominent London journalist, and asked him to find some means of preventing the Russians from shooting at Czech soldiers when the Czechs were in reality trying to pass over to the Russian lines. The squat man, named Vosca, was an American citizen, a Czech by birth, who had come from Prague, on his way back to the United States, with this message from Dr. Masaryk. The journalist, Mr. Steed, was able to arrange with Masaryk that the Czech soldiers should sing their national song, *Hei Slovane* (a quite usual event under Austrian rule); he was also able to arrange with Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, that the Russian soldiers should be instructed to take the singing of *Hei Slovane* as a sign of surrender. After the War was over Dr. Masaryk wrote about the Czech success to Mr. Steed: "It started in September, 1914, when I sent Vosca to you. Vosca was the beginning."¹

From the beginning of 1915 to the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in April, 1917, Masaryk's headquarters were chiefly in London. A Czech National Council was organised there, but the headquarters of the movement were still with the Czech National Council at Paris. In time the Paris headquarters became a useful centre of political and military information about Austria, which was placed at the disposal of the Entente. The chief man there, and throughout the next two years the right-hand man of Masaryk, was Dr. Benes, a lecturer in Sociology at Prague. Benes, a small, short-sighted young man, was in charge of the Czech National Fund, chiefly contributed by the 800,000 Czechs in the United States of America. He was described, when he visited London to confer with Masaryk in December, 1915, as "a typical young professor of an Austrian university, speaking little French or English, but fluent in German." He became one of the foremost European diplomatists, perhaps the most "European" in mind, a statesman of the League of Nations. But in the War he was the under-study of Masaryk in the absorbing crusade for Czech national

¹ Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years* (1924), II, 41-5.

independence. Meanwhile Masaryk's efforts were not confined to political and military affairs: he was one of the chief editors of the weekly journal, *The New Europe*, published in London from October, 1916, which did a great work in informing public opinion on the affairs of Central and South-Eastern Europe.¹ This influential journal came to an end in October, 1920.

The Czech National Council in Paris was, in fact, a Provisional Government. Dr. Masaryk was its head; Dr. Benes was its Foreign Minister. M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of M. Clemenceau, had given the recognition of the French Government to the Czech National Council as being "the first basis of the future Czechoslovak Government." Dr. Benes came to London and had an interview with Mr. Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil, the Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State. He was unable to obtain their assent to the French formula. They thought that to recognise the Czech National Council as "the first basis" of the future Government would curtail the right of the Czech people to choose its own Government. The objection was, however, removed by the words "trustees for" being substituted in place of "the first basis of." Dr. Benes, a little puzzled at the unexpected result gained by using the magical word "trustee," hurried off to Paris with the glad news.²

In 1918 Masaryk went to New York. He entered upon a breathless series of journeys which were to bring him in triumph to Prague on December 20, 1918, as the first President of the Czechoslovak Republic. The way had been prepared for him in the United States. At a Congress of Czechs held at Chicago in February, 1918, a Bohemian National Alliance in the United States was founded. Headquarters for this Czechoslovak movement in America were established at Washington. After Masaryk's arrival a Declaration of the Czechoslovaks in the United States was presented to Mr. Wilson (July 4, 1918). It affirmed the fixed purpose of the Czechoslovaks to work for the establishment of a Czechoslovak State.³

Thus when Masaryk arrived at New York in May, 1918, he found everything prepared for him by his compatriots there. The Russian Bolshevik Government had just completed its act of desertion of the

¹ Steed, *op. cit.*, II, 97-100, 124, 129.

² Steed, *op. cit.*, II, 231-3.

³ *Current History*, Vol. XIX, p. 311.

Entente, or, as they were now called, "the Allied and Associated Powers." The Czechoslovak legion or rather army (50,000) could not accordingly fight under the Russian flag against the Central Powers. Masaryk had, however, arranged with the Bolshevik Government that the Czech legionaries should proceed by way of Siberia to Vladivostok; from there they were to be shipped for service in France. On or about July 27, 1918, however, Masaryk, as Commander-in-Chief of the Czechoslovak army, sent a cabled message from America ordering the army to remain in Siberia in case the Allied Council at Versailles should decide to send forces there in order to re-create "the Russo-German Front."¹

Masaryk had been given an interview with President Wilson in June, and in early August came the welcome news of the recognition accorded to the Czechoslovak State by the British Government. Masaryk at once telegraphed to M. Pichon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that: "The independent Czechoslovak State is the final check to the Pan-German schemes of a Berlin-to-Bagdad route."² On September 3 Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, announced that the United States recognised the Czechoslovaks as a belligerent nation and the Czechoslovak National Council as a "de facto belligerent Government clothed with proper authority to direct the military affairs of the Czechoslovaks." By this time Italy and Japan had also recognised the Czechoslovak Government, which now was a State, although without a territory, "in the same position as the Belgian and Serbian Government in respect of having its seat temporarily on foreign soil."³

The autumn was spent by Masaryk in a tremendous pressure of publicity work in the United States, as well as in the growing diplomatic work of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government. This body still had its seat in Paris, although there was an important delegation of it at Washington. On October 18 the Provisional Government issued from Paris a Declaration of Independence. They denied all claims of the Habsburg dynasty to rule over the Czechoslovaks, who were declared to be "a free and independent people and nation." A meeting of delegates representing all parts of Czechoslovakia was held in Geneva, and Masaryk

¹ *New York Times*, July 28, 1918.

² Dr. Masaryk had already explained this view in an article in *The New Europe* for December 14, 1916, called "Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations."

³ *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1918.

was elected President of the Republic. On November 12 (the day after the Armistice with Germany) he was notified, through the State Department of the United States, of his election; the same message urged him to go to Prague at once.

On November 21, 1918, Masaryk sailed for Europe. He went first to London, and was accorded an official reception on his arrival on November 30. On December 7 he was in Paris, on the 17th he was visiting the Italian army in North Italy, and on the 20th his train steamed into the "Wilson Station" at Prague. With him was Vosca, by this time a captain in the United States Army, representing the American Government. The people were overjoyed to see their professor and statesman returning clad in the old familiar style of grey ulster and felt hat. He had come back to his own at last, bringing his sheaves with him.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ARMISTICE

When the year 1918 opened the Allied and Associated Powers were looking for a satisfactory ending of the War within a twelve-month. On January 8 President Wilson stated his Fourteen Points to Congress and to the world, to be the basis of the future peace. Mr. Wilson had not consulted the Allies before declaring his principles nor were they bound by his statement. Nevertheless, the Allies were ready to make peace along these lines. The Germans, on the other hand, were not prepared to accept as a basis of peace a declaration which required the evacuation and restoration of Belgium, and the retrocession of Alsace and Lorraine to France.

In the spring the German military chiefs concentrated all the available resources in one last effort to break the Allied armies in the West. The effort was worthy of the great military tradition of the German Army; and for some agonising weeks French and British seemed to fight a losing battle. It was while the military situation was still dark and terrible, while the great battle before Amiens was raging, that M. Poincaré, President, M. Clemenceau, the French Premier, Lord Milner, who was a member of the British War Cabinet, Marshal Pétain and Field-Marshal Haig, with Generals Foch, Plumer, Byng and others, met at Doullens, 27 miles north of Amiens, on March 26. Clemenceau had long been of opinion that there should be unity of command. So far he had only obtained the appointment of a Supreme War Council at Versailles (in November, 1917), which discussed, but did not command.

At the Council of Doullens M. Clemenceau and Lord Milner discussed various suggestions. At last M. Clemenceau sits again at the table and takes pencil and paper. He reads as he writes (in French):

General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments with co-ordinating the British and French operations before Amiens.

Foch interjects: "Better make it on the Western front."

"You are right," says Clemenceau, and makes the correction in his draft. Then there is added:

He (Foch) will come to an understanding to this effect with the two Commanders-in-Chief who are invited to furnish him with all necessary information.

The system thus inaugurated was not exactly one of "unity of command," but it worked well; the Western front was saved through Foch's co-ordination. It was co-ordination "more by negotiation than command. Racing from one Headquarters to another, advising, suggesting, insisting, Foch gained inch by inch the theoretic authority with which, thanks to M. Clemenceau, the crisis of March 26 had endowed him."

On April 3 (Amiens having been saved) an extension of control was given to Foch: he was to have "the strategic direction of military operations on the Western front." The Commanders-in-Chief (Pétain and Haig) were to retain the tactical direction of their troops; and, with regard to Foch's strategical dispositions, they were to have the right of appealing to their respective Governments.¹ This right of appeal appears never to have been exercised.

By the middle of June the turn came. The prolonged German effort, maintained with magnificent persistence, dash, and disregard of life, was exhausted: in face of the constant heroism of the retreating Allied armies and the vigour of the arriving fresh American troops, the German onslaught spent itself. On June 18 Foch's great counterstroke, the Second Battle of the Marne, began. By August the German Higher Command recognised that they could not win the war. A conference of political and military chiefs was held at Spa on August 13 and 14.

The chiefs who met in this fateful council were the Emperor William II, the Crown Prince, the Imperial Chancellor, Count von Hertling, Field-Marshal Hindenburg, General Ludendorff, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and three lesser officials. The military lords were still predominant. Herr von Kühlmann, the former Secretary of State, had tried to get rid of their domination over policy by boldly saying in public on June 25, 1918, that, "an absolute end can hardly be expected through military decisions alone." This was really a guarded way of saying that Germany had lost the war. Main Headquarters was furious: it had

¹ The above facts and quotations about the "unity of command" are taken from Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, Chap. II.

"never made a secret of its lack of confidence in the Secretary of State."¹ Kühlmann was dismissed and Admiral von Hintze took his place, thus setting a seal on the triumph of the military party. Hintze was not a good diplomatist, but no matter!—Germany's foreign relations with the greater part of the civilised world were now being kept up not by diplomatic notes but by shot and shell.²

At the Spa meeting on August 13 and 14 the military party still led the way. Hindenburg and Ludendorff reported that the military situation was "not hopeless," but had "changed for the worse." Yet "no one recommended a direct offer of peace to the enemy." The "home front" must be strengthened, and Lichnowsky must be punished for revealing the secrets of his London mission.³ The Emperor said: "We must prepare to seek the opportune moment for coming to an understanding with the enemy." Secretary of State von Hintze said this necessarily implied "some limitation of previous war-aims." Field-Marshal Hindenburg said that no attempt should be made "to lay diplomatic wires" until "the next (German) success on the Western front." He argued that "it would be possible to remain fixed on French territory, and thereby in the end enforce our will upon the enemy." Substantially, von Hintze noted, this meant that he had to negotiate a peace "by clinging to the war-aims set up for the case of victory."⁴

Two things emerge from an examination of the protocol of the Spa meeting. One, that the German authorities still refused to consider peace-terms which did not give them at any rate a substantial part of their war-aims. The second thing that emerges is that Main Headquarters controlled policy. Ludendorff's own books also prove this ascendancy of the military authorities over the civil. For instance, here is part of a conversation in a meeting between the Chancellor and Hindenburg and Ludendorff held on July 1, 1918.

Chancellor. If England ever became ready to negotiate for fear of falling entirely under the dominant influence of America, would we listen to her?

Main Headquarters. Of course, Main Headquarters has never refused to do otherwise.

¹ Ludendorff, *General Staff and its Problems*, II, 576.

² *New York Times*, July 12, 1918.

³ See Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914*, p. 290.

⁴ This account of the Spa meeting is taken from the signed protocol and von Hintze's Memorandum, which are reprinted in *Preliminary History of the Armistice* (Carnegie Endowment, 1924), pp. 17-21. Other quotations are from Ludendorff, *The General Staff and its Problems*, II, 585.

But Main Headquarters should never have been asked such a question. The Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy did not ask leave to negotiate from their General Staffs.

So the sands of time ran out. The German Government put off trying for peace on any such terms as the Allied and Associated Powers would consent to: until at last there were practically no terms to be obtained at all. This is the result of letting the soldiers control the civilian ministers. A curious fact which the study of diplomatic history shows, is that the men in uniform lose wars and the men in black coats win them.

Emperor Charles of Austria, Count Burian his Foreign Minister, and General Freiherr von Arz, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, had also attended the meeting at Spa on August 14. Burian had plainly warned the Emperor William that Austria could not carry on war over the winter. General von Arz, as tranquil and good-tempered as ever, discussed with Ludendorff the military situation and the means of sending more divisions of Austrian troops to the Western front, although he too said that they could not hold out through the coming winter. Then von Arz departed, still with his nonchalant air, his cheerful countenance. Ludendorff never saw him again but continued to hold him "in the highest esteem both as a man and a soldier."¹

Burian's plan was that the Allies should be invited to send delegates to a confidential and non-committal discussion in a neutral country. The German Government did everything in its power to prevent him, asking Talaat (who was stopping at Vienna) to support their point of view, and getting von Arz to use his influence with the Emperor. The Austrian note was postponed until September 14; then it was sent out, on the same day as a personal telegram arrived from the Emperor William trying to stop it under the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance.² The Austrian offer was refused.

We now come to the darksome days between September 26 and October 3, when the fate of Germany was sealed. On September 26 Ludendorff at Main Headquarters heard by way of Vienna that Bulgaria was going to conclude a separate peace. Orders were at once sent for the dispatch of troops to Sofia along with "the ablest

¹ *Ludendorff's Own Story*, II, 336; cp. Nowak, *The Collapse of Central Europe* (trans. 1924), p. 222.

² *Preliminary History of the Armistice*, p. 30 (Report of the German Foreign Office).

German General." The Imperial plenipotentiary at Sofia undertook with the Bulgarian General Savoff the task "of overthrowing the Government" at Sofia. But before he could perform this friendly duty, Bulgaria signed armistice-terms with General Franchet d'Esperey on the Salonica front (September 29).

Meanwhile the German Foreign Office had come to the conclusion that peace-negotiations must be prepared by democratising the Government; for it was clear that President Wilson—the main hope of the Germans—would not negotiate with any body under the existing constitution.¹ The Imperial Government, having for forty-seven years refused to admit the system of responsibility of ministers to the elected legislature, and thus having ruined German political life, now adopted the system as a device for the making of peace.

On October 1, before the new Government was formed, Main Headquarters, which had prevented immediate peace-proposals from being made on August 14, now suddenly demanded that a *peace-proposal shall be issued at once. To-day the troops are holding their own; what may happen to-morrow cannot be foreseen.* On the same day, a little later, another telegram was sent off from Main Headquarters by a representative of the Foreign Office; "General Ludendorff told me that our proposal must be forwarded *immediately* from Berne to Washington. *The Army could not wait forty-eight hours.*" Another telegram reported: "*He said he felt like a gambler, and that a division might fail him anywhere at any time.* I get the impression," added the Foreign Office representative, "that they have all lost their nerve here."²

The charge that Ludendorff was now in a panic has often been made. He denies it in his book, and writes: "I had slowly come to this fateful conclusion"³ [to propose peace]. The view of Main Headquarters was that the War was now definitely lost; therefore to continue it longer was merely to sacrifice life uselessly.⁴ Ludendorff is thus justified. The Germans would not have obtained any better armistice-terms by making up their mind to fight longer. Ludendorff is not to be excused equally easily from having advised

¹Memorandum prepared at the German Foreign Office, Sept 28, 1918 (*Prelim. Hist. of the Armistice*, p. 34).

²Lessner to Foreign Office, Oct. 1, 1918 (*Prelim. Hist. of the Armistice*, p. 40). The italics are in the original. On October 6 von Payer stated in Conference with the Chancellor: "Ludendorff's nerves are no longer reliable" (*ibid.*, p. 49).

³*Ludendorff's Own Story*, II, 376.

⁴Statement of Major von dem Bussche to the Reichstag, Oct. 2, 1918 (*Prelim. Hist. of the Armistice*, p. 45).

against peace on previous occasions. But the real vice was not in him but in the German system which allowed Main Headquarters to decide, instead of the civilians, when and how peace or war should be made.

The new German Chancellor, who was to inaugurate the system of Parliamentary Government in Germany, was the liberal brother of the Grand Duke of Baden, which was itself the most liberal of German States. Prince Max arrived in Berlin in the afternoon of October 1. It was hoped that the Peace Note would be issued on the 2nd. But the Grand Duke had not notified his approval of Prince Max's acceptance of the office of Imperial Chancellor. Not only was the approval of the Grand Duke necessary, but he could only be approached constitutionally through the Kaiser. It seemed impossible to arrange all this in one evening. The Kaiser was in a special railway-train returning from Spa to Berlin. However, the telephone works wonders. The Kaiser's train was stopped at Cologne, and he was put in touch with the Schloss at Karlsruhe. By midnight the Grand Duke's approval had been obtained.¹ Prince Max delayed a little in making up his mind to issue the peace-note, until he had heard again from Hindenburg that every day only made the military situation worse. On October 3 the peace-note was dispatched through the Swiss Legation to President Wilson. It requested him to take steps for the restoration of peace on the basis of "the programme laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918." The German Government also requested the immediate conclusion of an armistice. An Austro-Hungarian Note to the same effect was transmitted to Mr. Wilson through the Swedish Legation.

Everything now depended on the sort of armistice which would be granted. The Germans expected to be able to arrange an armistice which would obviously have to entail the evacuation of Belgium and north-eastern France but which would permit the resumption of hostilities on the Franco-German frontier if the peace-negotiations should fall through.² A surrender-armistice, a thing hitherto almost unknown in military-diplomatic history, was not contemplated.

President Wilson replied to the German Note on October 8 that

¹ Ludendorff, *The General Staff and its Problems*, II, 622.

² Max to Ludendorff, Oct. 8, 1918 (*Prelim. Hist. of the Armistice*, p. 51).

“ he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are on their soil.” He also observed that he was “ justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war.”

After a number of agitated meetings, the German authorities replied to Mr. Wilson on October 12, stating that the Government had the necessary popular basis, and that they were ready to comply with the propositions of the President regarding evacuation. They proposed that a mixed commission should meet to put evacuation arrangements into effect. President Wilson answered this sharply on the 14th:

(1) It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments.

(2) The President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field.

Mr. Wilson added that the Germans could have no armistice so long as they continued “ the illegal and inhumane practices which they still persist in.” The conclusion of the Note (saying that the Germans must alter the power which hitherto had controlled them) was practically a demand that the Germans, in order to gain a peace, must put the Hohenzollerns off the throne, and deprive the Junker class of their ascendancy.

This plain speaking, as well as the allusion to the military supremacy of the Allies, must have been gall and wormwood to the German Government. It was the view of Vice-Chancellor von Payer, stated in the Council held on October 16 to discuss the Note, that it completed the moral collapse of the German people: “ when the second Wilson Note arrived, their spirit broke down.”¹ The people knew, too, the figures of the number of American reserve troops steadily arriving in France: “ The American ments have always been correct.”²

¹ *Prelim. Hist. of the Armistice*, p. 88.

² Colonel Heye, in the same conference of Oct. 17. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

The second Wilson Note was debated in a Council at Berlin on October 17, in the absence of the Kaiser. Chancellor Prince Max was in the chair. Ludendorff was present. This Note in effect demanded something like a surrender. Admiral von Scheer for the Navy, and Ludendorff for the Army, were now in favour of continuing the war. Solf, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since von Hintze's resignation, called attention to this sudden change of opinion of Ludendorff: it is "an absolute riddle." At the beginning of the month Ludendorff was urging the political authorities to "beg our opponents for an armistice." The Admiralty was equally bewildering. A year ago it had distinctly promised to prevent the transport of American troops. "This promise has not been kept." Yet the Admiralty, trusting in the U-boats (in spite of the impending loss of the Flanders coast and the Austrian bases in the Mediterranean), advised that the Wilson Note should be rejected.¹ Colonel Heye said that the Note must be either accepted or rejected: its terms did not permit of negotiation: "it is a case of *to be or not to be*." Hindenburg's view, telegraphed from the Western front, was that the Note should be rejected and the war continued: "even if we should be beaten, we should not really be worse off than if we were to accept everything at present."²

After all this the German answer to the second Wilson Note was drafted and sent on October 20. It was feeble and inconclusive. It agreed that the conditions of the armistice should be left to "the judgment of the military advisers" [without stating whether the German military authorities were or were not included in this phrase]; it did, however, accept the condition of evacuation of occupied territories; and it undertook to secure that passenger ships should not be torpedoed. The Note assured the President that Germany had now Constitutional Government: "In future no Government can take or continue in office without the confidence of the Reichstag."³

The German answer was considered at a Cabinet meeting held by President Wilson at the White House on October 22. Albert Sidney Burleson, Postmaster-General, feared that if the armistice terms were left to Pershing, Foch and Haig, these soldiers might be too lenient. He was in favour of demanding complete surrender. William Gibbs McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, re-

¹ *Prelim. Hist. of the Armistice*, pp. 96-9.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 101, 105.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 105-6.

marked that such a policy might prolong the war: "we may as well face the fact that the Allies and even we may not be able to finance this war on its present scale—and it really means our financing it—for two years more." President Wilson said that "only Lloyd George and the British Labour Party had expressed concurrence in the terms he had outlined"; and that the British "were making trouble on the matter of the freedom of the seas." The Cabinet meeting then came to an end.¹

Next day, Wednesday, October 23, the President's reply to the Germans appeared in the Press. In this document Mr. Wilson stipulated that, if the Governments associated with the United States consented, *their military advisers and the advisers of the United States* should draft armistice terms. These terms, before being submitted to Germany, would be approved by the Governments opposed to her. With regard to the question of Constitutional Government in Germany, the President put aside all euphemisms: "the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire," he wrote, "is unimpaired."

Two high German diplomats at Munich and Berne wrote to the German Foreign Office their opinion that the last paragraph of Mr. Wilson's Note really amounted to a demand for the abdication of the Kaiser. The Government at Berlin was contemplating the possibility of such a course. Scheidemann, one of the new Secretaries of State (who was a Social Democrat), had said plainly in the Council of October 16: "Does anybody really believe that the inclination among the people to retain the Emperor is strong enough to-day to make them lift a finger for him." On October 28 an Imperial decree, which was published, contained the faltering remark: "the Kaiser's office is still one of service to the German people."

In the meantime the Emperor of Austria had, by telegram of the 27th, informed the German Government that he was going to sue for a separate peace. On the same day the German Foreign Office briefly answered Mr. Wilson's third Note: it said that the German Government now "awaits proposals for an armistice."

On October 28 General von Mudra, summoned from the Front to give evidence before the Secretaries of State, advised in favour of continuing the war, but added: "If Austria capitulates uncon-

¹ The account of the Cabinet meeting was given by David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture, in the *Chicago Herald and Examiner*, April 5, 1926.

ditionally and puts herself on the side of the enemy, our cause is lost."¹ A telegram dated October 31 announced that Turkey had signed the Armistice of Mudros. On November 3 Austria signed an armistice which included the right of Entente troops to use the Austrian roads, railways and waterways.

Mr. Wilson's last Note before the Armistice was dated November 5. It stated that the Allied Governments agreed with the United States to make peace with Germany on the terms laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement announced in his subsequent addresses. The Allied Governments, however, made two reservations with regard to the Fourteen Points:

Clause two relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas is open to various interpretations. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.

The President further stated that Marshal Foch had been authorised to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government, and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice.

The German Government had now decided to accept the Allies' terms. On November 3 the sailors in the Navy at Kiel had mutinied. The movement spread until it became a revolution. On November 7 the German Armistice Commission left Spa at twelve o'clock in automobiles for the French lines.² On November 9 the Kaiser abdicated and fled with the Crown Prince into Holland.

The Armistice Delegation which left Spa on November 7 consisted of Secretary of State Erzberger, Minister Count Oberndorff, Major-General von Winterfeld, Naval Captain Vanselow; there were also a captain, an interpreter, and two secretaries. The Delegation had been informed by wireless from the French that

¹ *Prelim. Hist. of the Armistice*, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 145.

they should present themselves at a certain cross-road (Chimay-Fourmies) on the La Capelle road. "The cross-road was clearly marked by the beams of several searchlights."¹ All firing by the French was stopped for some miles on either side. At 9.15 p.m. the three automobiles of the German delegates arrived at the cross-road. They were met by officers designated by Marshal Foch and were taken in the automobiles, with curtains drawn, to the Château Francport in the Forest of Compiègne. They spent the night in the Château. Next morning they proceeded in automobiles to the village of Rethondes, where Marshal Foch received them in his special train. Besides the Marshal there were present on the side of the Allies and Associated Powers, Admiral Wemyss, First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, and Admiral Sims of the American Navy. Pétain and Haig, respectively Commanders-in-Chief of the French and British armies, were with their troops.

"Qu'est-ce que vous désirez, Messieurs?"² inquired Foch, always gentle and polite, when the German delegates presented themselves. They made their mission known. After the verification of credentials, Foch read the Armistice terms in a clear voice. The German delegates seemed surprised at the completeness of the surrender which was demanded. Seventy-two hours, expiring on Monday at 11 a.m., were allowed for answer. Erzberger requested that in the meantime a provisional suspension of hostilities should be immediately accorded. Marshal Foch refused.

The German Delegation decided that a courier should be sent to Spa to give information and to receive instructions. The courier, however, was unable to proceed as the Germans were bombarding the La Capelle road. A French aeroplane was provided for him, but soon after a message arrived from German Headquarters announcing that fire would cease on the road. At 3.20 p.m. on the same day (November 8) the courier, Captain Helledorff, set forth by automobile for Spa. He made his difficult journey in time for telephonic communication to be opened with Berlin and for authority to sign to be obtained. The armistice was concluded in the chill and grey dawn of the Compiègne Forest at 5 a.m. on Monday, November 11. It provided for immediate cessation of hostilities by sea (that is, as soon as ships could be communicated with), and

¹ *Current History*, XVII, 360.

² Buchan, *A History of the Great War*, IV, 414.

for cessation of hostilities by land after six hours. Orders were transmitted over the wires along the lines.

The Armistice terms were of an unusual kind. They did more than stipulate for a suspension of hostilities: they exacted certain surrenders which made it impossible for one side to resume hostilities at the end of the Armistice. By Article 34 it was made to endure for 36 days, with power of extension (actually it was extended until the signature of the Treaty of Versailles). Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg were to be immediately evacuated (Article 2). The left bank of the Rhine was likewise to be evacuated, and also the bridges at Mayence, Coblenz, and Cologne, along with a 19-mile radius (30 kilometres) from these bridge-heads on the right bank. The left bank, the bridge-heads and the 19-mile radius of territory were to be occupied by the Allied forces. In addition there was to be a neutral zone on the right bank extending for 6½ miles (10 kilometres) inland (Article 5). The Germans were to surrender 5,000 guns, 25,000 machine-guns, 3,000 *Minenwerfer*, and 1,700 aeroplanes (Article 4). All prisoners of war taken by the Germans were to be restored without reciprocity. The return of German prisoners of war would be settled at the Peace Conference (Article 10). German troops were to evacuate all territory belonging to Russia, Rumania or Turkey since August 1, 1914, and the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were to be suppressed (Articles 12 and 15). The naval clauses included the surrender of all submarines, 5 battle-cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers and 50 destroyers (Articles 22 and 23), and the maintenance of the "blockade" conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers, who would, however, take steps for the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice (Article 26).¹

The terms were carried out by the Germans in spite of great technical difficulties in the way. A wing of the German army in retreat (about 70,000 men) passed through the southern tip of the Dutch province of Limburg—a violation of neutrality which was permitted by the Dutch, who retained the soldiers' arms and material of war.² If the Dutch Government had not allowed these troops passage through Limburg, the soldiers, not having evacuat-

¹ See Spa Agreement for provisioning Germany, February 8, 1919, Trier Agreement of 16 February, Brussels Agreement of 14 March, in Kraus und Rödiger, *Urkunden zum Friedensvertrage* (1920), I, 94 ff.

² *Pages d'Histoire, Chronologie de la Guerre* (1919), pp. 305, 307. Japikse, *Die Stellung Hollands im Weltkrieg* (1921), p. 316.

cd occupied territory by the stated date, would have become prisoners of war. The Entente Powers protested vigorously.

It has been suggested that the Allies might have refused an armistice, and might have continued the war until the German armies were broken and Berlin occupied. Or again, it was suggested at the time of the Armistice that complete surrender, that is to say, "complete disarmament and demobilisation" of the military and naval forces of the enemy, be demanded.¹ Against this last proposal Foch pointed out that it would be impossible for the Allies to see at this time that all the German forces were demobilised: the only practicable thing to do was to demand a specific amount of war material, to see that it was delivered, and to take over certain territories for occupation. As regards the demand that the war should continue, Foch's view was: Firstly, that the Allies were fighting to impose their will upon Germany, and that the Armistice terms accomplished this: "our aims being accomplished, no one has a right to shed another drop of blood." *On ne fait la guerre que pour les résultats*—"people only fight for results." Secondly, he informed the Supreme Council:

The conditions laid down by your military advisers are the very conditions which we ought to and could impose after the success of our further operations. So if the Germans accept them now, it is useless to go on fighting.²

At the time of signing the Armistice conditions the German plenipotentiaries protested that "the execution of this convention will throw the German people into anarchy and famine." This prophecy proved to be false. Bolshevism under the name of Spartacism broke forth in Germany, but was suppressed by the numerous and well-armed troops which the German Government was able to employ, and which it used with both firmness and discretion. The feeding of the German population proved to be a difficult task, and undoubtedly much misery existed during the blockade. It is by no means clear, however, that this misery would have been avoided simply by lifting the blockade; it was probably caused by the dislocation of economic conditions brought about by the war and by the disorder after the cessation of hostilities.

¹ This was the proposal of General Bliss, American representative on the Supreme Council (Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, p. 65).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 66 67

CHAPTER XV

THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS

The surrender made by the Germans at the Armistice was such that they had no choice but to accept the peace-terms of the Allies. What these peace-terms would be were known in general outline by the Reply of the Allies, December 30, 1916, to the first German peace-offer, and by the Reply of the Allies, January 10, 1917, to President Wilson's peace-note. Further, the Allies had agreed, as stated in Mr. Wilson's Note of November 5, to make peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points subject to two reserved conditions about the freedom of the seas and reparation for damage done to the civil population.

During the last months of hostilities preparations had been made in the chief Allied and Associated countries for the Peace Conference. A vast amount of information—historical, geographical, ethnological and statistical—had been collected and printed; but the Allies had not met together and arranged their precise peace-terms.¹ For one thing, the heads of the Allied Governments had their full energies occupied in conducting the war; for another, to meet and discuss peace-terms would have been a sure means of breaking up the harmony of the Allies, and weakening their prosecution of hostilities. There had been no peace conference on a really large scale since the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15. Consequently the Conference of Paris was rather slow in adopting a consistent method of business. One thing, however, seems to have been agreed upon before the start: the Conference was to be held at Paris, and German delegates were not to be admitted to the negotiations. Reminiscences of the way in which Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna had created dissensions among the Allies may have helped to bring about this view. The Allies of 1918 resolved to draft terms and then to offer these terms

¹ Temperley (editor), *A History of the Peace Conference* (1920), I, 237.

in, substantially, their final form, to the Germans. The Peace of Versailles was not to be a negotiated peace. Exactly when it was decided to exclude belligerents from the negotiations is not known: M. Tardieu says that nobody among the Allies ever suggested their admission.¹

The delegates of the Allied and Associated States assembled at Paris early in 1919. By January 12 work had begun. The Conference was formally opened on January 18 by the President, M. Poincaré, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Quai d'Orsay. On the motion of Mr. Wilson, who had come to represent the United States, M. Clemenceau was elected President of the Conference. A French Foreign Office official, M. Dutasta, was appointed Secretary General. The first Protocol of the Conference, which was issued to the public, gave these facts and the speech of M. Poincaré; an Annex to the Protocol gave the rules of the Conference. The most important of these rules was the division of the Allied and Associated States into two groups: firstly, belligerent States with general interests—the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan; and secondly, the belligerent States with special interests—Belgium, the British Dominions and India, China, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia, Siam, Czechoslovakia. The Five Powers with general interests were to attend all sessions and commissions. The eighteen with special interests were to attend when questions concerning them were discussed. This division, if a little invidious, was the only way in which the Conference could function. It was the Five Powers or rather the Four (Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States) which had won the war. Their will was bound to prevail, and it was better to say so frankly from the beginning. Moreover, if all the belligerent Allies, with their innumerable and often conflicting interests, had been admitted to all the sessions, the Conference would have become unmanageable.²

The Conference worked through the following groups. First, the Council of Ten, consisting of the heads of Governments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Four Great Powers (United States, France, Great Britain, Italy) with two representatives of ambassadorial rank from Japan. They held sessions twice daily from January 12 to March 24, after which date the Council was

¹ Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

² Cp. *Hist. Peace Conf.*, I, 249.

diminished in size and became the Council of Four (the Premiers of the Four Great Powers).¹ When the special interests of any minor belligerent State (or State which had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany) were being discussed, that State's plenipotentiaries took part in the session. Subordinate to the Council of Ten (or Four), were a Drafting Committee and over fifty other Committees or Commissions, of which the chief were the Committees on the League of Nations, on Reparations, on Territorial Questions. In addition to the plenipotentiaries, every State sent a large body of technical assistants, of all degrees from high ministers and diplomatists to typists and compositors. The total British Delegation and clerical staff was well over six hundred.

The housing of all the different delegations was not an easy matter to provide. The high statesmen were generally provided with quarters by some friend or some wealthy and public-spirited resident of Paris. Mr. Wilson stayed at the Hôtel Bischoffen, put at his disposal by the French Government, in the Place des États Unis. Many of the meetings of the Council of Four were held there. Mr. Lloyd George had the "appartement" of a British nobleman, No. 23 Rue Nitot, near the Arc de Triomphe. Most of the members of the British Delegation were housed in the Hôtel Majestic, which the British Government leased for the Conference. A complete British staff of servants was brought over, and every precaution was taken to keep the affairs of the Delegation confidential. Offices for the Delegation were secured in the Hôtel Astoria and another, which were also wholly taken over by the British Government. The contents of waste-paper baskets were carefully collected every night and burned. The arrangements of other Great Powers were similar. The American Delegation had the Hôtel Crillon in the Place de la Concorde. Thus the British in the Majestic and Astoria were at the top of the Avenue des Champs Élysées, and the Americans were at the foot of it. Most of the meetings of the Committee of the League of Nations were held at the Crillon. Many members of the American Delegation could not be accommodated in the Crillon. They were housed in various "appartements" and lodgings on either side of the river.

¹ There was also a subordinate *Council of Five*, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Great Powers with a Japanese representative. *Hist. Peace Conf.*, I, 267.

Paris was not at all gay at this time. No one could say of the Conference, as the Prince de Ligne said of the Congress of Vienna: *Le Congrès danse mais il ne marche pas*. The shops in Paris were nearly empty. The famous confectioners could supply little else but bread. There was small variety of food in the restaurants and prices were extremely high. A few formal receptions were given at the British and other embassies. In the hotels where the various delegations lodged, some dances were organised by unofficial amusement committees. But it certainly could not be said that the Congress danced. On the other hand, it worked extremely hard. If it suffered from anything it was from the mass of material which its assistants prepared. At any rate, it is only fair to say that although plenty of mistakes occurred, an honest attempt was also made to acquire full information on every subject and to weigh evidence.

In a pleasant and pervasive way the Conference was a potent international agency. There was a great deal of coming and going; there was much quiet entertaining among and between members of the various delegations. Apart from those who had official positions at the Conference, nearly everybody of any note came to Paris some time or other between January 12 and June 28. Europe, so far as it was represented by the Allied and Associated States, became for a few months *one*. Naturally each State had prejudices and jealousies of its own; but their delegates and their assistants were all members of the Conference, they had all taken part in the great co-operative effort of the War, and now, in the cheerful atmosphere of victory, they were all taking part in the making of peace. The Conference inspired something like the community-feeling of a church. It was an international centre or society; it embraced all the Allied nations. For a moment the United States of Europe showed itself before the clouds covered it again.

Nowhere, perhaps, was this aspect of international solidarity more strikingly seen than at the Hôtel Majestic. This was one of the biggest, newest and brightest of the Paris hotels: the food might have been more plentiful, but at least there was no lack of windows, mirrors, electric light, comfortable chairs and central heating. It was a place where people could foregather and escape from the damp and cheerless atmosphere of Paris outside. The British Delegation was probably the biggest: its friends and

acquaintances were numerous. The large and lofty entrance-hall of the Majestic became a sort of international caravanserai. In the evening, after dinner, the various members of the British Delegation—not the highest statesmen, but the rest—would sit by twos or threes in the wicker chairs by the little tables, talking, reading the newspapers, or simply looking idly at the incessant coming and going. Through the revolving door which kept out the icy blast would come men of all nations and all ranks, pass over the parquet-floor, and disappear to their various destinations and appointments. A British Cabinet Minister, in a heavy tweed overcoat ; a French officer in full-dress uniform—gorgeous epaulettes and magnificent wide red trousers with a broad black stripe ; an Arab prince in ample, white flowing robes ; British officers in plain khaki, with softly-coloured ribbons on their breast and wound-stripes on their sleeve ; an official from the Quai d'Orsay in plain black, looking businesslike and neat ; American naval and military officers, tall, straight men, with the old-fashioned tunic buttoning up to the neck, always looking smart and efficient ; Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Czechoslovaks and Serbs, bearded bourgeois of the black felt hat, the dark overcoat, and the sallow complexion that comes from lack of exercise ; Japanese, trim, impassive, determined ; inquisitive-looking Chinese ; ruddy Indian princes, with intelligent faces and pleased expressions, wearing their khaki uniform with a swinging, soldierly bearing ; Portuguese officers in light blue, Italians in grey ; French politicians and statesmen with their portfolios, their swift steps and their swifter, intelligent glances—the pageant of the Hôtel Majestic displayed a continual procession. Many of the new-comers sat down at the little tables with their friends beneath the glass-dome, sipped coffee, and discussed the demerits of their colleagues, the just claims of their own country, or the way to solve the difficulties of the world. All knew something about the Conference, the transportation question, the Danube, the coal-concessions, the ethnology of Transylvania ; but few knew anything of the centre of the machine, the mysterious room where a few high statesmen co-ordinated the results of thousands of reports and memoranda and made, clause by clause, the Treaty. In spite of the vast number at work, the actual making of the Treaty was wrapped in mystery. The high walls of the Hôtel Bischoffen, or the equally unscalable staircase of M. Clemenceau at the Ministry of war,

shut the Treaty off not merely from the world but from the Conference itself.

The work of the Conference falls into two well-defined periods: first, from January 12 to March 24, when the Council of Ten (Allied and Associated heads of Governments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs) worked at making the Treaty; and second, from March 24 to June 28, when the Council of Four (the heads of the Great Powers without Japan) had the work in hand. During the first period a great deal of valuable work was done, but the Treaty was not drafted. In the second period the Four, realising that time had been slipping away, made the biggest and most complex treaty in history and procured its signature: a truly magnificent achievement.

A member of the American Delegation has noted five great crises in the course of the Conference.¹ These were concerned with the colonial policy of the mandate; the proposed League of Nations; the third was concerned chiefly with reparations, and the left bank of the Rhine; the fourth was connected with Fiume; the fifth with Shantung.

It had been decided (or at any rate assumed) even earlier than the opening of the Peace Conference that the conquered colonies would not be given back to Germany. When, therefore, the question of disposing of these colonies was being considered at Paris in January, schemes of partition were put forward. On the whole the views of the Conference Powers tended towards annexation. President Wilson, however, was strongly in favour of the mandatory system. This idea had arisen out of the circumstances of British colonial history. The mother-country administered her colonies until they were able to govern themselves: the British Dominions were examples of countries which had attained self-government in this way. Similarly the occupation of the Philippines by the United States had always been considered provisional: the Americans were guiding the Philippines to the goal of self-government, and eventually of independence. Before the Peace Conference assembled General Smuts, one of the delegates for South Africa and member of the British War Cabinet, had written a pamphlet further elaborating a scheme for a League of Nations: in this work he had considered the possibility of the League undertaking the trusteeship or "mandate" for certain

¹ Ray Stannard Baker, *What Wilson did at Paris* (1919), pp. 20-1.

areas of territory. Colonel House had something like the same idea of mandates as early as June, 1914.¹ President Wilson seized on this idea, as a means both of increasing the influence of the League of Nations and of preventing an annexationist policy on the part of the European States. After some rather heated debates the mandatory system was adopted.

In the middle of February and first part of March the business of the Conference suffered from the absence of Mr. Lloyd George, who was called away to London by domestic British difficulties, and by the absence of Mr. Wilson, who went to Washington to sign a number of bills of Congress. It had been agreed on January 25, at the first plenary session of the Congress, that the Covenant of the League of Nations should be an integral part of the Peace Treaty. The League was Mr. Wilson's great interest. He held unalterably to his view that the Covenant of the League should be a part of the Peace Treaty and not a separate document. Yet when he came back from Washington on March 14 he found a design in existence for the conclusion speedily of a preliminary treaty of peace, which should settle the main problems, such as the territorial limits and disarmament of Germany, and leave the League for the final treaty. Mr. Wilson was afraid that this might weaken the League. For the Preliminary Treaty would really be the main treaty: it would make the peace; and he felt that if the League was to be grandly established as a fundamental part of the public law of Europe it should be in the main treaty. On the other hand the desire of people who sought to make a speedy preliminary treaty was certainly intelligible. A preliminary treaty would establish peace, instead of war with an uneasy armistice; it would relieve Germany of the blockade; it would leave matters that required time to be worked out at leisure in a cool atmosphere. It was the "classical way" of ending wars and making great peace settlements. So the second crisis took place, and again, after severe efforts, Mr. Wilson won. There was to be no preliminary treaty; and the Covenant of the League was to figure in the Final Act as signed by all the plenipotentiaries. Many unfair things have been said about the attitude of the Conference statesmen towards the project of a League of Nations. Wilson, Smuts, Cecil, Bourgeois, Balfour, were its great champions. The others were not hostile to it, but were content to leave

¹*The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 264, 275.

it in the hands of its zealous protagonists. It is said that the French Premier, on awakening each morning, said to himself: "Georges Clemenceau, you *do* believe in the League of Nations." A better authenticated story is that of the reply of an Italian Delegate when asked to define Italy's attitude towards the League. He said: "Well, we believe in it, but we want the question of Fiume settled first."¹

The month of April was the worst in the history of the Conference, and one of the worst in the history of the world. A Communist revolution had broken out in Hungary; another occurred on March 4 in Bavaria. The Allies had to evacuate Odessa and leave it to the Bolsheviki; the attempts at counter-revolution against the Bolsheviki were failing. Social and economic disturbances rumbled in England. Ireland was in rebellion. The world outside the Conference seemed to be falling to pieces. The Conference itself was riven by conflicting interests.

It was in these distressing conditions that the great demand of France for security was put forward. The principles establishing the basis of the League of Nations had been agreed to; the methods of disarming Germany for the future or for a considerable period had been discussed and settled without much friction. But German disarmament did not make France feel secure. She demanded that Germany's western frontier should be fixed at the Rhine. She was not asking that this territory should be annexed to herself. France's territorial aims in Europe were limited to Alsace and Lorraine, which had been taken from her by Germany in 1871, and the Saar basin, which had been taken from her in 1815, after about twenty years' occupation. Her plan now was that the left bank of the Rhine—the territory between Alsace and the frontier of Holland—should be erected into an autonomous and neutral State. During the War she had made a secret agreement to this effect with Russia, dated February 14, 1917.² The French plan was supported by strong arguments in a Memorandum of Marshal Foch, January 10, 1918, and of M. Tardieu (Clemenceau's right-hand man), on March 26.³

¹ Baker, *What Wilson did at Paris*, p. 74. *Hist. of Peace Conference*, I, 261-2. In Wilson's absence, Colonel House appears to have agreed that the Covenant should come after the signature of the Treaty, not as part of it. This is believed to have begun the estrangement of House and Wilson.

² Russian Note, published in the *Manchester Guardian*, Dec. 12, 1917.

³ Texts in Tardieu, *The Truth about the Treaty*, pp. 145-67.

The British view regarding the French plan was that it was quite impracticable. Seven million Germans, solidly massed, contiguous to their brothers on the other side of the river, could not be detached from Germany without introducing "complication and weakness" into the European system.¹ When President Wilson came back from Washington on March 14 he was equally critical and negative. It was a distracting period. Nearly every Government and prince in Europe, or even in the world, had a grievance or a petition. On March 25 the King of Spain, whose opinions and actions were entitled to respect, sent a message about Bolshevism to Mr. Wilson, enclosing a letter from Charles, ex-Emperor of Austria. This unfortunate prince was still living in his former Empire. His letter, dated from Eckartsau, a castle near Vienna, March 17, 1919, implored Allied intervention to prevent the Danube area from being "Balkanised" or worse. On April 4 came news of revolutions and communistic risings. "On the same day the handsome King Albert of the Belgians came flying down by aeroplane from Brussels to insist upon the priority right of Belgium to reparation—thus adding a new and irritating complication."² Mr. Lloyd George became engaged in a battle of Notes with M. Clemenceau, beginning with his now well-known Memorandum of March 26, in which he claimed that the territorial terms enforced against Germany must not be such as to leave a feeling of resentment after the peace.³ M. Clemenceau had no difficulty in pointing out that as Germany was losing her colonies, her fleet and many other things which she valued, she was bound to feel resentment powerfully in any case. President Wilson, whose health was seriously impaired, felt worried and depressed, almost despairing. On April 7 he sent a cable-message ordering the battleship *George Washington* to come from Brooklyn to Brest. Information of this was given to the American Press Bureau in Paris. The *George Washington* was, like Lord Beaconsfield's special train at the Congress of Berlin, prepared to leave at a moment's notice.

After the incident of the *George Washington* the air gradually

¹ Conversation of Mr. Philip Kerr and M. Tardieu at 23 Rue Nitot, on March 12, 1918 (Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 173).

² The letters of the King of Spain and of Charles of Austria are given textually in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (1922), III, 246-8; for King Albert see Vol. I, p. 46.

³ This Memorandum was published in England on March 25, 1922, after the Genoa Conference.

cleared. The parties began to yield a little to each other. On April 10 and 11 the last two sessions of the League of Nations Commission were held. The Covenant was completed along the lines that Mr. Wilson advocated, and it was to be in the Treaty of Peace. Thus he had his heart's desire. A compromise was arranged on the question of the Saar and the left bank of the Rhine—the French to leave the Saar mines and the Rhineland to be occupied by Allied troops for fifteen years. In addition, as a “set-off” against the left bank of the Rhine remaining German, the French Government was offered (March 14, 1919) a Guarantee Treaty of Security by Great Britain and the United States.¹

The conflicting views in the Conference, or rather in the Council of Four, regarding reparations centred over the question of war-costs and damage to civilians. Article 19 of the Armistice of November 11 had stipulated for “reparation for damages done”; but it also contained the phrase (with which the clause opened) “with the reservation that any future claims and demands of the Allies and United States of America remain unaffected.” This had been adopted, as a kind of after-thought, by the Supreme Council of the Allies and Associated Powers, on the suggestion of M. Klotz, French Minister of Finance, on November 2, 1918. But after much debate in the Economic Section of the Conference, it was finally agreed that the Klotz clause, which was only in the Armistice terms, and not in the pre-Armistice Note of the Allies, could not extend the terms of that Note. In the pre-Armistice Note of November 5, 1918, the Allies demanded “that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germans by land, by sea and from the air.” This was the only reservation which the Allies made in their Note to President Wilson, and to this the Germans had assented. Clearly then the Allies had debarred themselves from demanding their total war-costs from Germany. They could only exact reparation for damage to civilians. The question now was: What could be included in such damage. “The final argument that won the unanimous approval of what was known as the Big Four was a Memorandum submitted by General Smuts.”²

¹ French Note of March 17, 1919. Text in Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 180. Hastings and Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (1920), p. 132.

² Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the*

In this Memorandum General Smuts argued that the damage to civilian population included all loss inflicted upon every one who returned to civil life after the war: "This includes all war-pensions and separation-allowances, which the German Government are liable to make good, in addition to reparation or compensation for all damage done to property of the Allied peoples."

It was thus that the bill against the Germans for reparations was drawn up. An exception from the general principle was made in favour of Belgium which was not a party to the Armistice negotiations. All her war losses down to the signing of the Armistice were charged against Germany.

The crisis concerned with the question of Fiume was not as dangerous to the prospects of a general peace settlement as were the first three crises. Italy, Great Power as she is, although threatening to withdraw, could not influence the other three Powers by the prospect of a broken-up Conference. The Italian plenipotentiaries did actually withdraw after Mr. Wilson's Fiume Note of April 23, which was published to the world. But the Conference went on all the same, and the Italians wisely and generously came back and signed the Treaty, although they did not obtain satisfaction of their full claims.

The trouble did not arise wholly from the Treaty of London (or Adriatic Treaty) of April 26, 1915. This guaranteed a great deal to Italy but it did not promise to her Fiume. This port, with the entire Hungarian coast on the Adriatic, was assigned by a note in Article 5 of the Treaty to the Southern Slav State. The Italian question, however, was not so simple as it looked. The Italians were not much interested in the peace-terms to be offered to Germany: their quarrel was with Austria. In the Armistice terms offered to Austria Italy had not bound herself to make peace on the basis of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points.¹ The Italians were therefore in a position to insist upon the fulfilment of the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915. The Allies could not have dishonoured their pledge; they could not have refused to carry out the London terms. But Italy claimed, over and above the London terms, Fiume. There was, moreover, a secret agreement

Treaty (1920), p. 29. The Text of General Smuts' Memorandum is given in pp. 29-32. Cp. House and Seymour (editors), *What Really Happened at Paris* (1921), pp. 268-72.

¹ Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement*, II, 133.

undertaken by France and Great Britain at the Conference of St. Jean de Maurienne in April, 1917, that Italy should have Smyrna. Altogether, the Italian Question is said to have taken up more time than anything else at the Peace Conference.

The controversy went on for weeks; Orlando, the Italian Premier—urbane, eloquent, persuasive—and Sonnino—cynical, saturnine, determined, honest—reiterated their demands and arguments for Fiume, and more. Mr. Wilson constructed a hypothetical boundary known as the Wilson Line, which cut down the London terms. But Great Britain and France were perfectly ready to carry out the London terms. On April 23 Mr. Wilson gave to the American Press Bureau for publication a Memorandum written by himself, in which he not merely put aside the idea of Italy's obtaining Fiume but even argued powerfully for the modification of the Treaty of London. Next day Orlando and Sonnino left Paris. The Italian Premier carried away with him a Memorandum of the same day's date, written by Mr. Balfour (but not, like Mr. Wilson's, given to the public), in which the British Foreign Secretary stated his Government's readiness to keep to the London terms if Italy still insisted on them, but that Fiume could not be added to them.¹

The withdrawal of Italy from the Conference was a "gesture," according to the cant term that was then coming into the jargon of politics and journalism. It appeared to the public as a somewhat violent, ill-tempered move. Actually it was performed without much irritation and was never meant to be a final leave-taking. Orlando only wanted to go back to Italy and to renew in some way or other his popular mandate. He left behind him at Paris Signor Crespi, the Italian Economic delegate, whose ability and breadth of view had made him an important person at the Conference.

The Italian Premier and Foreign Minister explained affairs to a Parliamentary Committee in Rome and were back again in Paris on May 6. They were thus able to take part in the meeting with the German Peace Delegation on May 7, and subsequently with the Austrian Delegation which arrived in Paris on May 14. The Fiume difficulty, however, seemed insoluble. It was not settled at the Conference. The Italians signed the treaties concluded with Germany and with Austria; but it was not until 1920, after a new war had been avoided time and again, as by a

¹ Text in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement*, III, 281-6.

miracle, that Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came to an agreement, which involved a considerable renunciation for both sides.¹

The Japanese or Shantung crisis was becoming acute about the time when the Italian crisis was at its height. The Japanese properly insisted at the Conference on their position as a Great Power. They were a member of the Council of Five, although as a rule they were only summoned when Far Eastern affairs were under consideration. The Shantung affair could not have broken up the Peace Conference; their presence was not indispensable like that of the United States or Great Britain; but they were present, they were inflexible, and the other Powers, anxious to deal fairly with both Japan and China, found the Shantung affair highly troublesome.

The Japanese, although their losses were only about 400 men, had done good service by the capture of Tsingtao, November 7, 1914, and in combating the German submarine campaign in the Mediterranean. Their position was also fortified by an agreement which had not been divulged to the public. This Agreement, dated February 16, 1917, between Great Britain and Japan (subsequently assented to by France and Italy), had promised to the Japanese Shantung and the German islands north of the Equator. It was the beginning of the phase of the Far Eastern Question which was to become so acute in the post-Conference period. On the other hand, Japan, by Agreements or Notes of May 25, 1915, and September 24 and 28, 1918, made with China, had undertaken to return the territory which she had occupied in Shantung to the Chinese Government.²

The Shantung Peninsula was an area (about 57,000 square miles) where Germany had acquired extensive rights over about 117 square miles by lease from the Chinese Government in 1897, and where the Germans had developed the port of Kiaochow and had constructed the fortress of Tsingtao. The province remained under Chinese sovereignty; Germany only possessed the leasehold of Kiaochow and adjacent territory. At the Conference the Chinese delegates pleaded for the restoration of Kiaochow to China, as the Chinese Government had declared war on Germany on August 14, 1917.

¹ See below, p. 331-3.

² Baker, *op. cit.*, I, 243-4. *Hist. Peace Conf.*, VI, 374.

After prolonged discussions an agreement was reached in the Council of Five on April 30. Japan was to obtain the German rights in Shantung, and this stipulation is in the Peace Treaty. But Japan also made a statement on April 30, that she would hand back the Shantung Peninsula (so far as she was in possession of it) to China, retaining only the economic privileges which had been granted to Germany. This undertaking Japan did, later, carry out, after the Washington Conference of 1921-1922.

Opinion at the Peace Conference at Paris was perturbed by reports of political and social disturbances elsewhere. Bolshevism appeared to be leaping the boundaries of Russia and to be threatening Central and even Western Europe. In March, 1919, power in Budapest was seized by Communists, led by a former prisoner-of-war returned from Russia, Bela Kun. This Soviet *coup d'état* provoked an invasion by the Rumanian army in April. The Supreme Council was not unwilling to negotiate with the Hungarian Soviet, and sent General Smuts to Budapest. The Smuts mission, however, could arrive at no agreement with Bela Kun who held the position of People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs. In August, 1919, the Rumanians occupied Budapest. The Soviet Government fell. Bela Kun fled to Vienna and ultimately to Moscow. The Rumanian army exacted very severe contributions in Hungary in reprisal for contributions levied by the Austro-Hungarian forces in Rumania during the War. It was not until the Supreme Council at Paris issued an ultimatum in November (1919) that the Rumanian army began to evacuate Hungary.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

The German Delegation arrived at Versailles on April 29, 1919. They were lodged and carefully guarded in the Hôtel des Réservoirs. They were permitted to take exercise in the Park of Versailles, and were assured of free telegraphic and telephonic communication with their home government.

The Treaty was presented on May 7, at 3.30 in the afternoon. The Allied and Associated Delegates were seated at a table in the dining-room of the Hôtel Trianon Palais. The German Delegates were shown in. All the Allied plenipotentiaries rose to their feet. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, bowed to M. Clemenceau. Everybody resumed his seat. Glorious sunshine came into the quiet room through the windows. The park opposite the hotel was a radiant sight. The silence was broken by M. Clemenceau. He rose to his feet and made a brief speech, beginning: *Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires de l'Empire Allemand*, and stating that everything would be done with the courtesy that is the privilege of civilised nations.

The chief German plenipotentiary, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, was an aristocrat and a diplomatist of the old school. He had doubtless been appointed to his place by the German Socialist-Democratic Republic as being a man who would know the correct forms of procedure, and who would be careful of the customary points of international etiquette which soften a little even the harshest negotiations. Yet this is precisely what the product of the Imperial Chancellery did not do. Adjusting his horn-rimmed spectacles, he remained rigidly seated in his chair; and without rising even at his opening words, he read in a sullen, strained voice a speech which had all the appearance of having been carefully prepared. M. Clemenceau had spoken in French. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke in German:

GENTLEMEN (*Meine Herren!*)

We are sorely burdened by the present task, which has brought us together with you: quickly to give a lasting peace to the world. We do not delude ourselves over the extent of our defeat, the degree of our powerlessness. We are aware that the might of the German arms is broken. We know the weight of the hate which meets us here, and we have heard the passionate demand that the victors shall make us pay as vanquished and punish us as guilty.

The Count then launched out into a fairly long and very energetic exposition of the causes of the War, and, admitting that Germany had some share in bringing about a warlike atmosphere in Europe, vigorously rebutted the charge that the Germans were the guilty party. He pointed to the various things which, in his view, had conduced to the "illness of Europe," and he said that the Russian mobilisation had "taken from the statesmen the possibility of healing and gave the decision into the hands of the military powers."

After the question of war-guilt he turned to the Armistice and the post-Armistice Blockade; and in eloquent words he protested that Germany was not defenceless—she had the principle of Justice guaranteed to her by the Allied Agreement of November 5 to make peace on the Fourteen Points. He stated Germany's eagerness to co-operate in the work of international peace, in making good the wastage in Belgium and Northern France, and meeting financial liabilities to the Allies. The last half of the speech was a powerful and dignified expression of Germany's intentions. It did not, however, do away with the bad impression caused by the speaker's lack of manners at the outset and his ill-timed accusations of war-guilt.¹ At the close of the speech M. Clemenceau kept his highly inflammable temper in firm control, and dismissed the meeting in a curt sentence.

The Germans took away with them the copy of the Treaty which they had not yet read. They were permitted to submit to the Allied and Associated Delegates written observations on it, but they were not again to meet their adversaries until the day of signature. General Smuts, in a letter to Mr. Lloyd George dated May 22,² criticised certain points in the Treaty and suggested a meeting and discussion, but this proposal was rejected.

¹ Speeches in Kraus und Rödiger, *Urkunden zum Friedensvertrage*, I, 202-8. There is a translation of the whole text of Count Rantzau's speech in the *Times*, May 8, 1919.

² Text in Baker, *op. cit.*, III, 458-65.

Between May 7 and June 23 there took place a frequent exchange of Notes. The German Delegation must have worked extremely hard. Some of their Notes were very long, and were closely reasoned, detailed criticisms of the terms of the treaty. They gained a few points here and there, but no really substantial alterations were made. Nobody at Paris knew if they would sign or not. On May 20 the Government of Herr Scheidemann, who had declared the terms of the Treaty unacceptable,¹ fell. With him Brockdorff-Rantzau went out of office. Gustav Bauer became Chancellor, and Hermann Müller took the place of Brockdorff-Rantzau as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Herr von Haniel became Head of the German Delegation at Versailles. The Delegation had been permitted to leave Versailles for two nights to consult their Government at Weimar. The Allies had decided that if the Germans did not promise by June 23 to sign, Foch should advance the Allied forces further into Germany. In a Note of June 22 M. Clemenceau stated: "The Allied and Associated Powers consider that the time for discussion is past," and he pointed out that only twenty-four hours remained in which the Germans could signify their adherence to the Treaty. A request from von Haniel for an extension of the delay to forty-eight hours was refused. On the same day von Haniel communicated to M. Clemenceau the assent of the German Government to the Treaty "without thereby giving up their position over the unheard-of injustice of the conditions of peace."²

The room selected for the place of signature of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28 was the *Galerie des Glaces*, where, on the morrow of France's military defeats in the war of 1870, the German Empire had been proclaimed in January, 1817. It is a long, handsome chamber, opulently decorated with mirrors and gilt carving, with painted ceiling showing the Grand Monarch, Louis XIV, and his marshals, in the dress of old Romans. Through the line of great windows the flower-beds, fountains, lakes and avenues of the Park are seen, until they appear to melt into the low hills on the sky-line.

The statesmen who met there were worthy of the grand scene: they would have been men of mark anywhere: Poincaré, serious,

¹ "I ask you what honest man, I will not say what German, can accept such conditions." Speech of Herr Scheidemann to the German National Assembly at Berlin, May 12, 1919 (*Times*, May 13, p. 14).

² Notes in Kraus and Rödiger, I, 697-700.

quiet, confident; the old French Premier, with the flashing eyes and somewhat fierce expression; Wilson, grave, responsible, a little tired, as if he had the weight of the world's cares on his shoulders; the British Prime Minister, with the leonine head, the quick movements, the frank, winning manner; Balfour, tall, benevolent, courteous, friendly, yet just a trifle detached from it all; Bonar Law, small, honest, good, a natural gentleman through and through; Smuts, neat-pointed beard, ruddy, decisive, intellectual face, kindly, humourous eyes (looking, however, very serious just now because he was going to file a letter of protest against the Treaty that he would sign)¹; Pashitch, the Nestor of the Balkans, looking like a Biblical patriarch although his enemies called him an old fox; the big black-bearded Bratianu, sallow, voluble, rich; Venizelos, spectacled, bald, with a dome-like forehead; Benes, little moustache, hair brushed in the English style, an assured, inquiring expression, the air of a College tutor; the conciliatory Orlando, the discontented Sonnino; the dapper, inscrutable Japanese—all these were easily picked out in the concourse that filled the *Galerie des Glaces*. There were no Chinese. They stayed away because of the Shantung clause in the Treaty.² The high commanders were present as spectators, Foch, Haig, Joffre, Pershing, Diaz and others—their uniforms showing up sharply in contrast with the black-coated statesmen. When all were seated the Germans were admitted at three o'clock—Hermann Müller, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Johannes Bell, Minister for the Colonies. They looked grave, a little stiff, but not depressed. No one rose when they entered. M. Clemenceau certified that the Treaty which was lying on the table conformed textually with the two hundred copies which had been sent to the German delegates. He then invited the Germans to sign. They were conducted by the Master of the Ceremonies to the table. After them the Allied and Associated statesmen signed their names in the alphabetical order of their country according to French style: thus Mr. Wilson signed first for *Amérique du Nord*, Grand Bretagne came next, and others in the same order, the Great Powers, however, preceding the Small.

At 3.40 p.m. the ceremony was over. "The delegates passed

¹ Text in *Hist. Peace Conf.*, III, 74. Although objecting to many clauses of the Treaty, General Smuts signed it because it contained the destruction of Prussian militarism and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

² Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations*, p. 265.

out of the building into the open air. In the gardens the fountains, for the first time since the war had begun, were leaping in their famous cascades, and the crowds were cheering and pressing close—for all that their bodyguard could do—around the four men who had governed the world since the Armistice, and had now laid the German Empire in the dust in the very place where it had risen in its glory.”¹

Yet the Treaty which had been signed registered much more than a military triumph. It contained a fairer adjustment of territories than had previously existed, and in the Covenant of the League of Nations it had the means for a beneficent order of international society in the future.

¹ *Hist. Peace Conf.*, II, 19.

CHAPTER XVII

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The Treaty of Versailles contains 440 Articles, and is in fifteen Parts. It is in two languages, French and English. The Preamble abandoned the old formula "there shall be perpetual peace"; it stated that the object of the Treaty was to make a *firm and durable* peace. War was to terminate from the coming into force of the Treaty (that is, after ratification)¹ and official relations with Germany were then to be resumed.

Part I of the Treaty is the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The High Contracting Parties

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security

By the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

By the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,

By the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of all organised peoples with one another

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.²

Then follow the regulations concerning Admission, Withdrawal and the Constitution of the League (Articles 1-7). It was to have a Council, an Assembly and a Secretariat. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers—France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States—were always to have seats in the Council of the League. Four more Members of the League were to be elected to the Council by the Assembly from time to time at its discretion. With the assent of the Assembly, the Council could allot permanent seats to other Members of the League (Article 4). Except where otherwise provided in the Covenant or Treaty, decisions in the Council or Assembly must be unanimous. The seat of the League

¹ Article 440.

² Preamble of Part I of the Treaty of Versailles.

was to be at Geneva, but could be transferred to any other place by decision of the Council. Representatives of Members of the League and officials of the League enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. The buildings and property of the League are inviolable. The expenses of the Secretariat are borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, was to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments for the consideration and action of the several Governments: these plans to be reconsidered and revised every ten years.

The critical clauses, on which everything depends, are Articles 10-17, dealing with disputes likely to lead to war.

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled (Article 10).

Any war or threat of war, whether it affects members of the League or not, is declared to be a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effective to safeguard the peace of nations. It is the right of any Member to bring to the notice of the Assembly or Council any circumstance affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace. In the case of war or threat of war, the Secretary General on the request of any member must summon a meeting of the Council (Article 11).

The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators on the report of the Council (Article 12).

Article 13 dealt with the sort of cases which were suitable for arbitration. Article 14 promised that the Council of the League would submit plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. Article 15 stipulated that disputes likely to lead to a rupture which were not suitable for arbitration

were to be submitted to the Council of the League. Any party to the dispute might effect such a submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General.

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations. . . . It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be raised to protect the covenants of the League (Article 16).

Under this article also Members of the League undertook to afford passage through their territories to the forces of any Member of the League which was co-operating to protect these covenants.

In the event of dispute between a Member of the League and a State not a Member, the latter can be invited to accept the obligation of membership for the purposes of such dispute. If a State so invited refuses, and resorts to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable against the State taking such action. States, neither of which are Members of the League, can be invited to become members for the purposes of the dispute. If both parties refuse, the Council shall take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute (Article 17).

Article 18 aims at establishing a reasonable degree of "openness" in diplomacy.

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

Article 19 empowers the Assembly of the League to advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable; thus machinery is created for the necessary revision of existing treaties from time to time by mutual consent.

The Covenant of the League abrogates for Members all previous engagements which are inconsistent with it. No Member shall enter any such engagements in the future.

Article 22 is the clause which establishes the system of the Mandate.

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The character of the Mandates may differ according to the stage of development of the people, their geographical situation and other circumstances. In certain communities, such as former portions of the Turkish Empire, it may amount to little more than the giving of advice by the Mandatory Power. In others it approaches almost to legislative assimilation. But in any case the Mandatory Power must maintain "equal opportunity for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League," and must make an annual report to a permanent commission of the League.

Article 23 is a great humanitarian and economic clause. By it the Members of the League must endeavour to secure and maintain fair conditions of labour in their own and in all countries, to make provision for freedom of communication and transit, and to take steps in matters of international concern for the control of disease. They must entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms with countries in which control of this traffic is necessary, and with supervision over the execution of agreements regarding the traffic in women and children, and in opium. As part of the organisation of the League the International Labour Office was instituted at Geneva. Its constitution and functions form Part XIII of the Treaty.

Amendments to the Covenant take effect when ratified by Members of the Council unanimously and by a majority of the Assembly.

Part II, Articles 27-30, describes the boundaries of Germany: with Belgium, where slight rectifications are made; with Luxemburg, the frontier of August 3, 1914; with France, the frontier of July 18, 1873; with Switzerland, the existing frontier; with Austria, the frontier of August 3, 1914 from Switzerland to Czechoslovakia as subsequently defined; with Czechoslovakia, the frontier between Germany and Bohemia as existing before the war to a point just east of Neustadt, where Czechoslovakia touches the Part of Upper Silesia, later included in the new or restored State of Poland. The German frontier turns northward at

Neustadt across the contested region of Upper Silesia, and goes irregularly northward, leaving to Poland nearly all the former Prussian province of Posen, and the greater part of the former Prussian province of Pomerania so as to allow to Poland the now celebrated "corridor" to the North Sea. East Prussia was left to Germany with substantially its old frontiers, except that in the north-west it had to renounce the territory north of the River Niemen and of the Skierwith Channel of the Kurische Haff. East Prussia is by the Treaty separated by a belt of Poland from the rest of Germany. The frontier of Germany and Denmark was to be the same as before the war, subject to the results of plebiscites in Northern Schleswig.

Part III of the Treaty is called *Political Clauses for Europe*. Articles 31-39 concern Belgium. By Article 31 Germany recognises "that the Treaties of April 19, 1839, which established the status of Belgium before the war no longer conform to the requirements of the situation"; she therefore "consents to the abrogation of the said treaties," and undertakes to recognise any new treaties which may be made by any of the Allies in concert with the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands.¹

By Article 32 Germany recognises Belgian sovereignty over "Neutral Moresnet," the tiny piece of territory left unallotted (or at least ambiguous) by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and since administered as a condominium by Prussia and Belgium. Germany also renounced in favour of Belgium that portion of Prussian Moresnet to the west of the Liège—Aix-la-Chapelle road; and also, subject to a plebiscite, Eupen and Malmédy. The plebiscite was held within the next six months, and resulted in a decision in favour of Belgium, subject to approval by the League of Nations. Altogether the territory annexed by Belgium added perhaps 75,000 inhabitants to her population. This rectification cleared up the ambiguities of the Treaties of 1815 and added a little to the economic and strategic strength of Belgium. German nationals habitually resident in the transferred territories could, within two years after the transfer, exercise an option in favour of retaining their German nationality. They would then have to transfer their place of residence to Germany, taking their movable property with them. They would be allowed to retain their immovable property in Belgium. If they chose to remain in

¹ Negotiations between Holland and Belgium have so far failed to reach any agreement (March, 1927).

Belgium they would automatically acquire Belgian nationality and would lose their German status (Articles 36-37). For the annexed territory Belgium would have to assume responsibility for a due proportion of the Imperial German Public Pre-war Debt and also of the Prussian Public Pre-war Debt (Article 39). The German Government (Article 38) agreed to restore to the Belgian Government all archives and documents taken away by the German authorities during the war, "in particular from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Brussels." These documents, accordingly, are now back in the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* at Brussels, although marked by the pencillings of German officials. The Belgian Foreign Office Library also suffered from German handling; and the books have not been completely restored.¹

Articles 40 and 41 deal with the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. Germany renounces the provisions in favour of her of certain treaties concluded since the year 1842. Under these treaties Luxemburg had entered the German Zollverein or Customs Union. Prussia had acquired control of the Luxemburg railways. By Article 40 Germany recognises in particular that Luxemburg ceased to form part of the German Customs Union from January 1, 1919, renounces all rights to the exploitation of the railways, and adheres to the termination of the régime of neutrality of the Grand Duchy.

Articles 42-44 establish the epoch-making, although one-sided, demilitarisation of the Rhine, which has been the battleground of French and Germans for over a thousand years. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortification on the left bank of the Rhine, or on the right bank to a distance of 50 kilometres (31 miles) eastward (Article 42). In the area thus defined, she may not maintain, either temporarily or permanently, any armed forces, and all military manœuvres there are forbidden (Article 43). If Germany violates either of these articles, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the Treaty.

Articles 45-50 contain the conditions regulating the Saar. The districts of Saarlouis and Saarbrück had been allotted to France by the First Treaty of Paris, May 30, 1814, and had been taken

¹ The Librarian at the Belgian Foreign Office showed me in 1924 their edition of Bourgeois' *Manuel historique de Politique étrangère*, of which one volume was missing which had not been returned by Germany.

away and given to Prussia and Bavaria by the Second Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815, after the campaign of Waterloo. The Treaty of Versailles enacted:

As compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France and as part payment of the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal-mines situated in the Saar basin (Article 45).

The Government of the Saar territory (with a much more extended frontier than that assigned to France in 1814) is confided to the League of Nations as trustee.

At the end of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the inhabitants of the said territory shall be called upon to indicate the sovereignty under which they desire to be placed (Article 49).

The League of Nations Commission to administer the Saar consists of one citizen of France, one native inhabitant of the Saar not a citizen of France, and three other members belonging to three countries other than France or Germany. The members are appointed for one year, may be reappointed, and may be removed by the Council of the League of Nations. The Council of the League also designates the Chairman of the Saar Commission (Annex, Chapter II, Clauses 16-18). Inhabitants of the Saar retain their existing nationality—Prussian or Bavarian: "no hindrance shall be placed in the way of those who wish to acquire a different nationality, but in such case the acquisition of the new nationality will involve the loss of any other" (Clause 27). There is no military service, compulsory or voluntary, in the Saar territory (Clause 33). The territory is subject to the French customs regime (Clause 31). For five years products originating in the Saar basin were to pass into Germany free of duty. Likewise German goods for five years were to come into the Saar, for local consumption only, free of duty. At the end of the fifteen years specified in Article 49 the Saar inhabitants will vote by communes or districts on three alternatives: (a) maintenance of the present system established by the Treaty, (b) union with France, (c) union with Germany. The League of Nations, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants, will decide under whose sovereignty the Saar is to be. If the League of Nations decides for the main-

tenance of the present system, Germany must renounce its sovereignty to the League of Nations. If it decides in favour of union with France, Germany must make a similar renunciation of sovereignty to France. If the League decides in favour of union with Germany, the German Government must repurchase the Saar mines from the French Government at their value to be paid in gold (Clauses 35, 36). The conditions of the holding of the plebiscite are to be decided by the League of Nations.

The population of the territory within the Saar frontier as defined by the Treaty (Article 48) is about 650,000.

Articles 51-79 refer to Alsace-Lorraine, and together comprise Section V of the Treaty. The Section contains a preamble:

The High Contracting Parties, recognising the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country in spite of the solemn protest of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux,

Agree upon the following articles:

Article 51 restores to French sovereignty as from November 11, 1918, the territories which were ceded to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, February 26, 1871, and of Frankfort, May 10, 1871.

By Article 53 Germany undertakes not to claim as German nationals those who shall have been declared on any ground to be French, but to receive all others into her territory—that is to say, France reserved the right to refuse French citizenship to certain Alsace-Lorrainers and to expel them into Germany. Germans who migrated into Alsace after July 15, 1870, have no right to claim French nationality. They can only acquire it by naturalisation (Annex, Clauses 1-3).

The territory thus restored to France was to be handed over by Germany free from all public debts (Article 55). This privilege is allowed to France "inasmuch as in 1871 Germany refused to undertake any portion of the burden of the French debt" (Part IX, Financial Clauses, Article 255).

By virtue of Article 56 France acquires all property of the German Empire or of German States within Alsace-Lorraine (this included the railways). Similarly, she acquires all property there "of the former German Emperor or other German sovereigns." The German Government undertakes responsibility for paying all pensions which had been earned in Alsace-Lorraine on November 11, 1918. Germany is bound to furnish each year the necessary

funds in francs at the average rate of exchange for the year (Article 62).

Article 67 substitutes the French for the German Government, without payment, over the railways administered in Alsace-Lorraine by the Imperial Government. Article 68 exempts for five years all natural or manufactured products of Alsace-Lorraine from payment of customs-duty on being imported into Germany. This is the origin of what the Germans called "the hole in the West." The amount thus imported was not to exceed the average amount of the years 1911-13.

Article 80 is concerned with Austria. Germany agrees to acknowledge and respect the independence of Austria with the frontiers fixed by the treaty to be made with Austria. This independence is to be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

Articles 81-86 deal with the Czechoslovak State. Germany recognises the independence of this State and its frontiers as fixed by the Allied and Associated Powers. Article 83 gave to Czechoslovakia a small portion of Upper Silesia inhabited by Czechs, the district of Hultschin immediately to the north of Troppau. The Czechoslovak State agreed to enter into a treaty with the Allied and Associated Powers to protect non-Czechoslovak minorities, and another "to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations." It also undertook to assume responsibility for a part of the Prussian Public Debt on account of the cession of the Hultschin district. The Czechoslovak State thus recognised included the former Austrian territories of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Austrian Silesia, and the sub-Carpathian region of the Ruthenes which had been in Hungary. On the Danube it has the port of Presburg (Bratislava) and a frontier of 60 miles. Czechoslovakia has even a few square miles of territory on the south side of the Danube opposite Bratislava.

Articles 87-93 deal with Poland. The frontiers are outlined by Article 87 with reference to the frontiers already defined for Germany in the earlier part of the Treaty. Article 88 defines the portion of Upper Silesia which was to be occupied by an international commission until a plebiscite held under the Commission's auspices should decide whether the region was to be German or Polish. Poland assumes responsibility for a portion of the German and Prussian Public Debts except so much as was

contracted for the purpose of German colonisation in Poland (Article 92). Public property which belonged to the former kingdom of Poland is acquired by the new State free of charge; other public property is paid for at a valuation fixed by the Reparation Commission. Poland undertakes to conclude with the Allied and Associated Powers a treaty to protect the interests of non-Polish minorities, and another treaty to ensure freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations (Article 93).¹

Articles 94-98 deal with East Prussia. Plebiscites are to be held under an International Commission in the neighbourhood of Allenstein and in parts of the circles of Marienwerder and Marienburg. In the end, these districts voted for maintaining the union with Prussia. They were therefore assigned to Prussia by the Conference of Ambassadors, except for about five villages north-west of Marienwerder. By Article 98 Germany and Poland agreed to enter into a treaty so that Germany should be afforded adequate railroad, telegraphic and telephonic facilities over the intervening Polish territory from East Prussia to the rest of Germany; and similarly that Poland should be afforded facilities of communication over such German territory on the right bank of the Vistula as may intervene between Poland and Danzig.

Article 99 contains Germany's renunciation of the trans-Niemen territory of which the most important town is Memel. This territory was placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers and was assigned in 1923, under certain conditions, to Lithuania.

Articles 100-108 relate to Danzig. By Articles 100 and 102 Germany renounces about 709 square miles of country around the city of Danzig to constitute a small territory for that city—the whole to be established as a Free City, and placed under the protection of the League of Nations. A Constitution for the Free City is to be drawn up by representatives of the inhabitants in agreement with a High Commissioner appointed by the League (Article 103). The Allied and Associated Powers undertake to negotiate a treaty between Danzig and Poland, with, among others, the following objects: (1) To effect the inclusion of the Free City of Danzig within the Polish Customs frontiers, and to establish a

¹ The Polish Treaty was signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919 (*Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 223 of 1919). Chapter I is the Minorities Agreement, Chapter II is the Transit and Commercial Agreement.

free area in the port; (2) to ensure to Poland free use of all waterways and docks within the territory of the Free City necessary for Polish exports and imports; (3) to ensure to Poland the control and administration of the Vistula and of the whole railway-system within the Free City (except street railways), and of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between Poland and the Port of Danzig; (4) to provide that Poland shall undertake to conduct the foreign relations of the Free City (Article 104). On the coming into force of the present treaty German nationals in Danzig will lose their nationality (under reserve of the usual options) and will become citizens of the Free City (Articles 105, 106). German public property within the territory passes to the Allied Powers for transfer either to the Free City or to Poland as they consider equitable. The Free City undertakes responsibility for a portion of the German Public Debt (Articles 107, 108).

Articles 109-114 concern Schleswig. The original treaty in 1866 by which Prussia acquired this province stipulated for a plebiscite in Northern Schleswig. This stipulation, although subsequently abrogated,¹ was reinvoked by the Allies at Versailles. Their first idea was that Schleswig should be divided into three zones, of which the southern should include Flensburg. The Danes, however, did not wish to contest the southern zone. Accordingly Article 109 of the Treaty began the new provisional frontier at 13 kilometres (about 8 miles) east-north-east of Flensburg, and divided the country to the north of this into two zones. The usual provision was made for plebiscites to be held under an International Commission, and for options of citizenship and responsibility for a portion of the German Public Debt. The result of the plebiscites held in 1920 was that the northern of the two zones was assigned to Denmark and the southern to Prussia.

Article 115 stipulated for the destruction of the fortifications, military establishment and harbours of the islands of Heligoland and Dune by German labour and at the expense of Germany.

Part IV of the Treaty (Articles 118-158) is concerned with *German Rights and Interests outside Germany*. By Article 118 Germany renounces, in territory outside her European frontiers, all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or to her allies.

Article 128 begins the series regarding China. Germany renounces all rights resulting from the Final Protocol signed at

¹ See Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914*, p. 195.

Pekin on September 7, 1901, that is the Act regulating the Boxer Indemnity.¹ China acquires without payment the wharves, forts and other property of the German Government (except Diplomatic and Consular residences or offices) at Tientsin and Hankow or elsewhere. Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases of the Chinese Government under which German concessions were held at Tientsin and Hankow; China, restored to full sovereignty in the areas of these concessions, declares her intention of opening them to international trade and residence.

Articles 156-158 are the much-debated Shantung clauses. Japan acquires all German rights there.

Part V contains the very interesting clauses concerning military, naval and air armament. It is prefaced by a preamble solemnly stating that the disarmament is not meant as a one-sided thing for Germany alone.

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

Articles 159-163 stipulate that after March 31, 1920, "the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers." The total effective strength of officers must not exceed four thousand. The Great German General Staff and all similar organisations are to be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form. The number of employees or officials of the German States, such as customs officers, forestguards and coastguards, must not exceed that of the employees or officials functioning in these capacities in 1913. The number of gendarmes may only be increased to an extent corresponding with the increase of population since 1913. These employees and officials may not be assembled for military training. Article 164 states: "The manufacture of arms, munitions and any war material shall only be carried out in factories or works the location of which shall be communicated to and approved by the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which they retain the right to restrict." All other

¹ See Descamps et Renault, *Recueil international des Traités du XX Siècle*, Année 1901, p. 80 ff.

such establishments must be closed (Article 168). Germany may neither import nor export arms or war material of any kind (Article 170). "The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany" (Article 171).

Article 173 abolishes universal, compulsory military service. The period of voluntary enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be twelve years. The number of men discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of enlistment must not exceed in any year five per cent. of the total effectives (Article 174). Officers must undertake to serve for twenty-five consecutive years at least. Officers not retained in the army must be under no military obligations whatever. The number of officers discharged in any year must not exceed five per cent. of the total effectives (Article 175). All military academies or schools for officers, except those "absolutely indispensable" for recruitment of the authorised number of officers, must be abolished (Article 176). "Educational establishments, universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, generally speaking, associations of every description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military matters" (Article 177).

Article 180 provides for the destruction of all fortified works in the zone of territory extending from the Rhine to a distance of 50 kilometres (31 miles) eastward. New construction is forbidden there. "The system of fortified works of the southern and eastern frontiers shall be maintained in its existing state."

Articles 191-197 determine Germany's naval strength. She is to have 6 battleships of the *Deutschland* or *Lothringen* type, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats; she is forbidden to construct or acquire any warships other than those intended to replace the units which are in commission (Articles 181, 190). The personnel of the fleet is not to exceed fifteen thousand officers and men.

The personnel of the German Navy is to be recruited by voluntary engagements for twenty-five consecutive years for officers and warrant officers, and for twelve years for petty officers and men. No officer or man of the German mercantile marine shall receive any training in the Navy (Article 194).

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces (Article 198).

Articles 203-210 concern Interallied Commissions of Control, to supervise the execution of the disarmament clauses.

Articles 214-224 deal with Prisoners of War. By the terms (Article 10) of the Armistice of November 11 all prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers had to be repatriated forthwith, including those under sentence for any offence. Article 214 of the Treaty stipulates for the repatriation of all [German] prisoners of war and interned civilians, including those undergoing sentences for offences against discipline, as soon as possible after the coming into force of the Treaty. The whole cost of repatriation from the time of starting is to be borne by the German Government (Article 217). The High Contracting Parties waive reciprocally all payment of sums due for the maintenance of prisoners of war in their respective territories (Article 224).

Part VII, "Penalties," Articles 227-230, was practically still-born.

The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.

A special tribunal of five judges, one appointed by each of the Principal Allied and Associated States, was to be constituted to try the accused, "thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence." An address was to be presented to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender of the ex-Kaiser (Article 227). It is regrettable that the Government of the Netherlands refused to extradite the accused. The trial of William of Hohenzollern, with the best legal brains of all the great States probing the facts and documents, and defending their views, would, whatever the verdict, have been the most striking exposition of international law and morality which it is possible to conceive. The cause of good international relations lost a great chance.

The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war; it undertook to hand over such accused persons as the Allied and Associated Powers should specify by name (Article 228). The Germans protested against this clause, but not more than against other articles of the Treaty. For some reason which it is impossible to explain, the Allies deferred to the German protests in this case only, and permitted perfunctory

trials at Leipsic to be substituted for the trials established in the Treaty.

Part VIII, Articles 231-247, are the Reparation Clauses which have made more to-do in the world than all the other clauses put together. Nevertheless, it has yet to be proved that the Reparation Clauses were impossible of execution.

Number 231 is the so-called "war-guilt" article.

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

This is the article which has rankled most with the Germans. They have never ceased to agitate for its repeal, not in so far as it makes them pay, but in so far as it makes them admit that they were guilty of causing the War. Now there is no doubt that the Allies believed—and believe—that Germany was guilty of causing the War. This view was repeatedly stated at the Conference of Paris and is expressed most forcibly in the Mantelnote or covering letter sent with the Allies' response to Germany's criticism of the draft treaty on June 16, 1919.¹ Yet the plain words of Article 231 of the Treaty do not say that Germany was guilty but that Germany undertakes to pay for the damage done to the Allies by the war which began with the attack or aggression of the Germans in August, 1914.

In Article 231 the Allied and Associated Powers took note of the fact that the German resources were not adequate for making full restoration of all the loss that they had caused. They did not mention that in any case they were debarred from asking for complete restoration of war-costs by their Note of November 5, 1911, concerning the Fourteen Points and conditions of peace.² Nevertheless, they did observe the condition contained in that Note by stipulating only that

Germany undertakes that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers during the period of belligerency (Article 232).

But, as already stated, the Allies had at the Conference of Paris decided that *military pensions* were a part of the *civilian damages*

¹ Text in Kraus and Rödiger, I, 530 ff.

² See above, p. 132.

which they could claim.¹ In addition to the civilian damages Germany undertakes to reimburse all the sums which Belgium borrowed from the Allied and Associated Governments to November 11, 1918.

No specific sum is demanded from Germany, but a Reparation Commission is established by Article 233 which shall determine the amount of damage for which compensation shall be made. It was to consist of a representative of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State (actually the United States never served on the Commission).

The decision of the Reparation Commission on the amount which Germany must pay was to be notified to the German Government on or before May 1, 1921.

Germany is bound to supply the Reparation Commission with all necessary information, to provide for the salaries and expenses of the Commission and its staff, and to accord to the Commission and its duly authorised agents the same rights and immunities as are enjoyed in Germany by duly accredited diplomatic agents of friendly Powers (Article 240).

Pending the full determination of the claims for Reparations, Germany was to pay during 1919, 1920, and the first four months of 1921, the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks (Article 235).

There is an Annex III of Part VIII dealing with Reparations in the form of shipping.

Germany recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war.

But as the tonnage of German shipping in existence was not sufficient for this purpose, the Allied and Associated Powers were to receive property in all the German merchant ships of 1,600 tons gross and upwards.

Annex V of Part VIII is a very important section dealing with Reparation Coal deliveries. Germany undertakes to deliver to France 7 million tons of coal per year for ten years. In the same period she will also deliver as much coal in addition as is the difference between the annual production before the war of the French mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais destroyed as a result of the war and the production of the mines of the same area during

¹ See above, pp. 145-6.

the years in question: this additional amount not to exceed 20 million tons in any one year of the first five years, and 8 millions in the succeeding five years. Germany undertakes to deliver to Belgium 8 million tons of coal annually for ten years, and to Italy amounts ranging from $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons to $8\frac{1}{2}$ for ten years; at least two-thirds of the annual deliveries to Italy must be land-borne. Luxemburg also has, at the discretion of the Reparation Commission, a claim upon German coal delivery. All this coal shall be paid for by the Allies who receive it at the German pit-head price *plus* freightage to the French, Belgian, Luxemburg or Italian frontier (the payments would, naturally, be set off against German Reparation payments). France also was to receive and pay for during three years 30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia, 35,000 tons of benzol, 50,000 tons of coal-tar.

In Section II, Articles 245–247, Germany undertook to restore trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works of art carried away from France by the German authorities in the war of 1870–71 and during the late war. Mention was especially made of the celebrated *Papiers de Cerçay* taken on October 10, 1870, from the Château of M. Rouher, Minister of State of Napoleon III, and published in part by Bismarck's orders. The King of the Hedjaz was to receive back the Koran of the Caliph Othman, carried off from Medîna by the Turks and believed to have been presented to the ex-Emperor William; the British Government was to receive back the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa, removed from the Protectorate of German East Africa; the University of Louvain was to receive manuscripts, printed books, maps and other valuable things corresponding in number and value to those destroyed in the burning by Germany of the Library. Finally, "in order to enable Belgium to reconstitute two great artistic works," Germany undertook to deliver two works that had been acquired either by gift or purchase by German museums in the year 1820—the leaves of the triptych of the Mystic Lamb painted by the Van Eyck brothers, formerly in the Church of St. Bavon at Ghent, and the leaves of the triptych of the Last Supper, painted by Dierick Bouts, formerly in the Church of St. Peter at Louvain, two from the Berlin Museum and two from the Old Pinakothek at Munich. If Germany had won the war she would have been equally justified in demanding the Belgian portions of these great artistic works.

A large number of articles follow dealing with trade, communications and the internationalisation of the great German rivers.

Articles 428-433 are the fourteenth Part of the Treaty, and relate to guarantees. The chief guarantee is Article 428, which stipulates for the occupation of German territory west of the Rhine, together with the bridge-heads, for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the Treaty. According as the conditions of the Treaty are faithfully executed, the occupation may be restricted, so that after five years the Cologne area may be evacuated,¹ after ten years the Coblenz area, after fifteen years the area of Mayence, the bridge-head of Kehl (opposite Strashbourg), and the rest of German territory under occupation. If at the expiration of fifteen years the guarantees against unprovoked attack by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees (Article 429). If either during or after the period of fifteen years the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the Treaty with regard to reparation, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately. If before the expiration of the period of fifteen years Germany complies with all the undertakings resulting from the Treaty, the occupying forces will be immediately withdrawn (Articles 430-431).²

The concluding Articles 434-440 are miscellaneous. By Article 434 Germany undertakes to recognise the full force of the Treaties of Peace and Additional Conventions which were to be concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers "with the Powers who fought on the side of Germany." Article 435 takes note of the agreement reached between the French Government and the Swiss Government for the abrogating of the neutralisation of Upper Savoy; the stipulations for this neutralisation, which was in the Treaties of 1815, "are and remain abrogated."³ The

¹ The Cologne area was evacuated at the end of the year 1925.

² By the Rhineland Agreement, June 28, 1919, an Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission was established which had power "to issue ordinances, so far as may be necessary, for securing the maintenance, safety and requirements of the Allied and Associated Forces" (Cmd. 222 of 1919).

³ For Upper Savoy, see Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914*, p. 14 and note 1.

High Contracting Parties also agree that the stipulations of the Treaties of 1815 regarding free zones in Upper Savoy and Gex are no longer consistent with present conditions, "and that it is for France and Switzerland to come to an agreement together with a view to settling between themselves the status of these territories."¹

The French and English texts of the Treaty are declared to be both authentic. The periods of time specified in the Treaty begin to run from the date of the first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.²

¹ The zones free from Customs Duties in Gex and Upper Savoy were abolished by the French Government in 1920. Accord with Switzerland was reached on this subject in 1921 but was not ratified by the Swiss people.

² The deposit of ratifications took place at Paris on January 10, 1920, and the procès-verbal bears the same date. Text in Kraus and Rödiger, *op. cit.*, II, 920.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE COMPLEMENTARY TREATIES

The peace with Germany did not at once exorcise the spectre of war. France especially, still lacerated as the result of the late invasion, felt no confidence in German disarmament and did not believe that her eastern frontier would never be threatened. Accordingly, to safeguard France for the future, and to prevent an attack upon her which would develop into a world war, "as experience has amply and unfortunately demonstrated,"¹ the United States and Great Britain each concluded a guarantee treaty with France. By these treaties the United States and Great Britain agreed to come to the aid of France in case of unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany. The treaties were to remain in force until the Council of the League of Nations, acting by a majority, should decide that the League itself provided sufficient protection. The treaties were only to come into force when each had been ratified. As the American treaty was never ratified, both treaties lapsed. Thus the United States, having contemplated involving herself in European affairs for the indefinite future, withdrew once more to her own hemisphere. President Wilson himself was not very enthusiastic about the guarantee treaty. Mr. Lansing, who signed it with him, thought that it showed lack of confidence in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations—the Article which guarantees the territorial integrity and independence of all members of the League.² The French, however, continued to hold that a special guarantee treaty was necessary in addition to Article 10 of the Covenant, and eventually they obtained their desire in the Locarno Pact although without the co-operation of the United States.

¹ These words are in the preamble of the Franco-American Treaty.

² See Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations*, Chapter XV, "The proposed Treaty with France."

That part of the liquidation of the War represented by the Treaty of Versailles was a tremendously big business, but it was not the whole thing. Treaties had to be made with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. In addition, the United States, which did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles, had to make its own separate treaties with the enemy States.

The first of the complementary treaties to be signed after Versailles was with Austria, at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, on September 10, 1919.

Part I of the Austrian Treaty was the Covenant of the League of Nations. Part II (Articles 27-35) settled the frontiers. The Brenner became the frontier with Italy; thus Austria lost the Southern Tyrol, including Botzen and Trent. To Italy she also lost Trieste and Istria, and the islands of Cherso and Lussin in the Gulf of Quarnero; to Yugoslavia she lost Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Dalmatian coast and islands; to Czechoslovakia she lost Bohemia, Moravia, most of Austrian Silesia, and part of the Lower Austrian Province; to Poland she lost Galicia; to Rumania, the Bukovina; Hungary became completely detached from Austria. The liberation of these territories and their nationalities from Austria involved large expenses. The "Succession States" accordingly agreed to pay a contribution towards these expenses, not exceeding in the aggregate more than 1,500,000,000 francs gold.¹

Equitable provisions similar to those in the Versailles Treaty regulated the transfer of public property and of responsibility for public debt in the ceded territories. Italy, however, was not charged with any sum on account of the former Austrian embassy at Rome, the Palazzo Venezia, of which she had taken possession during the War (Article 40). The Palazzo Venezia was the property of the Republic of Venice before Austria annexed Venice in 1797.

The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Austria undertakes, in the absence of consent of the Council, "to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly, or by any means whatever, compromise her independence" (Article 88).

¹ Agreement of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers with Poland, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, Rumania and Czechoslovakia for paying the cost of liberation of territories from the former Austrian Empire, Sept. 10, 1919 (Cmd. 458 of 1919).

With regard to disarmament, conditions of transportation, customs régime, prisoners, Austrians guilty of breaches of the laws and customs of war, private debts, insurance contracts, and such things, the St. Germain Treaty followed the lines of the Versailles Treaty.

The conditions imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers concerning Reparations are also strictly similar to the Versailles conditions. They begin with a clause (Article 177) by which Austria accepts responsibility for the loss and damage inflicted upon the Allied and Associated Powers "as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her allies." Article 179 provides that the Reparation Commission was to determine the compensation which is to be made by Austria.

Free access to the Adriatic is accorded to Austria. Therefore she can transport goods over the territories and in the ports severed from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and shall receive in those territories and ports national treatment as regards charges, facilities and all other matters (Articles 284, 311). The Allied and Associated Powers enjoy freedom of international transit across Austrian territory (Article 284). Czechoslovakia, in addition, has the right to send its own trains over certain Austrian lines towards the Adriatic (Article 322).¹

There are three texts of the Treaty of St. Germain which were ratified—French, English and Italian. In case of divergence it is provided that the French text shall prevail, except in Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), where the French and English texts are of equal force (Article 381).

The Treaty of Peace with Hungary was signed in the Long Gallery of the Grand Trianon, adjoining the Park of Versailles, on June 4, 1920. The Magyars gave up sovereignty over the numerous races that they had ruled; Hungary lost territory at every point of the compass; she shrank to about half her former size.

It was in order to maintain this settlement that the Little Entente was negotiated, chiefly at the instance of Dr. Benes. The first instrument constituting the Little Entente was signed between Czechoslovakia and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State on August 14, 1920. After the former Emperor-King Charles tried to bring about

¹ See also Treaty of the Trianon, Article 306.

a Habsburg restoration in Hungary in March, 1921, the Rumanian Government joined the Little Entente by conventions signed in April and June. Charles made a second, dramatic, attempt at restoration in Hungary on October 21. This brought the Little Entente into great activity, and a war-crisis with Hungary ensued, ended only by the Hungarian Government declaring that it agreed to the exclusion of the whole Habsburg family from the throne. Poland came into friendly relations with the Little Entente, although she did not sign a treaty of alliance. The specific object of the Little Entente as defined in the Czechoslovak-Serbo-Croat-Slovene Rumanian conventions is the maintenance of the Treaty of the Trianon.¹

Bulgaria's peace terms were settled by the Treaty of Neuilly, November 27, 1919. She retained her coast-line on the Black Sea, but lost all her Ægean littoral (to Greece), and some small, although important, strategical areas to Yugoslavia on her western border. States to which territories are ceded assume responsibility for a portion of the Bulgarian public debt. Bulgaria recognises her liability to make reparation for the loss and damage which she has inflicted on the Allied and Associated Powers; and she agrees to pay a fixed sum of 2,250,000,000 gold francs to be paid in thirty-seven years from January 1, 1921 (Article 121). By Article 48 "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to ensure the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Ægean Sea."

As the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920, was never ratified by the Sultan, it is of little more than antiquarian interest, and falls into the unprofitable class of "might-have-beens." It is permissible, however, for a European historian to cast a look of regret upon this ill-fated document, and to reflect on the long tale of bad luck that has dogged Europe's dealings with the Turk. The Treaty was not as drastic as had been originally intended. "One of the chief objects of the War will be lost," wrote Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, "if we do not finally expel the Turk from Europe and take possession of Constantinople as an international city, so that the Straits may always be free."² It left to the Turks in Europe Constantinople, the shore of the Sea of Marmora,

¹ A full account of the origin and development of the Little Entente is given in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-23, pp. 287-303.

² *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge* (1925), II, 539.

and the Gallipoli Peninsula. In Asia Turkey was to lose Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, which was to be an independent State. The Smyrna district was to be administered by Greece, and after five years was to belong to Greece if a local Parliament or plebiscite decided for this; Kurdistan was to be autonomous, and even, if a plebiscite decided in favour of this, independent.

The Allied and Associated Powers, except the United States, ratified all the treaties of Peace. These treaties, except the Treaty of Versailles, contained a series of articles (each series drafted on similar lines) for the protection of minorities, ensuring such minorities the right to speak their own language, to worship according to their own religion, and to exercise trades and professions on an equal footing with the racial majorities of their States. Minority-protection treaties were also accepted by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Greece.¹

Opportunity was taken at the Peace Conference of Paris to settle an outstanding diplomatic question not concerned with the War. The island of Spitzbergen, since its discovery by a Dutch navigator in 1596, had been, very slowly, assuming some importance in commercial and international affairs. First hunting, later coal-mining, made the island an object of rivalry between Russians, Norwegians and Swedes. A conference of representatives of the three States, held at Oslo shortly before the outbreak of the Great War, produced no results. The Peace Conference was more successful, and at last a treaty was signed at Paris by Great Britain, the United States, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden, on February 9, 1920. The High Contracting Parties recognise, subject to the stipulations of the treaty, the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitzbergen, including Bear Island. The chief stipulation is that the nationals of the Contracting Parties be treated on a footing of complete equality in respect of fishing, hunting or industrial pursuits. Although Soviet Russia did not sign the treaty in 1920 she acceded to it in February, 1924.²

¹ Polish Treaty, June 28, 1919 (Cmd. 223 of 1919); Czechoslovak Treaty, Sept. 10, 1919 (Cmd. 479 of 1919); Rumanian Treaty, Dec. 9, 1919 (Cmd. 588 of 1919); Greek Treaty, August 10, 1920 (Cmd. 960 of 1920).

² Article by Professor Paul Knaplund, "Spitzbergen, A New Province of Norway," in *Current History*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (June, 1926). This treaty of Feb. 9, 1920, is printed in French, English and Norwegian, by the Norwegian Foreign Office (Utenriksdepartementet), St. prp. nr. 36 (of 1924).

CHAPTER XIX

THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENT WILSON

The Peace Treaties of 1919-20 are the fundamental documents of the New Europe. With the Covenant of the League of Nations in their forefront, they were to constitute a European System, and indeed something greater, a political system for the whole world, where the humane Law of Nations should rule supreme. Unfortunately the system started with three handicaps: the United States rejected the Treaty of Versailles; it also rejected the Treaty of Guarantee of France; and the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified.

In the United States the great contest took place not over the Treaty of Versailles as a whole, but over Part I, the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is impossible to say who was the originator of the League: Wilson, Smuts, Cecil, Bourgeois had their part. But the idea was not new. Dante's *De Monarchia*, the *Grand Desssein* of Henri Quatre, were reasoned schemes for a League. The idea is as old as the Roman Empire. The War, naturally, brought the old idea powerfully to the fore. In November, 1914, a British Member of Parliament, Aneurin Williams, published a remarkable essay called "Proposals for a League of Peace and Mutual Protection among Nations." "The only hopeful course seems to me," he wrote, "for the peace-loving nations, or some of them, to make a definite League to settle by peaceful means all disputes which may arise among themselves; and that in the event of any one of them being attacked—whether from outside the League or by some treacherous member of it—all should stand together for mutual protection."¹

In the United States the people who first appear to have methodically put forward a scheme and started a campaign for the League of Nations was the League to Enforce Peace. This was

¹ *Contemporary Review*, November, 1914 (vol. 106, p. 629).

an association established by certain prominent public men on June 17, 1915, of whom W. H. Taft, former President of the United States, was the chief. It had a constructive plan for the settlement of questions likely to produce war by a judicial tribunal. It was a non-party association, although owing to the fact that its head, Mr. Taft, was a Republican, it could expect to obtain at least as much support in the Republican Party as among the Democrats, the party of President Wilson. It was on the day after some members of the League to Enforce Peace had spoken with Mr. Wilson at the White House, that the President made the speech of May 27, 1916, in which he first put forward his scheme for a League of Nations. This speech was regarded as marking a revolution in American policy.¹ "We are participants whether we would or not," said Mr. Wilson, "in the life of the world." After the United States entered the War, the League to Enforce Peace pledged its members to support "two supreme duties: first, to make the world safe, by the defeat of Germany and German militarism; second, to keep the world safe by a League of Nations."² It had branches in every State, and although strongest in the East, was by no means devoid of support elsewhere. It was non-partisan and it was as wide as the continent.

Accordingly, the Covenant of the League did not take the public of the United States by surprise. When Mr. Wilson came back from Europe in July, 1919, he was justified in feeling that the battle for the League, although not won, was hopeful of a successful issue. After all, he could not forget that for over a hundred years the foreign policy of the United States had been based on "international" principles—the freedom of the seas, respect for the territorial integrity and independence of all existing States, settlement of disputes between nations by arbitration. When these and similar principles were put into a General Covenant for all nations to subscribe to, it was scarcely to be expected that their foremost champion would refuse. But so it happened. Bad luck and perhaps some blundering brought it about that the League of Nations started without that country which should have been its most ardent and most powerful member. That the States

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 295.

² See "Platform," prefaced to collection of Addresses made at the National Convention of the League to Enforce Peace, in the City of Philadelphia, May 16 and 17, 1918 (in *Win the War for Permanent Peace*, New York, 1918).

of Western Europe were able to struggle on and, aided by the Republics of South America, make the League a success, is a proof that the vital forces of the Old World are not exhausted, and that steadfast faith in high ideal gains its end.

The Senate of the United States, which has the duty of approving of treaties, had grave doubts concerning some of the provisions of the Covenant. The Republican party had a majority in the Senate. Mr. Wilson and two of the American Peace Delegates at Paris were Democrats, but the third was a Republican, and the fourth was a soldier.¹ During the Paris Conference, while the Covenant was being drafted, Mr. Henry White, a member of the American Peace Delegation, had sent a cable message to Senator Lodge, to Washington, dated March 9. The message inquired what changes would, if made in the draft of the Covenant, meet with the approval of the Senate. Senator Lodge consulted Senator Root, who advised against giving the requested information, as this might commit the Senate beforehand to approval of the League of Nations. Mr. Lodge suspected that President Wilson was the real author of the message. As a matter of fact, Mr. Wilson was on the Atlantic on March 9, on his way back to Paris. Mr. Henry White had sent the message on his own initiative and privately to Senator Lodge, and never informed Mr. Wilson of the incident. The object of the message was simply to bring the draft into conformity, if possible, with Senate views, but without in any way infringing the Senate's right and duty to approve or disapprove of every part of the Treaty.²

Unaware of this incident, Mr. Wilson thought that he had removed the Senate's chief doubt when he secured the insertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant. Article 21 is:

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

After his return to Washington Mr. Wilson received the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations on August 19, 1919, at the White House. The conference was fully reported for the public. Mr.

¹ Mr. Lansing and Colonel House were Democrats. Mr. Henry White was a Republican, but as a professional diplomatist probably had no party politics. The fourth delegate was General Tasker Bliss, American Representative on the Supreme Council during the War.

² See Mr. White's statement in the *New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1925.

Wilson went through a very searching oral examination conducted by Senators who feared that Article 10 would involve the United States in war without any choice being possible. Article 10 is:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Mr. Wilson pointed out that Article 10 did not specify war as the normal sanction to be invoked against a recalcitrant State; and that in any case the League of Nations could only advise Members concerning the steps which they should take. Article 10, he explained, did not contain any *legal* obligation on the part of the United States to enforce the sanctions of the League, although it contained a very strong *moral* obligation: "There always remains in the moral obligation the right to exercise one's judgment as to whether it is indeed incumbent upon one in these circumstances to do that thing." Yet a considerable number of Senators were unconvinced. They vaguely felt that Article 10 somehow transferred to the League (in the rather sloppily sentimental words of Mr. Lodge) "the right to send our boys into war." Mr. Wilson vainly argued that the League was a means of preventing wars, not of making them. Mr. Lodge and many of the Republicans were doubtful. "One very dangerous thing," Lodge had written to Roosevelt, "is this League for Peace."² The Republicans had a majority both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Wilson resolved to go straight to the people, in the Middle West and the West; the East, he knew, except for Senator Lodge's followers, was behind him in his fight. His friends and physicians advised him not to go. He listened with his usual courtesy, but maintained his resolve. "I know that I am at the end of my tether," he said, but he added: "in the presence of the great tragedy which now faces the world, no decent man can count his own personal fortunes in the reckoning."³ The great tragedy that hung over the world was the possible rejection of the Covenant

¹ Speech at the Jackson Dinner, January 8, 1920.

² *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, II, 547 (Lodge to Roosevelt, Nov. 26, 1918).

³ Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I knew Him*, p. 435.

of the League. Before the War Colonel House had written of Wilson: "He has a heroic bite. I am afraid it is his destiny to adhere to something that will sink with him."¹

The Western Campaign—crusade¹ would be the better name—began with a speech at Columbus, Ohio, an important railway junction and town of the Middle West, on September 4, 1919. It was too soon after the terrible and prolonged strain of the Conference of Paris. The President's secretaries had tried to arrange for a break of seven days in the middle of the trip, at the Grand Cañon of Colorado. But Mr. Wilson refused: "The people would never forgive me if I took a rest on a trip such as the one I contemplate taking." So he was scheduled to speak every day and evening between September 4 and September 28; altogether he intended to make over a hundred speeches. The effort broke him, but not until he had all but completed the task. He maintained the pressure until paralysis struck him down on September 26.

On the morning on which Mr. Wilson left Washington, a special committee of the American Bar Association, meeting at Boston at the same time, reported, although not unanimously, in favour of unconditional ratification. But the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, the powerful journal of the Middle West, had on its front page a large cartoon of Uncle Sam, with a surprised and pained expression on his face, in the act of having a "Foreign Wars Medal" pinned on to his breast. The legend above the cartoon ran: *His Reward if he Adopts Article 10 of the League Covenant.*² Its headline in heavy black type, introducing Wilson's first speech on the Western Campaign, was: WILSON SAYS LEAGUE MAY NOT END WAR.³ Thus was the President's frankness turned against him.

Large, although not overflowing, crowds greeted the President at Columbus when his special train steamed into the railway station "out of the fog and drizzle of the Ohio valley" on September 4. He made his first speech to about 13,000 people at noon at Columbus, and his second the same evening at Indianapolis. At Columbus he impressively said: "The whole world is waiting for America." At Indianapolis he challenged his critics to produce an alternative scheme to the League: "If I may be pardoned a homely expression, I should say to the people who are criticising the treaty: *it is time to put up or shut up.*"

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 134.

² *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Sept. 5, 1919.

³ *Ibid.*

Next day, September 5, Mr. Wilson spoke at St. Louis, where he had a splendid reception: on the following day he spoke at Des Moines. So the campaign proceeded, the interest being steadily maintained, the great West being thrilled to see and hear the President, and the eyes of all the world focussed upon him. All this time Mr. Wilson showed no bitterness, no disappointment, no fear. He gave his opponents strong blows, but it was always fair dealing. He refused to debate: from the first he had announced that he would expound the Treaty; but he would not engage in a dialectical controversy. He was courteous and serene, and in the brief intervals between speeches was cheerful and mildly jocular, as his manner was when relaxing.

As the President's tour progressed the Opposition in Washington steadily increased the pressure against the Treaty of Versailles. Their criticisms were many—the Shantung settlement in particular was the object of censure. But quickly opposition concentrated itself upon one point, and then the truth was out: the Republicans in the Senate were against Article 10; they would not face the risk. They adopted a resolution to "guarantee no territorial integrity of nations under Article 10." The *New York Times* commenting upon this resolution wrote:

It serves notice upon all militaristic Powers that they can do just as Germany did in 1914, so far as we are concerned. Later on, of course, we may come in, as we did in 1917. The whole proposal, therefore, is to put the world back in the condition in which it was in 1914.¹

From Minnesota the President passed, speaking, through the Dakotas and Montana. Then came the amazing Bullitt incident. Mr. William C. Bullitt, a journalist, had been employed on the staff of the American Peace Commission at Paris. On September 12 he stated in evidence before the Senate Committee that Mr. Robert Lansing, President Wilson's Secretary of State, was himself against the Treaty—the Treaty which he had signed. Mr. Bullitt stated that Mr. Lansing had said to him, on May 19, 1919: "I consider that the League of Nations at present is entirely useless."² On September 13, the private secretary of the President found him sitting in a car of the special train reading

¹ *New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1919.

² *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Sept. 13, 1919. Also *Treaty of Peace with Germany, Hearings before the Committee of Foreign Relations* (Washington, 1919), p. 1276.

the report of Mr. Bullitt's evidence. He was furious, felt that he was being stabbed in the back; his own Secretary of State, he felt, had betrayed him. Although Mr. Lansing explained his words in a telegram to the President and in a subsequently published book,¹ the damage could not be undone. Mr. Lansing confesses that since January, 1919, he had been out of sympathy with the President's view on the Peace and the method of making it. He says, reasonably, that both Mr. Wilson and he thought that resignation, with all the excitement which it would cause, would do more harm than good. It still, however, remains something of a mystery how he could continue to occupy the momentous office of Secretary of State and Peace Commissioner, or how Mr. Wilson could acquiesce in it. A member of Mr. Wilson's Cabinet wrote in his diary: "From what I had heard, the question was raised in my mind why he had not been asked to go sooner."²

On September 13 the President's special train reached the Pacific coast at Seattle. No prejudice could diminish the cordiality and intensity of his welcome. Thirty thousand people came together to hear him speak.

The only silent men in the crowd near the station appeared to be several hundred who wore badges bearing the words: *release political prisoners*. These were men who had been locked up during I.W.W. and other troubles in the north-west.³

If these were the chief opponents of the League of Nations in the West, the fact was not greatly to the credit of Senator Lodge and his friends. On the Pacific side of the Rockies the President held out his hand to the opponents of the Treaty. There was some ground, perhaps, for maintaining that he had been too absolute in his refusal to consider reservations to the Covenant. But on September 12, speaking at Spokane, State of Washington, he had stated his readiness to accept "reservations of interpretation," so long as they were not put into the Ratification of the Treaty. Reservations in the Ratification would mean delay and probably re-submission of the Treaty to the Conference of Paris. Reservations outside the Treaty would go on record as the interpretation of the United States as to what the Treaty meant: in this there

¹ R. Lansing: *The Peace Negotiations* (1921). Mr. Lansing's resignation was called for on Feb. 11, 1920, and was given on the next day (*ibid.*, p. 3).

² D. F. Houston: "Diary of Woodrow Wilson's War Cabinet," in *Chicago Herald and Examiner*, April 8, 1926.

³ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Sept. 14, 1919.

could be no harm. Mr. Taft and the League to Enforce Peace were strongly supporting the President. But nothing could turn Senators Lodge and Borah from their opposition to Article 10.

Yet the President was gaining ground, even in San Francisco. The *New York Times* considered the speeches here to be the turningpoint of the tour.¹ Mr. Wilson had not converted California to the League but he had made a great impression. Yet it was by no means certain that America would ratify the Treaty. "It would be a singular irony of destiny," said M. Clemenceau in Paris, "but the League can exist without the Americans."²

In the early morning of September 26 Mr. Wilson was smitten by a slight paralytic stroke. The overwrought system had snapped, and one more martyr was added to the cause of peace. During a trip of nearly 10,000 miles he had passed all but three nights in the train, speeding from one place of speech-making to another.³

Now is the stately column broke,
The beacon-light is quenched in smoke,
The trumpet's silver sound is still,
The warder silent on the hill.⁴

The Senate continued with its apparently endless consideration of the Treaty. Sixteen weeks were required to draft the Treaty, but the Senate required about thirty to discuss it. With President Wilson, invalid, only half working, in the White House, there was no strong man to arouse public opinion again for the League. The Senate did not begin its formal reading of the report of the Committee of Foreign Affairs until September 5, 1919. On November 6, Mr. Lodge presented the Treaty with a revised list of reservations, fourteen in number. The first was as follows:

The reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate are to be made a part and a condition of the resolution of ratification.

All the reservations were of a far-reaching nature. It will be sufficient to quote number 3:

The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations—whether members of the League or not—under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval

¹ *New York Times*, Sept. 19, 1919.

² *San Francisco Chronicle*, Sept. 26, 1919.

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1919.

⁴ These are Sir Walter Scott's words on Pitt in *Marmion*, introduction to Canto I.

forces of the United States under any article of the Treaty for any purpose unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or authorise the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or formal resolution so decide.¹

The debate on the question of Ratification went on in the Senate into the year 1920. On January 31, a letter appeared in the *London Times*, written by Lord Grey (formerly Sir Edward Grey), who had been British Ambassador on special mission to the United States from September 27, 1919, to January 3, 1920. During that period he had been unable to see or to get into touch with Mr. Wilson.² The reason for this curious attitude of the President appears to have been Lord Grey's anxiety to have the Treaty accepted even with the Lodge reservations.³ Mr. Wilson was determined to let the Treaty lapse so far as the United States was concerned rather than accept the reservations. Lord Grey had the authority of the Prime Minister to say that the British Government would not consider the reservations as inconsistent with American membership of the League of Nations. It was to ask for British patience and sympathy with the American attitude that Lord Grey wrote his letter to the *Times*. Unfortunately, in his scrupulous anxiety to be fair, he made a statement which strengthened the hands of the opponents of the Covenant. Lord Grey wrote:

It would be possible, if the Covenant of the League of Nations stands, for a President in some future years to commit the United States, through its American representative on the Council of the League of Nations, to a policy which the Legislature at that time might disapprove.

The letter created an unfavourable impression in the United States.⁴ It was printed from the report of the *Washington Post*, with headlines that were not in the original letter, in the *Congressional Record* (Proceedings of the Senate), on the demand of Mr. Lodge.⁵ The object of Mr. Lodge in doing this was not to wreck the Treaty but, like Lord Grey, to show that the United States could enter the League and be a useful member even with the reservations. Mr. Lodge also secured the printing in the *Con-*

¹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 58, pp. 8022-3.

² Annin, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1926), p. 320.

³ Lord Grey says that he was unable to get into touch with the President simply owing to Mr. Wilson's illness (*Twenty-five Years*, II, 206).

⁴ Annin, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 59, p. 2335.

gressional Record of the report of an interview given with the same purpose by M. Jacques Bainville to the *Christian Science Monitor*. Speaking for the French people, M. Bainville said: "It appeared to us as most natural that the American Senate should pass reservations to Article 10 along with other reservations."¹

The Lodge resolutions 1-14 were accepted, being voted separately, by majorities varying from 16 to 64. The average majority for each resolution was 28.² The Resolution for Ratification, with the reservations forming part of the ratification, was voted upon in the Senate on March 19, 1920. There were 49 yeas and 35 nays. Accordingly the resolution failed, not obtaining the necessary majority of two-thirds.³

This result was due to President Wilson. He still commanded a sufficient number of Democratic votes in the Senate to prevent acceptance of the Treaty, with the reservations, by a two-thirds majority. "Without his efforts," said Senator Lodge, "the Treaty would have been accepted to-day."⁴ Twenty-four Senators of Mr. Wilson's own party, the Democrats, voted against the Treaty as conditioned by the reservations. So there failed for the time being what "was and is the noblest dream of mankind."⁵ These are the words of one of the "reservationists," Mr. Owen, a Republican Senator for Oklahoma, in the last day's debate on ratification. The Senator saw that Mr. Wilson's influence would defeat the ratification resolution with the reservations which the Republican party deemed to be essential. So the United States did not enter the League. But, added Senator Owen, "the United States will in due time enter, either with or without Article 10, either with or without the reservations to Article 10."

Having rejected the Covenant of the League of Nations, the United States had rejected the whole Peace Treaties of Versailles of which the Covenant was a part. Accordingly a separate Peace Treaty was concluded by the United States with Germany on August 1, with Austria on August 24, and with Hungary on August 29, 1921. Against Bulgaria and Turkey the United States had never declared war.

¹ *Congressional Record*, p. 2337.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 59, p. 5422.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 60, p. 4599.

⁴ H. C. Lodge, *Senator Lodge and the League of Nations* (1925), p. 214.

⁵ Cp. C. S. Groves, *Henry Cabot Lodge* (1925), p. 97 ff.

CHAPTER XX

THE BALTIC STATES

There were (in addition to a number of transitory Governments) six new States in Europe after the conclusion of the Peace Treaties. In addition, some of the old States were modified almost out of all recognition. Germany had lost territory (excluding colonies) inhabited by over four million people; Austria-Hungary lost between thirty-eight million and thirty-nine million people.

The Great War and the Treaties of 1919 reversed a process which had been going on for hundreds of years—the process by which small States were being combined into greater.

Where the extension had been made along national lines, as in Italy, or mainly along national lines, as in Germany, the result was large, efficient and stable political units. But where the extension had been made at the expense of nationality the result was a State with suppressed forces of division, always tending to assert themselves whenever the government was weak. The strain of the War broke down the governmental bonds that held together the suppressed races of Russia and Austria. The dismemberment of Austria was actively assisted by Allied propaganda during the War. The Peace Treaties completed this dismemberment. Thus the face of Western and Central Europe was changed. At the same time Russia, under the Bolshevik Government, by repudiating its debts and declaring war upon the European social system, had outlawed itself. So the new Europe was different from the old in two ways. It contained six new States; and it stopped at the western border of Soviet Russia. The Union of Soviet Republics is, as yet, not completely in Europe.

The Revolution in Russia in 1917 led to the dismemberment of that country. Herr von Kühlmann at the Conference of Brest-Litovsk had talked of Germany recognising new "State-entities" along the German eastern or north-eastern border. Such

State-entities had already come into existence. The first was Finland, which proclaimed its independence in December, 1917, immediately after the Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia. Finland, ceded by Sweden to Russia in 1809, had been maintained as a self-governing Grand Duchy personally united with Russia under the Tsar. The Tsar had, on the whole, respected the rights of the Finns; they had their own Senate and they were not subjected to conscription for the Russian army even during the Great War.

In January, 1918, the Finns proclaimed neutrality in the Great War. They had sufficient to do in meeting the civil war in their own country. For four months Finish Communists or Bolsheviks fought to gain control of society and government.

The Bolsheviks of Russia had declared that they recognised the right of people to self-determination, even at the cost of complete separation from the State of which they were subjects. In accordance with this view they had, by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, March 3, 1918, to agree to the detaching from Russia of all territory west of a line drawn from Riga (on the east side of the line) to the Ukrainian border. This agreement only detached Courland, Lithuania, and Poland from Russian sovereignty, and it obviously did so because the German Government meant to bring these "State-entities" within the German Empire, or at least into some form of union with Germany.¹ Various plans were proposed for procuring German princes as sovereigns for the new States.

Before the Bolsheviks would consent to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, General Hoffmann had sent troops to occupy territory even to the north of Riga. After the treaty, German troops were taken by sea to Finland and in April helped to suppress the insurrection of Finnish Bolsheviks. The German Government then made a treaty of commerce with Finland, and the Finnish Government agreed to offer the throne to a brother-in-law of the German Emperor, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, as king. But Germany was falling at the very moment when her military conquests were most extended and her diplomatic agreements most far-reaching. By the Armistice of November 11 Germany consented to the suppression of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk, and with them went her dream of Empire over the Baltic. Article 12 of the

¹ The Line is given in Article 3 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and Annex I with map, March 3, 1918, in *Texts of the Russian Peace* (Washington, 1918).

Armistice of November 11, 1918, stipulated for the evacuation by German troops of all territories which belonged to pre-war Russia. Prince Frederick Charles "signified his inability" to accept the Finnish throne.¹

Freed alike from Bolshevik and German Imperial direct influence, Finland at once took a place as one of the bourgeois republics of Europe. It had two difficult territorial problems to arrange, one concerning the Aaland Islands, with Sweden, the other concerning its land frontier, with Russia. The Aaland Islands, like Finland, had been under Russia since 1809. The Swedes did not wish to receive Finland back, but they would have liked the Aalands, where the majority of inhabitants are of Swedish stock and speak the Swedish language. The dispute, on the initiative of Great Britain (acting under Article 11 of the Covenant), was brought before the Council of the League of Nations in June, 1920. The Council appointed a Commission to examine the question. This Commission presented a report to the Council, held at Paris in September, 1920. The report was to the effect that the question of the Aaland Islands was not one left by International Law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland; and that "notwithstanding anything that may have been done by Russia in the way of erecting forts in the islands during the late War, the provisions of the Convention and Treaty of Peace of 1856 concerning the demilitarisation of the Aaland Islands are still in force."² After further examination of the question had been made, the Council of the League, at its meeting of June 24, 1921, decided that "the sovereignty of the Aaland Islands is recognised to belong to Finland."

A Convention was signed at Geneva on October 20, 1921, by Great Britain, Finland, Germany, Denmark, Esthonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, and Sweden. Finland undertook not to fortify the Aaland Islands. No warlike installation or base of operations may be established within three marine miles of low-water mark on the Islands. Freedom of innocent passage for warships is allowed through the territorial waters of the Islands except in time of war, when the waters and Islands shall be con-

¹ "The Baltic and Caucasian States" (in *The Nations of To-day*), edited by John Buchan. (1923), p. 46.

² League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Oct. 1920, p. 395. The Aaland Islands Convention was a part of the Treaties of Paris which ended the Crimean War, March 30, 1856.

sidered as a neutral zone. In time of war, in order to assure the neutrality of the zone, Finland may temporarily lay mines there.¹

The political rights of the Aaland Islanders were guaranteed by an agreement entered into by the representatives of Finland and Sweden in the Council of the League and approved by the Council in its session of June 27, 1921. The Islands are to be autonomous, and the language of instruction in the communal schools is to be Swedish.²

The Aaland Islands Question concerned not merely neutralisation, but the delicate subject of self-determination. The Islanders, who numbered perhaps 20,000 out of the total of 3,366,000 population of Finland, appeared to desire incorporation in Sweden. A specially appointed Committee of International Jurists in their report presented to the Council of the League in October, 1920, strongly condemned the unlimited claim to self-determination :

To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within states and to inaugurate anarchy in international life.

Besides the Aaland Islands Question, Finland had a territorial claim to a port on the White Sea. A state of war existed between Finland and Russia. At last the Soviet Government admitted the Finnish claim and the matter was regulated by the Treaty of Peace of Dorpat, October 14, 1920.³ The treaty, which is in three languages, Swedish, Finnish and Russian, puts an end to the state of war and binds the two High Contracting Parties "to maintain for the future the state of peace and good neighbourhood." Article 4 secured to Finland the territory of Petschenga with an ice-free port on the Bay of Vaida (on the northern coast between Norway and Russia). Finland undertakes not to maintain any naval base on her coast on the Arctic Ocean, and not to have any ships of war of more than 400 tons. The territorial waters of the two Contracting Parties in the Gulf of Finland are to extend for four marine miles from the coast of each country. Each State agrees to support the principle of the neutralisation of the Gulf of Finland and the

¹ Convention relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralisation of the Aaland Islands, Oct. 20, 1921, in *League of Nations, Treaty Series*, Vol. IX, p. 213.

² *League of Nations, Official Journal*, Sept., 1921, p. 701.

³ *League of Nations, Treaty Series*, Vol. III, p. 6.

Baltic Sea. Neither State claims any indemnity for their warfare against each other. Finland is relieved of all share in the debts of Russia contracted for the World War of 1914-1918; and neither State is responsible for the public debts and engagements of the other (Articles 24, 25).

Esthonia, with its capital at Reval and its university at Dorpat, is the next after Finland of the Russian Border States. In 1918 the country was in occupation of German military forces, and the Emperor William had announced that some sort of permanent connection with the German Empire would be secured. The Armistice of November 11, 1918, is, as with so many countries old and new, a fundamental date. The Provisional Government of Esthonia, which was already in existence, made an arrangement with the German occupying forces for the evacuation of the country. There ensued a confused twelve months when the Esthonians were engaged in sporadic hostilities with remnants of German forces, with the Russian Bolsheviks, and with the vague armies or condottieri bands of certain adventurers like Colonel Bermond. Great Britain gave arms and munitions to the Esthonians, and a British squadron protected their coast. A commander of ability was found in Esthonia, General Laidoner. There were also numerous anti-Bolshevik Russians in Esthonia, and it was from here that General Yudenitch made his daring and hopeful but unsuccessful raid against Petrograd in October, 1919. The Esthonians and the anti-Bolshevik Russians did not agree together, as Admiral Koltchak, General Denikin and other Russian patriots were unwilling to recognise the secession of the Border States. Yudenitch ascribed the failure of his advance on Petrograd to lack of support from the Esthonians.

As the Russian Bolsheviks had proclaimed the right of all peoples to self-determination, they were ready to recognise Esthonian independence. A conference, in which MM. Krassin and Yoffe took part for Russia and Mr. Poska for Esthonia, took place at Dorpat in December and January, 1919-20. The Peace Treaty was signed on February 2, 1920. Esthonia was relieved of all liability for debts of Russia. A fairly strong frontier was defined by the river Narva, Lake Peipus, and certain other natural features, and a demilitarised zone was established along this frontier. The Esthonian Government agreed that Reval should be a free port of entry and departure for Russian goods.

In spite of the Treaty of Dorpat the relations of Esthonia with Russia are not good. Considering the weakness of all the Baltic Border States if each stands alone, it would be natural to suppose that a policy of union would ensue. So far, however, this tendency has only shown itself in a treaty of alliance between Esthonia and Latvia, November 1, 1923. The two States have bound themselves to come to each other's assistance if either of them is attacked without provocation. They also have agreed, by an Economic Convention, to form a Customs-Union of the two States.¹

To the southward, Latvia comes next among the Border States. It has its capital and university in the fine old Hanseatic city of Riga. It was here that in 1919 the notorious Colonel Bermondts carried out his operations. Bermondts (or Avaloff-Bermondts) was a Russian officer who claimed to be commander of all the Russian troops in the western provinces. He joined himself with the German troops whom General von der Goltz commanded in the Baltic regions. These German-Russian forces were anti-Bolshevik, and seem to have aimed at establishing German rule on the Baltic littoral in compensation for what Germany had lost in the Great War. By the end of the year 1919 Bermondts's and von der Goltz's adventure was at an end; Bermondts himself found a refuge in Germany.

The Russian-Latvian Treaty of Peace was signed on August 11, 1920.² Russia unreservedly recognised the independence and sovereignty of the Latvian State. The frontier which the treaty defines has no natural strength. Latvia must rely upon co-operation with other Baltic States, such as Esthonia, and upon the League of Nations.

Lithuania was a large principality until 1385, when Prince Jagiello married Queen Jadwiga of Poland. After this, Lithuania was united with Poland.

The Partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795 put Lithuania under Russia and divided Poland between Russia, Prussia and Austria. The Poles retained their consciousness of nationality throughout the nineteenth century. Apparently all or most of the educated, politically-minded inhabitants of Lithuania looked upon themselves

¹ Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23* (1925), p. 244.
L'Europe Nouvelle, Jan. 12, 1924.

² League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. II, p. 212.

as Polish nationals until about 1883, when a Lithuanian national movement began.¹

During the Great War Lithuania was occupied by German forces and was considerably impoverished by German requisitions and exactions. The Russo-German Treaty of Brest-Litovsk recognised the complete separation of Lithuanian territory from Russia. Lithuania was in process of being brought within the German Empire when the Armistice of November 11, 1918, caused here, as elsewhere, a sudden reversal of the wheel of fortune.

During the German occupation and after the Bolshevik revolution, a Lithuanian nationalist Government had been established, with its capital in the beautiful and historic city of Vilna. After the withdrawal of the German forces at the end of the year 1918, the troops of Bolshevik Russia drove the Lithuanian Government out of Vilna, in January, 1919, only to be themselves in turn driven out by the Polish army (April, 1919). Meanwhile the Polish Government, then under the premiership of the large-minded patriot Paderewski, had proposed union of Lithuania and Poland—a union which would have saved much bloodshed and misery (Note of February 12, 1918). The Lithuanians, however, refused. Fighting ensued between Polish and Lithuanian troops in the neighbourhood of Vilna. At the same time the war between Russia and Poland continued.

In July, 1920, the Red Armies burst through the Polish defence and poured over Vilna and onward to the doors of Warsaw. The Lithuanian Government reoccupied Vilna. They were not there for long. On August 14, 1920, occurred the epoch-making Battle of the Vistula, the "Marne" of the Polish-Bolshevik War. The Red Armies were thrown back in disorder and driven out of Poland. Again Polish and Lithuanian troops clashed in the Vilna "sector." A Commission of the League of Nations hastened to intervene. On October 7 the Armistice of Suwalki was signed, according to which the Poles kept to a line drawn 25 miles south of Vilna. But no sooner was the Armistice concluded than the Polish General, Zeligowski, went off with a regiment or division, crossed the Armistice Line and occupied Vilna. Zeligowski's action was technically a mutiny against his own Government. He

¹ E. H. Lord, "Lithuania and Poland," in *Foreign Affairs* (American Quarterly), June, 1923, p. 41. This article is one of the best accounts of the whole Polish-Lithuanian Question.

could show no authority by international or municipal law. But having occupied Vilna, he remained. It would be interesting to know whether he and his soldiers continued to draw pay from the Polish Ministry of War.

Throughout the winter of 1920-21 the situation of Vilna in international law continued to be abnormal. The League of Nations sent a Commission to arrange for a plebiscite, and was preparing to send an international force to occupy the disputed territory. The Swiss Government refused to give a permit to the proposed international force, which would have presumably assembled at Geneva, to cross its territory. The League gave up the project. Instead of holding a plebiscite, the League invited Lithuania and Poland to settle their dispute by negotiations with each other. Negotiations were opened, and were conducted for about five months in the summer of 1921 at Brussels, under the chairmanship of M. Hymans, who was Commissioner for the League of Nations. M. Hymans' plan was to attribute Vilna to Lithuania under terms which would ensure its autonomy, and at the same time to bring about a federal union between Lithuania and Poland. Neither side would accept this proposal. The Council of the League of Nations then "wearily washed its hands of the matter and invited the two litigants to settle the matter as best they knew how."¹

In January, 1922, the Polish Government held a general election in the Vilna district for a Constituent Assembly. This Assembly met and voted that Vilna should form part of the Polish Republic. Another year had to pass before Vilna was recognised as Polish in international law; at last, on March 15, 1923, the Conference of Ambassadors accepted the *fait accompli*. The Vilna district, with a population of about 900,000, of whom 100,000 are said to be Lithuanians and the rest chiefly Poles (but there are also Jews and White Russians), was recognised as being within the Polish frontier.

Thus the Lithuanian State is left with Kovno for its capital. It has, however, received territorial advantages in other directions. In the north Lithuania includes part of the former Russian province of Courland. In the south she has the district and city of Memel, detached from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, administered for about four years by a High Commissioner of the League of Nations, and attributed to Lithuania by a tardy

¹ E. H. Lord, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of February 16, 1923. Thus Lithuania obtains the Niemen for her southern frontier. Had Lithuania not lost Vilna it is possible that Memel would have been constituted by the Council of Ambassadors a Free City under the League of Nations, as Danzig is.

The significance of the Vilna district in the Baltic territorial system is that under Polish administration it gives the Republic of Poland a "corridor" to the Latvian boundary, and so connects it with all the Russian Border States, with which it wishes to make a defensive alliance. In Lithuanian hands Vilna would provide through communication from East Prussia to Russian territory; for the Germans deal more easily through Lithuania than through Poland. With the Vilna district cut off, Lithuania does not touch Russia at all.

The Republic of Poland was recreated by the Treaties of 1919, but the boundaries were not definitely fixed for some years. A condition of war existed between Poland and Bolshevik Russia until the autumn of 1920. The long-drawn-out hostilities had culminated in the meteoric advance of the Red Armies to Warsaw in August, 1920, and their equally dramatic defeat at the battle of the Vistula. After this the Bolsheviks recognised that their military strength, for the time being at least, was broken. Russian and Polish Peace Delegations met at Riga in Latvia, and a Preliminary Treaty of Peace was signed on October 12, 1920. This was accompanied by a Protocol suspending hostilities, and arranging for a neutral zone of 15 kilometres (10 miles) between the two armies. The final peace was concluded at Riga on March 18, 1921.¹ The first article of the Final Peace simply declared that "a state of war has ceased to exist" between the High Contracting Parties. In the second article the two Contracting Parties "in accordance with the principle of national self-determination recognise the independence of the Ukraine and of White Ruthenia." This was an indirect way of stating that Poland renounced any claim to the Ukraine and White Ruthenia, and recognised the fact that these regions were now within Sovietic Russia. It also meant that the Bolsheviks recognised the territory to the west of the Ukraine, that is the territory of Eastern Galicia (including Tarnopol), as being within the Polish State. Russia

¹ Prelim. Treaty in League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. IV, p. 32. Final Treaty in same series, Vol. VI, p. 122.

agreed to pay to Poland thirty million roubles in gold, "on the ground of the active participation of the territory of the Polish Republic in the economic life of the former Russian Empire." A provision, which has become quite normal in treaties with Bolshevik Russia, was inserted, that both Parties would "refrain from all agitation, propaganda or interference of any kind, and not encourage any such movement."

All things being considered, it must be allowed, that the resuscitated Poland came very well out of the struggles and disputes of the years 1919-23. She obtained Vilna from Lithuania, Eastern Galicia (formerly Austrian); and in the north the Treaties of 1919 had secured to her the "Corridor" between-East and West Prussia to the sea. This famous strip of territory is, at its narrowest, where it faces the sea, about 22 miles wide, while farther inland it broadens to about 65. The Corridor does not include Danzig, which has a special régime of its own under the League of Nations. Life in the Corridor is quiet. There are no great towns; the population is agricultural, and although annexed to Prussia from 1772 to 1919, has no bias towards Germany. Strategically the Corridor is undoubtedly weak. Economically it is inconvenient to Germany as cutting off East Prussia from the rest of Prussia. This inconvenience has, however, been met by a Convention signed by Germany on the one hand and by Poland (representing itself and also Danzig) on the other, at Paris on April 21, 1921. By this Convention, Poland accords to Germany freedom of transit in respect of persons, goods, vessels, carriages, railway wagons, mails, telegraph and telephone services, between East Prussia and the rest of Germany. Similar freedom is granted to German goods passing across the territory or territorial waters of Danzig.

German soldiers may be transported across the Corridor; for the transport of military property, including arms and ammunition, which are prohibited in ordinary trains, one military goods-train is to be dispatched each week in each direction across the Corridor. The same conditions are applied to the transport of Polish troops across Prussian territory on the right bank of the Vistula.

Passports are not required by passengers using the privileged transit service.¹

With Rumania Poland concluded a defensive alliance on March

¹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XII, p. 63 ff. The Convention was made in accordance with Articles 96 and 98 of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919.

3, 1921.¹ With France Poland signed a treaty at Paris on February 19, 1921, to the effect that the Governments of both countries should consult each other on all questions of foreign policy.² It appears, too, that France and Poland also made a Military Convention which, however, was not published.

Poland has the most intense national consciousness among all the Baltic States. Her people could not even bear the sight of the majestic and gorgeous Cathedral which the Russians had built at Warsaw in the time of their possession. Accordingly in 1924 the Polish Government carried out the demolition of the Orthodox Cathedral and restored the site to its former use as a parade ground.

¹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. VII, p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 12.

CHAPTER XXI

DIPLOMACY BY CONFERENCE

The years 1919-24 were a period of diplomacy by Conference, which recalls the period of Congresses after the Napoleonic Wars. Normally international relations are carried on by exchange of Notes between Governments. These Notes are forwarded through Ambassadors who may, if so instructed, reinforce or supplement the Notes by conversations. In this method of international contact the Ambassador is chiefly a channel of communication.

When time is not the most important element in the negotiation, communication by exchange of Notes is highly suitable: it is deliberate, slow perhaps, but sure. There are, however, many occasions when exchange of Notes would simply be interminable. When peace-terms are to be discussed there are so many questions to be settled, and to be settled quickly, that it is necessary for the heads of States or for their deputies to come together, to talk things over, and to settle things by personal agreement, by the give-and-take which results from the deliberation in common of reasonable men.

Although diplomacy by Conference was employed commonly in the years 1814-22, and on other great international occasions such as the Congresses of Paris or Berlin, or the Hague Conferences, it did not become a habitual method of international contact until the Great War. Before the War "almost the invariable practice was to deal through intermediaries—skilled, tactful and experienced intermediaries, but not those persons on whom the ultimate responsibility rested."

It was the War which brought about the method of direct and frequent consultation between the principal ministers concerned, which continues to-day not only between the principal Powers, but to an equal degree between the smaller States, and more especially between those that

formed the habit during the War. Properly speaking, therefore, our story begins with the War.¹

During the War the responsible heads of the Entente Governments met frequently together to arrange for concerted action, to exchange views, and to define their policy. These meetings were held at various convenient places, but most commonly at Versailles; they came to be known as meetings of the Supreme Council. After the Armistice of November 11 this body became a sort of regulating Cabinet for the whole of Europe; and during the Conference of Paris, under the name of the Council of Four, or "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers," it refashioned a great part not only of Europe but of the world. The last meeting of the Peace Conference of Paris took place on January 21, 1920, after the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles. After this the same Supreme Council although occasionally employed, gradually dies out. Indeed it may be said that the Supreme Council itself disappeared after making the Treaties of 1919, for its members tended to look upon themselves as representing each his own Government rather than as forming part of one "Cabinet of Europe." But although these heads of the former Allied Powers ceased to look upon themselves as one body, yet the useful habit of meeting together for Conference remained. The framework of a Concert of Europe was kept in existence in spite of gaps in its membership and divergencies in its views.

The daily or weekly work of superintending the execution of the Treaties of 1919 was turned over to the Ambassadors of the Great Powers in Paris, who with a representative from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the next five years formed the Conference of Ambassadors.

On February 12 (1920) a Conference of responsible Premiers or high ministers was held at London. M. Clemenceau was no longer Premier of France. He had left office on the same day as the Peace Conference held its last session. France was represented at the London Conference by M. Millerand, the new Premier. M. Nitti, the Italian Premier, M. Delacroix, the Belgian Premier; M. Trumbitch, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, also attended. The United States was no longer present.

Fiume, War Criminals and the future of Constantinople were

¹ Hankey, "Diplomacy by Conference," in the *Round Table*, Vol. II, p. 288.

the chief questions discussed at the London Conference of February, 1920, held at Number 10, Downing Street. With regard to War Criminals, the Allies drafted a Second Note to Holland (the first had been sent on January 15) in which, as the Dutch had refused to surrender the ex-Emperor Wilhelm, it was suggested that they might send him somewhere outside Europe (apparently Java was intended). To the German Government the Allies conceded that trial of men accused of war crimes would be permitted to take place in the Supreme Court of Leipsic, instead of in Allied Tribunals. Under this concession about fourteen unimportant people received moderate sentences. As regards Constantinople, the Allies decided to allow the Sultan and the Turks to remain there. This "remarkable decision,"¹ as the *Times* pointedly called it, was afterwards registered in the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne. With Fiume the Allies could do nothing. They decided wisely to leave Italy and Yugoslavia to settle it between them in the belief that the sense of justice of two Allied States would prevail.² The Conference lasted throughout the rest of February. The chief result, the keeping of the Turks at Constantinople, does not appear in any way to have been due to French pressure, but to the influence of the British India Office (fearful of the Indian Moslems) over the malleable mind of Mr. Lloyd George.

The next Conference of the Allies was held at San Remo in the last fortnight of April (1920). The French and British Governments were not agreeing so well together as formerly. The French suspected the designs of the German military party. They were confirmed in their view by the "Kapp Putsch" or attempted *coup d'état* of March 14-17 (1920). Although Dr. Kapp was Chancellor for only one hundred hours, the Republican Government had been forced for the time to leave Berlin, and the monarchists and militarists had, at any rate, "shown their hand." The Kapp Putsch was followed by a Spartacist (or Communist) outbreak among the half-starved industrial workers of the Ruhr Valley. In suppressing this revolt the Reichswehr (Regular German Army) advanced into the demilitarised zone on the right bank of the Rhine, in contravention of Article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles. The French Government thereupon sent troops to occupy Frankfort and Darmstadt (April 6, 1920). Mr. Lloyd George protested against this single-handed action of the French,

¹ *Times*, Feb. 16, 1920.

² See below, pp. 331-2.

in a rather sharp note. It was in these circumstances that the Conference of San Remo met on April 19 (1920).

The meetings of the Conference were held in the pleasant Villa Devachan. M. Nitti, a broad-minded, perhaps rather sentimental statesman, presided, as Premier in the Italian Government under whose auspices the Conference was being held. M. Nitti and Mr. Lloyd George were strong supporters of each other, and favoured moderate interpretations of the Treaty of Versailles. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, who was also present, supplied a slightly more "realist" tendency to British policy, and maintained co-operation with the French Government. M. Millerand, Premier, attended the Conference for France; Mr. Matsui, Ambassador at Paris, attended for Japan. The advance of the Reichswehr with all the panoply of war into the neutral zone of the Ruhr had brought forward conspicuously the half-dormant question of German disarmament: this was one of the chief subjects of discussion at San Remo.

Besides disarmament, Mandates and Turkey occupied the Conference. Now that Turkey was to stay in Constantinople, the question of the Straits became more than ever delicate. The Allies at San Remo agreed in principle to the Internationalisation of the Straits. Thus one good piece of work was accomplished. The League of Nations, however, declined to accept the Mandata for Armenia. This decision was probably inevitable, as the League could scarcely at this stage of existence have defended Armenia against the Turks. The friends of the Armenians had been looking forward to the Conference of San Remo to save Armenia. The remnants of the unfortunate people were left to their masters, the Turk in the Black Sea area (Trebizond, Erzeroum), and to the Bolshevik in the Tatar Republic of Azerbaijan on the Caspian.¹

The question of disarmament created some friction at San Remo. According to the Treaty of Versailles the German Army should have been reduced to 100,000 men by April 10; but the Allies had allowed an extension to July 10. The Ruhr episode—the penetration of the Reichswehr into the neutralised territory—had alarmed the French. It was a breach of the Treaty of Versailles. Mr. Lloyd George believed that economic pressure would suffice to induce the Germans to keep the Treaty. M. Millerand was not convinced. It was believed by responsible people, in Eng-

¹ For Azerbaijan, see O. Baldwin, *Six Prisons and Two Revolutions* (1925).

land as well as in France, that 500,000 Germans were ready to take the field.¹ A circular of General von Seeckt had come to light arranging for the hoodwinking, as far as possible, of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control: a code signal was to be distributed on their appearance with the words: *Waffenmeister kommt*.² Meanwhile a Note arrived at San Remo from the German Government asking for leave to have 200,000 men in the Reichswehr instead of 100,000, until Germany should be admitted to the League of Nations. The demand, on the insistence of M. Millerand, was rejected. Mr. Lloyd George suggested that as the Allies had never had a really eminent German in front of them, they should invite the German Chancellor to conference. This "startling proposal"³ threatened to wreck the San Remo meetings. Nevertheless the Allied Ministers maintained good social relations, dined with each other, and held informal conversations outside the Conference. The atmosphere improved. France was allotted the Mandate for Syria, Great Britain the Mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia. Palestine, in accordance with a Declaration issued by Mr. Balfour as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on November 2, 1917, was to be "a national home for the Jewish people." The Conference came to an end on April 26, with the Adriatic question unsettled. A satisfactory Note, however, was issued to Germany in the name of all the Allies, declaring that Germany must execute all the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Note contained a remarkable invitation to "the heads of the German Government" to come to some agreed place to confer with the heads of the Allied Governments. The difficulties in the way of execution of the Treaty might be "more easily solved by the exchange of views by the heads of Governments than by exchange of Notes." Thus did the Allied Ministers define the policy, which they were pursuing, of Diplomacy by Conference.

The question of the control of natural resources or raw materials by particular Great Powers was agitating opinion in economic circles. To avoid disputes with regard to oil resources, Great Britain and France made an agreement at the San Remo Conference, dated April 24-5, for an equitable division of the produce of crude oil in their colonies or in concessions controlled by their nationals. They agreed that in any concessions secured through British and French official negotiations in Rumania, British and

¹ *Times*, April 22, 1920.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, April 24, 1920.

French interests would share them equally. In Mesopotamia Great Britain would secure to the French Government or its nominee 25 per cent. of the crude oil obtained, to be paid for at market rates; or the British Government would secure to the French Government or its nominee 25 per cent. of the shares in whatever company developed the Mesopotamian oil field—the shares to be paid for at the same price as was charged to other participants. France undertook to give facilities for the construction of pipe lines through French mandated territory (i.e. Syria) to the Mediterranean. In French Colonies and British Crown Colonies, the nationals of either country were to be given facilities for the acquisition of oil concessions.

On April 26 the Conference of San Remo ended. The German Government soon withdrew its troops from the Neutral Zone in the Ruhr area; and therefore on May 14 the French began to evacuate Frankfurt, Darmstadt and Hanau.¹ The need for precautions was emphasised by the disclosure made at this time that the Allied troops on the Rhine only numbered 145,000 men.

The third of the post-Versailles Conferences was held at Lympe, a village near Hythe, on May 15 and 16 (1920). It was a Conference only of British and French Ministers and "experts," as the technical advisers—naval, military and economic—were coming to be called. M. Millerand and Mr. Lloyd George were entertained at Belcaire, a country house at Lympe belonging to Sir Philip Sassoon; and there the Conference was held. The Lympe Conference was informal and was simply preparatory to the Conference of Spa which was to be held in the following month.

The confirmation of the Franco-British Entente at Lympe was of the greatest significance. The year 1920 was a period of intense anxiety and difficulty to the responsible statesmen of Europe. The Poles, whose eastern frontiers had not been defined, had occupied Eastern Galicia and were involved in a great war with Bolshevik Russia—a war in which the Red Armies looked as if they might break through into Central Europe. The Spartacists were sporadically rising in various parts of Germany. Even solid, bourgeois Switzerland had riots and threats of a general strike; and severe measures had to be resorted to by the Swiss authorities.² The League of Nations having felt unable to take

¹ Hanau was occupied by French troops on April 14, 1920.

² *New York Times*, May 2, 1920.

up the Mandate for Armenia, the Turkish problem became more difficult than ever to manage. The Mandate for Armenia was next offered to the United States. Mr. Wilson was in favour of accepting, but on May 28 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported against it, and both Senate and House of Representatives concurred with this.¹

Two more Conferences of the informal sort were still required before the great meeting with the Germans at Spa could take place. The first of these two Conferences was held at Lympe on June 20. Once more M. Millerand crossed the Channel to sleep in the hospitable Villa Belcaire. There was something to discuss. German newspapers had been putting forward proposals for the floating of an international loan: that is, a loan subscribed in the Allied countries and given to Germany; with this Germany would pay her dues for reparation to the Allies. The proposal was not favourably received at the time; indeed it is scarcely likely that such a loan could have been raised in 1920, especially as Germany was unwilling to accept Allied control of its finances.² It was, however, one of the plans adopted in the Dawes Scheme of 1925. At this second Conference at Lympe, besides French and British Ministers, M. Venizelos, Greek Premier, was present. The revival of the power of Turkish Nationalists was causing much anxiety concerning the position in the Near East. Great Britain still had 22,000 men in and near Constantinople under the command of General Milne; and a moderate Turkish Cabinet was thus kept in office³; but neither a British nor any Allied garrison could, in the general post-war apathy of Western Europe, be retained permanently at Constantinople. M. Venizelos asked for the assent of France and Great Britain to his interposing Greek troops in Asia Minor between the forces of the Nationalist General, Mustapha Kemal, and the coast of the Sea of Marmora. Rather grudgingly, for they feared being dragged into another war, the British and French Governments assented. The Greeks carried out their operation successfully.⁴

Immediately after the second Lympe Conference, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Millerand and M. Venizelos crossed to Boulogne. Thither also came from Paris the new Italian Ambassador, Count

¹ *New York Times*, May 28, June 2, June 4, 1920.

² *Le Temps*, June 20, 1920.

³ *Ibid.*, June 21, 1920.

⁴ A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-1923, p. 12.

Sforza (the Nitti Government had fallen and had been replaced by a Cabinet under Signor Giolitti): Belgian and Japanese delegates were also present. The chief subjects discussed (June 21) were the measures necessary to secure German disarmament and the destruction of surplus German war-material. One more Conference was still required, a Conference of economist experts held in the Palais des Académies at Brussels on July 2—3, before the Allied Ministers could trust themselves to go to Spa and to negotiate directly with the Germans.

A few days before the Spa Conference the German Government had presented documents to the Allies, drawing attention to the misery which prevailed in Germany. The Finance Minister, Dr. Wirth, had announced in the Reichstag that the finances of the Government for the year would show a deficit of 27 milliards of marks.¹ That there was great distress in Germany, and that the public finances were going from bad to worse, could not be doubted. But the insolvency was largely caused by the weakness of the German Government itself, which would not resist demands for higher expenditure and which feebly met the higher expenditure chiefly by additional issues of paper money. The French naturally said that if the German Government through its own fault became bankrupt, it must not be allowed to escape its liabilities but must be put under a receivership.² Nevertheless, the coming meeting at Spa was looked forward to hopefully by Germans, inasmuch as now for the first time Germans met the Allies no longer as enemies.³

The Conference of Spa was opened on July 5 (1920). The German delegates were Herrn Fehrenbach, Chancellor; Simons, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Wirth, Minister of Finances. They were housed in the Hotel Villa "Annette et Lubin." The Allied delegates, M. Millerand, Mr. Lloyd George, Count Sforza and the rest, were housed in various fine villas, of which there are so many in that picturesque Ardennes watering-place. The Conference was held in the *Château de la Fraineuse*, where the Emperor William had lived during 1918. The technical experts sighed for the concentrated facilities for information which they had enjoyed at Brussels, and which compared very favourably with the dispersion of services at Spa.⁴

¹ *Le Temps*, July 3, 1920.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Kölnische Zeitung, Wochenausgabe*, June 23, 1920.

⁴ *Le Temps*, July 6, 1920.

M. Delacroix, Premier of Belgium, presided at the Conference. The first session took place on July 5. The German Chancellor, Herr Fehrenbach, was somewhat colourless. He had not been long Chancellor and confessed that he had not mastered the details necessary to discuss the ambiguous question of sanctions. He was a tall, massive, heavy-featured man of about sixty years of age with a placid, indifferent and tired expression. He had tried to telephone, he said, to Berlin without success, in order to summon more experts. Now he was trying to summon them by telegraph. The Allies were a little piqued by this *insouciance*. The Conference adjourned until the afternoon of the following day.

For the rest of the Conference Herr Simons, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, took the chief rôle on the German side. The German people hoped for some lightening of their burdens from the Spa Conference. This, however, was not to be. In particular the Versailles conditions respecting coal and armament were established more solidly than ever.¹

It is a curious fact that Germany came so badly prepared to the Spa Conference. By the time the second session opened, at 4.30 p.m. on July 6, Herr Gessler, the Minister of Defence, had arrived. He admitted that Germany had not disarmed according to the Versailles conditions. His remarks were so lengthy and so vague that no progress of any kind was made until Mr. Lloyd George intervened by "tapping sharply on the table and saying that the Allies were gathered to deal with precise dates and figures, and must insist upon precision."² Herr Gessler confessed that instead of 100,000 as provided for in the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had 200,000 men in the Reichswehr. Herr Fehrenbach promised, however, that he would execute the Treaty—nothing more definite. "Mr. Lloyd George said that he was deeply disappointed at the reply." General von Seeckt, Chief of the German General Staff, was a little more definite in his remarks at the third session held on July 7: he asked for fifteen months in which to bring about the reduction of the Reichswehr. Mr. Lloyd George replied that besides the Reichswehr there were other armed men in Germany: that according to General von Seeckt's own admission, there were still "1,000,000 armed men and 2,000,000 rifles unaccounted for." On July 8 the Allies granted to Germany

¹ *Kölnische Zeitung*, *Wochenausgabe*, July 21, 1920.

² *Times*, July 7, 1920.

a delay of six months in which completely to fulfil the disarmament conditions. If, by January 1, 1921, disarmament should not be complete, the Allies might occupy the Ruhr or some other part of Germany. On July 9 the German Delegation signed the protocol embodying these conditions.

With regard to coal deliveries the French Premier, M. Millerand, stated that in the Versailles Treaty Germany had undertaken to supply a total of 39,000,000 tons of coal each year to France, Italy and Belgium; that, in view of Germany's especial difficulties, the Reparation Committee had reduced this total to 21,000,000 tons a year; but that, nevertheless, Germany had only delivered about half this amount.

The next session, July 10, was disturbed and inflammable. Herr Hugo Stinnes, the German coal-master and captain of industry, who was permitted to address the Conference as an expert, made an unfortunate, provocative speech in which he alluded to the "disease of victory" with which the Allies were "afflicted," and he defied them to occupy the Ruhr with "black troops, those worthy instruments of public authority." Mr. Lloyd George was furious. M. Millerand took upon himself to answer, as France was the country most interested in Reparation Coal. With the perfect suavity of the educated Frenchman M. Millerand excused himself for addressing his remarks only to the German Delegation (of which Herr Stinnes was not a member). He then asked for a German plan of monthly coal deliveries; and he concluded by saying that the Allies "regarded Germany as a necessary and useful member of the European family, and were determined to aid her recovery provided she was equally determined to execute her Treaty obligations."¹

The Conference was suspended for two days, July 14 and 15, in order to allow for discussion of the Allied Delegates and Marshal Foch with a view to military coercion of Germany. On July 16 the Conference met again and the German Delegation signed the Spa Agreements concerning Reparation and Coal. Article 1 of the Reparation Agreement stated:

In pursuance of Article 237 of the Treaty of Versailles, sums received from Germany under the head of reparation shall be divided in the following proportions: British Empire 22 per cent., France 52, Italy 10, Japan .75, Belgium 8, Portugal .75.

¹ *Times*, July 12, 1920.

Further, 6.5 of the reparation payments were to be reserved for Greece, Rumania, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State and other Powers entitled to reparation and not signatory of the Agreement.¹

By the Coal Agreement of Spa Germany undertook to deliver 2,000,000 tons of coal each month for the next six months. This coal was to be valued at the German pithead price *plus* freightage, and the amount was to be credited to Germany in the Reparation Account. In order to encourage and help the German miners to increase the output of coal, the Powers receiving the coal were to pay, during the six months of the Agreement, a premium of five gold marks on every ton delivered to them: this money was to be used wholly in the purchase of food for the German miners. The Allies also agreed to make a loan to Germany to the extent of the difference between the pithead price and the world export-price of all the German reparation coal delivered in the six months period. This loan or advance was to be repaid by Germany with interest at six per cent. not later than May, 1921.²

The whole object of the Spa Coal Agreement was to stimulate the Germans to a maximum output of coal wherewith to make reparation deliveries. During the six months for which the Agreement ran it was fairly successful: the German deliveries were very nearly up to the agreed total. When the Agreement expired, the Germans were bound, as before the Agreement, to go on delivering coal without any cash premium. Deliveries soon fell in arrear, until the Reparation Commission formally declared Germany in default in December, 1922.

The year 1920 contained one more Conference, held at Hythe on August 8. It was really a Conference of two, M. Millerand and Mr. Lloyd George; Lord Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, also attended, as did Marshal Foch, Sir Henry Wilson and other technical experts. The two Allies agreed to help Poland, which looked like being overwhelmed by the Bolsheviki. The help took the form of the dispatch of General Weygand and his staff by the French Government along with munitions. This support, and the self-help of the Poles, resulted in victory over the Bolsheviki at the battle of the Vistula on August 14. Mr. Lloyd George, at the same time, was anxious to come to agreement with the Bolsheviki, and was somewhat incensed when the French

¹ Text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 114, p. 550.

² Toynebee, *op. cit.*, p. 122. *L'Europe nouvelle*, July 25, 1920.

Government at this very moment recognised the Crimean Government of General Wrangel. The little rift in the Entente widened again. M. Millerand, however, ceased to be Premier, as on the illness of M. Deschanel he was elected President in September. M. Leygues, the new Premier, visited London in November, and good relations were maintained.

In the year 1921 there were six inter-allied Conferences. The first was held at Paris, from January 24 to 30. M. Briand, who always kept on good terms with British statesmen, was now Premier. German reparation payments and German disarmament were the chief subjects of discussion. Notes were drafted dealing with the questions and were dispatched to the German Government, which was not represented at the Conference.

On February 21 the most important Conference of the year began, at London. It was chiefly concerned with reparation. The Treaty of Versailles, Article 235, had stipulated that Germany should pay, in goods or gold, 20,000,000,000 gold marks (£1,000,000,000) by May 1, 1921. Of this sum it was estimated by the Reparation Commission that Germany at the time of the London Conference, February–March, 1921, had paid about 8,000,000,000 gold marks by deliveries in kind.¹

In the second place the Treaty of Versailles stipulated (Article 233) that the Reparation Commission should estimate and notify to the German Government, on or before May 1, 1921, the total liability of Germany on account of reparation, and should draw up a scheme of payment. On the other hand, if the Germans were prepared to do so, they were invited by the Allies to "make proposals within four months of the signing of the Treaty for a settlement of the claims under each of the categories of damage for which she is liable."² Certain proposals had been made but no agreement had been reached. It was to deal with this state of affairs that the London Conference met.

The Conference assembled in St. James's Palace on February 21. Herr Simons, who had impressed everybody as the ablest of the German delegates at Spa, was the leader on the German side. He had with him as a technical adviser the redoubtable Hugo Stinnes, one of the world's richest industrialists, a darksome, Jewish-looking

¹ Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

² Letter of June 16, 1919, in Kraus und Böttiger, *Urkunden zum Friedensvertrage*, I, 570-1.

man, wearing his tweed clothes awkwardly. M. Briand, handsome, challenging, leonine in expression, represented France. The other principal Allies had their delegates. There was the Greek Premier—no longer the eminent Venizelos, but M. Kalogeropoulos, one of a series of now quickly changing Greek Prime Ministers; and there was a large batch of Turks, some big and powerful-looking like Bekir Sami, their leader, others small, dapper, sallow and acute—probably not Turks by race, but belonging to one or other of the many nationalities which Turkey has always used in its bureaux. Mr. Lloyd George, strong buoyant, sensible, a trifle explosive, presided.

The first days of the Conference were spent in trying to bring about an accord between the Turks and the Greeks, who were at war with each other in Asia Minor. This effort at mediation failed. M. Briand, however, was successful in putting an end to the Turco-French disputes concerning the Syrian frontier.¹ The subject of Reparation was taken up on March 1. The German delegates had arrived on February 28.

The Allies, in a Note to Germany dated at Paris, January 28, 1921, had demanded a total of 226,000,000,000 gold marks in forty-two annual payments, and in addition 12 per cent. of the value of Germany's export trade for forty-one years.² The German Delegation, headed by Dr. Simons, met the Allies on March 1 at Lancaster House, as St. James's Palace was being used for a Royal Levee. Dr. Simons did not look like the usual German bureaucrat or politician. Instead of the round head, shaven poll, and rigid body of the regular German, he had a handsome oval face, a neat moustache, a high forehead, and he wore his hair like an Englishman, parted at the side, and smoothly brushed down. But his engaging appearance, which had made such a good impression at Spa, could not conquer the aversion with which his *exposé* of March 1 was met.

Dr. Simons began by saying that Germany could not accept the Allied proposals made at Paris on January 28, so the German Government submitted proposals of its own. These were, briefly, that the Reparation Bill should be paid off in the near future by Germany. With this in view Dr. Simons proceeded to discount at 8 per cent. the payments which the Allies had demanded to

¹ See *L'Europe nouvelle*, March 26, 1921.

² *Current History*, Vol. 14, p. 27. *L'Europe nouvelle*, Feb. 5, 1921.

be spread over forty-two years. This brought the sum down to £2,500,000,000, (fifty milliard gold marks). From this, however, fell to be deducted the payments in kind already made by Germany. Dr. Simons valued these at 20,000,000,000 marks, or £1,000,000,000 sterling. Thus the German Bill was brought down to £1,500,000,000. This, according to Dr. Simons, was the utmost that Germany could pay. She would raise an international loan for £400,000,000 (which was the utmost likely to be raised) and she would pay £55,000,000 (one milliard gold marks) every year for five years. When the five years were over means for paying the balance due for reparation would have to be considered anew if they had not already been agreed upon.¹

To understand the effect which this offer made upon the feelings of the Allied Ministers three things must be borne in mind. Firstly, instead of the £11,300,000,000 (two hundred and twenty-six milliards of gold marks) demanded by the Allies in the Paris Memorandum of January 28, the Germans now offered only £1,500,000,000. Secondly, the German offer took no notice of the 12 per cent. levy on German exports which in the Memorandum of January 28 the Allies had demanded in addition to the £11,300,000,000. Thirdly, the German offer was contingent on the result of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, which was to be held in five weeks' time.

On Thursday, March 3, Mr. Lloyd George replied for the Allies in a speech of severe tone. The Allied proposals of January 28 involved, he said, a substantial relaxation of the full demand of the Treaty of Versailles. "The counter-proposals (of the Germans) mock the Treaty." Mr. Lloyd George was led to this view not merely by examining the proposals themselves, but also by studying Dr. Simons' previous speeches, especially one delivered at Stuttgart, "when he repudiated German responsibility for the War." (How many diplomatic efforts at *rapprochement* have been wrecked by the Germans always harking back to this subject !)

Mr. Lloyd George went on to point out that "German responsibility for the War must be treated by the Allies as a *chose jugée*. The Allies were not trying to oppress Germany; they regarded "a free, a contented and a prosperous Germany as essential to civilisation." They were not demanding the cost of the War, as Germany had demanded from France in 1871: "we have deliberately in the Treaty of Versailles not asked Germany to pay one

¹ *Times*, March 2, 1925.

single paper mark for the cost incurred by the Allied countries in defending themselves in the War." The Allies are only asking for "reparation in respect of the charges cast upon our respective countries by material damage to property and by injuries inflicted upon the lives and limbs of the inhabitants."

Mr. Lloyd George then gave figures concerning the devastation of France; he pointed out that Germany had not been damaged, that her factories were intact; that the Allies had gigantic debts, that German internal debt was small owing to depreciated currency, that her taxation was far lighter than the Allies', and that the German Government was spending large sums in subsidising railways and food supply. He concluded by saying that the Germans were deliberately in default, and that unless they accepted the Paris decisions by Monday, the Allies would employ sanctions.

These sanctions included the occupation of Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf on the right bank of the Rhine; the impounding of German customs-receipts on the frontier of the occupied territory; the retention in Allied countries of a proportion of all payments due from Allied nationals to Germans in return for German goods; the erection of a line of customs-houses on the Rhine and at the *têtes de ponts* occupied by Allied troops—the tariff on this line to be determined by the Allied High Commission of the Rhineland and to be levied on imports and exports for the account of the Allies.¹

Attempts to find some acceptable compromise between the Allies' terms and the German offer failed. On Monday, March 7, Mr. Lloyd George informed the German Delegation that the sanctions would be put in force. Dr. Simons, whose fashionable, "Foreign Office" dress and countenance could not cloak the inveterate Prussian tactlessness, could not forbear in his last speech from saying: "The question of war-guilt is to be decided neither by the Treaty, by acknowledgment, nor by sanctions; only history will be able to decide who was responsible for the World War."

The military sanctions were put in force on March 8 (1921). The economic sanctions were also speedily applied. The British Reparation Recovery Bill was passed through Parliament, and became law on March 24, enabling the Government to retain 50 per cent. of the price of all goods imported from Germany—the German

¹ Text of speech in *Times*, March 4, 1921.

Government being left to indemnify their nationals for the loss. Allied customs-houses were established between the occupied zones and the rest of Germany. These measures produced not inconsiderable sums. The British Reparation Recovery Act down to December, 1921, had brought in £2,241,098.¹

Why had the Allies in the London Conference suddenly become so decided in action? It has been suggested that they believed themselves to be opposed by an absolutely determined and intransigent passive resistance on the part of the German industrialists. This resistance the Allies meant to break.

Herr Stinnes and the Prime Minister met face to face at Spa, and the nature of their encounter was such that the German millionaire stamped himself forthwith on the impressionable mind of the Premier as a type rather than a personality—the type of the industrial Junker, as arrogant and pitiless as the militarist Junker, and at a moment like the present even more dangerous.²

The occupation of Duisburg, Düsseldorf and Ruhrort naturally made a great sensation in Germany. Meanwhile another Franco-British Conference, with M. Briand and Mr. Lloyd George present, was held on April 23 and 24 in the Villa Belcaire at Lympne. The fateful day of May 1 (1921) was at hand when Germany was to pay over the balance of £600,000,000³ and to have her total liabilities fixed by the Reparation Commission. It was decided at Lympne to proceed forthwith to occupy the Ruhr if the German Government rejected the Allies' terms.

The Allies met in Conference at London on April 30 (1921)—M. Briand for France; M. Jaspar (Minister of Foreign Affairs for Belgium; Count Sforza, Ambassador to France, for Italy; Baron Hayashi for Japan. Mr. Lloyd George presided. The Conference was held at Number 10, Downing Street. As the German Government had, through Dr. Simons, rejected the "Paris terms" in the famous London Conference of the previous March, the offer of these terms lapsed, and the total now fixed by the Reparation

¹ *Times*, March 2, 1921, p. 18.

² H. W. Harris, "The Conference that failed," in the *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 119, p. 441.

³ Germany was bound by the Treaty of Versailles to pay a first instalment of £1,000,000,000; she was unofficially estimated to have paid mainly by deliveries in kind about £400,000,000 by May 1. A later and official (Allied) estimate, however, put her payments down to April 30, 1921, at £284,500,000 (*Times*, Aug. 9, 1921; also *Hansard*).

Commission took their place. This was the much smaller sum of £6,600,000,000 (one hundred and thirty-two milliard gold marks). The Allies in Conference agreed that before proceeding to occupy the Ruhr they would allow the German Government six days in which to agree to this. The Allies' terms also dealt with the trial of war-criminals and disarmament.¹ The French public were disappointed at the six days' grace allowed to Germany; they had looked for sanctions to be put in force as soon as default was declared by the Reparation Commission on May 1.

Before the ultimatum was dispatched, the Government of Chancellor Fehrenbach and Dr. Simons had fallen. It could not survive the failure of its Reparations policy and also the prospect of losing a large part of Upper Silesia, for which a plebiscite was soon to take place. Nobody was anxious to take up the thankless task of German Chancellor. President Ebert was fortunate in inducing Dr. Wirth to accept the work of forming a Cabinet. Dr. Wirth was a Roman Catholic, a member of the Centre Party, and a former Minister of Finance. He was sixty-two years old, a man of good judgment, inclined always to moderation, public-spirited and patriotic. He succeeded in forming a Cabinet on May 10. On the same evening he placed before the Reichstag the issue of signing or not signing an agreement to the Allies' ultimatum, and he received a mandate to sign. This result was greeted with relief in Great Britain where a prolonged coal-strike was paralysing all industry; the British people were of opinion that a further military adventure into Germany would only delay the economic recovery of Europe. Opinion in France was that it would require much firmness on the part of the Allies to keep the weak but well-meaning Government of Dr. Wirth to its duty of satisfying the demands made upon Germany.²

The Wirth Government set about its task. A fairly successful effort was made to maintain coal deliveries to France, Belgium and Italy in the required amounts. Efforts, not quite so successful, were made to keep up with the prescribed scales of disarmament. On May 23 the first trial of a soldier accused of offences against the laws and customs of war was held before the High Court of Leipsic. Seven German judges in violet gowns tried a bullet-headed German sergeant, who was both highly excited and deeply puzzled at the

¹ Text in *Times*, May 6, 1921.

² *Le Temps*, May 12, 1921.

proceedings. He had maltreated British prisoners in an internment camp. He was now sentenced to ten months' imprisonment.

According to the Ultimatum of May 6 (1921), to which Germany had agreed, three types of bonds (called A, B and C bonds) were to be issued by Germany to a total nominal value of £6,600,000,000, the sum fixed by the Reparation Commission as the amount of Germany's total liability. Until those bonds were redeemed, Germany was to pay annually £100,000,000 (in quarterly instalments) as from January 15, 1921, *plus* 25 per cent. of the value of her exports. Payment for the first two quarters which had passed was to be made by May 31.

The first payment of £50,000,000 was actually completed by the end of May. Another payment of £50,000,000 was made to the Reparation Commission at the end of August. These payments were obviously straining the German Government finances severely. On May 31 the mark was worth about 245 to the pound sterling. At the end of June it stood at 280 ; at the end of July, 295 ; at the end of August, 325. Nor was the prospect reassuring for the future. The expenses of the Government were chronically greater than the receipts. Since April 1 the receipts had amounted to 15 milliards of marks, the expenses to 38 milliards. Without being naïve enough to assume that the German Government was exhausting all its sources of income, the Allies could not deny that the finances of Germany were in a critical condition.¹ It was becoming more and more difficult to purchase foreign exchange on the Bourse.² Germany's remittances to the Reparation Commission were not likely to go on for long.

On June 19 there had been a Conference between Lord Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and M. Briand, with the Italian Ambassador at Paris, concerning the Greco-Turkish War. Efforts were fruitlessly made to bring both sides to stop the War.³

On August 8 there had been a Paris Conference which was heralded as the most momentous since the conclusion of the War. It was to deal with German disarmament, the question of war criminals, the war which was going on between Greece and Turkey, the condition of Austria, and Upper Silesia. Delegates from all the Allies attended, and Mr. Harvey, Ambassador to Great Britain,

¹ *Le Temps*, Aug. 24, 1921.

² *Kölnische Zeitung, Wochenausgabe*, Aug. 24, 1921.

³ *Le Temps*, June 20, 1921.

was present at meetings at the Quai d'Orsay as an observer for the United States. The Conference resulted in an *impasse*. According to Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles a plebiscite had been held in Upper Silesia on March 20, 1921. Four-elevenths of the people had voted for Poland and seven-elevenths for Germany.¹ The British proposal made at Paris in August was so to divide Upper Silesia that about three-quarters would go to Germany; the French proposal, on the other hand, would have given nearly three-quarters to Poland.² Each side claimed that the industrial area should be indivisible—the British from the point of view of the Germans, the French from that of the Poles. In spite of the excellent personal relations which existed between the French and British representatives, in spite of entertainments and long talks between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand at the Hôtel Crillon (where the British Prime Minister stayed), and in spite of a visit of all the delegates to the President, M. Millerand, at Rambouillet, no compromise was reached. On August 13 the Conference came to an end, having referred the question of Upper Silesia to the League of Nations for a solution. It was suggested, not very hopefully, that the failure of the Conference (which was really the old Supreme Council of the war-time) might be the League of Nations' opportunity.³ The reference to the League prevented a rupture in the Entente.⁴

The Council of the League of Nations issued its decision on October 20, 1921. It drew a dividing line across Upper Silesia, a line which was a compromise between the French and British views, but inclined more to the British than to the French.⁵ Although the Award cut across the "industrial triangle" of Gleiwitz, Beuthen and Kattowitz (the latter being awarded to Poland), it also enacted that the dividing-line, the political frontier, should for fifteen years not be a customs frontier as regards the natural products of the plebiscite areas.⁶

The next Conference, the last of the year 1921, was held in

¹ The figures were 469,000 for Poland, 707,000 for Germany. By Communes, the voting was 678 for Poland, 844 for Germany (*Times*, Aug. 9, 1921).

² Map in *Times*, Aug. 10, 1921.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1921.

⁴ *Le Temps*, Aug. 13, 1921.

⁵ Map and text of Award in *Times*, Oct. 21, 1921.

⁶ A detailed analysis of the Upper Silesian problem, favourable to the point of view of Germany, is S. Osborne's *The Upper Silesian Question* (1921).

London from December 18 to 22. It took place while the Washington Conference was still in session. M. Briand, who was still French Premier and who had been at the first part of the Washington Conference, had arrived back in France on December 1, and now came over to London to discuss the Reparation question with Mr. Lloyd George. It was becoming apparent to the Allies that the German Government would probably not effect payment of the 500,000,000 marks of gold due on January 15, 1922. The Reparation Commission had visited Berlin and, after examining the condition of Germany, had solemnly urged the German Government, in a Note, "to make every possible effort to obtain the necessary amount of foreign exchange, either from its own nationals, who notoriously have such foreign exchange at their disposal, or from foreign lenders."

Shortly after receiving this Note Dr. Wirth, the German Chancellor, informed the Reparation Commission that the German Government would be unable to pay the instalments due on January 15 (£25,000,000) and February 15 (£12,500,000), according to the London Schedule of May, 1921.

Even by exerting every effort and without considering the requirements of its own Budget, the German Government cannot procure for the instalments, apart from deliveries in kind and the credit derived from the recovery account, a sum of more than 150 or 200 million gold marks (£10,000,000).¹

In other words, the German Government was bankrupt. One of the greatest empires that the world had known could not meet its domestic expenses, and could not obtain credit for any sum above £10,000,000! M. Briand and Mr. Lloyd George discussed this situation at London between December 18 and 22 but could only agree to hold another and grander Conference next month at Cannes. At the end of the year 1922 the mark had fallen to 790 to the pound sterling.

The delegates to the Cannes Conference began to assemble on January 4. All the Allied countries were represented. The United States had an "observer." Great Britain, France, Belgium and Italy were represented by their Premiers, as well as by other Ministers. The British Delegation was particularly imposing: in addition to Mr. Lloyd George, there was the Secretary of State

¹ *Times*, Dec. 16, 1921.

for Foreign Affairs (Lord Curzon); and three other members of the Cabinet were at Cannes or in the neighbourhood. The Conference was held in the Cercle Nautique, a club of which the magnificent façade and the beautiful, lofty rooms were not unworthy of the occasion. The questions of reparations, the security of France, a general non-aggression pact, the restoration of Russia and her return into the European system of States, and a general economic conference for all Europe, were the chief agenda of the Cannes meetings. The aim of the Conference was "to eliminate the paralysis of the European system."¹ Apart from private conversations between statesmen, the official sessions began on January 6, and ended on January 13.

The Reparation question was discussed so far as to result in agreement to summon the Germans to appear before the Conference. Dr. Rathenau, German Foreign Minister, arrived on January 11, but on that evening M. Briand left for Paris to face a ministerial crisis. His resignation followed his arrival, on January 12. The new Premier, who entered into office on January 13, was M. Raymond Poincaré, formerly President of the Republic. The Conference delegates departed for Cannes on the same day. Dr. Rathenau and his colleagues had appeared before the Conference, and had convinced it that Germany must be allowed a moratorium as regards the cash payments due on January 15 and February 15.² The Conference had also resolved that an international syndicate, with affiliated national syndicates, should be formed to undertake the economic reconstruction of Europe and to assure the co-operation of the various nations. It was also decided to invite representatives of Soviet Russia to the next Conference, to be held at Genoa.³

The Cannes Conference had some results in the economic field. The Germans had their payments postponed, the Russians came to Genoa. The proposed international syndicate, however, was not established. The questions of non-aggression and of French security had to wait till a later day for settlement. The security question came nearest to settlement.

The sill-born guarantee Treaty of 1919 was one which the French, as a matter of fact, did not like. "It was unilateral and humiliat-

¹ Resolution of January 6, 1922. Text in *Times*, Jan. 7, 1922.

² *Le Temps*, Jan. 12, 1922.

³ Resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, January, 1922.

ing," as M. Briand said to Lord Curzon later.¹ It only pledged Great Britain (and America) to support France; but it did not mention any obligation of France to support Great Britain. Nevertheless, this again was exactly the sort of treaty which Mr. Lloyd George was prepared to make at Cannes in 1922. He was willing to enter into a Pact with France that "in the event of unprovoked German aggression against French soil, the British people will place their forces at her side."² He thought that public opinion would not endorse a more extensive agreement.

This offer was rejected by M. Briand, who stated in his reply that "in the mind of the French Government any partly defensive treaty must be of a bilateral character." He pointed out that Great Britain, in view of new methods and engines of warfare, was not in such an impregnable position but that she too might be glad some day to have the assurance of French assistance.

Meanwhile the French Press and the French Chamber, seriously alarmed and fearing that M. Briand was giving away French interests with regard both to reparations and to security, had him recalled to Paris and then deposed from power. Tardy justice to M. Briand's statesmanship and to his tenacious defence of French interests was done by the publication in 1924 of the official papers relating to the proposed Pact.

The failure of the Cannes Conference was, naturally, a great disappointment to all the friends of Europe. A French journal ironically remarked that there was only one tangible result, a charge of 6,000,000 francs (£120,000) upon France for its hospitality.³

The Conference of Genoa, which the Allies at Cannes had decided to call, held its first session on April 10 in the Palazzo di San Giorgio. It was attended by delegates of twenty-nine States, including Soviet Russia, but not Turkey.

The President of the Conference was, naturally, the Italian Premier, Signor Facta, whose Government was acting as host. Mr. Lloyd George with a large staff was present for Great Britain, but there was no French Premier at Genoa. M. Poincaré had apparently made up his mind how far he would go in meeting the views of other Governments; he would not go an inch further. With his

¹ On Dec. 5, 1921. See *Parliamentary Papers, France*, No. 1, 1924, p. 108.

² *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³ *Times*, Jan. 14, 1922.

principles of foreign policy thus fixed, he could control affairs best from Paris. He sent M. Barthou, Minister of Justice, to Genoa, hedged around with a very strict set of instructions.¹ The French public too had little confidence in the Conference, and was somewhat perturbed at the *démarche* of Pius XI in a letter of April 7 to the Archbishop of Genoa. The Pope expressed his pleasure "on the occasion of the first international conference which for the first time in this glorious city reunites in peaceful discussion victors and vanquished." He expressed the hope "that the representatives of the Powers will be willing to consider with a spirit not only serene but also disposed to some sacrifice on the altar of the common good the sad circumstances under which all people suffer." To all this nobody could object; but the next words seemed to be a criticism of France: "It should not be forgotten that the best guarantee of tranquillity is not a forest of bayonets but mutual confidence and friendship."

This letter created a certain amount of *malaise*, which increased after the opening of the Conference. Signor Facta made the opening speech. Mr. Lloyd George then explained the resolutions adopted at Cannes for the Conference of Genoa. He began by saying (forgetting the Congress of Vienna) that this was "the greatest gathering of European nations which has ever been assembled in this continent." He then said that the conditions which the inviting Powers laid down at Genoa "apply to all alike":

They are the conditions which have hitherto been accepted by all civilised communities as the basis of international good faith. They are in themselves honourable. They are essential to any intercourse between nations. They do not derogate from the complete sovereignty of States. We fully accept them ourselves. They are the only conditions upon which we can consent to deal with others. I will summarise them in two or three sentences.

The first is that when a country enters into contractual obligations with another country or its nationals for value received, that contract cannot be repudiated whenever a country changes its Government without returning the value.

The second is that no country can wage war on the institutions of another.

The third is that one nation shall not engage in aggressive operations against the territory of another.

¹ *Documents Diplomatiques: Conférence économique internationale de Gênes* (French Yellow Book, 1922).

The fourth is that the nationals of one country shall be entitled to impartial justice in the courts of another.

After a speech from M. Barthou, the German Chancellor, Dr. Wirth, made an oration that was "unintelligible in three languages."¹ Then came M. Tchitcherin, chief delegate for the Soviet Government. He wore the orthodox "morning" or black tail-coat which has replaced the *redingote*, the frock-coat, as the garb of diplomatists and politicians. He looked like a clever bourgeois, but his expression lacked the bonhomie and easy confidence which marks European statesmen when they meet each other. There was something saturnine, watchful and uneasy about his countenance, but there was no sense of inferiority. Sometimes sanctimonious, always a little insolent, he proceeded to orient the Conference towards the Bolshevik stars. In a high nasal voice he read a prepared statement in French, and then read it again in English. No objection could be taken to much of his speech, for instance when he spoke of the waste of warfare: he was merely echoing the truisms of a thousand years. But when he proclaimed his faith in Bolshevism and spoke of the prospect of world economic reconstruction almost in the same breath, he was treading on delicate ground. His assurance were too general. "Recent decisions" of the Soviet Government had, he said, given full legal guarantees for trade with bourgeois States; and on a basis of reciprocity, equality of rights, and entire recognition of the existing Soviet system, "Russia was ready voluntarily to open her frontiers for the creation of channels of international communications, and to offer for cultivation millions of acres of the most fertile soil in the world."² He proposed that technical commissions should be appointed to work out the economic reconstruction of the world. Armaments should be limited, "although as Communists they could be under no illusion as to the possibility of removing the causes of war and economic crises as long as the present social system lasts outside Russia."³

This brought M. Barthou to his feet. The Genoa Conference was based on the Cannes programme; disarmament was not in that. If Russia suggested a discussion on disarmament at this Conference,

¹ Text in *Times*, April 11, 1922. Dr. Wirth spoke in German, and his speech was put into French and English.

² *Times*, Aug. 12, 1922.

³ *Ibid.*

the answer of France was "a definite, categorical, final, decisive No."¹

The Bolsheviks held the stage. If they could secure recognition of their Government from the Powers well and good (for them). If not, they had at any rate obtained a high platform to talk from.

Genoa was the great occasion for the Bolsheviks. The delegates became familiar figures in the fashionable streets and in the most expensive restaurants. The daily interviews which M. Rakovski gave to journalists were the best attended in the Conference, and many "brilliant allocutions" on Bolshevik policy were thus transferred to the bourgeois press. On April 14 Mr. Lloyd George had the Bolshevik Delegation to lunch at his residence, the Villa d'Albertis, where they discussed Russia's debts. It was then that the Bolsheviks produced their amazing scheme for "recognising" their debts (about £2,600,000,000) subject to a "counterclaim" by themselves of £5,000,000,000 against the Allies for damage done during the Archangel expedition, and the wars of Denikin, Koltchak and Wrangel.²

Shortly after the luncheon at the Villa d'Albertis came the sensation of the Conference. It was announced that the German and Russian Delegations had taken the opportunity afforded by their presence at Genoa to conclude a Treaty of Recognition and Commerce. It was signed by Dr. Rathenau and M. Tchitcherin on Sunday, April 16, at Rapallo, 18½ miles south-east of Genoa, and was announced in a communiqué of the German Delegation next day. The treaty was regarded simply as a defiance of Europe.

On April 18 the delegates of the five Powers which had convened the Conference, and the delegates of the Little Entente States (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania),³ with Poland, held a meeting and drafted a Note to the Germans. This Note declared that "whilst Germany was represented on the Commission and sub-commissions charged with the negotiation of the European peace

¹ *New York Times*, April 11, 1922.

² *Times*, April 17, 1922. The figures, quoted verbally from a conversation of Litvinoff with the correspondent of the *New York Times*, were Russia's debt 65,000,000,000 gold francs, Russia's claim 125,000,000,000 gold francs (*New York Times*, April 18, 1922).

³ The treaties of the Little Entente were signed on April 23 and June 7, 1921. They bound each of the three countries to come to the aid of each other, in case of an unprovoked attack made upon any one of them by Hungary (text in *History of the Peace Conference*, IV, 519).

with Russia on the basis of the Cannes stipulations, the German representatives on that Commission have, behind the backs of their colleagues, concluded in secret a treaty with Russia on the very questions which they had undertaken to consider in loyal conjunction with the representatives of other nations." The Note concluded by saying that Germany, having made her own arrangements with Russia, could not expect to participate further in the discussions concerning the arrangements to be made between Russia and other countries. With this understanding the Conference was continued.

Clearly the Conference was not going well. The Soviet Government wanted foreign money to restore its ruined industries, and was obtaining none. The other States, except Germany, were coming no nearer than before to reconciling their views with those of Russia. On Monday, April 24, M. Poincaré, who from afar was watching the Conference with undisguised dislike, made a speech at Bar-le-Duc announcing his policy. This was simply the Treaty of Versailles. "All we ask for to-day is the execution of the Treaty." He referred to the danger from Germany, and to the Treaty of Rapallo. The Germans were unrepentant for their part in the war, they were still on the look out for an occasion to upset the Treaty of Versailles. The date of May 31 was approaching when the Germans must accept or reject the conditions laid down by the Reparation Commission; if the Germans defaulted,

the Allies will have the right and consequently the duty in order to protect their interests to take measures which beyond doubt it would be infinitely desirable to adopt and to apply in common accord between them, but which by the terms of the Treaty could in case of necessity be taken by each interested nation, and Germany by the Treaty of Versailles would be obliged not to regard them as acts of war.

Thus did M. Poincaré foreshadow the Ruhr occupation and announce France's claim to the right of independent action. Mr. Lloyd George felt that such an announcement was scarcely the way to maintain "co-operation" among the Allies.¹ The Conference of Genoa was doomed. It appeared as if the Entente were doomed too.

Through the last weeks of April the financial delegates and advisers were working on a draft treaty for re-opening normal relations with the Soviet Government. The draft was ready by

¹ Statement of Sir E. Grigg, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, given to the Press on April 25 (*Times*, April 26, 1925).

May 2, and was submitted to M. Tchitcherin ;¹ but before it was known whether the Soviet Government would sign or not, the Belgian Government announced that it could not accept the draft treaty. M. Barthou, summoned to Paris, came before the French Cabinet on May 3. He too was instructed not to sign. So the Genoa agreement with the Soviet Government was still-born. It was the work chiefly of Great Britain and Italy, and represents the biggest effort of Mr. Lloyd George to bring Russia back into the European polity. The failure of the draft convention seems unfortunate, for it provided that Russia should honour her debts: it suppressed the disingenuous and vicious Russian counterclaim; and it would have set her, if the Soviet Government honestly tried to work it, on the road to prosperity and co-operation with Europe. But even if Belgium and France had signed the agreement it would still have been waste paper: for the Soviet rejected it.²

The Conference of Genoa came to an end, amid the general lassitude of the Delegates, on May 19, 1922. A decision had been taken to hold a meeting of economic experts at the Hague on June 26, for further examination of the possible economic restoration of Europe. In the meantime the Conference States agreed not to attack each other. The Pact of non-aggression, with a duration of four months from the end of the future Hague Conference, was the only solid result of the Genoa Conference. Perhaps it averted a war between Russia and Poland.³ The stipulation contained in the Pact was already in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; but Russia and Germany, who were not in the League, joined the non-aggression Pact for about six months which it had to run. All this time there were persistent reports in the European and American Press to the effect that a secret Military Convention had been attached to the Treaty of Rapallo, but no evidence has been found of its existence.

¹ Text in *Temps*, May 4, 1922.

² Text of answer of Russian Delegation in *Le Temps*, May 13, 1922: also in *Papers relating to the International Conference at Genoa* (*Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 1667 of 1922), p. 38.

³ Leading article in *Washington Post*, May 13, 1922. Text of Non-aggression Pact in *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 1667 of 1922, p. 50. The Hague Conference met but broke down over the question of foreign-owned private property in Russia.

CHAPTER XXII

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Charles Evans Hughes, United States Secretary of State in the Cabinet of President Harding from 1921 to 1925, was the author of the Washington Conference. It was his initiative which seized the moment when it was possible to hold a conference on limitation of armaments and to bring it to definite results.

On July 8, by direction of the President of the United States, the Department of State addressed an informal inquiry to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on the subject of limitation of armaments, to be held in Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon. Along with this inquiry, it was also stated to be manifest that the question of limitation of armaments had a close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. The suggestion having been favourably received, formal invitations were issued to the Four Powers on August 11, and an invitation was also extended to Belgium, China, The Netherlands and Portugal to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions in connection with the Conference. It was to meet at Washington, on Armistice Day, November 11, 1921.¹ The Delegates assembled by the agreed date but the opening session was postponed until November 12 in order to enable them to attend at the burial of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington Cemetery. The Conference was held in Continental Hall.

The proceedings were opened by President Harding.

On the motion of the chief British Delegate, the Right Honourable A. J. Balfour, it was decided that the United States Secretary

¹ *Conference on Limitation of Armaments*, Senate Document No. 125 of 1922, p. 3; *Conference on the Limitation of Armaments*, Sessional Papers of the Dominion of Canada, No. 47 of 1922. These documents respectively contain the Reports of the American and Canadian Delegations.

of State, Mr. Hughes, should act as Chairman of the Conference. Two Committees were set up, (1) consisting of the Delegates of the Five Powers (the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) to deal with questions of armaments, and (2) consisting of the Delegates of the Nine Powers (the Five with Belgium, China, The Netherlands and Portugal) to deal with Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

The work of the two Committees proceeded along parallel lines without interference with each other, and the conclusions reached in each were reported, from time to time, to the Conference in plenary session for its adoption. Each committee provided itself with the necessary sub-committees dealing with technical questions and with drafting, so that in the most expeditious manner all questions before the Conference were thoroughly considered.¹

The two Committees sat in private, but at the close of each session a communiqué was issued to the Press "which, generally, stated all that had taken place in the Committee, and, in all cases, set forth whatever matters of importance had received attention."² The plenary sessions of the Conference were seven in number and were public. At the last session on February 6, 1922, the treaties approved by the Conference were signed. In addition to the making of these treaties opportunity was taken of the presence of the representatives of the Powers and other interested States to settle certain outstanding questions, although these questions did not come within the scope of the Conference itself. Among such questions were the Japanese rights in Shantung, and the dispute between the United States and Japan about the island of Yap. The official languages of the Conference were French and English; in the Treaties and Resolutions both texts are authoritative.³

The problem of limitation of armaments was clarified early in the Conference. "It was recognised at the outset that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide at this Conference for the limitation of land forces."⁴ So far as the United States and the British Empire were concerned no difficulty of this kind presented itself. The army of the United States had since the war been already reduced to 160,000 men; that of the British Empire

¹ Senate Doc. 125 of 1922, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*

³ Report of the Canadian Delegation (*Sessional Paper* 47 of 1922, p. 11).

⁴ Report of the American Delegation (Senate Doc. 125 of 1922, p. 13).

(excluding the Indian Army) to 154,000, a figure which was generally recognised as a minimum.¹ The Italian Delegate intimated that Italy had reduced her armed land forces to 250,000 men and contemplated a further reduction ; but he said that it would be necessary " to take into consideration the armaments of the countries either created or transformed as a result of the war." This was a scarcely veiled reference to the armies of Serbia and Hungary. The Japanese Delegate said: " The size of the land armaments of each State should be determined by its peculiar geographical situation and other circumstances, and these basic factors are so divergent and complicated that an effort to draw final comparisons is hardly possible." M. Briand, Premier, spoke for France. The French army, he said, had already been reduced by one-third, and the reduction would soon be one-half. If the Powers meant to share the danger of France, greater reductions could be made. France did not expect such a sacrifice on the part of other Powers, but, he added: " If France is to remain alone, you must not deny her what she wants in order to ensure her security." The Report of the American Delegation says: " Further consideration made it quite clear that no agreement for the limitation of land forces could be had at this time."²

In approaching the question of limitation of armaments, the American Delegation stated two principles: one that " the core of the difficulty is to be found in competition in naval programmes." Competition leads not only to continually increasing number of warships but to continually increasing size. " Thus the race will continue so long as ability to continue lasts." The only way to stop this was to stop the ships now under construction. This would entail very serious sacrifices. The second principle which the American Delegation advanced was that " no one of the naval Powers should be expected to make these sacrifices alone."

No agreement for the limitation of armaments would be effective unless it included France and Italy. At the same time it was recognised that they could not be expected to make the full sacrifices demanded by a proper agreement for naval limitation. " These sacrifices could, however, be reasonably expected of the United States, the British Empire and Japan, and these were the Powers actually engaged in the competitive building of warships." The American plan rested upon the application of four general

¹ *Ibid.*

² Senate Doc. 125 of 1921, p. 15.

principles : " (1) that all capital shipbuilding programmes,¹ either actual or projected, should be abandoned ; (2) that further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships ; (3) that, in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned; (4) that the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies, and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed." Coming to practical details the United States proposed in her own case to destroy the results of her whole programme of 1916, that is to say, sixteen capital ships, nine battleships and six cruisers under construction. She further proposed " to scrap all the older battleships up to, but not including, the *Delaware and North Dakota*." The total thus destined for the scrap-heap would be thirty capital ships with an aggregate tonnage (reckoning ships in construction as if completed) of 845,740 tons. Naturally in making this offer it was contemplated that the sacrifice to be undertaken by Great Britain and Japan should be " fairly commensurate " with the sacrifice of the United States. The proposal, therefore, was that Great Britain should stop construction upon the four new *Hoods*, the new capital ships not laid down but upon which money has been spent; she was also to "scrap her pre-dreadnoughts, second-line battleships, and first-line battleships up to, but not including, the *King George V* class." The total tonnage to be destroyed would be 583,375 tons. In the same way Japan was to break up ships to the extent of 448,928 tons. Within three months after the making of the Agreement the navies of the three Powers would consist of certain designated ships, and would number for Great Britain 22, for the United States 18, for Japan 10. The total tonnage would be, Great Britain 604,450, the United States 500,000, Japan 299,700. No replacement tonnage was to be laid down until ten years from the date of the Agreement, and only for a maximum of 500,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States and 300,000 for Japan.² Subject to those conditions capital ships could be replaced when they were

¹ A capital ship was defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons, or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches. (Senate Doc. 125 of 1922, p. 26).

² Japan was ultimately permitted not to scrap the newly completed *Mutsu*, and the replacement tonnage was modified to 525,000 tons for Great Britain and the United States, and 315,000 for Japan (Senate Doc. 125 of 1921, pp.22-3).

twenty years old by new capital ship construction, but no new capital ship should have a displacement of more than 35,000 tons.

The ratio adopted in the United States' proposal was the actual existing naval strength of the three Powers. Without this principle, no agreement would have been possible :

General considerations of national need, aspirations and expectations, policy and programme, could be brought forward by each Power in justification of some hypothetical relation of naval strength with no result but profitless and interminable discussion. The solution was to take what the Powers actually had, as it was manifest that neither could better its relative position unless it won in the race which it was the object of the Conference to end.¹

The ratio adopted between the capital ships of Great Britain, the United States and Japan was 5-5-3.

Japan stated that she could not accept the ratio " if the Government of the United States should fortify or establish additional naval bases in the Pacific Ocean." It was therefore agreed that the *status quo* at the time of the signing of the Naval Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, should be maintained in the Signatories' respective insular territories and possessions, with certain exceptions. These exceptions, in which the United States was free to make new fortifications or naval bases, were in the islands adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska,² the Panama Canal Zone, and the Hawaiian Islands. The British Empire undertook to maintain the *status quo* in Hongkong and the insular possessions east of the meridian of 110° east longitude,³ except the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories and New Zealand and the islands adjacent to the coast of Canada.

The scheme of reduction accepted by the United States, Great Britain and Japan involved the breaking up of capital ships to the extent of 40 per cent. of the existing strength. It was recognised, however, that a corresponding reduction in the capital ships of France and Italy would be greater than these two Powers could be expected to accept, their existing navies not being very large. It was agreed, therefore, that they should keep their existing tonnage of capital ships, 221,170 for France, 182,800 for

¹ Senate Doc. 125 of 1922, p. 21.

² But not the Aleutian Islands, where the *status quo* was to be maintained.

³ This does not include Singapore, which is west of 105°.

Italy. The amount of capital ship tonnage which they could replace after the prescribed ten years was to be for each country 175,000 tons.

The American proposal with regard to auxiliary ships had to be abandoned altogether. The original plan had been that auxiliary craft—that is, cruisers (10,000 tons or under), flotilla leaders, destroyers and submarines—should be limited in the same proportion as the capital tonnage. Japan and France, however, both opposed this plan. In particular the French Delegates stated that France required for the protection of her territories and communications 90,000 tons for submarines and 330,000 tons for cruisers and other auxiliary craft, whereas the proposed reduction would leave her with only 30,000 tons for submarines and 150,000 for other auxiliaries. M. Sarraut, Minister for the French Colonies, stated definitely that the French Delegation had been instructed “to consent to no concession on the above figures.” This statement created great disappointment, for it prevented any agreement whatever in regard to limitation of auxiliary craft.

The discussion of the submarine question gave rise to a certain amount of irritation in the Conference. The British Admiralty would gladly have seen submarines abolished from the navies of the world altogether, and such a proposal was actually put forward.

The United States Delegation opposed this proposal, in a reasoned and temperately written memorandum. The general opinion at the Conference seems to have been that the abolition of submarine warfare would most benefit the British Empire, as the dominant Power on the surface of the sea. France, Italy and Japan opposed the British proposal. The quiet surface of the Conference itself became ruffled. The British Delegation brought forward notes of an article published in January, 1920, in the *Revue Maritime* by Captain Castex of the French Navy, Chief of Staff to the Admiral of the Second Division of the Mediterranean, supporting unrestricted submarine warfare.¹ With regard to the divergent views of France and Great Britain M. Briand is said to have remarked: “Perhaps the English want their capital ships to fish for sardines. Well, we want submarines to study the floor at the bottom of the sea for the benefit of our botanical societies.”²

¹ *New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1921, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1921, p. 1.

It remained, accordingly, that methods of submarine warfare were to be tolerated, but with one great exception: as a method of destroying ships of commerce it was not to be employed.

The rules with regard to the submarines were embodied in a Treaty signed on February 6, 1922.¹ Nevertheless, in view of the declared "practical impossibility" of conducting submarine warfare according to these rules, it is perhaps to be regretted that the simpler British proposal for the total abolition of the war-submarine was not adopted. The international situation, however, in 1921-22 was not favourable to this proposal: but it was revived (although still not adopted) towards the end of 1925, when the conclusion of the Treaties of Locarno had made Powers less suspicious of each other's military designs.

The Washington naval agreement, although it only included warships of more than 10,000 tons, nevertheless was a definite step towards general disarmament and opened a way to greater things. The Conference of Washington also effected a regional agreement, such as had been made regarding certain parts of Europe with good results in the nineteenth century. In this case, the region selected for the agreement was the islands of the Conference Powers in the Pacific.

Political conditions in the Pacific were causing anxiety to the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, and Japan. The people of the United States believed that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been made and had been periodically renewed "as a measure of protection in view of the policies of Russia and Germany in Far Eastern affairs." Such protection, they felt, was no longer necessary, since the War of 1914-18. Accordingly people in the United States were constantly saying: "the original sources of danger having been removed, against whom and for what purposes was the Alliance maintained?"² The British Government, on the other hand, still estimated the value of the Alliance highly. On July 11, 1921, Mr. Lloyd George, then Prime Minister, stated in the House of Commons: "We also desire to maintain our close friendship and co-operation with Japan. The greatest merit of that valuable friendship is that it harmonises the influence and

¹ The same Treaty also declared the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases to be prohibited, as already declared in Treaties "to which a majority of the civilised Powers are parties."

² Senate Doc. 125 of 1922, p. 44.

activities of the two greatest Asiatic Powers, and thus constitutes an essential safeguard to the well-being of the British Empire and peace of the East.”¹

The Canadian Government did not appear to feel any strong interest in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, nor did South Africa, owing to its geographical position. General Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, said at the Imperial Conference: “There [in the Pacific] Europe, Asia and America are meeting, and there, I believe, the next great chapter in human history will be enacted.”² He was obviously in favour of revision of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Mr. Hughes of Australia, on the other hand, was strongly in favour of the Alliance, with a certain reservation: “Speaking broadly, we are in favour of its renewal. But . . . it must be laid down as a *sine qua non* that any future Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia, must specifically exclude the possibility of a war with the United States of America.” The Government of New Zealand was also strongly in favour of renewal. Mr. Massey, the Prime Minister, believed “that the next naval war will be fought in the Pacific.”

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a continuing treaty, terminable twelve months after denunciation by one side or the other. Since its renewal in 1911 the Covenant of the League of Nations had come into force. Notice had been given by the British and Japanese Governments that in points where the Covenant and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty were inconsistent, the terms of the Covenant should prevail.³ This declaration, made in all honesty as it undoubtedly was, could not cure the dislike with which the people of the United States regarded the Alliance. A “state of international tension” existed in the Pacific:⁴ people began to talk gloomily of the imminence of another great war there.

Japan was, apparently, desirous of adhering to the Alliance; Great Britain did not wish to offend either Japan or the United States. Mr. Balfour, chief British Delegate at the Washington Conference, said that Great Britain was “between the possibilities of two misunderstandings—a misunderstanding if they retained the Treaty, a misunderstanding if they denounced the Treaty.”⁵

¹ *Parliamentary Paper* 1474 of 1921, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ July 7, 1921 (*Parliamentary Paper* 1474 of 1921, p. 4).

⁴ Senate Doc. 125 of 1921, p. 44.

⁵ Speech in the Conference on December 10, 1921. (Text in *Canadian Sessional Paper* 47 of 1922, p. 59).

Accordingly it was greatly to the credit of all parties that at Washington one month after the opening of the Conference agreement was reached for the supersession of the Anglo-Japanese Dual Alliance by a Four Power Treaty (Great Britain, France, United States, Japan) for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Pacific (December 13, 1921). The important clause of the Four Power Treaty is in Article 1 :

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

Further they agreed that if any controversy¹ should arise out of any Pacific question, and if it could not be settled by diplomacy, the High Contracting Parties would invite each other to a joint conference and should refer the question to this conference for consideration and adjustment. If any of the Contracting Parties are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, they undertake to communicate with each other fully and frankly "in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation."

The historic policy of the United States deters it from entering into any "entangling alliance." The Four Power Treaty is not an alliance but it is a very definite regional understanding. It has a duration, in the first instance, of ten years, and thereafter continues to be in force subject to the right of any of the Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice. The Treaty applies to all the insular possessions of the Four Powers and, as drafted, was meant to include the Japanese islands as well as Australia and New Zealand. However, public sentiment both in the United States and Japan was against including the main Japanese islands in the agreement, so by a subsequent convention signed by the Four Powers the scope of the Treaty was restricted, as regards Japanese possessions, to the southern portion of Sakhalin,² Formosa, the Pescadores and islands under the mandate of Japan.⁴

¹ No controversies which by international law are exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of either Power, such as immigration or tariffs, come within the scope of the Treaty (Senate Doc. 125 of 1922, p. 45).

² Senate Doc. 125 of 1922.

³ The northern portion of Sakhalin belongs to Russia.

⁴ Senate Doc. 125 of 1922, p. 47. The ex-German islands north of the Equator were under the mandate of Japan.

Australia and New Zealand, however, remained within the scope of it. The main Treaty (December 13, 1921) stipulated that immediately after the exchange of ratifications the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance should terminate.

The Four Power Pacific Treaty had not been part of the Agenda of the Conference, nor was it, strictly speaking, ever discussed by the Conference.¹ The same thing is true of the Shantung Agreement. It was settled, by conversations which took place during but outside the Conference, through the good offices of Mr. Balfour of Great Britain and Mr. Hughes of the United States.

In 1898, under a Convention concluded with China, Germany had obtained a lease for ninety-nine years of the Bay of Kiaochow, the port of Tsingtao and a zone of 50 kilometres (31 miles) in radius, together with certain railway concessions. In September, 1914, Japan, aided by a small British force, captured the area occupied by the Germans. In the ultimatum issued to the German authorities before the attack on Tsingtao the Japanese Government had stated that her action was taken with a view to the eventual restoration of the leased territory to China. On January 18, 1915, however, being now in occupation of Tsingtao, the Japanese Government had presented to the Chinese Government a series of articles, known later as the Twenty-one Demands. Included in these was an article (Demand 1) by which China undertook to assent to any settlement that Japan might hereafter reach with Germany respecting the Shantung interests.² This was assented to by China on May 25, 1915.³ At one time the heat engendered by the Shantung Question nearly wrecked the Conference of Paris. By the Treaty of Versailles (Articles 156-8) Germany renounced her rights in Shantung in favour of Japan, who at the same time declared her intention of handing the territories back in full sovereignty to China, reserving, however, the economic privileges. The Chinese Government was not satisfied with this declaration and refused to assent to the Treaty of Versailles. Until the Washington Conference no agreement between Japan and China on the Shantung Question seemed possible :

¹ *Canadian Sess. Paper* 47 of 1922, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 35. Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*.

³ China assented to Demands 1-14 and 20. Text in *History of the Peace Conference*, VI, 631-4.

it remained "perhaps the most disturbing factor in the general Far Eastern situation."¹

As the fate of Shantung depended on the Treaty of Versailles, it was not a thing with which the Washington Conference could interfere. Nevertheless the international outlook and conciliatory atmosphere of the Conference was favourable to the prospect of negotiations between the two interested parties. The atmosphere was also exceptionally favourable to China. The high moral attitude, the international point of view, the perfect expositions of the Chinese Delegates, combined with the helpless condition of their country, attracted to them the goodwill and chivalry of the Conference, and a warm sentiment in the American public. A friendly environment, "as everyone who has participated in the conduct of international relations knows, is of great importance."²

The conversations concerning Shantung lasted for weeks, but "though prolonged and meticulous to a degree," they were marked by great good feeling.³ In the end China and Japan signed a treaty on February 4, 1922. Japan agreed to restore within six months to China the former German leased properties of Kiaochow and all public properties therein without charge, except for improvements carried out during the Japanese occupation. The Tsingtao-Tsinanfu (Shantung) Railway was also to be transferred to China for approximately 53,000,000 gold marks, the sum assessed against Japan by the Reparation Commission as the value of the railway property taken by Japan from Germany in 1914. A Japanese subject was to be employed as traffic manager under the authority and control of the Chinese managing director. Japan relinquished her claim to the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement; and China was to open the whole of the territory to foreign trade.

Thus was eliminated one of the Twenty-one Demands, a set of diplomatic acts which were internationally very disturbing although Mr. Lloyd George admitted at Paris that he had never heard of them.⁴ Shantung had consumed much of statesmen's labour: "we have spent much time over discussing a traffic manager of a small railway in the Far East," said Mr. Balfour at the sixth Plenary Session of the Conference on February 4.

¹ *Canadian Sess. Paper* 47 of 1922, p. 35.

² "Report of Chinese Delegates," in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1923-4, p. 459.

³ *Canadian Sess. Report* 47 of 1922, p. 36.

⁴ R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson at Paris*, II, 254.

The satisfactory settlement was mainly to the credit of the Japanese Government, which had to make practically all the concessions. The British Government, however, immediately stepped in with a free concession. It announced, through Mr. Balfour, that it would now restore to China Wei-hai-Wei subject to its being available as a sanatorium for the British Pacific squadron.

At the twelfth session of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions there was an important discussion concerning leased territories in China. Mr. Wellington Koo for China stated that the existence of leased territories¹ was due in the original instance to the aggressions of Germany, whose forcible occupation of part of Shantung Province constrained the Chinese Government on March 6, 1898, to grant a lease for ninety-nine years of the Bay of Kiaochow. This was closely followed, on March 27, 1898, by a demand on the part of Russia for the lease of land in the Liaotung Peninsula, in which are Port Arthur and Dalny; this was coupled with a demand for the right of building a railway to be guarded by Russian soldiers traversing the Manchurian Provinces from Port Arthur and Dalny to join the Trans-Siberian Railway on the one hand and Vladivostok on the other. This was later the cause of the Russo-Japanese War which resulted in 1905 in the transfer of Port Arthur and Dalny and the Manchurian privileges to Japan with the consent of China. Following the lease of Kiaochow Bay to Germany and of Port Arthur and Dalny to Russia, France obtained from China on April 22, 1898, a lease of Kwangchowwan on the coast of Kwangtung Province² for ninety-

¹ There were three different kinds of territories occupied by foreigners in China: (1) Concessions. These exist at Newchwang, Tientsin, Hankow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang, and Canton. In a Concession the ground is leased *en bloc* to a foreign Government, and is then sub-let to foreign merchants. (2) Settlements, defined areas in which foreigners can lease land directly from Chinese owners, e.g. the International Settlement of Shanghai. (3) "Leased territories," technically so called, namely those established in 1898 by Germany, Russia, Great Britain and France, in which the foreign lessee Government has the right of maintaining troops and erecting fortifications. In the Settlements and Concessions the foreigners enjoy local self-government and judicial extraterritoriality. By special treaties some Powers have also the right to keep troops in certain places, for instance, in the Legation Quarter at Peking (see Protocol of Sept. 7, 1901, closing the troubles arising out of the Boxer Rising). The leases of 1898 and the Boxer Protocol are given in MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919* (Carnegie Endowment, 1921).

² Kwangtung is the province in which is Canton. The Japanese also, somewhat confusingly, call Port Arthur and Dalny Kwangtung Province.

nine years. Great Britain on June 9, 1898, secured the lease, also for ninety-nine years, of an extension¹ of Kowloon and the adjoining territories and waters close to Hongkong, and on July 1 a lease "for so long a period as Port Arthur should remain in the occupation of Russia" of the port of Wei-hai-Wei on the coast of Shantung. Both Great Britain and France had based their claims for leases on the ground of the necessity of preserving the balance of power in the Far East.²

The Chinese Delegate argued that in the twenty years which had elapsed since the granting of the leases (the object of which was simply to preserve the balance of power in the Far East) conditions had been completely altered. Germany and Russia had entirely disappeared as holders of Chinese territory. The established principles of the Open Door and the Integrity of China ought to make the maintenance of a balance of power unnecessary. "In the absence of that necessity the Chinese Delegation believed that the time had come for the interested Powers to relinquish their control over the territories leased to them."³

The Delegates of the Powers answered the Chinese appeal in various ways. M. Viviani for France declared "that the Government of the Republic is ready to join in the collective restitution of territories leased to various Powers in China." The Japanese Delegate, Mr. Hanihara, said that Japan was already in process, through the good offices of Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes, of arranging to restore Kiaochow to China. Japan's only other leased territory was the province comprised by Port Arthur and Dairen (Dalny). This province, gained at the cost of the Russo-Japanese War and with the assent of China, Japan had "no intention at present to relinquish." It formed a part of Manchuria, where, owing to her territorial propinquity, Japan has a vital interest. The Japanese Government claimed that "territorial propinquity" had been recognised by the Powers, in the New Consortium Agreement, to constitute a "vital interest."⁴ Japan's

¹ The extension is shown in the Map attached to the Convention of June 9, 1908, in MacMurray, I, 130. It gave to Hongkong a 20-mile radius on the mainland, so as to make it safe from gunfire.

² Minutes of Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, in U.S. Senate Document 126 of 1922, pp. 538-9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 539.

⁴ See "Correspondence respecting the New Financial Consortium in China," in *Parliamentary Paper* 1214 of 1921, pp. 40, 41, 51. Great Britain and the

retention of Port Arthur and Dalny was not, in her view, inconsistent with the principle of the resolution adopted by the Washington Conference on November 21.

Mr. Balfour, speaking for Great Britain, stated the readiness of the British Government to restore Wei-hai-Wei to China "as part of a general arrangement." Later, when Japan had agreed to restore Kiaochow to China, he announced Great Britain's intention to give back Wei-hai-Wei forthwith. He trusted that arrangements could be made for its continued use for the "innocent and healthful purpose" of offering a summer resort or sanatorium for ships of war from the tropical portions of the China Station.

With regard, however, to the other leased territory, Kowloon, Mr. Balfour could promise nothing. "The reason was that, without the leased territory, Hongkong was perfectly indefensible and would be at the mercy of any territory possessing modern artillery." This, Mr. Balfour added, was not just a British interest; it was easily first among the ports of the world." He then proceeded to read from the United States Government *Commercial Handbook of China* an extract concerning the excellent commercial conditions in Hongkong. Mr. Balfour added that anything which shook the confidence of nations in security would be a universal misfortune. "He hoped he need say no more to explain that the Kowloon extension was in a different category and must be dealt with in a different spirit from those leased territories which had been acquired for totally different motives."¹

Two other matters of great importance regarding China and the rest of the world were dealt with at the Conference. One was extraterritoriality, the second was the tariff.

For many years beginning with the Treaty of Nankin in 1842 the chief States of Europe and the United States have possessed extraterritorial rights in China. Their nationals trading in China have been subject only to their own Consular Courts. Great Britain, for instance, has Consular Courts in the chief Chinese cities and a Supreme Consular Court at Shanghai. The reason

United States had admitted the general right of Japan as of every other State to safeguard its economic life and national safety; but they had not committed themselves to approval on this account of any claim of Japan to monopolise portions of China.

¹ Senate Doc. 126 of 1922, p. 542.

for the existence of this system is that the Chinese have never developed a satisfactory jurisprudence. Nevertheless the Chinese Government has come to look upon extraterritorial rights as a limitation of its sovereignty and administrative freedom. But a condition which is necessarily precedent to the suppression of extraterritorial rights is the establishment of a proper system of jurisprudence by the Chinese themselves. Japan established such a system and gained by agreement with the Powers release from extraterritorial servitudes in 1899. On September 5, 1902, Great Britain and, on October 8, 1903, the United States and Japan agreed by treaty to assist China in the reform of her judicial system, and declared that they would relinquish their extraterritorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration and other conditions should warrant them in so doing.¹ At the Washington Conference the Chinese Delegation drew attention to this declaration. The Conference on February 10, 1921, adopted a resolution for the appointment of a Commission to examine and report on the Chinese judicial system. This Commission was to consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the United States and Japan and other Powers having by treaty extraterritorial rights who should choose to adhere to the resolution. Thus extraterritorial rights appear to be doomed to disappear from China, although the civil war and administrative chaos inside the country has prevented the Commission from recommending any immediate steps to this end. Russia, Austria and Germany renounced their extraterritorial jurisdiction at the end of the Great War.

In regard to the Maritime Customs or tariff, as with regard to judicature, the Chinese Government was subject to certain restrictions by treaty. These began with the Treaty of Nankin, August 29, 1842, between Great Britain and China. Before this China had been, in theory at any rate, closed to foreign trade. By the Treaty of Nankin, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai were opened for foreign trade, and a fair and regular tariff of import and export customs was to be published. The general rate of duty adopted was 5 per cent. *ad valorem*.² The United States and other

¹ *Canadian Sess. Paper* 41 of 1922, p. 37.

² See Treaty of Nankin (Aug. 29, 1842), Article 10, and Treaty of Tientsin (June 26, 1858), Article 26; Hertslet, *Treaties, etc., between Great Britain and China, and between China and Foreign Powers* (1896), I, 8-26.

countries followed with "most-favoured nation" treaties. In 1853 the Chinese Customs administration broke down in the Taiping rebellion. To meet this emergency a foreign board of inspectors was appointed. This was the origin of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, which by 1914 had 7,441 employees, of whom 1,357 were foreigners. The Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs is a British subject so long as British trade predominates in China.¹ No important change was made by treaty in the rate of customs duty until 1902, when a surtax on foreign goods was permitted to be levied.

The Chinese Maritime Customs Service has proved in the highest degree effective in collecting customs-duties for China. At the Washington Conference the Chinese Government declared that it had no intention of changing this system of administration. At the same time the Powers at the Washington Conference allowed a further revision of the Chinese customs as fixed by treaties. This paved the way for the Peking Conference of the autumn of 1925 which conceded to China complete freedom to fix its rates of customs-duties. This freedom was to become operative from January 1, 1929. The Chinese Government on its side declared, at the Peking Conference, that it would abolish the *likin* or duty levied on trade across provincial frontiers.

What might be called the "spirit of Washington" was sunny and optimistic for China and was reflected in the declaration made by the British Government that it would apply its share of the Boxer indemnities to the benefit of the Chinese. The United States was already spending all its share on scholarships for Chinese students. Nevertheless the relations of all the Powers with China remained complicated and difficult to conduct on both sides, but much had been done at Washington to simplify them and also to create good feeling. Mr. Balfour, who, along with Mr. Hughes of the United States, was one of the two outstanding successes among the Delegates, remarked with justice at the Sixth Plenary Session: "I firmly believe that though difficulties may arise in the future, people will never have to go further back than the date of this Conference."

¹ Note of Chinese Foreign Office, Feb. 13, 1898 (MacMurray, *op. cit.*, I, 105).

CHAPTER XXIII

THE RUHR

The occupation of the Ruhr was probably the most spectacular and extraordinary proceeding among all the surprising episodes of post-war history. The Ruhr was invaded in 1923 by a large French army, steel-helmeted, equipped with guns and tanks and all the paraphernalia and panoply of modern war. Yet it was an invasion which, according to the existing international law, could not be considered as an act of war and which, in point of fact, was carried out without resistance.

Two clauses of the Treaty of Versailles governed the Ruhr episode. These were:

In case of default by Germany in the performance of any obligation under this part¹ of the present Treaty, the [Reparation] Commission will forthwith give notice of such default to each of the interested Powers and may make such recommendation as to the action to be taken in consequence of such default as it may think necessary. The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals, and, in general, such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in such circumstances.²

The first clause is perfectly clear. The Reparation Commission could, unanimously or by a majority vote, declare Germany to be in voluntary default. The second clause was ambiguous. Did "economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and, in general, *such other measures* as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary" mean that the "other measures" must only be financial too, or did they mean any sort of measures? The British Government argued that the measures could only be economic,

¹ i.e., Part VIII, Reparations.

² Sections 17 and 18 of Annex II of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles.

like the "economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals" aforementioned. The French Government argued that *any sort of measures* were allowed by the Treaty. Secondly, did "respective Governments" mean each Government acting alone or only all acting together? The French Government argued that the wording of the Treaty permitted each Government to act for itself. The balance of the argument seems clearly on the French side, and this had been the view of the British Government in 1920.¹ France in occupying the Ruhr was acting within her rights according to the literal interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles: and presumably the Treaty was drafted, like any other legal act, with a view to bearing its literal interpretation.

On December 26, 1922, the Reparation Commission meeting at Paris declared Germany to be in voluntary default in timber deliveries to France during the year. On January 2 a Conference of Allied Premiers—M. Poincaré for France, Mr. Bonar Law for Great Britain, M. Theunis for Belgium (all these were Premiers of their respective countries) and the Marquis della Torretta for Italy—met at Paris. A British scheme for payments involving a four years' moratorium was put forward; a French scheme was also produced, involving a two years' moratorium but conditioned by a plan for wiping out France's external war-debt to Great Britain. The Paris Conference closed without accomplishing anything.

A moratorium of six months granted on August 31 by the Reparation Commission ran out and Germany became liable to pay 500,000,000 gold marks on January 15, 1923. Already on January 9 the Reparation Commission (the British Delegate dissenting) had declared Germany to be in default in deliveries of coal, and on January 11 French and Belgian troops had entered Essen and the whole Ruhr district.

The Ruhr episode, which was of the nature of a long-drawn-out agony, strained the Franco-British Entente to breaking-point. That the Entente did not break altogether remains one of the almost inexplicable facts of history. It is true that it had often been strained previously. At the Washington Conference, for instance,

¹ See statement of A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the House of Commons, Oct. 28, 1920. "The words of the paragraph clearly leave it to the respective Governments to determine what action may be necessary under the paragraph" (*Hansard*, 5th Series, Vol. CXXXIII, p. 1922).

the attitude of the French Delegation had "temporarily ruffled" the feelings of the British; yet "a full and lasting agreement with France" remained the "fixed policy" of Great Britain.¹ In regard to the Ruhr Question, however, the opinion of the British Government, and of a great part, although not all, of the British people, was absolutely against the French: and M. Poincaré's cold, and often aggressive, style in speaking and writing did nothing to assuage the British feeling. M. Poincaré was probably right. The occupation of the Ruhr and the steady wearing down of the German passive resistance produced the "will to pay" without which the Dawes Scheme would have been so much waste paper.

The French began their invasion of the Ruhr by marching two divisions of troops from Düsseldorf (occupied as a "sanction" since March 8, 1921) to Essen on January 11, 1923. Armoured cars preceded the column. "From these grim-looking cars, of which the occupants were invisible, stood out the muzzles of machineguns, a silent threat to the sullen crowds."² Horizon-blue cavalymen, with swords and slung rifles, followed at a canter; a little later came the swift tramp of the loose-stepping French infantry. Within a few days the whole Ruhr and Lippe region was occupied as far west as Dortmund. France had the co-operation of Belgian troops, and of a few Engineers of the Italian army. Italy, however, soon withdrew her detachment. France stood practically alone. With little support in Europe, she could not count upon any on the other side of the Atlantic, although leading American opinion was not unsympathetic with the French point of view.³ It was feared, however, that the Ruhr occupation would revive and perpetuate war-mentality in Europe.⁴

At this time the Government of Chancellor Cuno was in power in Germany. The Chancellor and Cabinet had now to make one of those tremendous choices on which the fate of untold millions of people depend. Should the Germans accept the French chastisement and, as the French Government demanded, submit proposals for paying Reparations; or should they break off diplomatic relations, cease making even coal deliveries, refuse to co-operate in any respect and passively resist all French efforts? The Cuno

¹ *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1922, p. 16.

² *Times*, Jan. 12, 1923.

³ *Cp. New York Times*, Jan. 20, 1923, p. 12, on "A German Miscalculation."

⁴ *Wisconsin State Journal*, Jan. 13, 1923, p. 31 (Leading Article, "War Clouds").

Government resolved to take the latter course, and so plunged Germany down the abyss of hunger, poverty and national humiliation. It has been said that the Cuno Government was driven to this decision by force of public opinion which was clamant in universal detestation of the French invasion. But it is the business of a Government to decide against public opinion when such action is necessary for the salvation of the country. A Government is expected to be wise in time of crisis, and not blindly to act according to "mass psychology." The unforgivable thing in a government is to lose its temper.

It is conceivable that the Cuno Government, in decreeing passive resistance to the French, was swayed by policy as well as by indignation. It may have calculated on receiving encouragement or moral support from Great Britain and the United States,¹ it may have counted on the break-up of the Franco-British Entente, and it may even have had a vague notion of wearing down the determination of the French. If it had any such hopes they were all shattered.

The Cuno Government either from policy or from weakness bowed its head before the storm of indignation that passed over Germany, and ordered all inhabitants of the occupied districts not to pay any customs duties, coal taxes or export duties which could come into foreign hands.² Reparation deliveries to France and Belgium were stopped. The directors and officials of the mines refused to meet the demands of the French. A number were arrested and sentenced to heavy fines by French courts martial.³ The German Government did everything, short of open resistance, to oppose the French efforts. It refused to send forward through-trains. It stopped the Paris-Bucharest and Paris-Prague expresses. The reply of the French to this last piece of passive resistance was to invade Baden in South Germany and to occupy the railway junction of Appenweier. On February 11 the French and Belgian Governments informed the German Government that in consequence of the orders given by the German Government to its officials, they had decided to prohibit export of all manufactured products from the occupied area. All coal in the district being already at the

¹ "Germany counts upon the support of the United States" (*Vorwärts*, quoted in *New York Times*, Jan. 20, 1923, p. 12).

² *Times*, Jan. 20, 1923.

³ Herr Thyssen was fined 500,000 francs. He refused to pay and was imprisoned.

disposal of the French authorities, the economic encirclement of the Ruhr was now complete. Large numbers of men were unemployed, food was scarce, feelings bitter ; in general, life in the Ruhr was a dull, prolonged agony. The German working man starved ; meanwhile the ruinous collapse of the mark, occasioned chiefly by the policy of passive resistance, was inflicting equally bitter conditions on the middle classes in every part of Germany.

The value of the German mark on January 11, 1923, when French troops entered the Ruhr was sufficiently low—47,000 to the pound sterling. After that its deterioration was catastrophic, although not steady. On January 18 it was over 100,000 to the pound. On the 20th the mark was very slightly better. The improvement was, at the time, momentary. On the 26th the rate of exchange was 120,000 marks to the pound. On February 1 it was 200,000. Within a few days, however, the mark improved again, perhaps because the determination of the Germans in maintaining passive resistance impressed foreigners ; also, doubtless, because the Germans were selling their foreign balances to obtain raw material and to sustain the mark. At the end of February it was little over 100,000 to the pound. Throughout March it was fairly well maintained. By the end of April it was 140,000 ; by the end of May, 280,000. After this there was a series of landslides. By the end of August the pound sterling was exchanged for *fifty-five million marks*.

In the Ruhr the dull struggle went on. On January 30 the French authorities had declared a state of siege there. The occupation which at first had been planned to be "invisible" was now a very open and drastic military régime. The officials of the German Government, refusing to co-operate with the French, had either voluntarily left the country or had been expelled. All the higher military staffs had gone. The French were obliged to bring in a large amount of railway *personnel* from their own lines. At first the service was execrable, but gradually it was improved. The French railway administration in the Ruhr was organised as a self-supporting unit called the *Régie*. Nothing could shake the determination of M. Poincaré. Just as French railway staffs took over the Ruhr railways, so did French engineers take over the coal-mines. Food was allowed to come into the district for rationing the population, but all stocks of money that could be discovered coming in were seized. The German Government was ruining

itself to sustain passive resistance by paying allowances to expelled officials, to miners "on strike," and in a multitude of other ways. At the end of the unhappy experiment, passive resistance was costing the German Government the almost unbelievable sum of 3,500 trillions of marks a week.

Somehow or other the Entente withstood the strain put upon it. There were rumours of a new Continental *bloc* being negotiated, from which Great Britain was to be excluded.¹ Sometimes the design of the *bloc* was imputed to M. Mussolini of Italy.² However, responsible French opinion as expressed in the leading journals did not support the design. The Entente remained because neither party notified the other that it was broken; that was all. The slenderness of the tie which joined the two countries may be judged from the words in which the Prime Minister, Mr. Bonar Law, in the "Ruhr" debate of the House of Commons, referred to the Entente. He almost seemed to be presiding at its obsequies:

It would be a great blow, to say the least of it, if what I had hoped would be the basis of our policy, that we should work together with France for the reconstruction of Europe, is to be dropped altogether. That, I am sure, would be a great blow, and I really believe that many of those who have spoken to-day have the same feeling in their hearts. They do not want to quarrel with France if it can possibly be avoided.³

At last—or at least so it seemed—Lord Curzon cut the thread by his Note of August 11 (1923). For months people had been vaguely saying that the British Government must do something—nobody could say what. Then hope seemed to be fulfilled when the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a nobleman of firm disposition and wide knowledge of international affairs, sent and published the celebrated Note. It grew out of a correspondence initiated by the German Government. The course of events was as follows.

On May 2, 1923, the German Government submitted an offer of renewing reparation payments (which, except for coal to Italy, had now entirely ceased). Germany now proposed to pay reparation in cash and kind, amounting to £1,500,000,000, which sum, however, was in the first instance to be advanced by inter-

¹ Mr. J. B. Macdonald in the House of Commons, March 6, 1923 (*Hansard*, 5th Series, Vol. CLXI, p. 318).

² *Times*, Jan. 13, 1923, p. 8.

³ March 6, 1923, *Hansard*, 5th Series, Vol. CLXI, pp. 369-70.

national loans. Another condition was to be the evacuation of the Ruhr.

The offer was rejected. It was condemned as unworthy of serious consideration. The conclusion of the German Note, with its reiteration of the word "must," was not tactful. Besides, the French Government, having gone to the Ruhr to seize "productive pledges," and having met continued passive resistance there, could not, with respect to its own dignity, leave the Ruhr until Germany surrendered, that is, promised to stop passive resistance. Meanwhile the bottom seemed to be dropping out of the European political system. With the mark at about 20,000,000 to the pound, and revolution, as it seemed, breaking out in the Rhineland and perhaps elsewhere in Germany, people went about their way in Europe, nervous and distressed, feeling that any catastrophe was not too terrible to contemplate.

On July 7 (1923) the German Government had presented a Note submitting fresh proposals for settling the question of reparation payments, and without mentioning the Ruhr or occupied Germany. Passive resistance was still going on, so the French Government rejected this Note as it had rejected the former. On being informed of this decision Lord Curzon wrote a rather "stiff" Note to the French Government asking: "What is the exact meaning attached by the French Government to the demand for the cessation of passive resistance?"¹

The French and Belgian Governments replied to this by polite Notes (dated August 3) in which they explained—a not very difficult task—what they meant by the phrase "the cessation of passive resistance." Briefly, they meant that the German Government should rescind its emergency decrees in the Ruhr district so as to restore the legal *status quo* as it existed before the occupation of January 11. The French Note gracefully alluded to "the friendly spirit which marked Lord Curzon's communication." This, it must be admitted, was heaping coals of fire on Lord Curzon's head; but M. Poincaré, who, after all, had quite as much right to be brusque as the British Secretary of State, could not be relied upon *always* to turn the other cheek.

On July 20 (1923) Lord Curzon read (or rather, wrote) another lecture to M. Poincaré. He first alluded to the former proposals

¹ Marquess Curzon to Count de Saint-Aulaire, June 13, 1923, in *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 1943 of 1923.

of the German Government, and next to the questions which His Majesty's Government had addressed to France and Belgium. "The replies that have been returned to these questions have not completely lifted the veil of uncertainty in which the situation is still in parts involved." Receiving these words—which are not the language of diplomacy but of the clever undergraduate—M. Poincaré still showed patience. The style of the Quai d'Orsay was not going to be corrupted by the new phraseology of the Foreign Office.

The Note of July 7 of M. Poincaré to Lord Curzon stated that "the French Government have replied to the best of their ability to the various questions that have been put to them by the British Government." He offered to reply to any further questions, "but we are bound to recall straightaway the principle of which the British Government have been aware from the beginning of our occupation, i.e. that France and Belgium will not evacuate the Ruhr except in proportion to the payments made by the German Government." And in any case Germany must first discontinue passive resistance, and submit to the Treaty of Versailles.

The wordy controversy between France and Britain was not helping to solve the Reparation Question. Moreover, the pith of the British Note of July 20 had not been any proposal to spare Germany, but a proposal that the Allies should (1) recommend Germany to abandon passive resistance, and (2) set up a body of "impartial experts" to ascertain Germany's capacity to pay. The French Government had brushed aside the latter proposal; the Belgian Government objected to the term "impartial experts" as implying some condemnation of the Reparation Commission; while the Italian Government interpreted it "in the sense that the aforesaid plan will include the solution of the question of inter-Allied debts."¹

The British Government and the British public sincerely believed that not merely Germany but Europe were being ruined by the Ruhr occupation and by the crumbling of the German economic and political system. It was felt that "something must be done." Lord Curzon therefore sent on August 11 an ably-written and firm Note to the French Government.

The Note began by stating that "the most sincere disappointment has been caused to His Majesty's Government by the replies which they have received under date of the 30th July from the French Marquis della Torretta to Marquess Curzon, Aug. 2, 1923 (*ibid.*).

and Belgian Governments to their identic Notes of the 20th ultimo." It pointed out that " official and semi-official pronouncements by and on behalf of French and Belgian Ministers have made it clear that the French Government wish to insist on a minimum payment to them of 26 milliard gold marks over and above the amount required to meet their debts owing to this country and to United States, which was 19 millions more than were due to her under the existing agreements."

After going on to the suggested Export Inquiry, the Note took up the delicate and highly debatable question of the legality of the Ruhr occupation. In order to settle any doubts on this point the British Government was willing to submit the question of validity to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. His Majesty's Government had only refrained until now " from formally contesting the legality of the Franco-Belgian occupation as an act authorised by the Treaty," in order " to avoid causing any needless embarrassment to their Allies."

The next thing dealt with in the Note was the period of occupation of the Ruhr. France and Belgium had (so the Note ran) intimated " in words of some vagueness " that when passive resistance ceased they would " consult together as to how far they may find it possible to lighten the burden which the military occupation of the Ruhr lays on the region." But they had refused to promise to evacuate the district " except in proportion as payments are made by the German Government."

The reiterated announcements to this effect, coupled with the insistence on leaving undiminished the total of 132 milliards of German indebtedness under the head of reparations, can only be interpreted as an intention to remain in occupation of the Ruhr for a number of years, which, at best, cannot be less than 36 (this being the minimum period over which the discharge of the debt is spread under the Schedule of Payments) and which, in view of the generally admitted improbability of the complete execution of the Schedule being found practicable under any circumstances, may be extended indefinitely, if not in perpetuity.

The last words were on inter-Allied debts. When steps were taken to ascertain the actual amount of reparation payments which could be obtained from Germany, " His Majesty's Government will be ready to deal as generously as circumstances permit, and in the light of their respective capacity to pay, with the debts due to Great Britain by her Allies." The British Government " remain prepared

to ask for no more in respect of the very large sums due by their Allies than will, together with reparation payments by Germany, meet the British war debt to the United States Government.”¹

Responsible comment in Great Britain on this Note was that it was “strong, but not too strong.” However, what chiefly concerned the British public was not the strength of the Note but the effect which it might be expected to produce. “The British Government in their latest Note foreshadow the possibility of taking alternative action on their own account.”² This is what everybody expected to follow—some “alternative action” of the British Government which, somehow or other, would find a way out of the Ruhr *impasse*. This was the most dramatic moment in the history of the Entente. Would the French Government listen to the advice of Great Britain; or would they refuse, and allow the Entente to be broken? They refused—but the Entente was not broken. The British Government, having made its very vigorous protest against the Ruhr Occupation, and finding the protest unheeded, did nothing. Indeed there was nothing it could do. The British protest had only encouraged Germany in her passive resistance.³ To break the Entente would only have encouraged Germany still more. Neither side took any formal step to cut the slender thread which bound Great Britain and France, and so the thread remained.

In Paris, Lord Curzon’s Note of August 11 was taken as accusing France of being a “bully,”⁴ but it did not create consternation. This may be because (although it did not appear on the surface) victory was declaring itself for the French. The Ministry of Dr. Cuno had resigned on August 12, and a new Government under Dr. Stresemann came into office. The resignation of Cuno was a confession that his great policy, passive resistance, had failed. The new Government, although it could not admit this at once,⁵ was obviously one charged with the task of extricating the Reich from the Ruhr trouble by the only possible way, the cessation of passive resistance.

¹ This is the principle laid down in the Balfour Note of Aug. 1, 1922.

² *Times*, Aug. 13, 1923.

³ *Kölnische Zeitung, Wochenausgabe*, Aug. 13, 1923, p. 7; Aug. 22, 1923, pp. 2-3; Aug. 29, 1923, p. 3.

⁴ *Tache de bully la France: Temps*, Aug. 14, 1923.

⁵ *Temps*, Aug. 16, 1923: *M. Stresemann ne nous donne à ce côté aucune déception.*

In the meantime, said Mr. Austen Chamberlain (who was not a member of the British Government), "the Entente is hanging by a thread." Then—it must be admitted that he had strong provocation—M. Poincaré replied. Evidently, his choler had risen, but in a strictly regulated way: that is to say, the Note which he sent to the British Government on August 20 was itself perfectly courteous, both in substance and in form. It was an indictment of the wasteful and (as he maintained) deliberately extravagant conduct of finance by the German Government. It also explained once more, patiently, the French views respecting the occupation of the Ruhr and on inter-Allied debts. Then followed an Annex replying point by point to the British Note of August 11. Having satisfied all the diplomatic proprieties in his Note, M. Poincaré, in the free atmosphere of the Annex, "let himself go," still in a perfectly calm style, but bitter and incisive. He coldly blamed the British Government for having adopted the method of *public* exchange of Notes: the French Government would have preferred that the British and French differences should be argued solely through diplomatic channels. He indignantly repudiated the suggestion that the French Government meant to annex the Ruhr. He proclaimed France's intention of paying her debt but not until payments from Germany put her in a position to do so. Lord Curzon, in the proposals which he had made, had been careful to reserve the rights of the British Government. So did M. Poincaré. "We understand very well that the British Government reserve their rights. They will understand, no doubt, that we reserve our rights *vis-à-vis Germany*." The last word remained with M. Poincaré. Still the Entente continued.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE BREAKING-UP OF GERMANY AND ITS ARREST

While the long-drawn-out agony in the Ruhr was in progress, there was going on, before the eyes of the French soldiers, a violent revolution for the establishing of a Rhineland Republic. This revolution was probably in its origin a spontaneous movement of anti-national German Communists. It was only natural, of course, that the French occupying authorities should extend a very benevolent neutrality towards this movement, as it agreed with the secular aspiration of France for the creation of a buffer State between France and Germany. The idea is as old as the Partition of Verdun of 843 which created the kingdom of Lotharingia along the whole frontier between the East and West Franks. The same idea was the basis of the "Neutral State" Agreement of France and Russia of February, 1917;¹ and it had been contended for by important Frenchmen at the Conference of Paris in 1919, although without any success. In March, an influential Frenchman in the Ruhr gave it out in public as his opinion that "the only real security for both France and Germany would be the establishment of an independent State between them under the protection of the League of Nations."²

From the German side the Separatist Movement may be said to have started in a meeting of prominent Rhinelanders at Cologne, which took place after the Armistice of November 11, 1918. At this time the Revolution was in progress in Germany, and it was uncertain whether Bolshevism was going to emerge as the triumphant force or not.³ But the immediate danger from Bolshevism or Spartacism passed away, and with it passed the conservative

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1924, Cmd. 2169, p. 7 (Russian Foreign Minister to French Ambassador at Petrograd, Feb. 1/14, 1917). The territories outside France on the left bank of the Rhine were to be made into an autonomous, neutral State.

² *Times*, March 17, 1923, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, July 18, 1923, p. 12.

Separatist Movement in the Rhineland. When, however, the German financial situation deteriorated out of all recognition after the invasion of the Ruhr, there were conservative people, wealthy merchants, bankers and others who looked wistfully at the high value and stability of the franc, and, without wishing to join with France, at least thought that there might come a time when they should separate themselves from the currency of the German mark. But it was not these people either who made the Rhineland Separatist Movement of 1923.

The chief leader of Rhenish separatism was Dr. Adam Dorten, the son of a well-to-do German merchant. Dorten was a lawyer by profession who had gained the Iron Cross in the War. His influence was very great in the wine-growing districts near Wiesbaden, and it was there that he chiefly carried on his agitation for a Rhineland Republic. His first proclamation of secession, in 1920, led to nothing more dramatic than his indictment by the Prussian authorities for disturbing the peace and his paying a fine of 10,000 marks.¹ The Ruhr Occupation and the general misery of 1923 in Germany gave Dr. Dorten another chance of carrying out his design. The British and American troops in occupation took absolutely no part in the movement. The French Government also was neutral; but certain of the French officials in Wiesbaden, Spire and in the Ruhr gave unofficial encouragement to the Separatists. Dorten's object was to separate the Rhineland from Prussia but not from Germany. The Rhineland was to be a constitutional State of the Reich, freed from the bureaucracy of Berlin. But the customs barrier imposed by the French in the Ruhr and by the Inter-Allied "Rhineland High Commission" elsewhere in accordance with the Reparations policy of the Allies, had already in practice cut the Rhineland off, economically, from the rest of Germany. If the Rhineland had become a separate State, although within the Reich, it would perhaps inevitably have gravitated within the economic orbit of France and Belgium.

It was reported that French soldiers—certainly not acting officially—abetted the Separatists against the municipal police. This was not the only incident of the kind but it was perhaps the worst. It happened at Düsseldorf on September 30, 1923:

I had just re-entered the hotel, thinking everything was over, when perhaps the most horrible incident of Düsseldorf's "Red Sunday"

¹ *Current History*, Vol. XIX, p. 764 ff.

occurred. Twenty French cavalrymen, led by a dozen of the "Rheinwehr," galloped up to a Green Policeman on duty close to the hotel, surrounding and disarming him. When this was done, the Separatists turned on the disarmed man with leaden pipes and beat him to death. The doomed policeman covered his face with his hands and sank to the ground. A score or more blows were rained on him during the half-minute it took to kill him.¹

Another protagonist of the Rhineland movement was Herr Smeets. He had been a member of a Soviet which for a few days in November, 1918, had seized power in Cologne. He was now editor of a newspaper called the *Rheinische Republik*, and he advocated complete separation of the Rhineland and its existence as a buffer State between France and Germany.

A third leader, and in the later days of the movement perhaps the most important, was Herr Matthes. He was stated to be a Bavarian, editor of a Socialist newspaper, who had been sentenced to six months' imprisonment for libelling the local burgomaster. Having fled to the Occupied Area for protection, he is said to have become a French secret agent.²

Thus in the Rhineland there were all the conditions making for serious trouble, both domestic and international : political agitation, misery, want, foreign intrigue, financial chaos. The year 1923 was a year of riots, of separatists against unionists, and of communists against the rest of the community. As in all times of trouble the riff-raff of the population rose to the surface. The criminal classes joined the separatist ranks.

It was not merely in the Prussian Rhineland that the Separatist Movement rose high in 1923. An even greater drive for Separation was made in the Bavarian Palatinate. This province is on the left bank of the Rhine, bounded by Prussian and Hessian territory on the north, and by Alsace on the south. Its chief towns are Zweibrücken, Spires, and Ludwigshafen. Here, in the Palatinate, the first tussle took place, with the French authorities almost openly supporting the Separatists ; and it was here, at last, that diplomacy was able to lend a hand in solving the enigma.

In October (1923) it appeared as if the Reich—"Imperial Republican" Germany—was really disintegrating. The 7th (Bavarian) Division of the Reichswehr was withdrawn by the

¹ Report of a correspondent in the *Times*, Oct. 1, 1923.

² *Times*, Nov. 2, 1923, p. 12.

Bavarian Government from the control of the Berlin Government ; the authority of Herr Gessler, the Imperial Minister of Defence, was denied ; and it was asserted that the Bavarian Division owed allegiance only to the Bavarian Government. A Communist revolution was attempted at Hamburg where open fighting took place ; and all along the Rhineland, from Aix-la-Chapelle to Mayence, local separatist movements were vigorously in progress. On October 23 the *Times* (which was not favourable to the Separatist Movement) published a map of the *Breaking up of Germany*. On October 24 the diet or local representative council of the Palatinate, in session at Spire, proclaimed the establishment of a Palatinate Republic. It was believed that General de Metz, the Commander of the French troops in the Palatinate, was directly supporting the Separatists.¹ Men and money were found in the Palatinate to form Separatist troops, and for about three months the civil government of the province was largely in the hands of the Autonomists. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles no German troops could enter the Palatinate. At last after a very great deal of blood had been shed "an English authority was entrusted with the final verdict on the movement's fate, although it was in the French occupied area. The episode thus came to an end."²

Early in January, 1924, the British Government instructed Mr. Clive, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Munich, to proceed to the Bavarian Palatinate in order to investigate the political and economic condition of affairs, and to make a report.³ Such a mission was quite a natural part of a Consul's duties, and there was nothing very abnormal about the British Government's entrusting Mr. Clive with it. At the moment, however, the French, who were in occupation of the Palatinate, could scarcely help viewing the mission of Mr. Clive with suspicion. The incident was managed creditably to the diplomatists both of the Foreign Office and of the *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*. The British Government informed the French of their intention of sending Mr. Clive to conduct the investigation. The French Government expressed the intention of attaching a French official to him during his visit.

¹ *Times*, Oct. 25, 1923, p. 12.

² Dr. Dorten, "The Rhineland Movement," in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. III, p. 410.

³ The first intention of the British Government was to send a representative from the British Headquarters at Cologne. But the French Government objected to this (*Hansard*, 5th Series, Vol. CLXIX, p. 153).

The British Government thought the French request not unreasonable. So Mr. Clive carried out his investigation under the eyes of a French official. The people of the Palatinate evidently regarded him as a messenger of fair-play. His inspection, which was conducted tractfully and modestly, was converted by the populace into something like a triumphal procession. His visit was followed by a visit of the Inter-Allied High Commission of the Rhineland. As soon as the affairs of the Palatinate came directly under what may be called the "international eye" the tension began, although slowly, to be relaxed. The Separatist Movement, never strong, although for a time very fierce, declined. By March affairs were reported to be normal. Belligerent Separatists who lost their chance of fighting in the Palatinate found another sphere of action by taking service in the French Foreign Legion.¹

The report of Mr. Clive, which had such a cleansing effect in Palatinate affairs, has never been made public. But a telegraphic summary of it was read by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ronald McNeill, on January 21, 1924. The important parts of this summary report were:

Having spent five days hearing views of people of every class and from every part of the Palatinate I have come to general conclusions:

Overwhelming mass of population are opposed to Autonomous Government.

This Government could never have come into existence without French support and would immediately be driven out if French support were withdrawn.

On admission of Bley, nominal head of Government, 75 per cent. of Separatists came from outside the Palatinate. These unquestionably include large element of ex-criminals, men entirely inexperienced in government.

Among peasant and working class there is strong feeling of war weariness and desire for peace at any price.²

Gustav Stresemann was a man of forty-five years of age. In politics before and during the War he had been known as a National Liberal, and he had succeeded to the leadership of that party on the death of the veteran Ernst Bassermann in 1917. Under the name of the German People's Party the National Liberals aspired to take the part which they should have taken under the Empire, the part of keeping the politics of Germany

¹ *New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1924, p. 21.

² *Hansard*, 5th Series, Vol. CLXIX, pp. 485-6.

along moderate, constitutional lines. Herr Stresemann had a difficult task now, for the German State was almost in ruins. There was only one chance for the country. Germany must abandon the policy of passive resistance, that is, must surrender in the face of French action in the Ruhr. A few weeks were required to prepare the public mind for this; and a week or two more were required for negotiating with the French. M. Poincaré would hear of no terms. Conversations between Herr Stresemann and M. de Margerie, French Ambassador at Berlin, produced no results, and before the end of September there seemed to be an absolute deadlock. M. Poincaré was nearer winning than perhaps he knew. He refused to make the common mistake in diplomacy of giving way at the last moment just before success. *No compromise* was his watchword. Suddenly on September 26 the German Government commenced the cessation of passive resistance. In the last week the support of passive resisters in and out of the Ruhr had cost 3,500 trillions of marks. Yet the abandonment of passive resistance seemed like the last shock which would break the German political body into fragments. With one terrific effort Dr. Stresemann surmounted the final wave and brought his ship into port. On the day following the announcement of the cessation of passive resistance the German Government proclaimed martial law over the country. The Army remained, in spite of discontent in the Bavarian Division, true to the Government; the steel band held the country together. At the same time the old mark was left to its ruin, and by a piece of heroic finance, a new currency, the stable *rentenmark*, secured on the material assets of the German people, was issued. Thus President Ebert, Chancellor Stresemann, Finance Minister Luther, three strong men who "did not despair of the State," brought the country through the agony of the Ruhr.

On November 30 the Reparation Commission at its meeting took the modest but momentous step of setting up two committees of experts, "one to be charged with the inquiry into the means of balancing the Budget and the measures to be taken to stabilise the currency, the other to consider the means of estimating the value of capital which has escaped from Germany and of bringing about its return."

CHAPTER XXV

THE DAWES REPORT

The idea of the holding of expert committees seems to have originated with Mr. Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States, in 1922. On December 29 of that year, speaking before the American Historical Society at New Haven, he suggested an independent commission of "men of the highest authority in finance in their respective countries," to be called to advise on the question of European war reparations.¹ The setting up of expert committees was the very thing which Lord Curzon had suggested in his celebrated and unfortunate Note of August 11, and which M. Poincaré had summarily, and in slightly contemptuous language, rejected. If M. Poincaré had still wished to prevent the establishment of a committee to investigate Germany's capacity to pay, he could have done so, because, through the casting vote of the French chairman, he controlled the Reparation Commission. Clearly, now that he had won his victory in the Ruhr by inflexibility of will, M. Poincaré was ready to be accommodating. Thus Lord Curzon, ere he left the Foreign Office for ever, was able to see his policy beginning to succeed. The fruits were left for Mr. Ramsay Macdonald to gather in.

By the end of November the Stresemann Government had fallen in Germany, and a new Chancellor, the Centre Catholic Herr Marx, was in office, with, however, the indispensable Herr Stresemann as Minister of Foreign Affairs. On December 5 M. Poincaré, for the first time since the Ruhr Occupation began, received the representative of Germany in Paris, Herr von Hösch, Chargé d' Affaires.

The First Committee of Experts set up by the Reparation Commission, to inquire into the means of balancing the German Budget and stabilising the currency, held its first session at Paris, at the Commission's headquarters, the Hôtel Astoria, on January

¹ *New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1922, pp. 1, 2.

14, 1924. It consisted of General C. G. Dawes and Mr. O. D. Young of the United States, Sir R. M. Kindersley and Sir J. Stamp of Great Britain, M. Parmentier and M. Allix of France, Dr. A. Pirelli and Professor F. Flora of Italy, Baron M. Houtart and M. E. Franqui of Belgium. At this opening meeting, General Dawes spoke of the difficulties which obstruct the passage of common sense in the politics of the world. This resistance to common sense astonishes the plain citizen:

He does not first realise the barriers which must first be beaten down, erected by national pride and the pride and selfish interest of different allied officials whose powers are affected by any act of coercive inter-allied co-ordination, and by the incessant misrepresentations and intolerable interjections of those foul and carrion-loving vultures, the nationalist demagogues of all countries, who would exploit their pitiful personalities out of a common misfortune.

General Dawes then pointed out how all military authorities believed in the need of united command, yet it took four years of unsuccessful war to induce the Allied Governments to establish a unified command. What brought about the complete allied co-operation in time of war? "Nothing but an overwhelming emergency." A common plan for reparations, and the infusion of common sense in the agreement, was what General Dawes outlined as the object of Committee Number I. The French public were disappointed that he had not alluded to the justice of France's claims. As France was acknowledged "to hold the key to the situation," obviously French goodwill was as necessary as the skill and common sense of the Experts' Committees. The ultimate success of the Committees was therefore as much to the credit of French reasonableness as to that of the Experts.

Committee Number 2, charged with the task of estimating the value of capital escaped from Germany and of bringing about its return, held its first meeting at Paris in the Hôtel Astoria on January 21. Its members were Mr. H. M. Robinson of the United States, Mr. R. McKenna of Great Britain, M. Laurent-Atthalin of France, Dr. M. Albert of Italy, and M. A. E. Janssen of Belgium. Mr. McKenna, the Chairman, promised that the problem before the Committee would be examined in a business-like spirit, and that the results would be declared with courage. The presence of American citizens on the Committees was noted and welcomed. The Americans came only in their private capacity, but it was well

known that the State Department approved of their accepting membership. Nevertheless their freedom and detachment were complete: they paid their own expenses.¹

For the next two or three months there was a lull in the diplomacy of Reparations. The French were still in the Ruhr but the occupation was being made, so far as possible, invisible. The cost of the occupation, which had been about £1,000,000 a month,² decreased, and receipts from coal deliveries and coal-tax increased. The Entente became again cordial. Nevertheless in the United States there was talk—incredible as it may seem—of a probable war between Great Britain and France.³ However, on his way back from a brief holiday at Aix-les-Bains Mr. Baldwin, then still Prime Minister, paid a visit to M. Poincaré at Paris on September 19, 1923. The two statesmen found a simple formula for renewing the Entente.

It was not to be expected [so ran the communiqué issued on the same afternoon] that in course of the meeting MM. Poincaré and Baldwin were able to settle upon any definite solution. But they were happy to establish a common agreement of views and to discover that on no question is there any difference of purpose or divergence of principle which could impair the co-operation of the two countries, upon which depends so much the settlement and peace of the world.

It really required, however, more than a communiqué to establish the Entente. What did make this possible was the victory of M. Poincaré with the cessation of passive resistance in the Ruhr. When Mr. Macdonald became Prime Minister he seized the occasion afforded by the improving atmosphere to hold out a cordial hand to M. Poincaré. On January 26 (1924), four days after he became Prime Minister, Mr. Macdonald sent a kind and frank letter. M. Poincaré's reply, dated January 28, was equally kind and frank. One paragraph was deeply significant:

If we have to take into account public opinion in our respective countries, if we have both to safeguard our national interests, I am confident that in applying, each in his own sphere, the vigorous action and goodwill of which you speak, to the settlement of problems arising between us, we shall solve them in such a manner as to maintain between Great Britain and France the policy of co-operation essential to our two countries and to the tranquillity of the world.

On February 21 Mr. Macdonald tried to carry the Entente one

¹ *New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1924.

² *Times*, Nov. 27, 1923.

³ *New York Times*, Aug. 14, 1923, p. 2.

stage further into the domain of cordiality by explaining to M. Poincaré the various items or supposed items of French policy to which the British public objected.

Mr. Macdonald appeared to be of opinion that the problem of "security" lay at the root of the trouble: but security "is not merely a French problem, it is a European problem." He suggested that something might be done towards solving this problem by local demilitarisation or the creation of neutral bands of territory between certain States. In order to deal with the Reparations problem which (along with that of inter-Allied debts) Mr. Macdonald thought capable of solution, the reports of the Experts' Committees must be awaited.

M. Poincaré in answer denied specifically that France aimed at continental supremacy, or that apart from Alsace she had ever claimed the Rhine as a frontier. The reply was conciliatory and was a perfectly satisfactory expression of sound sentiments. But it is doubtful if this exchange of letters between the Premiers did anything to improve the Entente.

The reports of the Committees of Experts, Number 1, the Dawes Committee, and Number 2, the McKenna Committee, were submitted to the Reparation Commission on April 9 (1924) and were made public on the same day. In a covering letter sent along with the report of Committee Number 1, General Dawes stated that the plan contained in it was based "upon those principles of justice, fairness and mutual interest in the supremacy of which not only the creditors of Germany and Germany itself but the world also have a vital and enduring concern." The simple rule which the Committee had adopted in framing its plan was that:

Since, as a result of the war, the creditors of Germany are paying taxes to the limit of their capacity, so also must Germany be encouraged to pay taxes from year to year to the limit of her capacity.

The specific object of Committee Number 1 was to show means by which Germany could balance her Budget and stabilise her currency. It found that the first condition of this was the restoration of "the fiscal and economic unity of the Reich." This meant that all the customs-barriers between Occupied and Unoccupied Germany must be suppressed, the French railway *Régie* must be abolished, and no taxes levied except those which went into the German exchequer. On the hypothesis of complete fiscal and economic unity (wrote the Committee) "our whole report is based."

The task of the Committee would have been hopeless "if the present situation in Germany accurately reflected her potential capacity." But in fact Germany, with her growing and industrious population, her technical skill, her solid basis of highly developed agriculture, her material resources of water, wood and minerals, had all the factors necessary for a prosperous future. Moreover, in the period since the War, the country had been "improving its plant equipment." Means of communication by telephone, telegraph, canal and railway had all been bettered. Expense had not been spared. "Lastly, the industrialists have been enabled further to increase the entirely modern plants which now are adapted in many industries to produce a far greater output than before the War." The only thing which Germany really lacked at the moment was credit: and the Dawes Committee had a scheme for meeting this difficulty. "Without undue optimism it may be anticipated that Germany's productions will enable her to satisfy her own requirements and to raise the amounts contemplated in this plan for reparation obligations."

The first thing which the Committee took up was the question of stabilisation of currency. By means of the Rentenmark stabilisation had been attained for a few months, "but on a basis which in the absence of other measures can only be temporary." The Committee now proposed that all the many kinds of paper-money in circulation in Germany should be gradually withdrawn, and that a new bank of issue (or else the Reichsbank reorganised) should be established with the sole¹ right of issuing notes. The new issue was to be covered by a legal reserve of 33½ per cent. Thus currency would become stable (on the assumption also that the budget would be balanced)—a great benefit to the whole community. Although some people might benefit from "the amazing overturn of fortunes which inflation brings...", for the working classes instability is wholly evil; it has no compensation whatever."

After currency, the report turned to the question of the budget; in order that it should be balanced, "the budget requires certain relief from immediate charges for treaty purposes which, while securing the budgetary position, will not imply the cessation of the payments indispensable to the Allies in the form of deliveries in kind."

In considering how much Germany could pay for reparations,

¹Except the limited issues of certain State banks.

the Committee held that two principles must be recognised as basic. One is that the German Government's internal expenditure must be cut down to the minimum.

The second principle was that while the creditors of Germany should share in any increase in that country's prosperity, there should not be an undefined liability.

Finally, the Committee recommended with reference to means of payment that the burden to be laid upon the German taxpayer should be commensurate with that borne by the Allied taxpayer; that the excess of revenue over minimum necessary internal expenditure should be credited to the Allies' account in gold marks; and that those marks should be converted into foreign currencies from time to time "according to the actual capacity of the exchange position" at the moment. Thus two problems were kept separate in the Committee's plan: firstly, the problem of raising the utmost possible amount of money in Germany for the payment of reparations; secondly, the problem of transferring the value of this money, in cash, goods or services, to the Allied countries.

Bearing all these principles in mind, the Committee proposed that Germany should make payment from three sources: (1) from her ordinary budget; (2) from railway bonds and transport tax; (3) from industrial debentures.

With regard to the first point, the Committee believed that if temporary relief were given from treaty payments the German budget would be balanced for the year 1924-25 "by a vigorous internal effort" and without any recourse to a loan. The budget for 1925-26 might yield a small surplus, but the Committee recommended still that it should not be compelled to bear any treaty payments. These could therefore begin (so far as they were to be borne by the budget) in the third year, 1926-27. The payments to be provided for in the budgets would be as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1926-27 | 110,000,000 gold marks. |
| 1927-28 | 500,000,000 " " |
| 1928-29 and following years | 1,250,000,000 " " |

Thus the sum of 1,250,000,000 gold marks is to be the standard payment from ordinary budget resources during the period for which reparations are to be paid.

Secondly, the Committee took up the question of the railways which, since the Armistice, had been operating at a constantly increasing loss.

The German railway administration cannot but plead guilty to two serious charges. In the first place, as is proved by the reduction which it is now possible to make, they have been enormously overstaffed, even when all account is taken of the introduction of an eight-hour day and of peace treaty charges justifying temporary disorganisation. In the second place the administration has indulged in extravagant capital expenditure for which the official excuse is that construction was largely undertaken to ward off unemployment.

The Committee believed that the railways could provide a large surplus over operating expenses for payment of reparations. The railway experts whom the Committee consulted came reluctantly to the conclusion that this could only be secured if the operation of the railways was removed from Government control. "The whole spirit of Government's ownership in the past has been directed to running the railways primarily in the interest of German industry, and only secondarily as a revenue-producing concern, and in their opinion a complete break with old traditions is essential."

The proposals of the Committee were that the railways should be operated as a corporation independently of the German Government. The capital value of the railways was considered to be 26 milliards of gold marks. Of this, 11 milliards were to be represented by first mortgage bonds bearing 5 per cent. interest and 1 per cent. for sinking fund. These bonds would be issued to the Allies, and the interest would count as part-payment of reparations. In a normal year the interest and sinking fund charges would amount to 660,000,000 gold marks, but during the years 1924-25, 1925-26, and 1926-27, smaller payments would be accepted.¹

In addition to the 11 milliards of bonds the railway corporation was to have a capital of 2 milliards of preference shares and 13 milliards of common stock (making a total capital of 26 milliards). Of the 2 milliards of preference shares, 1½ milliards were to be sold to private persons in order to provide for future expenditure on the railways; the German Government was to hold the remaining ½ milliard of preference shares and all the common stock.

The railway corporation was to be managed by a board of 18

¹ The sums recommended by the Dawes Committee were :

| | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| 1924-25 . . . | 330,000,000 | gold marks. |
| 1925-26 . . . | 463,000,000 | " " |
| 1926-27 . . . | 556,000,000 | " " |
| 1927-28 and thereafter | 660,000,000 | " " |

directors, of whom nine were to be chosen by the German Government and the private holders of preference shares; the other nine were to be named by the trustee of the bonds, and five of them might be German. It was therefore contemplated that Germany might have fourteen members on the board of nineteen. The chairman of the board and the general manager of the railways were always to be German.

Having dealt with the question of a budgetary and a railway contribution to reparation payments, the Committee next proposed an annual payment from German industry:

The Committee has been impressed with the fairness and desirability of requiring as a contribution to reparation payments from German industry a sum of not less than 5 milliards of gold marks, to be represented by first mortgage bonds bearing 5 per cent. interest and 1 per cent. sinking fund per annum. This amount of bonds is less than the total debt of industrial undertakings in Germany before the War. Such indebtedness has for the most part been discharged by nominal payments in depreciated currency, or practically extinguished.

In consideration of the fact that liquid capital had been much depleted in Germany, the Committee recommended that interest on these industrial bonds should be entirely waived for the first year, that during the second year it should be $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., during the third year 5 per cent.; thereafter 5 per cent. interest and 1 per cent. sinking fund should be paid.

If all these arrangements were carried into effect, the total payments to be made by Germany would in a standard year (i.e., after the fourth year) be 2,500,000,000 gold marks, or £125,000,000. In the first year only 1,000,000,000 marks (£50,000,000) from the proceeds of the foreign loan and from interest on railway bonds would be paid. This sum would be divisible among the Allies according to the proportions settled by the Spa Agreement.

All payments for the account of reparations were to be paid into the bank of issue (established to control the German currency) to the credit of the "Agent for reparation payments." This Agent was to be a co-ordinating official under the Reparation Commission. He was to be assisted by five persons skilled in matters relating to foreign exchange and finance, representing five of the Allied and Associated Powers. Together they were to form a committee which should control the transfer of cash to the Allies by the purchase of foreign exchange, and which should also

- regulate the programme for such parts of reparation payments as were to be made by deliveries in kind.

The Dawes Committee also recommended that, as security for the due payment of reparations, the taxes on customs, alcohol, tobacco, beer and sugar, should pass into the hands of an impartial controlling authority. The treaty payments should first be deducted by the controlling authority for the account of the Allies, and the balance in each year was to be handed over to Germany.

During the first year in which the Committee's scheme should be in operation, the Committee considered that a foreign loan of 800,000,000 gold marks would be necessary for Germany. The funds thus obtained were to be used for establishing the new bank of issue, for stabilising the currency, and for financing deliveries in kind and the costs in Germany of the Armies of Occupation, and in general such obligations to the Allies as do not necessitate the transfer of money abroad.

The plan of the Committee provided for a commissioner of the bank of issue, a commissioner of railways, a commissioner of controlled revenues, and an Agent-General for Reparation Payments. The last official should not merely receive payments on reparation account and arrange for their transfer to Allied countries, but he should also act as a co-ordinating official among the various commissioners and sub-commissioners and as an intermediary between the Reparation Commission and the commissioners. The Reparation Commission would retain all its former powers as the ultimate authority under the Treaty of Versailles. There was also to be a Trustee for the railway and industrial bonds. Both the Agent and the Trustee were to be appointed by the Reparation Commission. The expenses of the organisation set up under the Dawes plan, and the cost of the troops of occupation, were to be included within the prescribed annuities which Germany had to pay.

Altogether the payments which Germany would make under the Dawes plan in a standard year would represent a relief to Allied taxpayers of $2\frac{1}{2}$ milliards of gold marks (£125,000,000) *plus* such additional amount as the index of German prosperity might provide. On the other hand, to the German taxpayers they would be a burden of only one-half of this sum, the balance being provided by interest on the railway and industrial bonds. Such interest could not be itself considered as a new burden, as it represented only a charge of about 3 per cent. on the German pre-war

railway and industrial indebtedness, which indebtedness since the War had been wiped out in the depreciation of the mark. The Committee did not indeed pretend that it was making things easy for Germany, but it contended that it was making practicable and tolerable and capable of fairly speedy liquidation "a burden which is, and should be, onerous."¹ Nevertheless the sum which Germany would have to pay in reparations was only about half the sum which she would have had to pay internally on her war-debt, if the depreciation of the mark had not practically extinguished it.²

In ending his great work for the healing of the nations General Dawes, in the covering letter sent with the report to the Reparation Commission, commended his colleagues for their vision, independence of thought, and spirit of high and sincere purpose:

That their work, which I now place in your hands, may assist you in the discharge of your great responsibilities, is their prayer, and the knowledge hereafter that it has done so will be their full reward.³

Committee Number 2, of which Mr. McKenna was chairman, reported at the same time as the Dawes Committee. Its object was to estimate the amount of German capital placed abroad during "the flight from the mark," and the means for bringing it back.

German capital had been placed abroad and consequently foreign currency acquired by Germans since the Armistice mainly by the sale of paper marks to foreigners. With regard to this the Committee reported:

It is interesting to note that the foreign assets acquired in this way amounted to between seven and eight milliards of gold marks, the whole of which, in consequence of the final devaluation of the mark, was lost by more than one million foreigners who at one time or another were buyers of mark credits.

Some portion of these foreign assets had been spent since they were acquired by Germans; the Committee was of opinion that the total amount in German ownership abroad at the end of December, 1923, was 6½ milliards of gold marks. In addition

¹ *Report of First Committee of Experts*, Part I, § xiv.

² *Ibid.*, Part II, § ii. Meanwhile the Allies were paying 6 milliards (gold marks) on their own war-debts.

³ The Report has been frequently published. The official American copy, along with the *Report of Committee No. 2* (McKenna), was printed and issued by the Government Printing Office, Washington, 1924.

there was foreign currency inside Germany to the value of about 1 milliard 200 million gold marks.

As regards the second problem, that of bringing the exported capital back, the Committee was of opinion that there was only one means: that was "to eradicate the cause of the outward movement. Inflation must be permanently stopped." Once the mark was made stable, confidence and the needs of trade would bring the exported capital home.

The 6 or 7 milliards of foreign currency owned by Germans would appear to have formed a useful fund (if it could have been tapped) from which the German Government could recommence reparation payments. No resort, however, was made to this fund in the scheme which was subsequently adopted by the Allies and accepted by Germany according to the Dawes plan. Doubtless by the ordinary operations of foreign trade the foreign currency was brought back to Germany and contributed to the proper working of German economy on which the payment of reparations depended.

NOTE.—The Dawes Scheme recommended that Germany should pay, in addition to the fixed sums, a variable addition thereto dependent upon, a composite index figure. The years 1926-1929 inclusive are to be taken as the base; an increase in railway traffic, foreign trade, consumption of tobacco, etc., calculated on the basis of the average of those years, is to be reflected by a proportionate increase of the Dawes annuities, in such a way that Germany will retain her incentive to develop by retaining the major part of the increase.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON

M. Poincaré had always stated that France would only evacuate the Ruhr in proportion to the actual payments made by Germany. In point of fact, since the occupation of the Ruhr on January 11, 1923, Germany had paid nothing, in cash or kind, to either France or Belgium.¹ On June 1, 1924, however, M. Poincaré resigned from the premiership after his supporters had been to a large extent defeated at a general election. It is doubtful whether this defeat was due to a reaction of the French electorate against M. Poincaré's foreign policy² or to the apparently invincible dislike of the French to direct taxation; for M. Poincaré had at last called a halt to the policy of balancing the budget by means of loans, and had proposed an impressive increase in taxes, in addition to making retrenchments in administrative charges to the extent of 440,000,000 francs.

After the Premier, the President. M. Millerand had so clearly been in sympathy with the policy of M. Poincaré, that now, owing to the definite swing of public opinion against M. Poincaré, nobody would accept office so long as M. Millerand was President. One energetic man indeed, M. François-Marsal, took office and formed a Government for a few hours, but he could not obtain a vote of confidence. So, as M. Millerand could not remain President without a Government for the three years which remained unexpired of his presidential term, he resigned (June 11, 1924). On June 13, M. Gaston Doumergue was elected twelfth President of the French Republic. M. Doumergue was a "safe" man. He had held many posts, including that of Premier; he had been a Senator

¹ The German Government had continued to make up and dispatch the coal-delivery train to Italy down to Aug. 11, 1923.

² Mr. George Glasgow believes that it was (*Macdonald as Diplomatist* (1924), p. 77.).

since 1910; he had been, in a quiet way, connected with all important political affairs of the last fifteen years and had made no mistakes. His solid gifts were to be as useful to France in her times of crisis as were President Ebert's to Germany.

The Premier who took office with an assured majority on June 14 was M. Edouard Herriot, the leader of the Radical groups in the Chamber. M. Herriot, a man of literary and academic tastes, had been a Senator from 1913 to 1919, and had then resigned in order to become a member of the Chamber of Deputies. As Mayor of Lyons he had won a reputation for efficiency. "Personally, M. Herriot is inclined to corpulency, somewhat neglectful of his appearance, a pipe-smoker and a lover of good food and wine. He is a great reader and collector of books."¹

M. Herriot, on coming into office, had stated as part of his programme of policy that he accepted the plan of the Dawes Committee. As this was also the intention of the British Government, there was little difficulty in arranging for Franco-British co-operation. A visit of M. Herriot to England was arranged. He arrived at Victoria Railway Station on Saturday afternoon. From London M. Herriot went straight out by automobile to Chequers, the official country-house of the British Prime Minister, where Mr. Ramsay Macdonald met him (as French journalists wrote) *en tenue de sport*—knickerbockers and a golfing jacket. M. Herriot had brought similar garb of easy fit, which he wore next day when the two Premiers walked together in the grounds of Chequers, and smoked, sitting on the lawn. They had talked through the previous evening from ten o'clock to two in the morning. M. Herriot returned to London on Sunday afternoon, visited the tomb of the Unknown British Soldier, and crossed to Paris next morning.

The communiqué issued in London stated that the informal discussions at Chequers had revealed general agreement between the French and British Governments. It was decided, subject to the convenience of the other Allied Governments, that a conference should be held at London not later than the middle of July, and also that the two Prime Ministers should be present together at the opening of the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva.

The London Conference opened on July 16, 1924. Although the circumstances did not confidently promise success, yet it had three things greatly in its favour. In the first place it had a

¹ *New York Times*, June 15, 1924, p. 3.

thoroughly well-compacted plan—the Dawes Plan—to work upon. Secondly, it had not merely the presence but the very willing and cordial co-operation of representatives of the United States. Thirdly, it had to consider one thing only; the other two questions—Security and inter-Allied Debts—which had so frequently entered into Conferences and obstructed them, were to be deferred to future meetings.

The Conference was held at the Foreign Office. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald was elected Chairman. In view of his strongly pacifist attitude during the War, his opening words of welcome to the “representatives of the nations that fought by our side while the War was raging” was a graceful expression of his acceptance of accomplished facts; as Prime Minister of Great Britain he acknowledged all the responsibilities of his country in the War and in the Peace. His remarks on post-war diplomatic controversies were equally sensible:

The after-war problems have been many and intricate, and it was in the nature of things that we could not always see eye to eye regarding them. But every time we have disagreed we have had fresh proof of the imperative necessity of unity if our victory is really to make Europe safe for either the large Powers or small nationalities.

The worst thing about Western international policy since the War was that it had not merely “failed to yield the expected reparations,” but had opened up “a grey prospect of threatening danger.” The favourable reception of the Dawes plan and the present meeting of the Allies had made an opportunity which must be seized “to create happier prospects.” One thing was essential: the report of the Dawes Committee, if adopted, must be taken as a whole: “we must not try to alter its details or we shall be back in the disagreements where we have been before.” Other subjects (Mr. Macdonald meant Security and inter-Allied Debts) must be rigidly kept out of the discussion: “the fatal habit of connecting one question with another has been much responsible for the failure to solve any of them in the past.”

The real problem, in a word, was: “Can our interest and our conceptions of political wisdom be co-ordinated into an agreement?” “I believe that they can,” asserted Mr. Macdonald. His living faith, his conciliatory method, his admirable power of hard work justified his belief.

The successes of the Conference of London were Mr. Macdonald

and Mr. Kellogg. The chief American representative, who was also Ambassador to the Court of St. James, had, as a Republican Senator, voted for the entry of the United States into the League of Nations.

The United States had been represented by "observers" at previous Conferences; but this was the first time that there was under consideration a plan which the Government of the United States cordially approved of, and was anxious to see made effective. Mr. Kellogg and his colleague, Colonel Logan, were not delegates or full members of the Conference, but their presence, as observers, this time implied more than merely onlooking. The Conference was "formally assured of the American Government's interest in seeing the Dawes plan put into effect."¹ In an interview which a "Dawes expert" (believed to be Mr. Owen D. Young) gave to the *Berliner Zeitung*, a statement was made that the loan to Germany, on which the success of the Dawes plan hinged, would be to a large extent subscribed in the United States.²

The work of this Conference, like so many others, was carried on in Committees more than in plenary sessions. The Great Powers were fully represented on the Committees, which numbered three (concerning Sanctions, the Fiscal and Economic Unity of Germany, and Transfer of Reparation-payments). The minor States—Greece, Portugal, Rumania and Yugoslavia—had altogether only two representatives on each Committee as compared with three or four for each of the Great Powers.

The great battle was fought in the First Committee, which was charged with investigation of the question of sanctions in case of wilful default by Germany. On the solution of this question depended the possibility of raising an inter-Allied loan for Germany; and on the raising of a loan the success of the whole Dawes plan depended. If the Reparation Commission, which by reason of the French chairman's casting-vote always adopted the French view, could declare Germany to be in wilful default, and if France, under Clause 18 of Annex II of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, could take separate action and enforce sanctions, then no investors would subscribe a penny for loan to Germany: for they would have no assurance that Germany would not be driven to the verge of ruin by another Ruhr occupation. M. Herriot had given his word to the French Chamber that at the London Confe-

¹ *New York Times*, July 18, 1924, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

rence the rights of France under the Treaty of Versailles would not be diminished. Accordingly no change could be made in the famous Clause 18 of Annex II, Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. France maintained the claim to a right of single-handed intervention which she had put forward when she invaded the Ruhr. Obviously then the really crucial point in putting the Dawes plan (including the international loan) into effect would be the Reparation Commission. If this body, which would still have the duty of declaring any default of Germany, should continue under control of France, investors from other nations would not care to risk their money in Germany. The condition of affairs in the Reparation Commission would, of course, have been quite different from this if the United States, as originally intended in the Treaty of Versailles, had appointed a delegate. Now there seemed no way out of the *impasse* until at the first meeting of the Committee of Sanctions Colonel Logan, Mr. Kellogg's colleague at the Conference was asked if the United States would allow a representative to sit on the Reparation Commission when a question of default had to be decided.

To the astonishment of M. de la Peretti de la Rocca, the chief French delegate on the Committee, he at once answered that his Government would have no objection to such a course. That announcement was one of the most dramatic incidents in the whole series of post-war Conferences.¹

In addition to the great gain of an American representative, the Committee on Sanctions was able also to agree that any German resources pledged to the service of the proposed loan should have absolute priority over "any resources that may arise as a result of the application of sanctions." It was also established that if there was default the interested Governments would confer together on the nature of the sanctions to be applied. Thus the prospect of isolated intervention of France under Clause 18 of Annex II was at any rate very greatly diminished.²

On the acceptance by the Conference of the sanctions article it is said that "consternation entered the German camp, the shock echoing through Wilhelmstrasse."³ Only the National Party was jubilant. They thought that it would make the Conference protocol unacceptable to the German people, and would enable

¹ Glasgow, *Macdonald as Diplomatist*, p. 157. ² *Le Temps*, July 19, 1924.

³ *New York Times*, July 20, 1924, p. 1.

them to upset Herr Marx's Government.¹ In London, however, the diplomatic atmosphere steadily improved. On July 19 the American Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, arrived to attend the meetings of the British and American Bar Associations. He insisted that his visit was purely personal and in no way official, but he went so far as to permit himself to say that "American sentiment is very strongly behind the Dawes report as it now stands."

On July 28 the Conference nearly came to grief because the British and American bankers, who would be responsible for issuing either the whole or the bulk of the international loan, were of opinion that Germany could not offer adequate security for the loan, if a decision of default and consequent sanctions were continually hanging over her. All the ingenious suggestions of M. Theunis, the Belgian Premier and delegate to the Conference, and all the wise words of Mr. Kellogg and Colonel Logan, were unable to solve this difficulty. In addition, M. Herriot's position at Paris was very unstable, but he courageously stuck to his work at London. On August 2 agreement was at last reached in a form that satisfied the legitimate scruples of the bankers. The new formula ensured that if the Reparation Commission, by a majority only, declared Germany to be in default, the minority could appeal to an Arbitral Commission. The Arbitral Commission was to be appointed for five years by the Reparation Commission itself, acting unanimously, or failing unanimity, by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. All was now ready for the reception of the representatives of the German Government who were invited to attend the Conference. The *Paris Temps*, in a sensible leading article, refused to take into account alarmist rumours from Berlin, and said that the political and economic situation of the *Reich* was sufficiently favourable to inspire in the German delegates neither discouragement nor nervousness.² The same thing might have been said of the situation in London.

Dr. Marx, Chancellor, Dr. Stresemann, Foreign Minister, and Dr. Luther, Finance Minister, arrived at London on the morning of August 5. They were the guests of the British Government at the Ritz Hotel. At midday the Conference assembled at the Foreign Office, with the German delegates present. Mr. Macdo-

¹ *New York Times*.

² *Le Temps*, Aug. 4, 1924.

nald made a courteous but firm speech to the Germans. "The sole business of the Conference," he said, "is to deal with matters arising out of the application of the Experts' Report, and to that I must as Chairman of the Conference confine its attention." When Dr. Marx made his reply it was observed with approval that he made no reference to the question of war-guilt. He is one of the few German statesmen who has been able to abstain from this subject even in the most delicate negotiations.

The French and Belgian Governments agreed that an amnesty should be declared for all "Ruhr" prisoners except those proved guilty of manslaughter or sabotage. As regards the question of military evacuation, and the employment of French and Belgian railway *personnel*, it was pointed out that these questions were not in the Dawes Report, and so did not come within the purview of the London Conference. They must be arranged by direct negotiation between Germany, on the one hand, and France and Belgium on the other. The Germans acquiesced. It is said that Mr. Hughes, United States Secretary of State, who had extended his private travels from London to Berlin, had so far departed from his habitual reserve as to inform the German leaders that the London Conference was their last chance.¹

On Saturday, August 9, there was a Cabinet crisis in France. M. Herriot had gone to Paris to meet his colleagues and to gain their assent, particularly that of General Nollet, the Minister of War, to the military evacuation of the Ruhr within twelve months. 'General Nollet's restraint, helped by the habitual moderation and gentleness of Marshal Foch, averted a ministerial crisis and the break-up of the London Conference to which it must have led.'² *La Conférence de Londres continue*, the *Temps* announced proudly.³

The German delegates still hoped to gain immediate military evacuation of the Ruhr, indeed it was asserted that the existing state of public opinion among the German people would not allow their delegates to make any concession on this point. There was always a chance, indeed a likelihood, that the nationalists might overthrow the Government of Herr Marx either peacefully in the Reichstag or by a *coup d'état*. It has been said that President Ebert personally intervened, warning parties in Germany that M. Harriot's Government in Paris would stand or fall on the

¹ *New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1924, p. 1.

² Glasgow, *Macdonald as Diplomatist*, p. 173. ³ *Le Temps*, Aug. 11, 1924.

question of a twelve-months period for evacuation. The fall of M. Herriot would mean the triumph of the French nationalists and the return of M. Poincaré.¹ This prospect, once they realised it, was apparently sufficient to make the German parties agree to let M. Herriot have his twelve-months period. M. Herriot, on his part, gave up the French demand to retain French *personnel* (the Belgians agreeing to withdraw theirs too) on the Rhineland railways. On these terms Herr Marx was able to sign the London Protocol and its Annexes on August 16.

"We are offering the first really negotiated agreement since the War," said Mr. Ramsay Macdonald at the final plenary sitting of the Conference. No praise is too high for the skill, the patience, the firmness and the tact with which the British Prime Minister had conducted the London negotiations. The Conference of London was the crown of his life, his title to undying fame; for that good work he had sacrificed many other interests, and had allowed the policy of his Government to slip into dangerous ways. But the London negotiations tower above all mistakes, and place him with the great peacemakers, the Congress statesmen who have builded Europe's structure since the close of the Middle Age.

The Agreements consisted of a Protocol and four Annexes. The Protocol enumerated the States represented at the London Conference—Belgium, the British Empire, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Germany, "accompanied by representatives of the Government of the United States of America with specifically limited powers." Representatives of the Reparation Commission were also present. There was no actual treaty, but the Protocol registered a binding agreement, equivalent to a treaty, to put the Experts' Plan into operation.

The Protocol concluded the most successful Conference since the War. The United States Ambassador, Mr. Kellogg, in one of the final speeches, declared his confidence that "the settlement of the reparations, the adjustment of national finances, and the rehabilitation of Germany, lay at the foundation of the future prosperity of Europe."² He emphasised one other feature of the Conference: "the recognition and furtherance of the principles of arbitration for settlement of international disputes."

¹ *New York Times*, Aug. 16, 1924, p. 3.

² *Proceedings of the London Reparations Conference, July and August, 1924* (Cmd. 2270 of 1924), pp. 97-8. This Parliamentary Paper contains the Final Protocol, Annexes and other documents.

CHAPTER XXVII

RUSSIA

No country can do without administrators and no country can do without international relations. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia dislocated the Tsarist Civil Service and destroyed Russia's intercourse with other States. These two things had to be re-established. The administrative system had not been wholly destroyed. Functionaries will always remain at their bureaus and transact their placid work, unless they are violently expelled. Thus, just as happened throughout the French Revolutions, there persisted throughout the Revolutionary months of 1918 and 1919 a mass of trained bureaucrats who carried on the business of their offices under the orders of those who had seized authority. The methods of transacting the routine of public affairs never changed, and the new ministers or "people's commissars" naturally adapted themselves to the existing technique of the offices. It was not merely the subordinate bureaucrats who remained at their desks; in every office some of those who were highly placed accommodated themselves to the new régime. Thus the organisation of, for instance, the Foreign office or War Office, under the Soviets, was not so different as might be expected from what it had been under the Tsar: the *personnel* was only partly renewed; the standard of efficiency was, however, greatly lowered through the introduction into the offices of unsuitable people who were given places for political reasons.

If the Foreign Office was soon reconstituted, international relations were not so easily resumed. The Soviet Government had declared the existence of class-war; it had proclaimed its sympathy with world-revolution; and it had repudiated all Russia's international engagements, political or financial. Obviously, it could not, so long as it entertained these views, enter into normal international relations. Yet it is nearly as hard for a State to live without international relations, as it is for an individual to live without

social relations. In practice, if not in principle, the Soviet Government gradually reconciled itself to the necessity of recognising the existing normal system of the other European States, and to conducting its affairs with them according to the received usages of international comity.

Before, however, Russia could enter into something approaching normal international relations it was obviously necessary that the civil war should stop, more especially as foreign Governments were known to be supporting the anti-revolutionist forces in the civil war.

An effort was made at the Conference of Paris to bring all the Russian groups together. The anti-Bolshevik groups already had their representatives at Paris. Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was to invite representatives of the Soviet Government to come. It was considered, however, to be unsuitable that they should come to Paris. Prinkipo, a little island in the Sea of Marmora, was therefore selected as the place of meeting. The invitation was issued on January 22, 1919, and was transmitted by radio to Moscow. Every one who was at Paris at that time will remember the stir which the proposal made. But it came to nothing. The Soviet Government was prepared to attend the meeting, on condition that the Powers undertook "to refrain from interference in Russian internal affairs"¹; but the anti-Bolshevik groups were not willing, nor, in point of fact, was the French Government.

Soon afterwards, however, another star, of apparently brilliant promise, rose and fell. This was the mission of Mr. William C. Bullitt, a journalist who was in charge of the current information bureau of the American Peace Delegation. He was sent by Mr. Lansing to Russia on February 22, 1919, and stayed for one week.² Bullitt returned with an acceptance of the Allies' terms, undertaken on behalf of the Soviet Government by Tchitcherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Litvinov, assistant of Tchitcherin. The chief condition was recognition of the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire to Foreign States. There were also terms concerning amnesty for political offenders, and concerning right of transit to parts of the former Russian Empire. The undertaking concerning foreign debts was obviously the most important because it was by repudiating these contracts that the

¹ *History of the Peace Conference*, VI, 313.

² *The Bullitt Mission, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (New York, 1919).

Soviet Government had cut itself off from Europe, and from all contractual relations.

The Soviet Government attached to its concessions the condition that they must be accepted by April 10. When Mr. Bullitt returned to Paris he was at first received with encouragement both by Mr. Lloyd George and Colonel House, but soon indifference appeared, and finally the Soviet terms were allowed to lapse. Mr. Bullitt ascribed this result to the fact that the forces of the Omsk Government, under Admiral Koltchak, had suddenly made an advance of one hundred miles; peasants had revolted against the Soviet, and the doom of the Bolsheviks seemed imminent.

The Soviet adjusted its diplomatic relations with its Oriental neighbours, with Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and with China, without much difficulty. To Turkey the Soviet ceded Kars and Ardahan, although it retained Batoum; and it agreed to the suppression of the Capitulations. The Chinese were pleased by the Soviet's consent to the abolition of Russian extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. A vigorous Soviet propaganda was undertaken to popularise Communism in the Orient.

With countries of Western civilisation the Soviet made little headway, except in Germany, which negotiated the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. The United States Government would have nothing to do with a Government which refused to honour contracts, the basis of all civilised life. France was very nervous with regard to the possible social effect of recognising a Communist Government. Great Britain, however, which was suffering from severe post-war trade depression, was anxious at least to open up commerce with Russia.

Accordingly, on March 16, 1921, a Trade Agreement was concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government. In the Preamble the Soviet undertook to refrain "from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State of Afghanistan." By Article 1 of the Agreement both parties undertook "to remove all obstacles hitherto placed in the way of the resumption of trade between the United Kingdom and Russia."¹

¹ The Agreement was signed by Sir Robert Horne and L. Krassin. Text in *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 1207 of 1921.

The Agreement had disappointing results. It might declare obstacles to trade to be abolished, but it could not remove the greatest obstacle of all, namely that all Russian foreign trade, import or export, had to be carried on through the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Trade. The British Government also complained that anti-British Communist propaganda was not stopped among the peoples of the East.

The British and Soviet Governments found their intercourse to be all the more difficult because the ordinary civilities of diplomatic language were not maintained by the Soviet. In 1923 the British Government presented (March 30, 1923), in perfectly moderate language, an appeal to the Soviet Government to remit the sentence of death passed upon Monseigneur Butkevitch, Vicar-General of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia. Such interventions have taken place on several occasions between civilised countries, and are not considered to be outside the limits of international comity.

The reply of the Soviet Government was a note, signed "G. Weinstein" (March 31, 1923), in which the appeal of Great Britain was stated to be "an unfriendly act and a renewal of the intervention which has been successfully repulsed by the Russian people." M. Weinstein also felt it "necessary to mention" that a message on the same subject had been received from the Irish Republic, referring to "the hypocritical intervention of the British Government, which is responsible for the assassination in cold blood of political prisoners in Ireland, where 14,000 men, women and young girls are treated in a barbarous and inhuman fashion in conformity with the will of Great Britain, while British control over cables prevents the civilised world from learning the horrible details of these atrocities."

M. Weinstein's concluding paragraph was :

If similar facts which have taken place under British rule in India and Egypt are taken into consideration, it is hardly possible to regard an appeal in the name of humanity and sacredness of life as very convincing.

The British representative at Moscow, Mr. R. M. Hodgson, replied next day (April 1, 1923) : "I am sorry to say that I cannot accept the note of the 31st March, bearing your signature, in its present form." M. Weinstein answered with another note :

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs regrets that you do not

find it possible to transmit to your Government the note handed to you but intended for it and that, consequently, it only remains for it to find other means for acquainting the British Government with its contents.

The Soviet Government thereupon published the correspondence.

This persistence in the manner of insult induced Lord Curzon to compose a Memorandum (May 2, 1923) which Mr. Hodgson was instructed to read to M. Tchitcherin, M. Litvinov or M. Karakhan (that is, to the chief Commissaries). The Memorandum described, in the ample and convincing style of which Lord Curzon was a perfect master, the different ways in which the Soviet Government had in the last two years broken the Trade Agreement, with regard to anti-British propaganda and to outrages on British subjects. As the Weinstein notes, said Lord Curzon, were only the latest incident "in a long series of studied affronts," His Majesty's Government felt constrained to demand (1) the repudiation of the acts and agents of anti-British propaganda; (2) compensation for British subjects and ships unlawfully treated; (3) "the unequivocal withdrawal of the two communications signed by M. Weinstein." His Majesty's Government, "having no desire or intention to enter into a prolonged and possibly acrimonious controversy," gave notice that these demands must be accepted within ten days, otherwise the Trade Agreement would be at an end.¹

Actually the time of the ultimatum was extended as some intricate points arose regarding the three-mile limit for trawlers and also regarding officials guilty of anti-British propaganda. Finally, however, in a note of June 9 (1923) the Soviet Government acceded to the British demands. M. Weinstein disappeared from the diplomatic scene along with his famous notes. In the later stages of the controversy the Soviet dispatches had been ably written and were couched in clear, conciliatory and diplomatic language.²

Soviet Russia at this time was nominally in a state of war with Great Britain, France and Italy: that is to say, no definite treaty of peace had been made between these Powers and Russia, nor had they recognised the Soviet as the *de jure* Russian Government.

¹ The Weinstein Notes and the Curzon Memorandum are in *Parliamentary Papers* 1869 of 1923, (Russia No. 2).

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1890 of 1923 (Russia No. 4).

Perhaps a definite treaty of peace was not necessary, as hostilities had ceased, and, as a matter of fact, no state of war with Russia had been declared. Recognition of the Soviet Government by the Western Powers would put an end to this anomalous condition of international relations. The Soviet had itself taken steps to regularise its position. In 1921, when Russia was afflicted with famine (caused largely by the Communist policy of confiscation and opposition to private enterprise), the Soviet had established the New Economic Policy : that is, it " re-established private trade, the private ownership of small undertakings, and the right of concession and lease with regard to large ones."¹ About the same time the Soviet also announced : " The Russian Government declares itself ready to recognise the obligations towards other States and their citizens which arise from State loans concluded by the Tsarist Government before 1914, with the express proviso that there shall be special conditions and facilities which will enable it to carry out this undertaking." This declaration was made on October 29, 1921.²

On February 1, 1924, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in the Labour Government which was in power in that year, dispatched by telegraph to Moscow a note recognising the U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) as " the *de jure* rulers of those territories of the old Russian Empire which acknowledge their authority." In the same note the British Government invited the U.S.S.R. to send a delegate to London to draw up the preliminary basis of a complete treaty. This invitation being accepted, a Conference was opened on April 14, 1924, at London.

The London negotiations were conducted chiefly by Mr. Arthur Ponsonby, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and M. Christian Rakovski, Member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. After very long and distracted negotiations, and after much intervention by Labour Members of Parliament, two draft treaties (a General and a Commercial Treaty) were at last signed on August 8 (1924), subject, however, to ratification.

These treaties, which never came into operation, were remarkable

¹ Note of M. Tchitcherine to Lord Curzon, Oct. 29, 1921, in *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 1546 of 1921 (Russia No. 3).

² *Ibid.*

in diplomatic history. It is impossible to avoid the contention that Mr. Macdonald, who had proved himself to be a most careful and orthodox, and also brilliant guardian of his country's foreign relations in every other respect, and whose hands were fully occupied with the great London Conference on German Reparations, deliberately left the conduct of the Russian negotiation to the doctrinaire section of his Ministry. The result was a fantastic treaty of which Mr. Macdonald was not the author, although his name appears as the first plenipotentiary before that of Mr. Arthur Ponsonby. But even allowing for Mr. Macdonald's absence the form and the terms of the treaty are still inexplicable. Officials of the Foreign Office must be supposed to have been taken by Mr. Ponsonby into partnership in the making of it. If they were so taken into partnership, it is hard to see how the draft treaty could pass through their hands and issue in the form in which it was finally printed.

The General Treaty, to begin with, had a most unusual preamble : " Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the one hand, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the other hand." The title of the King was omitted as a concession, presumably, to Soviet feelings. The Prime Minister, Mr. Macdonald, stated later that the King was omitted in the preamble because this was the regular form in treaties with a Government which had no single head. Mr. Macdonald must have been misinformed. The treaty-making power of the United States does not lie with a single head but with the President and Senate. Nevertheless, British-American treaties have preambles beginning : " His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America."

The second curious point was that while the Soviet Government recognised the claims of British holders of Imperial and Municipal Russian loans, the British Government also admitted that the Soviet had counter-claims on the ground of British intervention in Russia during the War after the Bolshevik Revolution. This amounted to an admission by the British Government of " indirect claims " which might be of almost infinite extent. It is well known that Bolshevik calculations made out a bill for war-costs which more than balanced the sums payable by them for the Imperial loans which they had repudiated.

In any case the money to be handed over to British fund holders

would only come out of another British loan to Russia which, by Article 12 of the draft treaty, the Government agreed to recommend Parliament to guarantee.

The Draft Commercial Treaty also had its lurking dangers. Article I stated that "taking into account that the monopoly of foreign trade in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics belongs to the Government," the members of the Russian Trade Delegation were to be counted as members of the Union Embassy, and were to enjoy full diplomatic privileges and immunities. There would be equally good reason for according diplomatic immunity to the officials of the Swiss Federal Railways in London.

Article 19 recognised the right of the Soviet Government to reserve the whole of its coastal trade to Russian ships. As no geographical limitation was specified, the treaty apparently would enable the Soviet Government to prevent a British ship from trading between Archangel and Batoum, both being Russian coastal ports, although all the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea lay between.¹

After the publication of the Draft Treaties in August, 1924, public opinion steadily hardened against them. Both the Liberal and the Conservative Parties, which, if they acted together, would have a majority in Parliament, were against it. On October 9, 1924, Parliament was dissolved. A general election was to be held on October 29.

After the Conservative Party had been returned to Parliament with a large majority, the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. A. Chamberlain, intimated, in a Note of November 21, 1924, that the British Government found themselves unable to recommend the Russian treaties to Parliament.

Besides Great Britain, Italy also recognised the Soviet Government in the year 1924, as did likewise France, the Scandinavian States, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Greece.²

¹ The texts of the General and Commercial Treaties are in *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 2215 and 2216 of 1924.

² See Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, pp. 260-1.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE REVIVAL OF TURKEY

By signing the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918) the Turks placed themselves at the disposal of the Allies. The forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus were surrendered into the hands of Allied troops; the whole Turkish army, except such forces as were required for the surveillance of frontiers and the maintenance of internal order, was to be demobilised. After the Armistice had been signed Allied warships passed the Dardanelles and anchored off Constantinople.¹

It was generally taken for granted in Allied official circles that the Turkish Government would have to leave Constantinople. Mr. Lloyd George's famous statement (January 5, 1918)—“nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace”—was in the nature of an offer, conditional upon Turkey ceasing to fight there and then against the Allies. By persisting in the War until October, 1918, the Turks had forfeited any claim to that pledge. The difficulty was to find an occupier whom all the Allies would trust. Great Britain would doubtless have proved an honest occupier, but it was out of the question to expect the other Allies even to think of such a solution. The Bolshevik Government of Russia disclaimed all pretensions to benefit by Tsarist treaties, and would not have accepted Constantinople, nor did the Allies have any intention of offering it to them. The Agreement of March, 1915, by which Constantinople was promised to Russia, still held good. The Allies still believed that the Bolshevik Government might fall, and that a restored Russian “bourgeois” Government would be able to claim fulfilment of the pledge of 1915. If this did not take place, perhaps the United States, which was universally trusted,

¹ The city itself was not occupied by Allied Troops until March 16, 1920. See Grinnel Mears, *Modern Turkey* (1924), p. 631; Select Document No. 19.

could be persuaded to accept a "mandate" for Constantinople. "We cannot settle Turkey till we know what the United States is going to do," Mr. Lloyd George stated at Sheffield on September 17, 1919. So time ran on.

The question of Constantinople, wrote M. Poincaré, has run a course simply of *tours, détours et retours*. M. Pichon, while Minister of Foreign Affairs, had prepared a "remarkable Memorandum" stating the reason which, in his view, should induce the Allies to leave the Sultan at Constantinople. Armed with this Memorandum, M. Clemenceau went to London and, in conference with Mr. Lloyd George, maintained this proposal with vigour and brilliance. Mr. Lloyd George, however, was definitely for expulsion. Anxious to be conciliatory and to meet the British point of view, M. Clemenceau came over to the side "of his ardent and subtle contradictor," and when he went back to Paris left behind him at London an eminent official of the Quai d'Orsay who was implacably opposed to the maintenance of Turkey in Europe. Arrived in Paris, M. Clemenceau, on further examination, went back to the conclusions of M. Pichon and supported "with rejuvenated vigour" the maintenance of the Sultan at Constantinople. As it turned out, Mr. Lloyd George had also been converted by certain advisers at home, and now in the House of Commons was supporting, "with the most brilliant argumentation," the opinion which M. Clemenceau had held in London and which he had persuaded M. Clemenceau, at any rate temporarily, to abandon.¹

Having decided that the Sultan should be left at Constantinople, and knowing now that the United States would not accept the mandate, the Allies could proceed to make the final peace with Turkey on comparatively simple lines. But the Turks, who have ears and eyes, knew that the Allies were not very solidly united on the Turkish Question, and so they began to prevaricate, in their time-honoured way, with a view to gaining valuable concessions. It may have been in order to check this movement that British marines were disembarked at Constantinople towards the end of February (1920), and that on March 16 General Milne, commanding the Allied Forces, formally occupied the Ministries of War and Marine and the Prefecture of the City.

The decision of the Allies to allow the Sultan to remain at Constantinople had been made public before the end of February, 1920.

¹ B. Poincaré, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, March 15, 1920, p. 478.

The long delays and changes of policy had given the Sultan's Government considerable advantage in the negotiations, nevertheless, at best, it could not hope for favourable terms. The Peace Treaty was at last signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920.¹

The revival of Turkey, exhausted, prostrate, nerveless as she was in 1920, is one of the marvels of history, a striking proof of the essential virility of the Turkish people and of the capacity of their statesman. This was Mustapha Kemal.

While the Sultan's ministers were feebly negotiating at Paris in 1919, and while the guns of the Allied warships were trained on Constantinople, Mustapha Kemal was at Erzeroum on the coast of the Black Sea.

This remarkable man is a Salonika Turk. He graduated from the Military School at Constantinople in 1900, two years after his great rival, Enver Pasha. Having distinguished himself in the Balkan Wars, he was given command of a division in the defence of Gallipoli, and made a great popular reputation. Towards the end of the War he was Turkish Commissioner with the Central Powers with his headquarters at Constantinople. He had advocated the negotiation of peace between Turkey and the Allies while there was yet time. Naturally, after the Armistice, his reputation grew at the expense of that of Enver, whose rashness and obstinacy had brought Turkey to the surrender at Mudros. Enver went off to adventures in the Caucasus and finally to death in some obscure revolution in Turkestan. Mustapha Kemal was appointed by the Grand Vizier, Ferid Pasha, to a mission in Anatolia. Against the advice of General Milne, commanding the Allied troops in Constantinople, Mustapha Kemal was sent to Asia Minor with a select staff of forty-two Turkish officers.² Thus while Enver was going eastwards to his death Mustapha Kemal went to gain an Empire. He now held the post or at least the title (for there can have been little to do) of Inspector-General of the Third Army. It was a moment when the fortunes of Turkey appeared to be at their lowest. The Greek Government and the Government of the Armenian State had, it seems, concluded an agreement for the partition of the territories of Turkey on the Black Sea.³ The Greek Army, in order to make good its claim to the Smyrna vilayet, had landed at Smyrna

¹ For terms of Treaty of Sèvres, see above, pp. 177-8.

² "Mustafa Kemal," by H. G. B., in the *Contemporary Reviews*, November, 1922, p. 590 ff.

³ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Feb., 1922, p. 551.

in May, and was occupying the country almost unresisted. This renewal of warfare on the mainland of Asia roused excitement and inflamed the minds of Mohammedans. Mustapha Kemal took advantage of this feeling to invite the religious and civil notables of Anatolia to meet in Congress. They met at Sivas, in September-October, 1919, and a long telegram was sent to the Sultan's Government at Constantinople. In this telegram (which was really an ultimatum) the Congress denounced the cession of any Turkish territory : it has become famous as the National Pact.¹

Failing to receive a favourable response to the telegram the Congress would be constrained to undertake the defence by its own means. No answer, or at least no satisfactory answer, was received. Mustapha Kemal then ordered that elections be held throughout the provinces of Eastern Asia Minor for deputies to be sent to a National Assembly. Turkish officers and soldiers supervised the elections. The Christians abstained from voting. The news of the landing of Allied troops at Constantinople and the proclamation of General Milne announcing the military occupation of the city further inflamed the patriotic feeling of the Anatolian Turks. It was in these circumstances that the Grand National Assembly was elected. It was opened on April 23, 1922, at Angora. This place was to become the capital of Turkey.

The first thing that the Grand National Assembly had to do was to form a Government. A Cabinet was therefore appointed with Mustapha Kemal at its head. The rift widened between Angora, free and independent among its barren hills, and Constantinople, protected or controlled by the bayonets of the Allies. Angora, naturally, already considered itself as at war with the Greeks in the Smyrna vilayet. Hostilities against the Greek army were organised. At first Mustapha Kemal made use of the existing bands of irregulars, and formed others ; gradually, behind these he built up a regular army, well officered and disciplined. Arms and munitions were purchased in Europe. The Angora Government appears never to have lacked funds ; and, apparently, Russia was not the only country on the Continent of Europe in which Angora's money could purchase munitions.

¹ The usual date given for the National Pact is January 28, 1920, when the lower chamber of a Parliament convened by the Sultan at Constantinople adopted it. The members of this Parliament afterwards for the most part went to Angora and joined the Nationalist party there.

Early in 1921 the Angora Government sent Bekir Sami Bey to the Conference of London, but no accord could be concluded which would correspond with the limits defined in the National Pact or in any way satisfy Angora (May, 1921). The Greek advance, although checked at Inn-Eunu, was maintained as a whole with great success throughout the first half of the year 1921, until the Sakaria River was reached. Here, about 200 miles from Angora, the Greek army was stopped. The Kemalist army made a good defence; the Greeks on their side, far from their base, were running short of munitions.

A Treaty of Alliance of March 16, 1921, was signed at Moscow between the Soviet Government and the Government of Angora.

Meanwhile life went on, not exactly tranquilly, but without serious interruptions at Angora. It is a poor little town, distinguished by one splendid remnant of the ancient Roman Empire, the *Monumentum Ancyranum* on which the Emperor Augustus inscribed the record of his reign. The sessions of the Grand National Assembly were often turbulent, clamorous, passionate. When the young General (Mustapha Kemal was only forty years of age) appeared in the chamber the clamour redoubled. Slightly built, neat, dapper, with clipped moustache and hair brushed carefully back, Mustapha Kemal looked just the typical Turkish officer of the School of Enver. But when he began to speak, the leader of men appeared. Beginning calmly, with a low-pitched voice, he gained the ear of the Assembly at once. Soon his voice would rise, his words would become more rapid, his passion would burst into expression, and then the whole Assembly would take fire and "acclaim the national hero."¹

The old Turkish functionaries accepted the Angora régime. Bureaus were organised, counterparts of the great offices of Constantinople: a Foreign Office, a Ministry of War, a Treasury, Public Debt Office, Tobacco *Régie*, an Ottoman Bank. The revenues of Asia Minor were collected and retained, and receipts for revenue collected were sent to the still nominally supreme Government at Constantinople. Foreigners entered the Angora service and gave technical assistance, especially in the military formations—Russian, Bulgarian and German officers. Recruits arrived daily from the interior; soldiers filled the streets. There was an air of ardour, hope, patriotism which reminded French observers of the history of Paris during the Convention.

¹ M. Pernot, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Feb. 1, 1922, p. 567.

The National Movement in Anatolia was now a thing which must be reckoned with. The French Government was the first of the Western Powers to make up its mind on this subject. The President of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, M. Franklin-Bouillon, was sent on a mission to Angora, and agreement was established by the Convention of October 20, 1921.¹ The British and French Governments had both, on August 13 (1921), declared their neutrality in the existing Greco-Turkish War; Great Britain, however, was as regards the Greeks benevolently neutral. France's neutrality was now to be benevolent in favour of the Turks. The Franklin-Bouillon Convention, however, as published, did not contain any promises of French support. It dealt wholly with the Turco-French frontier between Syria and Cilicia, and with questions arising out of this.²

The year 1922 brought an extraordinary access of fortune to Angora, and a stunning catastrophe to Greece: indeed the year has been called the most calamitous in the whole of modern Hellenic history.³ Several attempts were made by the Powers to settle by mediation the Greco-Turkish War, but these attempts all broke down over the question of the evacuation of Smyrna by the Greeks.

On July 29 the Greek Government took the last step which could possibly lead to a decision against Angora. It announced the intention of occupying Constantinople.

Twenty-five thousand Greek troops were actually landed at Rodosto, on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora. The Allies, however, who were in occupation of Constantinople, could not in fairness keep the Angora authorities out and let the Greeks in. Warned by the Allies that serious consequences would ensue from an effort to occupy Constantinople, the Greek Government desisted.

On August 26 (1922) the blow fell. A general attack of the Nationalist forces on the Greek lines was opened by Mustapha Kemal in the neighbourhood of Afum Karahissar. The battle gradually extended over a large area. Within a fortnight the Greeks, who had lost one strong post after another, fell into confusion. A general retreat was undertaken, which swiftly became a rout. An astounded Europe suddenly found that the Greek cause was

¹ France had already, by an Agreement of March 26, 1921, regulated her Syrian frontier with the Angora Government.

² Text in *L'Europe nouvelle*, Nov. 5, 1921.

³ *Annual Register*, 1922, p. 210.

irretrievably lost, and that victorious Turkish armies were sweeping the Greeks into the sea, while others were marching straight for the Demilitarised Zones on the shore opposite Constantinople.

The battle of Afium Karahissar was fatal to the aspirations for a Great Greece embracing all the territories where Greek speech was spoken. The Turkish forces entered Smyrna on September 9, driving in front of them thousands of Greek peasants as well as the fleeing remnants of the Greek army. A large part of the city was burned. Ships sent by the Allies as well as by the Greek Government took off the refugees. They were transported to Salonika and other ports, where vast camps of refuge were improvised. The Government of King Constantine could not stand against the loss of prestige caused by the terrible disaster of Afium Karahissar. A military rising or *pronunciamento* brought about his abdication (for the second time) on September 27. Two months later five of his ministers and the commander-in-chief of the army were tried and executed at the orders of a Revolutionary Committee.

Meanwhile the cloud of another war suddenly loomed over Europe. The victorious Turkish army entered Smyrna on September 9. A few days afterwards, elated by victory, believing (as is the way of Orientals after a success) that they were invincible, they approached the Neutral Zone in the neighbourhood of Chanak, opposite the Gallipoli Peninsula, occupied by Allied troops under the Treaty of Sèvres. The view of the British Government was that the freedom of the Straits must at all costs be preserved. On September 16 the *Times* was able to announce that accord on this point had been reached by Britain, France, and Italy. But the freedom of the Straits was construed by the British Government as implying that the neutrality of the Demilitarised Zones must be respected; that is to say, that the Turkish Army must not be allowed to come into them. The French and Italian Governments were not prepared to face the consequences if the Turks attempted to force these Zones.

On September 15 it was known that the Turkish troops were quite near to the Chanak Zone. If they chose to cross the line of the Zone and were resisted, that would be war. Could the statesmen of Europe ask their peoples, exhausted and shattered by the Great War of 1914-18, passively relying upon the hope that there would be no more war for at least a generation—could the statesmen of Europe ask them to enter into a new war in the Near East?

On the other hand, the revival of Turkish military strength, the stunning defeat and rout of the Greek armies, had lowered the prestige of Europe. The whole of Asia was seething with excitement. If the Turks challenged Europe and entered the Zones unopposed, this might start a new wave of insurrections; it might be the end of European influence in the Near East. A more immediate result might be a massacre of Christians at Constantinople. One hundred and twenty thousand were stated to have perished in the fire and general disorder which followed upon the entrance of the Turkish Army into Smyrna.¹

Mr. Lloyd George did not shrink before the awful alternatives offered to him. If the policy of Great Britain, as well as the other Allies, had been feeble and vacillating in the Near East since the Treaty of Sèvres, one Power at least was now to show decision. On September 16 a semi-official statement, emanating from Number 10, Downing Street, announced that Great Britain was "prepared to do her part in maintaining the freedom of the Straits and the existence of the Neutral Zones"; and that for this purpose the troops under British command there would be reinforced. The communiqué added: "The British Government . . . has given orders to the Mediterranean Fleet to oppose by every means any infraction of these Zones or any attempt on the part of the Turks to cross to the European shore."

There is no doubt that the British Government faced the prospect of war rather than see the Turks enter the Neutral Zones. It invited the Balkan States to take part in the defence, and issued a similar invitation to the British Dominions.

Neither the French nor the Italian Government was in favour of sending reinforcements to the threatened Zone. In fact, their policy of non-intervention was even more complete. On September 21 they withdrew their existing detachments from the Zones of Ismid and the Dardanelles. The British troops in Chanak were left alone.

A complete breach between the policies of France and Great Britain was prevented by the public-spirited action of Lord Curzon, who at the expense of his health made a rapid journey to Paris on September 19. The mission was successful in re-establishing accord with the French Government, in a common view that a

¹ *Times*, Sept. 16, 1922. This estimate was given on the authority of Mr. John Manola of the American Relief Committee.

Peace Conference must at once be held. Lord Curzon's action saved Franco-British relations at a very critical moment.

Meanwhile the British Government held inflexibly to its decision to maintain the inviolability of the Neutral Zones and of the Straits, by separate military action if need be. The Admiralty was confident that the navy alone could prevent the passage of the Kemalist army across the Dardanelles. But what would happen if the Kemalists, filled with the confidence given by victory over the Christians, entered the Zone of Chanak? There was only one British battalion there. Reinforcements were rapidly brought in, and wire entanglements were constructed. By the time that the French and Italian troops were withdrawn, the British hold upon the Chanak Zone was fairly secure. Four battalions of Guards were also ready to embark from England for the Near East. Nevertheless the situation remained terribly critical. On the evening of September 20 General Harington, British Commander-in-Chief in the Near East, issued from Constantinople a statement that "any attempt to violate the Neutral Zone will be resisted by all the naval and military forces available." The reply of Hamid Bey, Angora's representative in Constantinople, on receiving General Harington's communiqué, was that "the Nationalist Government did not desire war, but were resolved to pursue their beaten enemies into Thrace." General Harington promised to send Hamid's views to the British Government, but "as a soldier" warned him that entrance into the Neutral Zone would actually be resisted by force.¹

The French Government had had fairly good relations with the Nationalists ever since the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. Now, although they refused to take part in the defence of the Neutral Zones, they acted in concert with the British Government in counselling peace. Yet when on September 23 some Turkish cavalry entered the Chanak Zone one of those fateful occasions occurred when the issues of war or peace depend on the discipline and self-control of officers and men, strained almost beyond endurance by watching and waiting for the enemy. The snapping of a trigger from a sentry-post might have plunged the Near East into renewed battle.

Meantime Lord Curzon, who finished his mission and left Paris on September 24, had made an agreement with M. Poincaré, French Premier, and Count Sforza, Italian Ambassador, for the issue of a

¹ *Times*, Sept. 22, 1922, p. 10.

Joint Note inviting Greece and Turkey to a Peace Conference. The Note referred "with favour" to the Turkish claim to Thrace as far as the Maritza and Adrianople. The Turkish Government, however, was required, pending the conclusion of peace, not to send troops into "the Zone, the provisional neutrality of which has been proclaimed by the Allied Governments." The Allied Governments reaffirmed an assurance given in the previous March that they would withdraw their troops from Constantinople as soon as the Peace Treaty entered into force.¹

The Turkish troops which entered the Chanak Zone on September 23 withdrew on the 24th, but came back on the 25th. Each time they were met by cavalry patrols of the 3rd Hussars, although fighting was avoided. Every day added to the strength of the British positions, which were now held by about 10,000 seasoned troops. Kemal had about 70,000 men near the Zone; numerous as they were, they could not have stormed the British entrenchments.²

No praise can be too high for the way in which General Harington handled the situation. An observer reported: "He is cautious and cool, determined not to allow provocation, but equally determined not to be imposed upon. His presence in the Near East is felt to be the greatest local security for the avoidance of conflict."³

Another eminent soldier and statesman was fighting his battle in Turkish headquarters. Mustapha Kemal, like Bismarck after the battle of Sadowa, had to struggle with victorious generals breathing fire against their enemies. He had to weigh policy against glory, and to look into the future through the bewildering chances of war. His own personal wishes must have drawn him as strongly as his generals to accept the challenge of the British and to march for Chanak. He decided instead to meet the British general in peaceful discussion, and so won a greater victory than that of Afium Karahissar: he conquered himself, his generals, the fanatical Nationalists of Angora, and he won, without loss of another man or gun, a favourable and honourable peace.

The Armistice negotiations which Mustapha Kemal agreed to open were held at Mudania, on the southern shore of the Sea of Marmora, about half-way between Chanak and Ismid. The Confer-

¹ Text in *Times*, Sept. 25, p. 10.

² General F. Maurice in *Contemporary Review*, November, 1922, p. 560. General Maurice visited Chanak about this time.

³ *Times*, Sept. 29, 1922, p. 10.

ence, which began on October 3, was attended by Generals Harington, Charpy, and Mombelli; for Mustapha Kemal, by General Ismet Pasha; and by General Mazarakis for Greece. The Conference did not at first proceed very smoothly, as Ismet proved rather uncompromising. Moreover, the French and British Cabinets still did not see eye to eye on the Near Eastern Question. It required another rapid journey of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, and personal negotiations with M. Poincaré on October 7, before accord could again be reached. At last on October 11, in the quiet little Anatolian country-town of Mudania, where the local life had gone on undisturbed throughout the Conference, an Armistice was signed. New Neutral Zones were to be delimited and to be respected; Greek troops were to evacuate Thrace; and the Turks were not to cross thither, pending the settlement of a final peace. The preamble of the Armistice took note of the fact that the Allied Governments had decided to hand over Eastern Thrace and Adrianople to Turkey.

A few weeks after the signing of the Armistice and before the final Peace Conference opened, the Angora Grand National Assembly abolished the Sultanate and the Sublime Porte by resolution of November 2, 1922. The Sultan Mehmed VI escaped to Malta in a British battleship. Turkey became a Republic. The Caliphate was for the time being continued in the person of Abdul Mejid (son of a former Sultan Abdul Aziz), whom the Grand National Assembly elected to the office. On February 27, 1924, the Assembly likewise suppressed the Caliphate. It was out of sensitiveness regarding the Caliphate that the British India Office had opposed the plan for the expulsion of the Turkish Government from Constantinople at the Peace Conference of 1919. Yet it was perhaps scarcely worth while to be so careful of the Caliphate and of Mohammedan sentiment seeing that the Turks themselves could abolish the office without upsetting the Orient.

Thrones were tumbling in the Balkan area. About the same time as the historic Sultanate disappeared from Constantinople, a junior throne tottered at Athens. King Constantine could not survive the disaster to Afium Karahissar. He had abdicated the Greek throne on September 27 (1922).¹ His son George II as king reigned through the period of the Conference of Lausanne, but left his kingdom in December, 1923. Thus Greece too became a Republic.

¹ Constantine died at Palermo in the following January.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE

The Conference of Lausanne was opened by a speech of the President of the Swiss Confederation, at the Casino de Montbenon, Lausanne, on November 20, 1922. In this tactful address the President paid a tribute of honour to the soldiers of both sides "who, without hesitation, sacrificed themselves on the alter of their country." He alluded to "the two great religions to which the two adversaries of yesterday owe their faith, and from which their civilisation is nourished," and stated that they now met with the common aim of peace.

Lord Curzon expressed the hope that this would be "the last of the various Conferences that have been held during the last four years to conclude peace"; and he pointed out that it was the first of the Peace Conference to be held in Switzerland, "who sets an example to all Europe of a peace-loving and orderly community." Ismet Pasha, the chief Turkish Delegate, stated in his speech that Turkey, by "making superhuman sacrifices," had "conquered its place in civilised mankind with all those rights to existence and independence which are inherent in nations capable of a vigorous vitality."

The States represented at the Conference, besides Greece and Turkey, were Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

After the opening session, the meetings were held in the Hôtel du Château d'Ouchy. The languages officially used were French, English, and Italian. When the régime of the Straits was being discussed, representatives of Russia took part. The Presidency of the Conference was held in rotation by Great Britain, France, and Italy, who were the "inviting Powers." Ismet Pasha claimed that Turkey should be president by rotation; but Lord Curzon pointed out that the assumption of the presidency by the inviting

Powers "did not imply any intention of failing in courtesy towards the Turkish delegation. In point of fact the responsibility for the Conference rested on those Powers which had convoked it; that was why it belonged to them to direct the debates of the commissions." The Turkish Delegation was all through the Conference very sensitive concerning the dignity of Turkey and her equality with other Powers, and a great deal of time was spent in smoothing over the numerous small points of friction.

The method of the Conference was to work through commissions and sub-commissions. Plenary sessions were rare. The Delegation of the United States was present at all discussions "on a footing of entire equality with other Delegations," but it made a distinction between doing this and actually taking part in the negotiations; it did not sign any document and it did not enter into any engagement.¹

The Lausanne Conference falls into two distinct parts. The first lasted from November 20, 1922, to February 4, 1923; the second from April 24 to July 24. Of the first part of the Conference, which failed to arrive at a definite agreement, Lord Curzon was the hero. The intense labour, the moderation and conciliatory spirit, the tact, courtesy and knowledge of men, as well as the moving appeals which he made for agreement, show up the character of that great public servant at his best. In the second part, Sir Horace Rumbold, British Ambassador at Constantinople, was the chief presiding delegate; this time a definite conclusion was reached. Throughout the whole Conference Ismet Pasha was chief plenipotentiary for Turkey, M. Venizelos for Greece, and M. Tchitcherin for Russia.

On January 31, 1923, a draft treaty was presented to the Conference Powers. It proposed to fix the Turco-Greek frontier at the Maritza, but with a terminal railway-station (not Karagach, which was to remain to Greece) on the west side. The destination of Mosul was to be settled by the League of Nations. Provisions respecting non-Moslem minorities were to be under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The Capitulations concerning the special régime applicable to foreigners were to be abolished. The Straits were to be open to all ships of commerce and to a

¹ Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-23, in *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 1814 of 1923, p. 11; Child, *A Diplomatist looks at Europe* (1925), Chap. IV.

limited number of warships. About these terms, Lord Curzon justly remarked:

When we contrast the conditions of the former Treaty of Sèvres with those of the present instrument, I do not think any one will be found to complain of a lack of generosity or concession here. In fact we might be blamed for going too far. And this change has not been due simply to the fact that the Turks were victorious in the latest stages of the war with Greece, but to an increasing and sincere recognition of their own aspirations for national unity.¹

In spite of the generosity of the draft terms Ismet asked for eight days for reflection. As the terms had all been fully discussed already in conference, and as Ismet had had the draft treaty in his hands for three days before it was presented, Lord Curzon was disagreeably surprised by this request:

I cannot postpone my departure indefinitely nor remain here for eight days, but I will do my best to stay till the evening of the 3rd February or even the 4th February. By that time a full week will have elapsed since the treaty was laid before the Turkish Delegation. I am, like Ismet Pasha, a hard worker, and often sit up late at night. I shall be only too pleased to spend the whole time working, and to pass as much of it in Ismet's company as he likes. It will be strange if he is not able to define the views of the Turkish Delegation by the end of that period.²

Lord Curzon was hopeful of Ismet. "When I depart on February 4," he said, "I expect to have the pleasure of shaking him warmly by the hand and congratulating him on a common victory."

It is impossible to say whether the reluctance of the Turkish Government to sign the treaty as drafted came from its own spontaneous will, or on account of the attitude of Russia. M. Tchitcherin and his Delegation absolutely refused to have anything to do with that part of the treaty which related to the Straits.

"Nothing is more temperamental than a Conference. One day the world is saved; the next it is lost."³ The last and tragic scene of the first part of the Lausanne Conference took place on the afternoon of Sunday, February 4 (1921), in Lord Curzon's room in the Beau Rivage Hotel. The meeting began at 5.40 p.m. Matters came to this point, that Ismet was able to agree on the whole draft

¹ Cmd. 1814 of 1923, p. 430.

² *Parl. Papers*, Cmd. 1814 of 1923, p. 446.

³ Child, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

treaty as amended, with the exception of certain of the judicial and economic clauses. At this point the Conference was shipwrecked. One after another, Lord Curzon, M. Bompard, the Marquis Garroni, made the most moving appeals to Ismet not to ruin the treaty after so much had been gained. The assault upon the Turkish general must have been almost unbearable. The Russian Delegation had departed. Except for his own two assistants, Ismet had not a friend in the room. He was besought, on the ground of humanity, policy, justice, friendship, to append his signature. He remained immovable. The minutes sped away. After a last powerful speech, in which he depicted the horrors of renewed war—European war perhaps—Lord Curzon at 7.40 p.m. stated that his train was to leave at nine o'clock. Would Ismet not return in half an hour, after reflection, and sign the treaty? "At this point Ismet and Riza Nur rose and took their leave." They did not return. At nine o'clock Lord Curzon left Lausanne on the express.

Fortunately, the Conference was only interrupted. Although Lord Curzon had stated distinctly that the draft treaty, with the amendments offered on February 4, represented the limit of concessions, the French Government was showing a different attitude. In a Note communicated to the Turkish Delegation, and also to Rome and London, on January 31, the French Government showed that it did not regard the draft treaty as the Allies' last word.¹

It was fairly clear that though the French Government was willing to make further concessions to Turkey, it was not willing to go very far in this direction. Ismet, who was a very shrewd diplomatist, probably realised this. He went back to Angora but left a secretary at Lausanne. The nucleus of an Allied secretariat remained also. At Angora the National Assembly rejected the draft treaty, but at the same time authorised the continuance of negotiations. It sent a Note of 115 pages, couched in moderate language, proposing among other things, that the economic clauses be detached from the rest of the draft treaty and discussed separately. American opinion was that 115 pages of moderate language would bring appeasement.² The war cloud, which had loomed up again for a few days, blew over.

Lord Curzon at once took up the ideas contained in the Angora Note and invited the Allied Powers to meet in London. A brief

¹ *New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1923.

² *Ibid.*, March 12, 1923, p. 14.

conference, with M. Bompard and Marquis Garroni present, was held at the Foreign Office on March 21-28. Accord was reached between the Allies and a Note was dispatched to the Turkish Government. In this Note the Allies declined to separate the economic clauses from the rest of the treaty. On this understanding the Lausanne Conference resumed its sessions on April 24. This time Sir Horace Rumbold, British High Commissioner and Ambassador at Constantinople, was chief delegate for Great Britain and presided over the Conference. General Pellé, French High Commissioner at Constantinople, was the chief French delegate; Signor Montagna represented Italy; Ismet appeared for Turkey; M. Venizelos represented Greece. Mr. Grew, Minister to Switzerland, was the American representative.

The second part of the Conference of Lausanne was even longer than the first. Its tedious sessions appeared to be unending. Yet its general result was a foregone conclusion. The Turks and Allies, having come back to Lausanne in a spirit of accord, could scarcely fail to sign. Yet a vast amount of detail, chiefly economic and judicial, had to be gone over again. A Soviet Delegation, headed by M. Vorovsky (Soviet representative in Rome), came to express its views on the Straits Convention. On May 11 a most unfortunate incident occurred. M. Vorovsky, while sitting at dinner in the Hotel Cecil where he was staying, was shot dead by a Swiss citizen who had served in the Russian army. The Soviet Government protested that the Swiss Government had not afforded adequate protection to Vorovsky. This charge appears to have been quite unfounded. The Soviet Government remained in strained relations with Switzerland for the next two years.

The economic, financial and legal difficulties between Turkey and the Allies could be adjusted. The question of Mosul, which was already before the League of Nations, could be deferred. The real stumbling-block appeared to be Karagach, the railway-station of Adrianople on the line to Dedeagach and Constantinople. Karagach, although it is the station of Adrianople, is on the other (west) side of the Maritza. The Greek Government was, naturally, anxious to retain it, and was ready to fight over the question. Premier Pangalos, the "dictator" of Greece, had an army on the Armistice-line of the Maritza and was prepared to cross towards Constantinople.¹ M. Venizelos worked to prevent this contingency, and

¹ *Times*, Oct. 10, 1925.

finally agreed that the Turks should have Karagach. Thus "once more a war that was 'inevitable' in the morning has blown over by nightfall."¹ It was believed that everybody was now ready to sign peace. Two more months, however, were still required. As late as June 22 opinion in well-informed circles in Paris was that the financial clauses still proved an insuperable stumbling-block: there appeared "no issue"—except further concession by the Allies.² At last enough was yielded, and by July 24 Ismet was ready to sign. The Treaty of Lausanne is his treaty.

The signatures were affixed to the various documents in the Palais de Rumine, a hall of the University of Lausanne. The President of the Swiss Confederation opened the meeting, and praised the work of the Conference, long-drawn-out as it was, which had come to an end. The news was greeted with enthusiasm at Constantinople.

As signed on July 24, 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was substantially the same as that rejected by Ismet Pasha on February 4. Turkey gained Karagach and a railway-station on the right (west) side of the Maritza. She had been promised a railway-station but not Karagach in the first part of the Conference. The claims of the Contracting Powers for damages against each other were reciprocally renounced, without any payment by Turkey. This also had been one of Lord Curzon's last-moment offers to Ismet on February 4. On the other hand, in minor economic matters concessions were made to Turkey which, in the total, were probably worth a considerable sum of money. On the whole, Turkey gained distinctly by Ismet's firmness in the first part of the Conference.

Article 1 adopted the existing Turco-Bulgarian frontier from the Rezvaya River on the Black Sea westwards to where it met the Greek frontier on the Maritza, to the north-west of Adrianople. From this point a new Greco-Turkish frontier was defined, following the course of the Maritza, except near Karagach, where an angle was formed to enclose that township and railway-station in Turkey. With Syria the frontier adopted was that of the Franco-Turkish (Angora) Agreement of October 20, 1921. With Iraq (Mesopotamia) the frontier was to be decided within nine months by friendly arrangement between Turkey and Great Britain, the mandatory Power. Failing agreement, the dispute was to be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

¹ *New York Times*, May 29, 1923.

² *Le Temps*, June 22, 1923.

At sea, Turkey was to have, in addition to the islands in the Sea of Marmora, Imbros, Tenedos and the Rabbit Islands, which command the entrance to the Dardanelles. Greece retained all the rest except for Rhodes, Castellorizo, and the Dodekanese, in respect of which Turkey renounced all her rights in favour of Italy (Article 15).

Turkey renounced all rights and titles over Egypt and the Sudan, as from November 5, 1914; she was at the same time freed from all obligations with regard to Ottoman loans secured upon the Egyptian tribute, these loans henceforth forming part of the service of the Egyptian Public Debts (Articles 17, 18). Turkey recognised the annexation of Cyprus, proclaimed by Great Britain on November 5, 1914.

Each of the High Contracting Parties accepted, in so far as it was itself concerned, the complete abolition of the Capitulations, that is of the special and privileged régimes under which foreigners had hitherto resided in Turkey (Article 28).

Articles 38 to 44 related to the protection of rights of minorities, and were declared to be fundamental laws of Turkey over which no law or official regulation shall prevail (Article 37). These Articles are placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations (Article 44). Such minorities, being non-Moslem Turkish nationals, are to enjoy free exercise of their religion, and the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

The Ottoman Public Debt was to be divided between Turkey and the States in favour of whom territory has been detached from the Ottoman Empire since the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 (Article 46).

Appended to the Main Treaty, and having the same force as if inserted in it, were several important conventions.

The Convention relating to the Régime of the Straits recognised "the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and by air in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus." An Annex gave the rules under which this freedom is to be exercised. In time of peace there is to be complete freedom of passage for merchant vessels under any flag and with any kind of cargo by day and night without any formalities, tax or charge, except for services rendered such as pilotage, which is optional. In time of war, Turkey being neutral, navigation will be under these same conditions. In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, there will be freedom of navigation to neutrals, who are not carrying contraband. Turkey will have the right of search of such vessels.

Warships in time of peace will have freedom of passage by day and night, provided that the maximum force which any one Power may send into the Black Sea be not greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea: in any case each Power can send in a force of not more than three ships, none of which shall exceed 10,000 tons.

In time of war, Turkey being neutral, complete freedom of transit is secured by day and night, for all warships, under the same limitations as in time of peace. These limitations, however, are not to be applicable to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights. Presumably this means that a State at war with, for example, Russia, could send its whole navy, however large, into the Black Sea. No hostile act, however, may be committed in the Straits.

In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, there is to be complete freedom of passage for neutral warships. Turkey may bar the passage to warships of her enemies.

Demilitarisation of land zones is declared to exist on both sides of the Dardanelles (Gallipoli and Chanak) for a distance of about 75 miles along the shore and of about 3 to 15 inland. Similarly both sides of the Bosphorus are demilitarised (the Constantinople Peninsula and the Ismid Peninsula) along their whole length and for a depth of about $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles. In the city of Constantinople itself and the Princes' Islands (Kizil Adalar) the Turkish Government has the right of maintaining a garrison of 12,000 men; and an arsenal and naval base may be constructed at Constantinople. With the exception of Kizil Adalar, all the islands of the Sea of Marmora are declared to be demilitarised. In the Ægean Sea, the Turkish islands of Imbros and Tenedos and the Rabbit Islands, and the Greek Islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytelene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria are demilitarised. In the last four islands the Greek Government may keep a military force limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which may be trained on the spot. The Turkish Government has the right of transporting troops through the demilitarised zones and islands of Turkish territory. Moreover, in case of war "in pursuance of their belligerent rights," Turkey or Greece may, during the war only, modify the provisions of demilitarisation contained in the Straits Convention (Article 9).

In order to supervise the provisions of the Straits Convention

there is a Commission composed of a representative of Turkey, who shall be president, and representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Russia,¹ and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, in so far as they should sign the present convention. The United States, on acceding to the convention, is also entitled to have a representative. The Governments represented on the Commission pay the salaries of their representatives. The Commission exercises its functions under the auspices of the League of Nations and addresses an annual report to the League.

Demilitarisation of the land frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria and between Turkey and Greece is secured by a convention called the Tracian Convention, supplementary to the Main Treaty of Lausanne. The frontier on both sides from its beginning at the River Rezvaya on the Black Sea, overland to its end at the mouth of the Maritza on the Aegean, is declared to be demilitarised to a depth of about 30 kilometres (18½ miles). No armed force whatever shall be maintained in this area, other than a maximum of 5,000 gendarmerie or frontier guards for Turkey and 2,500 for Bulgaria and 2,500 for Greece. No artillery may be kept within this demilitarised territory: the armament is to consist only of revolvers, swords, rifles, and four Lewis guns per 100 men.

In a Convention regarding Conditions of Residence, Business and Jurisdiction, note is taken of the abolition of the Capitulations. Article 17 states:

The Turkish Government declares that the Turkish courts will ensure to foreigners in Turkey, both as regards persons and property, protection in accordance with international law and the principles and methods generally adopted in their countries.

In matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, succession, the national tribunals of the party whose status is in question shall have jurisdiction.

By a further declaration the Turkish Government undertook to take immediately into its service for a period of not less than five years a number of European legal counsellors who, without the right of interfering, would watch over the administration of justice and receive complaints.

A Commercial Convention declared that the tariff in force for imports and exports is that of September 1, 1916, that is, a tariff freely adopted by Turkey during the War. It may be varied only

¹ Russia signed the Straits Convention on August 14, 1923.

as the rate of exchange varies between the pound sterling and 745 piastres of Turkish paper (the rate of September 1, 1915).

A Convention dealt with the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations. This system was a concession to the nationalising policy of the Turkish Government, and was deplored by all the other signing Powers. Lord Curzon, during the Lausanne Conference, had called it "a thoroughly bad and vicious solution, for which the world would pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come."¹ Greece and Bulgaria already had a system of voluntary exchange of populations, but the Turco-Greek system was to be compulsory. There were excepted from it the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople who were already established there before October 30, 1918. Likewise all Moslems established under Greek rule in Western Thrace were excepted from the exchange. The rights of property and monetary assets of Greeks in Turkey or Moslems in Greece were not to be prejudiced in consequence of the exchange.

By a protocol signed at the same time as the Main Treaty the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy undertook to withdraw their troops from Turkish territory as soon as the Grand National Assembly ratified the Treaty.

Finally, although the Main Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920, had never been ratified, and therefore never came into force, the Allies now found it necessary to bring into force two of the supplementary instruments concluded at Sèvres. These were the Convention between the Allied Powers and Greece for the protection of minorities (the usual minority treaty, placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations) and the Treaty relating to Thrace. This treaty secured to Bulgaria free access through Greek territory to the port of Dedeagach and the possession of a free zone there.

An interesting point in the Treaties and other instruments of Lausanne was the omission of any mention of the Greek Patriarchate. The Turkish Government had wished to insert in the treaty a provision for the removal of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, but had ultimately deferred to the wishes of Greece, supported by the Allies, to leave the headship of the Greek Orthodox Church in the *status quo*. The position of the Patriarchate therefore remains governed by its old privileges and rights.

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 1814 of 1923, p. 212. The Exchange Convention was signed on July 30, 1923, six days after the Main Treaty and the aforementioned Conventions.

The result of the Treaty of Lausanne was to free Turkey wholly from international servitudes, to reduce enormously her national debt, to re-establish her firmly in a large province with important cities in Europe, and to guard the most precarious of her frontiers from the chances of war—a happy state of affairs for the Turks, which should enable them to rank as one of the progressive and peaceful nations of the world.

The War also made necessary a new régime with regard to certain other former possessions of Turkey. After Turkey's entry into the War against Great Britain, the British Government annexed Cyprus on November 5, 1914. On December 18, 1914, the British Government declared a Protectorate over Egypt. On February 28, 1922, it declared the Protectorate to be terminated and recognised Egypt as an independent State. The declaration contained the important reservation: "The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt: (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; (b) the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect; (c) the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities; (d) the Sudan.¹

In a circular dispatch sent to British diplomatic agents for presentation to the Governments to which they were accredited, His Majesty's Government gave notice that: "the termination of the British protectorate over Egypt involves no change in the *status quo* as regards the position of other Powers in Egypt itself." The dispatch concluded thus:

The welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt long recognised by other Governments. These special relations are defined in the declaration recognising Egypt as an independent sovereign State. His Majesty's Government have laid them down as matters in which the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved, and will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other Power. In pursuance of this principle, they will regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another Power, and they will consider

¹ Cmd. 1592 of 1922, pp. 29-30.

any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at their command.¹

This dispatch was signed by Lord Curzon, at that time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In the firm wording of the declaration his handiwork can be clearly seen, a permanent definition of British policy regarding Egypt.

¹ Dispatch dated March 15, 1922 (Cmd. 1617 of 1922).

CHAPTER XXX

LOCARNO

"The Experts' plan proposed in effect an international experiment in good will." This was a statement of the Agent-General for Reparation Payments in his first, semi-annual, report, on the working of the Dawes Plan.¹ All the agreements and conditions entered into at the Conference of London had been put formally into effect; but their success depended upon their being loyally operated by all parties and particularly by the German Government at whose expense they were made. The Experts' scheme came into force on September 1, 1924. Under date of May 1, 1925, the Agent-General was able to testify to the existence of the "spirit of friendly co-operation which was the basis of the plan." The German Government's revenue, according to the 1924-5 Budget, was showing a considerable surplus. The paper-mark debt of Germany, through the deterioration of the currency, now stood at the value of only 1,000 gold marks (£50).² The international loan had been issued and had been fully subscribed, the Reichsbank had been reconstituted, the new Railway Corporation established, and a debenture charge of 1 per cent. on the whole of German industry had been created. 620,689,419 marks of gold value had been paid, through the Agent-General, to the Allied and Associated Governments. This, after certain prior charges had been satisfied, was divided according to the percentages of the Spa Agreement, with a modification to allow a payment of 2½ per cent. to the United States Government. This last was to be an annual charge, to satisfy the claims of the United States Government for the expenses of its former Army of Occupation.

The Experts' (Dawes) plan did not deal with the total liability

¹ *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, August, 1925, p. 559.

² *Ibid.*, p. 558. It was subsequently revalorised at 5 per cent. of its nominal value.

of Germany for reparations which remains at the figure of the London Schedule, 132 milliards of gold marks, with a minimum period of 36 years; but it was a working scheme for gradually paying off that sum. From despair and bankruptcy Germany had risen to confidence and hope. This was not all due to the Experts' plan. The lesson of the Ruhr had not been lost: it had broken Germany's will to resist the War settlement.¹ All things combined with the high statesmanship of Herren Marx, Luther and Stresemann to impel the German Government to take the initiative for further international progress, to make its grand offer of a non-aggression pact and of regional neutrality on the Rhine.

The offer that came from the German Government was certainly a work of high statesmanship, for although the Dawes plan was being operated successfully, in other ways the political atmosphere in Germany was not favourable to conciliation. January 10, 1925, was the date at which the first zone of Allied Occupation, Cologne, should be evacuated if Germany had performed its obligations under Article 429 of the Treaty of Versailles. The Allies, being of opinion that Germany had not fully carried out the disarmament conditions of the Treaty, declined (January 5, 1925) to evacuate Cologne on the specified date. The report of the Commission of Control, showing that the disarmament stipulations were still incompletely fulfilled, did not come out until five months later.² The "economic occupation" of the Ruhr had ceased in September, 1924, but the military occupation, in a progressively attenuated form, continued until July 31, 1925.

The Treaties of Locarno (or London) were the first successful step taken to solve the tremendous problems of European security, after five years of failure.

The most potent cause making for war in Europe was the feeling of insecurity. It was this feeling that made nations keep up large armies; it was this feeling that made their Governments nervous and led them to contemplate forestalling attack by themselves attacking their neighbour. Great Britain and the United States, protected by the sea and by their navies, might feel secure.

¹ The French Government claimed that the Ruhr Occupation yielded a net profit of nearly 4,000,000,000 paper-francs; this statement may be criticised, but "as a diplomatic weapon the Ruhr Occupation may be said to have been successful" (*Foreign Affairs*, Oct., 1925, p. 121, article by N. Roosevelt).

² June 4, 1925. "Note presented to the German Government," in *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 2429 of 1925.

Continental nations, with their long land frontiers which seemed only by an imaginary line to keep away the glistening bayonets of their neighbours, could have no such consciousness of safety.

The attempt to find a means of attaining security ran all through the Conference of Paris. The clauses of the Treaty of Versailles enforcing German disarmament and the non-fortification of German territory eastwards to a distance of 50 kilometres from the Rhine obviously reduced the chances of war, but they were far from a complete solution of the problem. The Guarantee Treaty for France, signed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson on June 28, 1919, never came into effect, since the United States Senate did not recommend its ratification. Thereafter the French feeling of insecurity seemed to increase. The British people recognised that, although the Treaty of Guarantee had been destroyed, they still owed an obligation to France. The French and Belgian Governments were the most nervous, but the Germans must have felt the most insecure; the invasion of the Ruhr showed that as far as armies were concerned, they were practically helpless.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was drafted to give security to law-abiding States, but the conditions of public opinion at the time would not permit any definite sanctions to be defined in it; besides, Russia, Germany and Turkey, as well as the United States, were not members of the League. Proposals for the security of France brought forward at the Conference of Cannes came to nothing; the Genoa pact of non-aggression had a legal life of only about six months. At the fourth Assembly of the League of Nations in September, 1923, a Treaty of Mutual Assistance was drafted, and submitted to the various member Governments. Its object was to define the means to be taken under Article 10 of the Covenant, by which members guaranteed each other's territorial integrity, and Article 16 by which the Council undertook to recommend measures for enforcing the obligations of the League.

This draft treaty received the approval in principle of eighteen Governments,¹ but it was rejected by the British Government, by letter, dated July 5, 1924.

This letter destroyed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, although, naturally, the studies which had gone to the making of the treaty and the attention which it had aroused were not wasted. It bore

¹ *League of Nations, Fifth Assembly: Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments: Protocol and Resolutions* (Cmd. 2273 of 1924), p. 6.

fruit at the next Assembly of the League of Nations (September, 1924) when, on the motion of the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain, M. Herriot and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, a renewed and systematic effort was undertaken to bring about peace and disarmament. This resulted in the drafting of the now famous Protocol of Geneva. M. Politis of Greece, the *rapporteur* for the First Committee, which dealt with arbitration, explained the provisions of the Protocol in an admirable speech before the Assembly. It was something which went far beyond the Covenant of the League of Nations. It proposed to eliminate war, and to substitute therefor compulsory arbitration. "Henceforth no purely private war between nations will be tolerated." The arbitration proposed was of a totally new kind. Under the Protocol of Geneva arbitrators could not refuse to give a decision on the ground that international law furnished no rule or principle applicable to the particular case: "they are bound to proceed on grounds of equity, for in our system arbitration is always of necessity to lead to a definitive solution of the dispute." All aggressive war was prohibited. Article 11 of the Protocol stated :

In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the State attacked or threatened.

The Protocol also recommended the creation of demilitarised zones, and it provided a scheme for distinguishing between an aggressor nation and a defender. Article 17 of the Protocol provided for the meeting of a disarmament Conference in June, 1925. The Protocol could only come into force when the plan for the reduction of armaments had been adopted by the Conference provided for in Article 17. Dr. Benes of Czechoslovakia, *rapporteur* for the Third Committee which dealt with sanctions and disarmament, solemnly asserted: *the peace of the world is at stake*; and earnestly recommended the Protocol to the Assembly and the various Governments.

Nevertheless, the Protocol of Geneva, although adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 2, 1924, including the representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy, failed in the end through the action of the British Government.

The British Government stated its preference for regional pacts.

A suggestion for a regional pact to guarantee the *status quo* upon the Rhine for thirty years had been made by Dr. Cuno, the unhappy Chancellor of passive resistance, in December, 1922. This,

his sole contribution to statesmanship, must be credited to him as a substantial achievement. It bore fruit in a memorandum communicated by the German Ambassador at Paris on behalf of the Government of Dr. Luther to the French Government on February 9, 1925; this communication, doubtless, Mr. Chamberlain had in mind when, in making public the British Government's rejection of the Protocol of Geneva, he alluded to the possibility of a regional pact.

The proposal of the German Government was quite tentative. It suggested that possibly the Powers interested in the Rhine—above all, England, France, Italy and Germany—might enter into “a solemn obligation for a lengthy period (to be eventually defined more specifically) *vis-à-vis* the Government of the United States of America as trustee not to wage war against a contracting State.”

A further proposal in the Memorandum was for “a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status on the Rhine.” This could be further strengthened by a guarantee of the fulfilment of the obligation to demilitarise the Rhineland which Germany had already undertaken in Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

Finally the Memorandum stated:

It would be worth considering whether it would not be advisable to so draft the security pact that it would prepare the way for a world convention to include all States along the lines of the “*Protocole pour le Règlement pacifique de Différences internationales*” [the Protocol of Geneva] drawn up by the League of Nations.

Some of the seed of this Memorandum fell by the wayside. It was no use, at this particular time, asking the United States to be trustee for a European non-aggression pact. The third suggestion, that the way might be prepared for a world convention along the lines of the Protocol of Geneva, was passed over silently as an aspiration that was, at the moment at any rate, impracticable. But the second or middle suggestion for a guarantee of the existing territorial status on the Rhine took root, although for about five months it was a very tender plant.

When the proposal was made public in June, 1925, the French became interested because it amounted to a renewed and this time a voluntary renunciation for ever on the part of Germany of Alsace and Lorraine. For the same reason the Nationalist Party in Germany was stirred up to indignation at the prospect of such a great refusal. In Great Britain comparatively little notice was taken of the epoch-making offer; and much of the notice which

it received was hostile. For, to some of the supporters of the League of Nations, a special Rhineland Pact seemed like an attempt of the Old Diplomacy to do something outside the League. The project might have died through neglect. "Somehow it survived." Only the London *Times* gave it steady, though quiet support. On March 30, 1925, it published a letter from a correspondent, referring to the German offer of a security pact: "This offer is surely the greatest ground for hope in the anxious future of Europe, and is the best thing that has happened since the conclusion of the war. In the first place, it will go a long way towards putting an end to the gravest danger to European peace—irredentism, and especially irredentism in that borderland between the French and Germans which has been fought for every ten or twenty years since the time of Charlemagne. . . . Secondly, the pact would bring Germany back into the Concert of Europe."

After this the proposal for a Security Pact seemed to slumber for some months. Actually the machinery of the Foreign Office and the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* was working steadily, although the German Government was probably as unaware of this as was the outside public. Apparently the best that the German Government heard of its proposal for nearly three months was in a brief note from the French Government, dated February 20, 1925, stating that it had read the Memorandum of February 9, "with interest and with a determination not to neglect anything which may contribute to European and world peace."

The month of April was passed, so far as the proposed Security Pact was concerned, with the drafting of a reasoned answer to the German Memorandum by the French Government. This draft, when completed on May 12 (1925), was submitted to the British Foreign Office for comment and criticism. Mr. Chamberlain replied to the French Government with a very frank series of questions (May 19). On the 22nd May the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* replied point by point to the questions. This reply, while it showed the two Allies working in complete harmony, showed also a considerable divergence of view: in particular the French Government wished Great Britain to enter into guarantees concerning regions elsewhere than the Rhineland. The British Government, however, in a closely reasoned answer, declined.

The reply of the French Government, dated June 4, 1925, was

marked by the same patient effort to meet the British point of view as had characterised its proceedings throughout the episode. It admitted that the scattered dominions of the British Empire justified the British Government in limiting its undertakings on the Continent of Europe. France, however, was in a different situation and "could not remain indifferent" to attempted territorial changes in other parts of Europe as well as the Rhine :

That is why, in their draft reply to the German proposals, they consider it essential to preserve their liberty to go to the assistance of States to which they deem it necessary to grant their guarantee without it being possible for the provisions of the proposed Rhineland Pact to block their way and thus to be turned against them..... In our eyes this is an essential condition of the proposed pact.

The British Government readily concurred in the idea contained in the above paragraph. The proposed neutralisation of the Rhineland could not be allowed to protect Germany from war on the west in case she broke her treaties with neighbours on the east.

Yet the negotiations, although they went forward, did so very slowly. On June 4 the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris, which was still sitting, sent a Note on the question of Disarmament to Germany. In this, it justified the action of the Allied Governments in not evacuating Cologne on January 10 : "it was for the German Government by faithfully fulfilling their obligations to earn the benefit of evacuation of the first zone of occupation, as provided for by Article 429 [of the Treaty of Versailles]." A number of infractions by Germany of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were pointed out. The dispatch of the Note at this time has been criticised as tactless diplomacy, but it is more likely that the Note acted as a lever to bring about agreement between the German Government and the Allies. For the German Government could reasonably hope that the conclusion of a Rhineland pact would be a sufficient pledge of peaceful behaviour to secure evacuation of at least the first zone of occupation.

The negotiations continued but with—so far as the public could judge—little life-blood in them. The British public were absorbed in the crisis of the coal-mining industry ; the question of the Pact seemed forgotten. On July 23, 1925, a correspondent in the *Times* wrote :

The Security Pact—the most momentous and, at the same time, the most

hopeful of current international questions—has no chance if it is not supported by the intelligent public opinion. The danger is that it may be pushed out of sight by our pressing domestic problems.

The point which the British people should keep clearly in mind is this: that if an assault is at any future time made upon the Western frontiers of Europe, Great Britain will be drawn inexorably into that war, whether the Security Pact has been signed or not. The only difference that our adhesion to the Pact will make is that it will render such a war far less likely to occur.... The idea of the Security Pact is inspired by an earnest and practical attempt to take out of the perilous domain of military strategy and international rivalry that great "Burgundian" area of Europe which, Louis XV long ago stated, "has been the origin of all our wars."¹

Actually the diplomatists were doing much more than the public knew. M. Briand, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, came to London, and on August 12 and 13 held discussions with Mr. A. Chamberlain. When the next French Note was handed to the German Foreign Office on August 24, a suggestion was verbally conveyed from the French Government, by M. de Margerie, Ambassador at Berlin, that a commission of jurists might set to work at constructing formulæ, "bridges" between the opposing points of view. The German reply came almost at once. On the evening of August 27 Herr von Hoesch, Ambassador at Paris, gave to M. Briand a Note in which Germany accepted the invitation to the Allies to take part in a meeting of jurists at London, and it named the man whom it would send—Dr. Gaus, chief of the legal section of the German Foreign Office. "This speed on the part of Germany produced a favourable impression in Paris."²

The Committee of Jurists met at London in the first week of September, 1925. They were Sir Cecil Hurst for Great Britain, M. Fromageot for France, M. Rollin for Belgium, Signor Pilotti for Italy, and Dr. Gaus for Germany. This was the first time that the Italian Government actively participated in the negotiation of the Security Agreements. Three draft texts of the Rhineland Pact—English, French and German—were prepared. By the time the jurists had finished their labours, the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations was being opened at Geneva. M. Painlevé, Premier of France, who acted as President *pro tempore*, in opening the Assembly declared that the high hopes of the world could not be fulfilled at one jump, but only by steps. The Protocol of Geneva had failed

¹ *Times*, July 23, 1925.

² *New York Times*, Aug. 27, 1925.

to win acceptance, but M. Painlevé predicted "a gradual move toward the consolidation of world peace." Indeed two possible moves were very much in the air during that brilliant month on the shores of Lake Geneva. One was the question of the adhesion of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The second was the negotiation of the Security Agreements. These things were not officially before the Assembly of the League, but they were in everybody's mind. Mr. A. Chamberlain and M. Briand, the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France, were present, as were also the active and far-sighted Dr. Benes of Czechoslovakia, and M. Skrzynski of Poland. It was recognised that "the logical procedure would be to draft the Central European Arbitration treaties simultaneously with the Rhineland treaty."¹

Throughout September the Government of Chancellor Luther was in difficulty from opposition of the Nationalist Party to the proposed Rhineland Pact which obviously involved a renunciation for ever by Germany of Alsace and Lorraine. On September 22, however, it became known in Paris that the Allied and German Governments had agreed to meet together on October 5. The place selected was Locarno, at the Swiss end of Lake Maggiore. The German Nationalists still put their drag on the negotiations. They demanded that the Luther Government should require, as part of the Security Agreements, that the Allies should withdraw the sentence of war-guilt imposed at the Conference of Paris in 1919.²

The demand for repudiation of the war-guilt charge is one which no German statesman can ignore. The German public is insistent on it. It enters by one means or another into every negotiation, and tends to vitiate any effort at *rapprochement* on either side. The British, French and Belgians are unlikely ever to unsay what they have officially said; the Treaty of Versailles and the Notes of the Paris Conference must stand. The only statesmanlike thing to do is to leave the registers of the past as they stand, and to begin afresh a system of peace and good relations. This undoubtedly was what Herren Luther and Stresemann would, if left to themselves,

¹ *New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1925, p. 22.

² The verdict of war-guilt does not depend on Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty so much as on certain Notes presented to the German Delegation at the Conference of Versailles: see especially Kraus and Rödiger, *Urkunden zum Friedensvertrage von Versailles*, I, 557 ff. See also above, p. 169.

have done ; but to satisfy public opinion they were compelled to bring up the demand for a repudiation of war-guilt in their Notes previous to the Locarno Conference. Yet they were too sensible to insist on the demand when the Allies quietly and firmly rejected it. Having satisfied honour and public opinion Dr. Stresemann tacitly accepted the inevitable, and went on with the Security negotiation, thankful that the war-guilt incident passed over so smoothly.

Drs. Luther and Stresemann arrived at Locarno on Saturday, October 3, accompanied by Herr von Schubert, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, and by Dr. Gaus. M. Briand arrived on the same day, Mr. Chamberlain arrived on the 4th. M. Vandeveld of Belgium and Signor Scialoja of Italy were also present. By Monday, the 5th, the Conference was ready to set to work. Late-comers to the Conference were Signor Mussolini and the Czech and Polish Delegations. The hotels of Locarno could not hold all the diplomatists and journalists. The German Delegation had a hotel some four miles outside the town.

When the Conference opened in the Palais de Justice of Locarno, Mr. Chamberlain said : " We are here to get away from the antagonisms of the great conflict and lay foundations for peace in the future." Dr. Stresemann said : " We are all here on an equal footing, and Germany wants to show she needs peace as much as other nations." It was the German Delegation which, as Germany had first made the proposal, now put forward the plan for a Rhine-land Pact. Dr. Stresemann had on the previous day privately told Mr. Chamberlain that he would not mention the disturbing subject of war-guilt, as Mr. Chamberlain had told him " that if the nations did not bury the past, they could not make any plans for the future."¹

The Conference was all through a somewhat informal affair. In the Court Room on the second storey of the Palais de Justice, with the big, airy windows overlooking the lake, the delegates talked at their ease. There was no chairman or president. Americans said that the diplomacy of old Europe was taking its cue from the " shirt-sleeve " diplomacy of the New World. When, on the second day of the Conference, Dr. Stresemann fell ill, the Allied delegates visited at his bedside. When the hum of excitement in Locarno proved distracting, M. Briand and Herr Luther

¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1925, p. 2.

drove out ten miles into the country, and sat for an hour in an inn-garden by the lakeside, at the foot of a snow-capped mountain, talking over European adjustments. On October 10 an afternoon sail of the British, French and German delegates on the placid, sun-bathed waters of the lake took the Conference over the final difficulties.

The real turning-point of the Conference, however, came when Signor Scialoja, acting on instructions from Signor Mussolini who had not yet arrived, announced on October 10 that Italy would join with France and Great Britain in guaranteeing the Rhineland Pact. Until this moment, the Italian Government had not committed itself to a definite undertaking. Now the solidarity of the Western Powers was proclaimed; the effect was decisive. Throughout the whole negotiation, the Italian delegate, Signor Scialoja, "showed an extraordinary ingenuity in devising formulæ to settle differences."¹

On October 14 Drs. Luther and Stresemann received by telegraph the assent of their colleagues in the Cabinet at Berlin to the draft terms which had been sent there post-haste. On the 15th Signor Mussolini arrived. On the same day accord was reached in the Court Room above Lake Maggiore on the terms of the Rhineland Pact and the Franco-German and Belgo-German arbitration treaties. The five treaties which compose the Agreements of Locarno were initialled on the evening of Friday, October 16. The Conference was over, and while secretaries applied blotting-paper to the newly initialled treaties and tidied the papers, the statesmen in excellent humour went to the windows and watched the lengthening shadows on Lake Maggiore. Someone threw up a window and announced the great event to the crowd outside who hailed the conclusion of the peace-pacts of Europe, the healing of the Great War's wounds.

Few conferences have been more secret than Locarno and few more successful. After all, the only publicity which can reasonably be demanded of diplomatic agreements is that they shall be submitted openly for ratification to the respective parliaments. The negotiation of the agreements cannot be carried out in public. Mr. Chamberlain explained this to the inquisitive journalists at Locarno :

¹ "Notes from Locarno," by H. F. Spender, in *Fortnightly Review*, Dec., 1925, p. 756.

In diplomatic bargains statesmen took positions from which they really expected to recede part of the way, but recession from which became exceedingly difficult from a domestic and political point of view after the Press had presented the initial position as the official position.¹

During the Locarno Conference all the statesmen had to take an uninformed and not altogether reasonable public opinion into account, an opinion which was especially sensitive and irritable in France and Germany. The secrecy of the Conference made for its success. All the agreements had still to go before the legislatures before they could come up for the final signing at London on December 1. This was successfully carried through, and on December 1 the texts approved at the Conference of Locarno became the Treaties of London.

The Final Protocol and six Annexes constitute the diplomatic instruments of Locarno and London.

The most important of the treaties or annexes is the first : (a) *Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy*. The Preamble states that the Contracting Parties are anxious to satisfy the desire for security among the peoples on whom fell the scourge of the war of 1914-18, taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium,² conscious of the necessity of ensuring peace in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts ; and animated with the desire of giving to all signatories supplementary guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties in force between them, have agreed as follows. Then come the ten articles of the treaty. By Article 1

The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following articles, the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty, concerning the demilitarised zone.³

¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 13, 1925, p. 22.

² Article 31 of the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919.

³ Article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles forbids Germany to have any fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to a distance of 50 kilometres eastward. Article 43 forbids the maintenance or assembly of troops there, or military manœuvres of any kind.

By Article 2

Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

Exceptions to this stipulation are permitted in the case of legitimate self-defence, or of a "flagrant breach" by one party of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles if such breach is an unprovoked act of aggression. Exception is also permitted in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, or of a decision of the League in pursuance of Article 15.¹

Article 3 provides that all disputes between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France, which cannot be settled by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted to a judicial decision, or to a conciliation commission.

By Article 4 any Contracting Party alleging that a violation has been committed of Article 2 must bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations. When the Council of the League has satisfied itself that a violation has been committed it shall notify the Powers signatory to the present treaty "who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed." If, however, a flagrant violation of Article 2 has been committed, each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to come immediately to the assistance of the attacked Power without waiting for notification from the Council of the League provided that they agree to the recommendations of the Council as soon as issued.

By Article 5 the provisions of the Treaty (Article 3) concerning the peaceful settlements of disputes are placed under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties, that is to say, they must come to the assistance (under the provisions of Article 4) of any signatory Power which is willing to settle a dispute by peaceful means against any signatory Power which refuses to do so.

Articles 6 and 7 safeguard the rights of the High Contracting Parties under the Treaty of Versailles and the Agreement of

¹ Article 15 of the Covenant: "If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. . . . For Article 16, see above, p. 157.

August, 1924, concerning the Dawes Plan, as well as the rights and duties of the League of Nations. Article 8 stipulates that the Treaty shall be registered with the League of Nations, and shall remain in force until, on the request of one or other of the Parties, the Council of the League, by a two-thirds majority, decides that the League ensures sufficient protection to the signatory Powers : the Treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision.

Article 10 states that the Treaty should be ratified, and the ratifications deposited in the archives of the League. It should enter into force immediately after the deposit of ratifications and of the entry of Germany into the League of Nations.

The second Agreement, the *Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium*, provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes between these countries by the normal methods of diplomacy, by arbitral procedure, or by the Permanent Court of International Justice. It established a permanent conciliation commission which should attempt to settle all disputes before any resort is made to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal under the Hague Convention of 1907.

The third Agreement was an identical Arbitration Convention *mutatis mutandis* between Germany and France.

The fourth Agreement was an Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland. This was the same as the Franco-German and Belgo-German Arbitration Conventions, except that it had a much more elaborate and significant preamble. For everybody at Locarno knew that the German Government had renounced for ever any claim to a substantial rectification of its frontiers with France and Belgium, but that it had by no means made a similar renunciation with regard to Poland. The most that the German Government promised was that it would not try to rectify its frontier with Poland by warlike means ; but it notoriously hopes to be able to do so by agreement. The preamble to the German-Polish Arbitration Treaty therefore states that the Contracting Parties are " resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries." They declare that " respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals " ; and they agree " that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with

its consent." Then follow the articles of the Arbitration Treaty for settlement of disputes by the normal methods of diplomacy, by a permanent conciliation commission, or failing this by an arbitral tribunal under the Hague Convention of 1907 or by the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The fifth Agreement—Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia—is, *mutatis mutandis*, the same, including the preamble, as the German-Polish Treaty.

The last of the general Locarno Agreements was in the form of a Collective Note of all the Powers represented at Locarno addressed to Germany to assure her that her disarmed condition would not expose her to exceptional dangers if she undertook the obligations of League membership.

In addition to the above Protocol and six Annexes, there were two Treaties which are not strictly part of the Locarno Agreements, but which were actually negotiated at Locarno and are complementary to them. These two complementary treaties arose from the fact that the British and Italian Governments, under the Treaty of Assistance, only guaranteed the French and Belgian frontiers with Germany, and the Franco-German and Belgo-German Arbitration Conventions. With regard to the eastern (German-Polish and German-Czechoslovak) frontiers, the British and Italian Governments gave no guarantee whatever. The French Government, however, had all through these negotiations maintained that the security of France depended not only upon her position in the Rhineland, but upon her system of alliances in Eastern Europe.¹ Accordingly at Locarno M. Briand concluded two treaties, one with Poland and one with Czechoslovakia. The Contracting Parties, "acting in application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations," agreed "to lend each other immediately aid and assistance," in the event of one or other party "suffering from a failure to observe the undertakings arrived at this day between them and Germany." In effect, France guaranteed that Germany should observe the eastern Arbitration Treaties, and Poland and Czechoslovakia guaranteed that Germany should observe the western treaties.

¹ The Franco-Polish Treaty of Alliance, February 19, 1921; the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance, January 25, 1924: see George Glasgow, *From Dawes to Locarno* (1926), pp. 105-7.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE EUROPEAN POLITY

The compacts of Locarno contributed powerfully to the restoration of the European States-system which had been so grievously disrupted by the events of 1914-18. It was not merely the guarantees and the machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes that gave the new régime its importance; there was over and above all this a new current in public affairs, the "spirit of Locarno," as it was frequently called. The good feeling which prevailed at the Conference was maintained afterwards. When the German delegates went back to Berlin, the French Ambassador met their train on its arrival and he and Dr. Stresemann were later seen to emerge from the railway station, arm in arm, and wreathed in smiles. At the Guildhall Banquet on November 9 Mr. Chamberlain after drinking from the loving-cup made a great sensation by immediately passing it, with his natural, winning graciousness, to the German Ambassador. The spirit of Locarno is the spirit of accommodation. When this becomes the attitude of all Europe, the road to peace then is secure. Germany's equality and genial reception at the Council Table of Locarno had done much to counterbalance the feeling left by the "dictated" peace of Versailles.¹

The Locarno Conference marked a revival of the prestige of Europe which had diminished so much during the War of 1914-18, and in the years immediately following the War. The decay of European prestige had brought about simultaneously the decline of law and order in the Far East and Near East. Turkey had successfully led a revolt of Islam against European authority. The Chinese were persistently demanding the suppression of the extra-territorial rights, still possessed by most of the European States. Syria and part of Morocco were in the autumn of 1925 in flames.

¹ *Deutsche Rundschau*, Nov., 1925, p. 195: *Die Konferenz von Locarno*.

The success of the Locarno Conference had an immediate effect on the way Europe was regarded by the rest of the world. A European Customs-Union was considered as quite practicable, and "already a United States of Europe is being talked of."¹ The phrase was often mentioned, with a sort of wonder, in the American press where it was recognised that "Europe was beginning to take its position of leadership again."² Once more the truth of Treitschke's saying was being demonstrated: "Europe will always be the centre of the world," because it has its roots so deep in the past, and has its traditions of culture and politics so well established.

The European system was greatly strengthened at this time by the growing authority of the League of Nations. The liquidation of the Corfu incident had demonstrated the League's power for good, although not in a very striking manner.

On August 27, 1923, the Italian members of the International Commission which was delimiting the frontier between Albania and Greece were attacked while proceeding in Greek territory from Janina to Santi Quaranta. General Tellini, Major Corti and Lieutenant Bonaccini were murdered.

The Italian Government, of which Signor Mussolini was the head, sent an ultimatum to the Greek Government making certain demands, including the holding of an inquiry by an Italian officer on the scene of the murder, and the payment of an indemnity of 50,000,000 Italian lire. Receiving a reply which he did not consider satisfactory, Signor Mussolini ordered the occupation of Corfu which was carried out on August 31, after bombardment of the town by Italian warships. Fifteen civilians appear to have been killed by the bombardment.³ Signor Mussolini, however, declared in a *communiqué* that the occupation of Corfu was temporary and not an act of war. Nevertheless opinion in Europe was naturally very disturbed. It was seriously feared that the Italian Government might keep Corfu, as she had kept the Dodekanese. The elements of a European conflagration seemed to be present.

The Greek Government acted with great restraint and brought the matter, under Article 15 of the Covenant, before the Council

¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1925.

² *Boston Evening Transcript*, Oct. 19, 1925.

³ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Nov., 1923, p. 1277.

of the League of Nations. Fortunately, both the Council and the Assembly of the League were in session in September at Geneva.

Lord Robert Cecil said that the Council of the League could not recognise any distinction between Great Powers and small: "They are all equally amenable to the obligations they have entered into by signing the Covenant."¹ The Italian Government through its representative, Signor Salandra, denied that the League was competent to deal with the case at all. The Conference of Ambassadors at Paris was the body charged with the execution of the Peace Treaties. The International Commission for the delimitation of the Greco-Albanian frontier had been set up by the Conference of Ambassadors, in pursuance of its duty of executing the treaties of peace. The Greek Government, as a matter of fact, had already agreed to accept the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors on the question of responsibility for the murders, but the Italian Government had made no such promise.

The Council of the League on September 6 sent a letter to the Conference of Ambassadors, encouraging the Conference to find a settlement of the dispute, but reserving the Council's view of its own competence to deal with the question. Accordingly the Conference was able to state on September 8 that if the Greek Government accepted certain conditions, Corfu would be evacuated. The chief conditions were that the Greek Government should make ceremonial apologies to Italy at Athens and Phaleron, and that an International Commission of Inquiry should investigate the crime at Janina.

By this Note the affair of the Janina murders, and of the responsibility for them, was taken out of the hands of Italy, and was made into a question for the three Allied Powers (Great Britain, France and Italy) acting through the Conference of Ambassadors. Thus, whatever the final terms were, Greece could give way with dignity, for she would not be surrendering to the *force majeure* of Italy, but to the judicial opinions of the Conference. To this statesman-like solution the Council of the League of Nations, by its pressure upon Italy and by its publicity, had undoubtedly contributed.

On September 19 the stipulated ceremonies were carried out at Athens and Phaleron without incident. "The International Commission of Inquiry having failed by September 25 to discover the persons guilty of the murder of the Italian officers, the Con-

¹ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Nov., 1923, p. 1279.

ference of Ambassadors in a Note to the Greek Government issued on September 26 decided to consider the incident closed, and ordered Greece, by way of penalty for the failure to ensure the capture and punishment of the culprits, to pay to the Italian Government the full sum of 50,000,000 lire."¹ Greece had already as an earnest of good faith deposited this sum in the Swiss National Bank ; it was now paid over to the Italian Government.

Thus the rule of international law was saved. The League of Nations had influenced the Conference of Ambassadors in the direction of taking up the question. The Conference of Ambassadors had brought its authority to bear on both the Greek and the Italian Governments ; and the Italian Government which had begun by asserting its claim to independent action had accepted the decision of the Conference. It had, it is true, acquiesced in the decision which awarded to it the sum originally claimed, namely 50,000,000 lire. Many people criticised these damages as excessive. On the other hand, the Conference of Ambassadors had made it quite clear that Italy must evacuate Corfu and any other of the Ionian Islands which she had occupied, at once, on satisfaction of the claim for payment. Also, the original demand of Signor Mussolini that the Court of Inquiry must be held by an Italian officer had been overruled by the Conference. Corfu was evacuated on September 27.

In the course of the Corfu incident Signor Mussolini had denied the competence of the League of Nations to deal with any question arising out of the Peace Treaties. While the solution of the actual incident arising out of the murders was left to the Conference of Ambassadors, the Council of the League took occasion to assert its competence.

The Members of the Council being agreed that any dispute between Members of the League likely to lead to a rupture is within the sphere of action of the League, and that if such dispute cannot be settled by diplomacy, arbitration or judicial settlement, it is the duty of the Council to deal with it under Article 15 of the Covenant :

The Council decides that these questions shall be referred to a Special Commission of Jurists for an opinion as to the answers to be given to them.²

The questions concerned the freedom of action of the Council when " seized of a dispute," and the answers given were, as a

¹ *Annual Register*, 1923, p. 225.

² League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Nov., 1923, p. 1351.

whole, favourable to the League.¹ The only limitation recognised by the Jurists was under paragraph 8 of Article 15 of the Covenant, which says :

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

" Little by little " and " line upon line " might have been the League's motto. The next time that there was an act of war on the part of one European State against another the League stepped in very decisively. This occurred in the Greco-Bulgar dispute of October, 1925.

On October 19 firing occurred on the Greco-Bulgar frontier near Demirkapu. Regular troops of the frontier became engaged, " blockhouses on both sides were captured and within a brief period Bulgarians and Greeks were occupying one another's territory."² The Greek General Staff, on receiving the news, became intensely excited, fearing that the communications between the Greek authority in Macedonia and Thrace were being cut.³ It at once sent forward the Third Army Corps from Salonica, occupied a large tract of Bulgarian territory and shelled the town of Petrich. An ultimatum also was sent to the Bulgarian Government, with a demand for an indemnity of 2,000,000 French gold francs. On October 23 the Bulgarian Government protested to the League of Nations against the action of the Greek Government.

The Bulgarian appeal, forwarded through the Secretariat of the League of Nations, reached M. Briand, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was also at the time President of the Council of the League. M. Briand at once issued a strong Note to the Governments of Athens and Sofia, demanding that the troops of each Government be immediately withdrawn behind the respective frontiers and that no new military operation be undertaken during examination of the question by the Council.

For four days the danger of a general Balkan War hung over Europe. It was uncertain whether the Yugoslav kingdom (which had very strained relations with Bulgaria) would remain neutral.

¹ Questions and Answers in *Official Journal*, April, 1924, p. 524.

² Crawford Price in *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 19, 1925.

³ Report of League Commission of Inquiry. See *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 8, 1925.

Bulgaria was supposed to have her own friends among the Great Powers, Greece to have hers. It was feared that rivalries of the Western Powers would be displayed on the often-fought-over rocks of the Balkans. Europe drew a deep breath of relief when it was announced on October 24 that the Greek Government had agreed to withdraw its troops from Bulgarian territory, conditionally on Bulgaria evacuating the Greek posts which she had seized. The Greek Government agreed "to accept the competence of the Council."¹ A telegram from Athens, published on October 26 by the Greek-Legation in Washington, stated that the Greek assent to the League's message was due to a request of the Rumanian Government which "exhorted the Greek Government to give proofs of its pacific intentions."

The Council of the League, presided over by M. Briand and attended by Mr. A. Chamberlain and eight other European Statesmen, met at the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* at Paris on October 26. After hearing statements of both the Bulgarian and Greek Ministers at Paris, the Council passed the following resolution :

The Council is not satisfied military operations have ceased and troops have been withdrawn behind the national frontiers. Therefore it requests the representatives of the two States to inform it within twenty-four hours that the Bulgarian and Greek Governments have given unconditional orders to the troops to withdraw behind the respective national frontiers and within sixty hours—that is, at the sitting to be held on Thursday—that all troops have been withdrawn within the national frontiers, that all hostilities have ceased, and that all troops have been warned that resumption of firing will be visited with severe punishment.

"And let it be carefully understood," said M. Briand to the representatives of Greece and Bulgaria, "that this time limit runs from now."² The demands of the Council were complied with, and a small commission was sent by the League to Demirkapu to investigate the incident and determine the responsibility.

The President of the investigating Commission was Sir Horace Rumbold, British Ambassador at Madrid. The Commission included a French military officer, an Italian military officer, a Swedish civilian and a Dutch civilian. The report convinced the Council of the League that the Greek invasion of Bulgarian territory was not justified, although it established the fact that a Greek

¹ Text of Greek Note in *New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1925.

² *New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1925.

sentinel and a Greek officer with a white flag were killed on the first day of the incident, October 19. The Commission estimated the damage to Bulgaria at about £45,000. A Committee of the League Council, presided over by Mr. Chamberlain, examined this report, and decided that Greece was the delinquent party and should pay to Bulgaria an indemnity of 30,000,000 leva, about £43-45 thousand.

The peaceful liquidation of the Demirkapu incident which had so suddenly unloosed the dogs of war on the morrow of the peace of Locarno was the League's most spectacular success. There were critics who pointed out that the League Council had been brusquer in its treatment of the two weak Balkan States than it had been in its treatment of Italy over the Corfu incident. Others, more generous, saw that the Great Powers, especially Great Britain, France and Italy, by their applause of the League's action had "given hostages for their future conduct."¹ In a future crisis between Great Powers the precedent of the League's handling of the Demirkapu incident will be decisive, still more so if the power and high principles of the United States are supporting it.²

In the previous five years another wound of Europe had been healed, by direct negotiation between the contending parties.

The Adriatic Question had baffled President Wilson and all the other statesmen of the Peace Conference. Italy had Trieste and the peninsula of Istria, Yugoslavia had most of the Dalmatian coast, but Fiume was an apple of discord between them. It was occupied by Allied troops, but on September 12, 1912, Gabriele d'Annunzio, the celebrated poet, novelist, and soldier of the World War, led a small host of volunteer "legionaries" to the town and seized it. The Allied soldiers evacuated the city to avoid hostilities which might have precipitated an Italo-Yugoslav War.

The Italian Government had an honest intention to deal fairly with Yugoslavia, but it was terribly at the mercy of public opinion; it dared not proceed to fight d'Annunzio and his legionaries. At last, on November 12, 1920, Signór Giolitti concluded the Treaty of Rapallo with Yugoslavia. By the terms of this treaty Yugo-

¹ *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, Oct. 31, 1925.

² *The Milwaukee Journal*, Oct. 29, 1925. The Middle West is not generally favourable to American participation, but the result of the Demirkapu incident aroused this aspiration in an Editorial of the above-mentioned journal of this date.

slavia was to have all the Dalmatian coast except Zara, which was to be an Italian enclave, and Fiume, which was to be an Independent State. The Treaty of Rapallo was made public. At the same time Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Secretary, sent a covering letter (dated November 12, 1920) to Dr. Trumbitch, Yugoslavian Foreign Minister, stating that Porto Barros, an artificial basin at the south-east end of Fiume, should belong to Yugoslavia. This letter was not given to the public, as it would only have inflamed Italian opinion at that time. A provision of the Treaty of Rapallo stated that the Independent State of Fiume should have a coastal corridor of territory north-westwards to the Italian frontier.

The Treaty of Rapallo was ratified by the Italian Parliament, and Signor Giolitti felt himself strong enough to draw his lines closer around Fiume, and to signify to Signor d'Annunzio plainly that if nothing else would move him, an overwhelming force of armed soldiery would. So on December 31, 1920, d'Annunzio proclaimed that he yielded to *force majeure*. He then left the once-prosperous city where grass was now growing on the streets.

The Independent State of Fiume thus came into existence, but its life was brief. Serious disturbances were created in the little State (it only had about 40,000 people) by the National Party who desired to be annexed to Italy. At last the Italian Government appointed a Royal Commissioner on June 13, 1921, to administer Fiume. Count Sforza admitted in the Italian Parliament that Porto Barros was to belong to Yugoslavia.¹ This announcement further increased the Nationalist agitation; for Porto Barros, although the necessary outlet for the Yugoslav town of Sushak, was considered to be equally necessary for the economic prosperity of Fiume itself.

The solution of the question was brought about by Signor Mussolini, who became Premier in Italy after the Fascist revolution of October 26, 1922. He energetically stated that he was going to keep the Rapallo agreements. He entered into conversations with the Yugoslav Government. Nevertheless Fiume was being governed practically as an Italian possession. It was clear that the Rapallo agreements must be amended. Both Italy and Yugoslavia were willing to negotiate. At last, on January 27, 1924, new instruments were signed by the two Governments. The

¹ See Toyabee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, p. 413.

Free State of Fiume was suppressed. Porto Barros and the adjacent Delta of the Recina River were acknowledged as belonging to Yugoslavia, with an additional outlying strip of territory. The rest of the Independent State, including the coastal corridor (reduced in size), was annexed to Italy. As Porto Barros alone was not a satisfactory port for the Yugoslavian hinterland, a lease for fifty years was given to Yugoslavia of a basin in the main harbour of Fiume. The Agreement was further strengthened by another, concluded on July 5, 1924, called a *Pact of Cordial Collaboration*.¹ Thus Yugoslavia and Italy, so often, as it seemed, on the brink of war, settled this long-standing cause of quarrel by patience and diplomacy.

A dispute in which the League of Nations was directly concerned was that between Great Britain and Turkey regarding the frontier of Turkey and Iraq [Mesopotamia]. Great Britain, as the Mandatory Power for Iraq, was responsible for the safeguarding of that country's interest.

The Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, Article 3, Stated that :

The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.

In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

The territory in dispute was the northern portion of the old Turkish province of Iraq, generally called the region of Mosul. In addition Great Britain wished to include in Iraq some districts inhabited by Assyrian Christians, in order that they might be saved from persecution by the Turks. The whole territory under dispute was of importance, strategically, because without it Iraq could not be easily defended, and economically, because it contained oil.

Negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey in 1924 failed to bring about any agreement. Accordingly, the British Government, after the time specified in the Treaty of Lausanne had run out, referred the dispute to the League of Nations. Meanwhile

¹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 26, 1924, No. 637. The two Parties agreed to concert together in case they were agreed that there was any menace to their common interests.

it appears that the *status quo* had not been observed by Turkey. Turkish forces had penetrated into areas where at the time of the signing of the treaty there had been none. The British Government therefore asked the Council of the League to define the position in the borders between Turkey and Iraq which the British and Turkish Governments had undertaken to observe. The Council, meeting at Brussels, drew a provisional frontier; Turkey agreed to respect this "Brussels Line" until a final settlement should be made.¹

A Commission of the League of Nations was appointed. It proceeded to Iraq and finally reported to the League of Nations in August, 1925. The commissioners recommended that the frontier adopted should be the Brussels Line,² which would leave Mosul itself and Amadia in the territory of Iraq. The British Government, while generally content with this proposal, claimed a frontier running somewhat north of this line, so as to "include in Iraq the ancient home of the Assyrian people, who had been driven from it by the Turks."³

Turkey, although not a member of the League of Nations, had a representative, Dr. Tewfik Rushdy, to take part in the discussion concerning Mosul. Both Great Britain and Turkey had undertaken (September, 1924) to abide by the decision of the League.⁴ As Dr. Tewfik Rushdy demurred to the report of the Commission of Investigation, the Council of the League deferred its decision and appointed another committee to examine the views of both parties to the dispute.

The Turkish Government, in spite of its previous undertaking to abide by the decision of the Council of the League,⁵ now claimed that the League could not give a binding decision, but simply a recommendation, which should be subject to the consent of the two parties concerned.

The Council of the League therefore decided, on September 19,

¹ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Nov., 1924, pp. 1648-54, 1659-60.

² *Times*, Aug. 8, 1925. Also League of Nations, Thirty-fifth Session of the Council (Cmd. 2528 of 1925).

³ Speech of Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, at the Thirty-fifth Session of the Council of the League, September, 1925 (Cmd. 2528 of 1925, p. 6).

⁴ See Report of M. Unden (Cmd. 2565-of 1925, p. 3).

⁵ See *Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice*, Series B, Collection of Advisory Opinions, No. 12, p. 17.

1925, to refer the question of the competence of the Council, under Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, to the Permanent Court of International Justice.¹ The questions asked were :

(1) What is the character of the decision to be taken by the Council in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne—is it an arbitral award, a recommendation, or a simple mediation ?

(2) Must the decision be unanimous, or may it be taken by a majority vote ? May the representatives of the interested parties take part in the vote ?

The Permanent Court of International Justice gave its advisory opinion on November 21, 1925. It stated that "the decision to be taken by the Council will be binding on the parties and will constitute a definitive determination of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq." It also held that the decision "must be taken by a unanimous vote, the representatives of the parties taking part in the voting, but their votes not being counted in ascertaining whether there is unanimity."² The British Government offered no objections to this opinion. The Turkish Government declared that it would not agree : according to its view the Council could only adopt the opinion of the Court by a unanimous decision of its members, including the representatives of the parties. In spite of this, however, the Council proceeded to accept the opinion of the Court unanimously, the votes of the two parties not being counted.

A painful impression was caused by the publication of the report of General F. Laidoner, dated from Mosul, on November 23, 1925. General Laidoner, a distinguished Esthonian soldier, had been sent by the Council of the League of Nations to investigate the situation on either side of the Brussels Line. He reported that there were no longer any Turkish military posts south of the Brussels Line, but that the Turks were driving Christian inhabitants out of the provisional Turkish zone on to the provisionally-Iraqi side of the boundary. This procedure was accompanied by "atrocious acts of violence, going as far as massacre," by the Turkish soldiery, who also took a toll of fines and women.³

¹ The Court was established in 1921 in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

² *Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, Advisory Opinions, No. 12, p. 33.*

³ Text of Report in Cmd. 2557 of 1925.

The Council of the League of Nations delivered its decision on December 16, 1925, and fixed the definitive boundary at the Brussels Line.¹ It invited the British Government to make a treaty with Iraq, assuring for twenty-five years the continuance of the mandatory régime. The whole affair was then taken up by Great Britain and Turkey and settled through direct negotiation.

¹ There is a map of the Brussels Line in the League of Nations, *Official Journal*, for Nov., 1924, p. 1671.

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